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Thesis Abstract 
 
This thesis examines representations of Circe in early modern English literature, from her appearances 
in Jacobean and Stuart English masques, including Browne’s Inner Temple Masque (1615), 
Townshend’s Tempe Restored (1632) and Milton’s Maske at Ludlow Castle (1634), through to the 
epic poetry of Spenser and Milton; The Faerie Queene (1590) and Paradise Lost (1674). In these 
texts, I argue, Circe is a vector for the writers’ interrogation of the prevailing, allegorically inflected 
relationship between poetry and Reformed moral philosophy that emerges in contemporary literature. 
In the Christian age, Circe is most frequently depicted as a clarissima meretrix or renowned prostitute 
who captivates men with her beauty and siren-like song, and tempts them to drink her pharmakon 
kakon (“evil drug”). Thereafter her victims are transformed into beasts, a state which appropriately 
reflects their capitulation to base desire and appetite. The works that I examine are noteworthy for 
their departure from this tradition, and for their sensitivity to an essential ambivalence at the heart of 
Circean mythology: the Homeric Circe uses her voice to seduce but also to prophesy and instruct. As I 
show, in Spenser and Milton’s works, Circean indeterminacy is brought to bear upon questions of law, 
hermeneutics, and spiritual and moral discernment. In Milton in particular, Circe is invoked to support 
a belief in the necessity of trial and choice for spiritual and moral growth, and for the very possibility 
of Christian liberty. This view has profound epistemological and theological implications and 
culminates, I argue, in Milton’s daring portrait of the Circean chaos of Paradise Lost.  
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Introduction 
 
The primary focus of this thesis is an examination of Circean representations in the works of John 
Milton and Edmund Spenser (circa 1590-1674). In these texts, I argue, Circe is a vector for the 
writers’ interrogation of the prevailing, allegorically inflected relationship between poetics and 
Reformed moral philosophy popularised by contemporary literature. As Yarnall’s monograph has 
shown, Circe begins life as a powerful “nature” goddess, the sole inhabitant of the island of Aeaea, 
where she intercepts Odysseus and his men on their way home from Troy.1 Those who drink from her 
pharmakon kakon or “evil drug” are transformed into pigs, but Odysseus, with the aid of the moly 
plant given to him by Hermes, escapes this fate and persuades her to restore his men to their former 
shapes. From the beginning, there is an essential ambivalence at the heart of Circean mythology. In 
the Odyssey, Circe is described as δεινὴ θεὸς αὐδήεσσα, “dread goddess of human speech,”2 an 
epithet which, as Watkins notes, “underscores an uncanny crossing of the boundary between human 
and non-human experience,”3 and which, as we will see, would in a later period encourage Circe’s 
identification with the Sirens as figures for the dangers of poetic pleasure. The Homeric Circe uses her 
voice to seduce but also to prophesy and instruct, and it is only by heeding her guidance that Odysseus 
is able to successfully navigate the dangers of Scylla and Charybdis and continue on to the next stage 
of his journey back to Ithaca.  
Circe’s dual nature, however, is largely ignored by the two most famous Latin writers of epic 
poetry, Virgil and Ovid,4 and stands again at some distance from the popular, allegorical conceptions 
of the Goddess as a clarissima meretrix or most renowned prostitute that emerge in the following 
                                                          
1 Judith Yarnall, Transformations of Circe: The History of an Enchantress (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1994). 
2 Homer, The Odyssey, trans. A. T. Murray, The Loeb Classical Library L104-Ll05 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1995), 10.136. All further references are to this edition unless otherwise specified. 
3 John Watkins, “‘A Goddess Among the Gods’: Virgil, Milton and the Woman of Immortal Voice,” in Never 
Again Would Birds’ Song Be the Same: New Essays on Poetry and Poetics, Renaissance to Modern, ed. Jennifer 
Lewin (New Haven, Conn: University Press of New England, 2002), 13. 
4 For an overview of the Virgilian Circe, see Charles Segal, “Circean Temptations: Homer, Vergil, Ovid,” 
Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 99 (1968): 419–42. For the difference 
between the Homeric and Ovidian accounts, and their respective popularity in the Renaissance, see Judith E. 
Browning, “Sin, Eve, and Circe: Paradise Lost and the Ovidian Circe Tradition,” Milton Studies 26 (1990): 
135–57. Browning argues that the Renaissance mythographic tradition speaks to the “victory of Ovid's 
interpretation of the myth over Homer's: the Circe myth became a story of the conflict between virtue and 
sensuality resulting in seduction, metamorphosis, or death” (Browning, “Sin, Eve and Circe,” 138).  
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centuries.5 This latter tradition relies upon a moralistic opposition of reason and sense that features in 
allegorical treatments of Circe from the time of Antisthenes onwards,6 but became particularly 
prevalent in the Christian age, which saw Circe widely depicted as a witch or sorceress who charms 
men with her beauty and siren-like song, and persuades them to drink her pharmakon kakon. 
Thereafter her victims are transformed into beasts, a state which appropriately reflects their 
capitulation to base desire and appetite. In the extended allegory, Circe’s “defeat” by the hero 
Odysseus who is in possession of the moly plant, a pharmakon esthlon (“good drug”) gifted to him by 
Hermes, celebrates the rational, and divine jurisdiction by which man’s “lower” nature ought to be 
governed. The popularity of this interpretation, as indeed, with the sustained interest in Circean 
mythology more generally, owes much to the notion of the scala naturae, a chain of being in which 
all creation is ordered hierarchically along the same continuum, from the immutable perfection of God 
at the highest point, down through to the stations occupied by the angels, man, the animals, plants, 
and to the insensible elements of the natural world at its lowest. Medieval anthropology held that man 
occupied a middle place in this ontological schema, and that his “mixed” nature – a composite of 
higher and lower capacities that aligned him, simultaneously, with both ends of the scala – rendered 
him a microcosm of the universe itself.7 
It was on the basis of this tradition, of course, that humanist writers such as Pico Della 
Mirandola founded their ideas of man’s dignity and glory, of his unique liberty to choose how to 
shape his own nature. Thus, Pico asserts that God has declared to man, “Thou shalt have the power to 
degenerate into the lower forms of life, which are brutish. Thou shalt have the power, out of thy soul’s 
judgment, to be reborn into the higher forms, which are divine.”8 Christian teaching about man’s 
nature and potential, however, tended to be rather less generous. With the Fall, it was held, Adam and 
Eve lost the easy command of the passions they had enjoyed in Eden, and human reason became 
                                                          
5 See Servius, Servii Grammatici Qui Feruntur in Vergili Carmina Comentarii, ed. George Thilo, trans. Phyllis 
Stanley, vol. 2 (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1883), 3.309–13. 
6 Harry Vredeveld, “‘Deaf as Ulysses to the Siren’s Song’: The Story of a Forgotten Topos,” Renaissance 
Quarterly 54, no. 3 (2001): 856. 
7 See Paul Oskar Kristeller and John Herman Randall, “General Introduction,” in The Renaissance Philosophy 
of Man, ed. Cassirer et al. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 18-19. 
8 Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola, “Oration on the Dignity of Man,” in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, 
225. 
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locked thereafter in perpetual conflict with the flesh, in which our first parents’ sin and our inherited 
depravity was indelibly inscribed. The Fall, of course, also marked the end of humankind’s dominion 
over nature: in Milton’s Paradise Lost, before she gives in to the serpent’s temptation, the animals 
who surround Eve in the garden of Eden are said to be “. . .more duteous at her call, / Than at Circean 
call the herd disguised.”9 As Harrison has found, “Patristic exegetes were quick to explore the rich 
symbolic connection between the exterior and interior domains suggested by the Genesis narrative. 
The loss of dominion over nature was linked to the domination of reason by bestial and carnal 
affections, and the beasts themselves were identified with individual passions.”10 In Sandys’ 
commentary on Ovid’s Metamorphoses, published two years before Milton’s Maske at Ludlow Castle 
was performed, the significance of Circean metamorphosis is presented in these very terms:  
 
Lust . . . naturally incites to luxury; and getting the dominion, deformes our soules with all 
bestial vices; alluring some to inordinate Venus; others to anger, cruelty, and every excesse of 
passion: the Swines, the Lyons, and the Wolves, produced by her sensuall charmes.11 
 
Yet as I have suggested, this reading does not exhaust the significance of Circe’s character, 
particularly in Homer’s fuller version of the story of her encounter with Odysseus, which George 
Chapman had translated into English in 1614. In Homer, after their transformation, Odysseus’s men 
are said to be made “younger than they were before, and far handsomer and taller to look upon” (Od. 
10.396-98), an indication, perhaps of a kind of upward metamorphosis, which for Yarnall suggests 
that Circe “offers both debasement and deliverance, a new life in the flesh.”12 Something of this idea 
does, in fact survive in continental literature of this period influenced by neo-Platonic and 
Pythagorean currents. In his popular Mythologiae, a work from which several of the writers I deal 
                                                          
9 John Milton, Paradise Lost, ed. Alastair Fowler (London: Longman, 1999), 9.521-22. All further references 
are to this edition. 
10 Peter Harrison, “Reading the Passions: The Fall, the Passions, and Dominion over Nature,” in The Soft 
Underbelly of Reason: The Passions in the Seventeenth Century, ed. Stephen Gaukroger (London: Routledge, 
1998), 50. 
11 George Sandys, Ovid’s Metamorphosis Englished, Mythologiz’d and Represented in Figures (Oxford: Iohn 
Lichfield, 1632), 654. 
12 Yarnall, Transformations of Circe, 7. 
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with here draw, Conti envisions Circe as a figure who presides over the mixing of elements and the 
generation of new forms, facilitating that perpetual, cosmic change that brings about the seasons and 
time, and forms the material basis for life itself.13 Yarnall has argued that Conti “sees nothing sublime 
in this process and never refers to . . . [Circe] as dea. To him the natural and the divine are antithetical. 
And so she represents ‘the worthless force of nature’ which is unable to corrupt the ‘divine affable 
reason’ and ‘immortal soul’ of Odysseus.” Yet it is clear that the mythographer invests in Circe here a 
metaphysical importance seemingly absent from the more typical depicitons of the goddess we find in 
contemporary allegorical literature.14  
The focus of this thesis, however, is English literature, and I would contest that the single 
biggest contributing factor to the re-evaluation of the moral and didactic value of Circean lore in the 
English poetry of Milton and Spenser is the Reformation. Like Circe’s pharmakon itself – 
etymologically, both poison and cure – the impact of Reformation culture on humanist representations 
of Circe is double-sided. From the mid-fifteenth century on, iconographic and literary identifications 
of Circe with the “whorish” church of Rome, her victims slavish communicants in a kind of unholy 
mass, begin to proliferate. By the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, however, there is 
some evidence that writers were turning to Circean mythology to address problems within the 
Reformed tradition itself, which saw a new emphasis on the corruption of man’s higher, rational 
faculties, as well as his lower appetites, by consequence of the Fall. Together with the fatalist leanings 
of Reformed soteriology, this development threatened to seriously undermine the possibility for 
meaningful moral choice and ethical action in this life. In the works of Milton and Spenser, this 
question of human potential intersects hermeneutic, and ultimately epistemic concerns about the 
virtue of literary engagement. There is some precedence in the humanist tradition for the application 
of Circean metaphor in this area, as Plutarch’s adoption of Odysseus’s ability to hear, yet withstand 
the song of the Homeric sirens as an allegory for “right reading” might suggest.15 Gough’s thesis and 
                                                          
13 Natale Conti, Mythologiae sive Explicationum Fabularum Libri (Venice: 1581), 380. 
14 Yarnall, Transformations of Circe, 109.  
15 Plutarch, "How the Young Man Should Study Poetry," in Plutarch’s Moralia, vol. 1, trans. Frank Cole 
Babbitt, The Loeb classical library 197 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1927), 79. 
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later publications have drawn valuable attention to this history,16 yet she leaves unexamined its legacy 
– and, I would suggest, its apogee – in the seventeenth-century Miltonic imagination. 
 
 
Structure and Argument 
 
My thesis is comprised of four main chapters. The first chapter, “A Circean Renaissance: Reading the 
English Masque tradition, 1600-1634,” examines the representation of Circe in Baltasar de 
Beaujoyeulx’s Balet Comique de la Royne (1581). As I will discuss, this production enjoyed a 
significant afterlife in several seventeenth-century English court masques which cast Circe as a central 
character, and thus extends its influence through to John Milton’s Circean Maske at Ludlow Castle 
(1634), the subject of my third chapter. The Balet is a product of the French Academy, and speaks 
therefore to the Neoplatonic interests of this group, as well as to the European, humanist tradition 
more widely. The influence of a Neoplatonic metaphysics may also be detected in the Circean 
allegories of the mythographer Natale Conti, which make up a lengthy appendix to the printed edition 
of the Balet. There, we learn that “the person of this goddess is described as being extraordinarily 
lovely, endowed with everything attractive, her voice sweet and clear. This represents what may 
arouse desire, either by sight or hearing – desire to love virtue or its contrary; for desire for some 
people is an instrument of salvation, for others the instrument of perdition or ruin,”17 an idea which is 
not readily compatible with the moral allegories of Circe that proliferate elsewhere, and, indeed, 
within the Balet’s own allegoria. The polarised oppositions between virtue and vice, reason and 
passion that characterise moral allegory more easily cohere with the panegyric demands of courtly 
entertainments of this period, and, as I suggest, Beaujoyeulx’s mixed allegories point to an interesting, 
discursive tension between the formal and political demands of the Balet and its Circean content. A 
comprehensive study of the Neoplatonic reception of Circe in the Renaissance would demand a thesis 
                                                          
16 Melinda J. Gough, “Daughters of Circe: Effeminacy and Poetic Efficacy in Renaissance Epic and Theatre” 
(PhD diss., Yale University, 1996), 72–90. 
17 Baltasar de Beaujoyeulx, Le Balet Comique de La Royne, ed. and trans. Carol MacClintock and Lander 
MacClintock, Musicological Studies and Documents 25 (New York: American Institute of Musicology, 1971), 
101–2. 
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of its own, and I do not seek to attempt anything of this nature here. The Balet is important, however, 
for the instability and ambivalence it might be seen to introduce to the Jacobean and Stuart masques 
which it helped inspire – amongst them, William Browne’s Inner Temple Masque (1615) and 
Aurelian Townshend’s Tempe Restored (1632), from which latter work the quotation in the title of my 
thesis derives. These masques are non-identical in terms of either their project or their audience, yet 
both attest, I argue, to a continued fascination with Circean ambivalence or slipperiness. Such 
slipperiness is eventually anathema to allegory, and thus proves germane to my later analysis of the 
Circean preoccupations of Milton and Spenser, writers who grapple with the problem of interpretative 
freedom as they inflect their poetic treatments of Circe with Reformed, theological concerns about the 
liberty of the human will. 
My second chapter moves across genres to investigate Circean instability (as opposed to 
allegorical determinacy) in an important instance of early modern epic poetry: Spenser’s The Faerie 
Queene (1590). It has been well observed that Sir Guyon’s ruthless destruction of Acrasia’s Bower of 
Bliss in canto 12 of Book 2 of The Faerie Queene, the “Book of Temperance,” raises questions about 
the ethical, and indeed spiritual status of Spenser’s faerie knight. An appraisal of Sir Guyon’s 
interpretations and actions as he approaches, and then enters the Bower, however, also exposes the 
vexed relationship between Spenser’s Circean enchantress Acrasia and the Aristotelian notion of 
akrasia, commonly glossed as incontinence. In this chapter, I argue that in Book 2 of his epic poem 
Spenser eliminates any real possibility that Guyon might engage in akratic action. He secures this 
through the commands and prohibitions of the Palmer who accompanies Guyon as his guide, rather 
than through any disposition to temperance that the knight himself could be seen to possess, or to 
develop, across the course of the canto. A study of the “mini-odyssey” that Spenser writes into the end 
of Book 2 as Sir Guyon journeys towards the Bower reveals, however, several missed opportunities 
when Guyon might have exercised judgement and choice, responsibility which is at these moments 
instead outsourced to the Palmer. Spenser’s narrative here draws on a long-standing association of 
Circean temptation with hermeneutic crisis: as Gough has explored, Odysseus, who escaped Circean 
enchantment and withstood the sirens’ song, is allegorised as the exemplary wise man or reader. 
Although this is a constant theme of the Italian romances from which Spenser drew inspiration for 
13 
 
Acrasia, in the Faerie Queene the Palmer’s interventions severely hamper Guyon’s capacity for 
interpretative choice and determination.   
 Ultimately, I agree with Cefalu that Spenser’s Book of Temperance illustrates the difficulty 
of reconciling Aristotelian accounts of virtue-formation with the demands of a Reformed theology and 
soteriology that “has trouble imagining that ethical agents develop their imparted characters according 
to any additive or developmental regimen of ethical conditioning.”18 In place of this, Cefalu suggests, 
Protestant writers often appealed to Mosaic Law: thus, “There is no other thing but the law of nature, 
printed in the hart of man, in the beginning: now made patent by the mouth of god to man, to utter his 
sin, and make his corrupted nature more patent to himself. And so is the lawe of nature, and the lawe 
of Moses, joyned together in a knot, which is a doctrine, teaching all men a perﬁte rule, to know what 
he should do.”19 For several critics, indeed, the legalistic attributes of the Nymph of the Well – whose 
waters at the beginning of Book 2 fail to wash Ruddymane’s hands of his mother’s blood, and 
catalyse, in effect, the killing curse that Acrasia had placed on his father Mordant – have suggested 
Spenser’s awareness of the limitations of Law, and of the unanswered questions his narrative 
therefore poses. I argue further, however, that the latent scepticism that informs Spenser’s 
presentation of his narrative of Mordant and Guyon’s dealings with Acrasia has an important legacy. 
Via an examination of the legalistic role of the Palmer in Book 2 of the Faerie Queene and an analysis 
of Milton’s seemingly erroneous reference to this character in his Areopagitica (1644), I begin to 
forge links between the later writer’s estimation of Circean temptation, and the questions raised by his 
“sage and serious” predecessor Spenser about the ethics of an allegorical hermeneutic that restricts 
interpretive independence and choice.  
My third chapter, “Milton’s Circean Maske at Ludlow Castle,” takes up this theme as I see it 
developed in Milton’s masque of 1634. This chapter builds on my briefer discussion in chapter 1 of 
the formal interest and innovations of this work by interrogating the philosophical and theological 
implications of the Circean temptation it stages. In the Maske, I argue, Milton’s sets up a dialectical 
relationship between the figures of the enchanter Comus, his absent mother Circe, and the Lady 
                                                          
18 Paul Cefalu, Moral Identity in Early Modern English Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 81. 
19 Henry Balvanes, The Confession of Faith (London: 1548), 57–58. 
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whose chastity is to be tested. Milton thereby establishes akrasia as a driving principle of the work's 
dramatic and philosophical engagement, and in doing so presents a vision of man’s moral capacity 
and ethical responsibility that the Reformed doctrine of total depravity would seem to disallow. It is 
through, and not in spite of, the Lady’s confrontation of her own akratic potential as it manifests in the 
Circean Comus that the potentia or possibility vital to her own spiritual (as well as the masque’s 
theatrical) progression is activated. This same potentiality, dependent, like Milton’s poetry itself (if 
we read the Areopagitica rightly) upon man’s freedom to experience yet transcend an akratic state, 
enables the Lady's eventual consent and accession to grace. Against Spenser’s prohibitive Palmer, and 
the life-denying, legalistic waters of the Nymph of the Well, Milton therefore offers Sabrina – a figure 
with Circean attributes of her own, who  
 
. . .can unlock 
The clasping charm, and thaw the numbing spell, 
If she be right invoked in warbled song.20 
   (852-54) 
 
My fourth and final chapter explores the significance of the Circean allusions and tropes 
deployed by Milton in Paradise Lost. While Browning and Brodwin in particular have contributed 
valuably to our understanding of Milton’s engagement with Circean mythology in his epic poem, their 
accounts presuppose a more or less total identification of the figure with the effects of spiritual 
degradation.21 Milton’s only direct allusion to Circe in the poem appears, it is true, at a particularly 
inauspicious moment in the narrative: leading up to the Fall, a comparison between Eve and Circe is 
made as Satan observes her amongst the animals in the garden, who are said to be “. . .more duteous 
at her call, / Than at Circean call the herd disguised” (9.521-22). As Giamatti finds, “of all the 
analogies by which to imply the harmony and innocence of the creatures in the garden before the Fall, 
                                                          
20 John Milton, “A Masque Presented at Ludlow Castle,” in Complete Shorter Poems, ed. John Carey (London: 
Longman, 1971), 168–229. All further references are to line number of this edition. 
21 Browning, “Sin, Eve, and Circe”; Leonora Brodwin, “Milton and the Renaissance Circe,” Milton Studies 6 
(1975): 21–84. 
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the comparison of Eve to Circe’s power is, to say the very least, the most ambiguous.”22 The problem, 
however, is partly one of perspective. Myth, of course, is a product of the Fallen world, and at this 
moment in the poem’s narrative time, Eve has yet to Fall, although both the reader and Satan – with 
whose voyeuristic gaze we are aligned – are already exiled from her “happy state” (1.29). We might 
note that Satan, in fact, had furthered his own downwards metamorphoses by taking on the form of 
the serpent in order to beguile Eve, and that the other distinctly negative Circean event in the poem – 
the generation of the Scylla-like Sin – occurs again at Satan’s instigation. As I discuss, Milton’s story 
of Sin’s creation bears a perverse resemblance to that of Eve’s, yet a crucial distinction between the 
two characters is maintained. Eve is born of God’s love for Adam and is the future “mother of human 
race” (4.475), whilst Sin, the product of Satan’s narcissistic self-desire, can generate only death. 
Equating Eve’s Circean “charm” with Adam’s passion, and Adam’s passion with his fatal 
disobedience of God’s commandment proves, moreover, inconsistent with Milton’s understanding of 
what it means to be made “sufficient to have stood, though free to fall” (3.99) in a human world where 
“reason also is choice” (3.108). Ultimately, I suggest that the Circean potential so important to the 
exploration of Christian liberty in the Maske is granted enhanced providential importance in this, 
Milton’s most famous work. It is the primacy of choice in Milton’s theology, I suggest, which 
conditions the metaphysical attributes of his Chaos in Paradise Lost as a space of pure potential, and 
the cosmic heart of Circean desire.
                                                          
22 A. Bartlett Giamatti, The Earthly Paradise and the Renaissance Epic (New York: Norton, 1989), 329. 
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A Circean Renaissance: Reading the English Masque Tradition, 1600-1634 
 
This chapter investigates Circean representations in the French Balet Comique de la Royne (1581) and 
three English masques of the early seventeenth century: Browne’s Inner Temple Masque (1615), 
Jonson’s Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue (1618) and Townshend’s Tempe Restored (1632). Attention to 
these works will serve to contextualise my discussion in chapter 3 of Milton’s Maske at Ludlow 
Castle (1634), a work in turn indebted to Spenser’s Faerie Queene, the subject of chapter 2. The 
aspects of the masque tradition that I treat here, therefore, are those that I believe will provide the 
necessary background to this study, and substantiate my later claims about Milton and Spenser. The 
second half of my title for this chapter, “Reading the English masque tradition,” acknowledges from 
the outset the necessary qualifier to my argument: masques, by nature and by design, are richly 
textured, ephemeral productions. Any assertions I make here, therefore, rely on the literary afterlives 
of the courtly entertainments I discuss – contemporary printed editions of the works and 
commemorative materials which often have political or poetic agendas of their own. Masques, 
moreover, were always collaborative affairs, and as scholars of these works have long noted, music, 
dance, set design and costume are perhaps even more key to their overall effect than the spoken 
word.1 Although the writers and producers of the masques I discuss do sometimes take great pains to 
record the extra-literary aspects of their works through musical scores, illustrations and careful 
description, much of it, inevitably, has been lost to time.2  
My account in the pages below of representations of Circe in the Balet of 1581, through to the 
English masques of Jonson, Browne, Townshend and Milton, is therefore self-consciously partial. 
Against this, if the geographical and chronological parameters of the texts I have selected for 
discussion will appear rather more generous than those of my later chapters, which each primarily 
                                                          
1 See for instance John Peacock, The Stage Designs of Inigo Jones: The European Context (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995); Barbara Ravelhofer, The Early Stuart Masque: Dance, Costume, and Music 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Peter Walls, Music in the English Courtly Masque 1604-1640 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
2 The dearth of surviving choreographies for English court masques is discussed by Ravelhofer, Early Stuart 
Masque, 16. 
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examine a single, English work, the “softer” focus here is intended to capture something of the 
broader humanist traditions to which the more canonical works I treat in this thesis are indebted. In 
the masques I examine, the conflicts and confrontations that play out between the allegorical Circe of 
the European mythographers and the political and theological needs of writers in post-Reformation 
England expose the scope but also the limitations of the masque genre, and illustrate, perhaps, why 
Milton and Spenser’s most serious engagements with Circean myth take place instead through the 
medium of epic poetry. 
 
 
Le Balet Comique de la Royne and the English court masque 
 
There are several reasons why a chapter which examines representations of Circe in the English 
masque tradition might open with a discussion of the French Balet Comique de la Royne. Although as 
Yarnall notes, “at least ten musical entertainments in which . . . [Circe] was a main character, as well 
as many others that featured her mythological descendants, Alcina and Armida, were produced in 
France, Italy, and Belgium during the seventeenth century,” of all these performances, it is the Balet 
which has the greatest claim to influence over the developments of the English art form in the early 
seventeenth-century.3 The Balet, which features extensive appearances by Circe, was presented by 
Queen Louise de Lorraine, and performed for the court of King Henri III in the “grande salle de 
Bourbon” in Paris in 1581.4 This lavish state occasion, commissioned as part of a two-week long 
period of festivities to mark the wedding of the Duc de Joyeuse, the King’s favourite, to Mlle. de 
Vaudemont, the Queen’s half-sister,5 is of scholarly importance in its own right. High significance has 
been attributed to the Balet by historians of music and dance, as well as theatre: it has been suggested 
that these elements, together with verse, came together in performance to create a uniquely composite 
                                                          
3 Yarnall, Transformations of Circe, 146. Yarnall’s claim relies on Jean Rousset, La Littérature de l’age 
Baroque En France: Circé et Le Paon (Paris: Librairie José Corti, 1953), 255-57. 
4 Baltasar de Beaujoyeulx, Le Balet Comique, ed. Margaret M. McGowan, Medieval & Renaissance Texts & 
Studies, v. 6 (Binghampton, New York: Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, State University of 
New York at Binghampton, 1982), A3v. Citations of the French text are to page number of this facsimile 
edition. Citations in English, again by page number, rely on MacClintock’s translation. 
5 Beaujoyeulx, Le Balet Comique de La Royne, trans. MacClintock, 25. 
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art form which would lead eventually to the development of opera.6 More immediately, however, the 
publication by Baltasar de Beaujoyeulx of a print edition of the Balet’s verse and score spread news of 
the performance across Europe. Sir Henry Cobham, English ambassador to Paris, was present at the 
event, and purchased a copy of the printed edition of the work.7 Perhaps more significantly, another 
copy of the Balet made its way into Ben Jonson’s library – the title page of this book, held now at the 
New York Public Library, features notations in the English court poet’s own hand.8 The strongest 
evidence for the influence of the Balet on the English court masque, however, arrives with Aurelian 
Townshend and Inigo Jones’s masque of 1632, Tempe Restored. As Veevers notes, “Jones and 
Townshend worked allusively from the text of the Balet comique, but closely enough to suggest the 
original to those who possessed a copy . . . or who had access to the copy used by Jones.”9 Milton’s 
Maske at Ludlow Castle of 1634 in turn has a number of important thematic and performative 
connections to Townshend’s masque, and both performances are preceded by William Browne’s 
Inner Temple Masque of 1615, a work in which critics have detected further echoes of the Balet.10 
The Balet’s presentation of Circe, then, anticipates her (re)appearance in successive Jacobean 
and Stuart court masques, and we might not unreasonably seek to establish the significance of these 
later figures by examining the function of their predecessor in the French performance. As this work 
may be less familiar, I summarise below its main narrative events. In brief, the Balet opens with the 
escape of the “fugitive gentleman” (41) from Circe’s garden at the far end of the hall. The gentleman 
                                                          
6 See McGowan, “Introduction,” in Le Balet Comique, by Baltasar de Beaujoyeulx, ed. McGowan, 22. 
7 Frances A. Yates, The French Academies of the Sixteenth Century (London: The Warburg Institute, 1947), 
239. My discussion of the Balet throughout this chapter is indebted to Yates’ seminal study of the text. Her 
contextualisation of the performance within the political and cultural milieu of the court of King Henri III, and 
her exposition of the relationship between the French Académie de Poésie et de Musique and the ballet de cour 
tradition, remain invaluable. 
8 Baltasar de Beaujoyeulx, Balet Comique de La Royne (Paris, 1582), New York Public Library Lincoln Center 
Collection, Drexel 5995. 
9 Erica Veevers, Images of Love and Religion: Queen Henrietta Maria and Court Entertainments (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 194. On this point see also John G. Demaray, Milton and the Masque 
Tradition (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1968); Yates, The French Academies of the Sixteenth 
Century, 264. 
10 The likely involvement of the composer of the Maske’s songs, Henry Lawes, in Tempe Restored is detailed by 
Demaray. Two of the Egerton children, Lady Katherine Egerton and Lady Alice Egerton had also appeared in 
Townshend’s performance. See Demaray, Milton and the Masque Tradition, 83-5. For a discussion of the 
narrative and scenic parallels between the Balet and Browne’s masque, see Anne Daye, “The Role of Le Balet 
Comique in Forging the Stuart Masque: Part 1 The Jacobean Initiative,” Dance Research 32, no. 2 (2014): 202. 
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approaches the King, the Balet’s chief spectator, and begs for his assistance to defeat “la sorciere” 
(C1r) who had at one time transformed him into a lion, and has now  
 
. . . va de loin les nymphes espier 
Afin de les charmer par magique cautelle 
Et les garder de voir ce Roy, qui les appelle 
Dendans un temple en France, auec les autres dieux 
Qui le siècle doré font retourner des cieux. 
(C1r) 
 
gone to spy upon the nymphs from afar so as to prevent them by a magic spell from seeing 
that King who is summoning them to a temple in France, together with other gods who are 
bringing the Golden Age down from heaven (42). 
 
As the gentleman kneels before the king, Circe enters in pursuit and laments his loss, before returning 
to her garden. Three Sirens and a Triton then enter the hall on a float, singing the praise of the French 
King, followed by a magnificent and ornately decorated fountain, which holds on its upper-most basin 
twelve naiads seated on twelve golden chairs, Queen Louise amongst them. Glaucus and Tethys 
accompany the naiads in chairs at the base of the fountain, which is followed on to the stage by the 
Sirens. Following a song of the Tritons, a dialogue between Glaucus and Tethys takes place, in which 
Glaucus begs Tethys for help against “Circe, jalousie Circe, indigne qui te nommes / Fille du Dieu” 
(F1v) (“jealous Circe, unworthy to be the daughter of the god” (54)). The stage is cleared, and then 
the nymphs re-enter the hall, followed by the twelve naiads, and all begin to dance. As the tune “la 
Clochette” (F2v) begins to play in the last passage of the music, Circe leaves her garden in anger and 
touches all of the nymphs and musicians with her wand, rendering them motionless. She returns to the 
garden, and Mercury descends in a cloud, sent by Jupiter “pour . . . deliurer les Naiades de son 
echantement, auec le ius de la racine du Moly” (F3r) (“to break the enchantment of Circe with a piece 
of the Moly root” (59)). He sings, and then uses a golden flask to sprinkle the juice of the moly root 
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over the heads of the nymphs and musicians, who are instantly reanimated. This provokes Circe’s 
anger, and she leaves her garden again. After a speech in which she aligns herself with “Destiny” and 
“change” against the water nymphs who would “faire reuenir / En France l’age d’or” (G2r) (“bring 
the Golden Age back to France” (63)), she declares her intention to keep the messenger God “vaincu 
dans ma tour enfermé” (G2v) (“vanquished and imprisoned in my tower” (62-3)), and arrests 
Mercury, as well as the dancers and musicians once again with her wand. 
Seven flautists and one vocalist then enter as Satyrs, again celebrating the virtue of the King, 
to be joined by four Dryads. All twelve then approach the Royal party, and the nymph Opis declares 
her intention to ask Pan to intervene against Circe. Pan promises to help, and the “four Virtues” (72) 
enter to sing before the King, followed by the goddess Minerva in “un fort beau, riche & magnifique 
chariot, qui estoit trainé par un grand serpent” (L4r) (“a very beautiful, rich and magnificent chariot 
drawn by a great serpent” (73)). Minerva addresses the King, and then appeals to Jupiter to descend 
from heaven and lend his aid against Circe, a request to which the God acquiesces. Pan then leads his 
eight Satyrs to assail Circe’s castle, until eventually the enchantress’s wand is rendered defunct 
“under the influence of Minerva” (89). Finally, Jupiter strikes Circe with a thunderbolt, and Minerva 
captures her and parades her around the hall, presenting both the enchantress and her wand to the 
King. The performance ends with a Grand Ballet, after which the queen presented an emblem to the 
King, and “following the Queen’s example, all the other Princesses, ladies and maidens went 
according to their rank and degree to choose a Prince, a Lord, or a Gentleman,” to whom “they 
presented a medal with their symbols” (98). Circe is one of this party, and we are told she “gave M. le 
Cardinal de Bourbon a book” (98) with the inscription Fatorum arcana resignat (T1v): “it opens the 
secrets of the fates.” 
These, then, were the Balet’s main events. Reading between the lines and through the lens of 
her historical knowledge of the contemporary anxieties and preoccupations of Henry III’s court, Yates 
has stressed the Balet’s importance as an expression of the strength and power of the French state 
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during a period of prolonged religious conflict between the Hugenots and their Catholic opponents.11 
Circe, she observes, in part represents the threat of imminent religious and civil war, which Henry III 
and his mother Catherine de Medici struggled to forestall. Indeed, in prefatory material affixed to the 
printed text of the Balet, Minerva is related allegorically to the Queen Mother, Catherine de Medici, 
whose “wise counsels” and “sound remedies” are praised for bringing peace back to France after the 
bloody violence of the conflicts that had gripped France (30; 28). Something of this may account for 
the preoccupation with Circean mythology evident in the English masques: although nothing like the 
French wars occurred on English soil during the period in question, religious disputes continued 
throughout the reign of James I and became even more pronounced with the marriage of his successor 
Charles I to a Catholic consort, Henrietta Maria, in 1625.12 As we will see, the Book of Sports 
controversy over which both James I and Charles I presided has been seen by some critics as an 
important context for Milton’s presentation of the Circean, yet courtly Comus in his Maske, while 
anxieties about the undue influence Henrietta Maria’s Catholicism was feared to exert over Charles 
and his court appear to have had some bearing on the Circean interest of Townshend’s Tempe 
Restored.  
Beyond its demonstration of the usefulness of Circe as a figure for dissent and civil disorder, 
however, the French Balet’s greatest influence on the English masque tradition would appear to lie in 
the work’s formal innovations, bearing out Chibnall’s argument that “the true relationship of the 
masque to history is in its form, not merely in its content.”13 Yates’ important study traces the Balet’s 
artistic genesis to the literary and musical activities of the sixteenth-century Académie de Poésie et de 
Musique, a group presided over by Jean-Antoine de Baïf which was itself an outgrowth of a wider 
humanist movement with strong links to the Neoplatonic philosophy of the original Florentine 
                                                          
11 Yates, The French Academies of the Sixteenth Century, 250–62. For more on the French Wars of Religion and 
the bearing of the ongoing conflict between Hugenots and the Catholic League on the policies of Henry III in 
the 1570s and 1580s, see R. J. Knecht, The French Religious Wars, 1562-1598 (Oxford: Osprey, 2002). 
12 Throughout his reign, Charles resisted considerable pressure to support the Protestant cause in Europe in 
military action against the Catholic powers Austria and Spain. Veevers argues that “the emphasis in court 
culture of the thirties on Arcadian peace, harmony, and love has polemical insistence that cannot be divorced 
from religion,” and suggests even that France of 1582, where Catherine de Medici struggled to appease both the 
Hugenots and the Catholic League, “had many similarities in religion and politics with the 1630s in England” 
(Images of Love and Religion, 184; 191). 
13 Jennifer Chibnall, “‘To That Secure Fix’d State’: The Function of the Caroline Masque,” in The Court 
Masque, ed. David Lindley (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 85. 
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Academy. The French Academy enjoyed the patronage of both Henry III and the Duc de Joyeuse, and 
the Balet itself seems to speak to a marriage of academic and political interests: as Yates observes, 
across the performance as a whole, “the political aim of harmonising the religious problems of the age 
through the use of court amusements is related to the philosophical aim of revealing the universal 
harmony through the power of ‘ancient’ poetry, music, and dancing.”14 Beaujoyeulx’s text itself 
draws attention to this goal in its careful exposition of key musical and choreographic events: the 
musique mesurée, for instance, which sounded from the voûte dorée (golden vault) at key junctures of 
the Balet, is “la vraye harmonie du ciel, de laquelle toutes les choses qui sont en estre, sont conservées 
et maintenues” (B1v) (“the true harmony of heaven, by which all living things are conserved and 
maintained” (38)).15 Tellingly, the first direct paraphrase of Beaujoyeulx’s text in an English masque 
appears in relation to this idea. Jonson’s preface to the third dance of his Masque of Queens (1609) 
asserts that “Wherein, beside that principal grace of perspicuity, the motions were so even and apt, 
and their expression so just; as if Mathematicians had lost Proportion, they might there have found 
it.”16  
This is suggestively close to Beaujoyeulx’s description of the geometrical figures that formed 
the Grand Ballet at the end of the French performance, “si bien l’ordre y estoit gardé, & si dextrement 
chacun s’estudioit à observer son rang & cadence: de manière qu’Archimède n’eust peu mieux 
                                                          
14 Yates, The French Academies of the Sixteenth Century, 270. Following Yates, Veevers suggests that 
Catherine de Medici’s “programme for religious toleration amounted to a Royalist Counter-Reformation, in 
which the arts were used in an attempt to soothe the natures of those around her and to influence the course of 
events, particularly towards an agreement between moderates on the Catholic and Protestant sides” (Images of 
Love and Religion, 19. 
15 MacClintock notes that the musique mesurée, “associated exclusively with Baïf’s Academy, was the result of 
an attempt on the part of Baïf and his confrères to reproduce, in French, classical prosody based on quantity – 
vers mesurés à l’antique, or metered verse in the ancient manner – sung to music whose rhythms would 
correspond exactly to those of the poetry” (Carol MacClintock, “Introduction,” in Le Balet Comique de La 
Royne, by Baltasar de Beaujoyeulx, ed. and trans. MacClintock, 19). See also Milton’s poem to Henry Lawes, in 
which he praises  
 
Harry whose tuneful and well-measured song 
First taught our English music how to span 
Words with just note and accent…  
 
(John Milton, “Sonnet XIII. To Mr H. Lawes, on His Airs,” in Complete Shorter Poems, ed. and trans. John 
Carey, lines 1-3). 
16 Ben Jonson, The Masque of Queenes, ed. David Lindley, in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Ben 
Jonson Online, eds. Martin Butler, David Gants, et al., Cambridge University Press and King’s College London, 
lines 622-5, accessed 15 September, 2018. 
http://universitypublishingonline.org/cambridge/benjonson/k/works/queens/facing#. All further references will 
be to this edition, cited parenthetically by line number. 
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entendre les proportions Geometriques, que ses princesses & dames les pratiquoyent en ce ballet” 
(56r) (“. . . so well was order kept, and so cleverly did everybody keep his place and his cadence [that] 
the spectators thought that Archimedes could not have understood geometric proportions any better 
than the princesses and the ladies observed in this Ballet” (91)),17 lines which prompt Yates to remark 
that “the Pythagorean-Platonic core of the Academy – that all things are related to number, both in the 
outer world of nature and in the inner world of man’s soul – perhaps found in the marvellous accuracy 
of this measured dancing one of its most perfect artistic expressions.”18 Demaray’s description of the 
typical seventeenth-century English court masque as “an attempt to unify the arts through a masked 
ball depicting an ideal society in an ideal universe,”19 moreover, suggests that in this respect at least, 
the Balet’s more esoteric philosophical underpinnings were readily compatible with the ideological 
and political motivations of writers placed at some remove from the French Academy.20 Importantly, 
in both the Balet and several of the English masques I discuss, allegory serves as the vehicle through 
which these aspirations are bridged with the theatrical, musical and choreographic phenomena of the 
performance itself. 
In the printed version of the Balet an allegorical frame of reference is immediately established 
in the service of royal panegyric. Prefatory dedications identify King Henri III with Jupiter, as well, as 
we have seen, as his mother Catherine de Medici with Minerva, figures who assume pivotal roles in 
the performance as the engineers of Circe’s defeat (28-9). No less than four allegories derived from 
Conti’s Mythologiae showing the significance of Circe’s character, moreover, are appended to the 
                                                          
17 As close as Jonson’s lines appear to be to the French text, it is not cited. Daye notes that “Jonson’s 
annotations tended to advertise classical sources rather than more recent ones, and were not a complete set of 
references” (“The Role of Le Balet Comique in Forging the Stuart Masque,” 187). Ravelhofer, Early Stuart 
Masque, 18, notes that “the Continental influence on English court masques has long been established. . . . 
ensemble choreographies consisting of geometric figures were performed in the Escorial, the Louvre, Whitehall, 
Vienna’s Hofburg, Neapolitan Jesuit seminaries, and Roman palazzi.” 
18 Yates, The French Academies of the Sixteenth Century, 248. Meagher notes further that “the metaphorical 
implications of the dance, as formed in antiquity, greatly resembled those of music: both were primarily 
suggestive of the harmony and order of the cosmos. The Renaissance, of course, picked up these associations”  
(John C. Meagher, Method and Meaning in Jonson’s Masques (London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), 
85). 
19 Demaray, Milton and the Masque Tradition, 28. 
20 Rygg notes that in England, “a Pythagorean doctrine preaching the ascent of fallen human beings to the divine 
through their own endeavour, possibly even through repeated lives on earth, by necessity appeared as 
profoundly heretical to a Protestant church in which humans were understood to be totally dependent on God’s 
grace and forgiveness,” yet such ideas had strong imaginative appeal for this very reason. As Rygg 
acknowledges, “the power of the Puritans had its limits” (Kristin Rygg, Masqued Mysteries Unmasked: Early 
Modern Music Theater and Its Pythagorean Subtext (Hillsdale, NY: Pendragon Press, 2000), 174). 
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text. The first allegory, or “natural” allegory, presents Circe as “la mistion des elemens” (“the 
composite of the elements”), since she was born of Apollo and Perseis, and “toutes choses sont creés 
de chaleur & d’humidité.” Drawing a Platonic distinction between the mutable and destructible body 
and the immortal soul, the allegory further explains that “on dit qu’elle changeoit les hommes en 
formes monstreuses & diuerses: pour ce que la corruption d’une chose, est la generation de l’autre qui 
reaist, mais non pas en sa premier forme” (“it is said that she changed men into monstrous and divers 
shapes, because the corruption of one thing is the generation of another thing formed from it, but not 
in the first shape”). Ulysses escapes this fate because “l’ame de l’homme est immortelle & diuine, le 
corps perissable & terrestre” (“Ulysses was preserved by the gods because the human soul is immortal 
and divine, the body perishable and earthly” (T2r; 99)). 
The second allegory, attributed to the Sieur de la Chesnaye, expands Circe’s metaphysical 
influence: “Circe est la circuition de l’annee par la course reuoluë du Soleil” (“Circe is the revolving 
of the year, following the revolution of the Sun”), Ulysses is “le temps qui ne s’arreste, allant 
tousiours” (“time which never stops, always continuing”), and his men who are transformed are the 
past and the present (T2r; 100 ).21 The third allegory, “l’allegorie morale,” repeats the first allegory’s 
notion that Ulysses represents the soul, but further specifies that this is “l’ame capable de raison” 
(“that part of the soul capable of reasoning”), whereas “les compagnons d’Vllsse signifient & 
puissances & facultez de l’ame, qui conspirent & accordant auec less affections des sens qui 
n’obeissent plus à la raison” (“Ulysses’ companions mean both the powers and qualities of the soul 
which work with and are in agreement with the affections of the senses which no longer obey the 
Reason”) (T2; 100). This idea may recall the common deployment of Circe as a warning against 
intemperate sensual enjoyment outlined in my introduction: the Balet’s moral allegory thus argues 
against Conti’s “natural” allegory that Circe’s parentage in fact indicates that “le desir & 
concupiscence pouiennent aux animaux de chaleur & d’humidité” (“desire and lust come to animals 
from heart and dampness”). The bestial transformations of those who drink from the enchantress’s 
                                                          
21 Yates emphasises the fatalism of the Balet’s allegorical association of Circe with temporal law: “Circe is not 
only the power of natural law binding man to change and decay with the four elements; she is also the power of 
temporal law, binding man to inevitable historical processes and carrying him helplessly onward from the cradle 
to the grave as the seasons pass” (The French Academies of the Sixteenth Century, 244). 
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cup signify the dangers of allowing one’s higher, rational capacities to be enslaved to base passion: 
Circe is that desire which, if overindulged, “nous incite à la volupté nous maistrise, il nous pousse aux 
vices, qui nous sont semblables aux bestes: soit paillardise, yurongnerie, cruauté & autres mauuaises 
qualitez: mais celuy qui est accompagné de raison, est asseuré contre ces poisons” (“urges us to those 
vices which make us resemble animals, that is to say, lechery, drunkenness, cruelty and certain other 
vices. But the man who is endowed with Reason is protected against these poisons”) (T2r-v; 100). 
The fourth, and longest allegory elaborates and broadens the message of its predecessors. The 
encyclopaedic ambition of the allegory, however, which notes at the outset that “toutes les allegories 
des fictions poetiques en general, se referent ou à la morale, ou à la supernaturelle & diuine, ou à une 
meslange de l’vne & de l’autre” (“all allegory of poetical fictions in general is based on natural 
philosophy, or on morality, or on the supernatural and divine, or on a mixture of one and the other”) 
(T2v; 100), extends Circe’s significance beyond the terrestrial sphere: Circe we are told, “selon 
Homere est deesse, & partant immortelle” (“according to Homer, is a goddess and therefore 
immortal”), and that “il ne fera pas hors de raison de prendre la Circé pour le desire n general qui 
regne & domine sure tout ce qui a vie & est meslé de la diuinité & du sensible” (“it seems not 
unreasonable to take Circe for that desire in general which rules and dominates all things and is a 
mingling of the divine and sensual”) (T2v; 101). We will return to the significance of this claim later. 
It is interesting that, as Meagher notes, the allegory was provided by one “Sieur Gordon,” who “is 
without question to be identified with John Gordon, D.D., a man of notable learning . . . . [who] 
preached frequently before King James.”22 Allegory proves similarly indispensable to the 
seventeenth-century English court masque, and Butler has written astutely about “the complex 
entanglements of politics and hermeneutics which the masques involve.”23 While the use of allegory 
in English court entertainments certainly predates the Balet,24 Meagher has argued that 
                                                          
22 Meagher, Method and Meaning in Jonson’s Masques, 30. For further details of the Gordon family’s ties to the 
court, see Daye, “The Role of Le Balet Comique in Forging the Stuart Masque” 187. 
23 Martin Butler, “The Politics of the Caroline Masque Form,” in Theatre and Government Under the Early 
Stuarts, ed. J. R. Mulryne and Margaret Shewring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 124. 
24 Allegory is a staple of Tudor masques and pageants, as well as medieval mystery and morality plays: 
Schelling has argued that “the allegorical nature of the masque . . . comes direct from the time-honoured 
practices of the morality” (Felix E. Schelling, Elizabethan Drama, 1558-1642 (New York: Houghton Mifflin & 
Company, 1908), 214). There were, of course other influences, as Daye’s argument that “both the English 
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“Beaujoyeulx’s use of the classical gods of music and dance, of allegory, of the king, can all be found 
paralleled in Jonson’s work in a way that apparently never occurred in earlier English masques.”25 
Meagher’s claim that “it is illuminating to look at Jonson’s masques with the Balet Comique in mind; 
it is perhaps more pertinent to the background of Jonson’s masques than any of his English 
predecessors,” should remind us, moreover, that if the thematic and formal preoccupations of the later 
Circean masques I treat hearken back to the French Balet, they are likely to do so through a Jonsonian 
lens.26 
 
 
Formal developments: Ben Jonson 
 
Jonson’s Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue, in fact, might be understood as a significant intertext between 
the Balet and Milton’s Circean Maske of 1634.27 As we have seen, the Balet’s “moral” allegory 
stipulates that “Ulysses means that part of the soul capable of reason . . . Ulysses’ companions are the 
powers and qualities of the soul which work with and are in agreement with the affections of the 
senses which no longer obey the Reason” (100). The dualistic opposition of reason to sense and of 
souls to bodies evident here, together with the further opposition of permanence to impermanence 
established by the Balet’s first allegory (“Ulysses was preserved by the gods because the human soul 
is immortal and divine, the body perishable and earthly,” 99) relies on a Platonic schema that is 
similarly reflected in Jonson’s allegorical conception of the form and function of the masque itself, 
and which can also be seen to condition the metaphysical and moral landscape of Jonson’s Pleasure.28 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
masque and the French ballet were based on the Italian model of the mascaraed,” or intermedio, should remind 
us (Daye, “The Role of Le Balet Comique in Forging the Stuart Masque,” 192). For more on this background, 
see Henry Prunières, Le Ballet de Cour En France Avant Benserade et Lully (Paris: H. Laurens, 1914). 
25 Meagher, Method and Meaning in Jonson’s Masques, 30. 
26 Ibid. 
27Pleasure first appears in print in the second folio collection of Jonson’s works, published in 1640. A 
manuscript of Pleasure from the year of the masque’s performance also exists, and it is to this version that my 
discussion refers. On the variants between the two texts, see Ben Jonson, Ben Jonson, eds. C. H. Herford, Percy 
Simpson, and Evelyn Simpson, vol. 7 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1941), 475-78. 
28 In the preface to Hymenaei (1606), Jonson explains that whereas bodies and sense impressions are transient 
but necessary ephemera which serve to delight and entertain, the “inward parts” of the masque, “grounded upon 
antiquity, and solid learnings . . . should always lay hold on more removed mysteries.” (11-13) Ben Jonson, 
“Hymenaei,” The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Ben Jonson Online, ed. David Lindley, lines 11-13, 
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An indication of the importance of moral allegory to the form and content of Pleasure is given by its 
title, which derives from Xenophon’s account of Hercules’ fabled choice between the paths of virtue 
and vice, represented respectively in the masque by the personified figures of Virtue and Pleasure.29 
Orgel notes that for early modern allegorists, this legend “was considered the most significant part of 
the story of Hercules,” and documents the appearance of the encounter “as a fable illustrating the 
moral life” in contemporary emblem books which render “the active hero a rational soul subject to 
persuasion.”30  
This interpretation would suggest some degree of symbolic or discursive overlap between 
Renaissance renditions of Xenophon’s legend and moral allegories of Circean temptation, a hunch 
which might be confirmed by the “argument” of Sandy’s 1632 translation of Ovid’s Metamorphoses, 
where we are informed that those “who forsake that faire Intelligence, / To follow Passion, and 
voluptuous Sense; / That shun the Path and Toyles of Hercules;” are “Such, charm’d by Circe’s 
luxurie, and ease, / [that] Themselues deforme.”31 Milton, furthermore, would elide the two scenarios 
in his tract An Apology for Smectymnuus (1642), where the reader is directed to “the divine volumes 
of Plato, and his equal Xenophon: where, if I should tell ye what I learnt of chastity and love, I mean 
that which is truly so, whose charming cup is only virtue, which she bears in her hand to those who 
are worthy; (the rest are cheated with a thick intoxicating potion, which a certain sorceress, the abuser 
of love’s name, carries about).”32 Interestingly, in Jonson’s masque, it is Hercules’ “abused” cup that 
Comus’s “bowl-bearer” audaciously carries with him, “to fill the drunken Orgies up.”33 In fact, 
although Circe never appears as a character in her own right in a masque of Jonson’s creation, an 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
accessed September 15, 2018, 
http://universitypublishingonline.org.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/cambridge/benjonson/k/works/hymenaei/facing/#. 
29 Xenophon, Memorabilia, 2.1.21-34. Xenophon derives the story from the Sophist Prodicus. 
30 Stephen Orgel, The Jonsonian Masque (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 151. 
31 Ovid, Ovid’s Metamorphosis Englished, trans. Sandys, A1r. 
32 John Milton, “An Apology against a Pamphlet Call’d A Modest Confutation of the Animadversions of the 
Remonstrant against Smectymnuus,” in The Works of John Milton, ed. Frank Patterson et al., vol. 3 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1931), 305. All further references to Milton’s prose works are to this edition, unless 
otherwise stated. 
33 Ben Jonson, “Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue,” ed. Martin Butler, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Ben 
Jonson Online, lines 78-80, accessed September 15, 2018, 
http://universitypublishingonline.org.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/cambridge/benjonson/k/works/pleasure/facing/#. All 
further references are to this edition, cited parenthetically by line number. In the mythological accounts, by 
contrast, an admiring Sol awards Hercules the cup so that he may sail in it to the island of Erythia where he 
completes his heroic tenth labour – as Jonson puts it, the cup was “the crowned reward / Of thirsty heroes, after 
labour hard” (Pleasure, 78-80) 
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important genealogical relationship between Circe and Comus, the infamous “belly” of Pleasure, is 
set up in Milton’s 1634 Maske at Ludlow Castle, where Comus is introduced as the son of Circe and 
Bacchus, “like his father but his mother more” (57).34 The figure of Comus was celebrated by the 
ancients as the god of banquets and revels, and is associated with Bacchus by the Renaissance 
mythographer Cartari: “Since wine has a warming effect, the usual image of Bacchus was supposed to 
be of a beardless young man, happy and carefree. Comus, who was the god of feasts for the ancients, 
bore a close resemblance to this image.”35 In the sixteenth century, a further association of the figure 
with excess and gluttony is notable in the texts of French writers and moralists, and Comus is 
sketched briefly to this effect in works by several English playwrights which date both before and 
after Jonson’s Pleasure.36  
Like Circe, then, Comus is associated with crude and intemperate sensual enjoyment. 
Jonson’s Comus, however, is awarded additional Circean significance: in Pleasure, his rout of 
revellers is described as having “wallowed” in the “sty / Of Vice” (83-4), recalling the bestial 
transformation of the men who drink from Circe’s cup in Homer’s Odyssey, and precipitating the 
Attendant Spirit’s description in the Maske of Comus’s victims, who “roll in pleasure in a sensual sty” 
(77). In Pleasure, this nod to Circean mythology serves to cement Comus’s moral significance within 
a wider allegorical framework that is established spatially, as well as verbally, with the aid of “the 
mountain Atlas” (1), a set piece around which the masque’s action unfolds. As Kogan has noted, 
“Jonson identifies the base of his mountain with an antimasque of man’s lower appetites, while the 
top becomes a metaphor of the soul’s upward journey,” so that “the entire stage device . . . represents 
man’s upward movement from sense to understanding”: Atlas, we are told, “the heavens upbear[s]” 
                                                          
34 Critics have argued convincingly for the debt this performance owes to Jonson’s earlier work – Jonson’s 
masque was not published until 1640, but Milton may have seen it in manuscript. See Leah S. Marcus, The 
Politics of Mirth: Jonson, Herrick, Milton, Marvell, and the Defense of Old Holiday Pastimes (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1986), 108–27. 
35 Vincenzo Cartari, Vincenzo Cartari’s Images of the Gods of the Ancients: The First Italian Mythography, 
trans. John Mulryan, Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, v. 396 (Tempe, Ariz: Arizona Center for 
Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2012), 326. 
36 See Pierre Viret, The Christian Disputations, trans. John Brooke (London: Thomas East, 1579), 140v; Jean 
Taffin, The Amendment of Life Comprised in Fower Bookes, trans. unknown (London: John Windet, 1595), 230; 
Thomas Dekker, The Guls Horne-Booke (London: Nicholas Okes, 1609), 4; Thomas Middleton, Honorable 
Entertainments (London: George Eld, 1621), C4r. 
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(146).37 Towards the end of the masque, after Comus has been “Beat from his grove, and that 
defaced” (153), the twelve masquers emerge from the mountain under the watchful gaze of Hesperus, 
“the glory of the West” (159), from whose “bright race” (172), it is suggested, James I is descended. 
Hesperus is flanked by Justice, Wisdom, Beauty and Love, and commands Virtue, who “brings forth” 
(169) the twelve Princes or maskers from the mountain to perform the dances endowed with “sacred 
harmony” by “Dedalus the wise,” “a guide that gives them laws to all their motions” (204-6). 
Ultimately, however, it is the King himself as the earthly agent of heavenly powers who embodies the 
“more removed mysteries” of the masque, and thus lends Pleasure its final meaning.38  
This ending recalls the closing movements of the Balet, where the four Virtues, Fortitude, 
Justice, Temperance, and Prudence parade in front of the Royal party, and together with Minerva and 
the musicians of the voûte dorée sing to the King, praising the princes of France and “leurs loix / Qui 
banniront d’icy les vices & la guerre” (N3r). Rygg notes that “because the king possesses these 
virtues, he has the capacity to conquer Circe,” and indeed, it is the entrance of the virtues, together 
with Minerva’s appeal, that precipitates the descent of Jupiter – a figure, as we have seen, for King 
Henri III – to bring about Circe’s defeat.39 As in Pleasure, the oppositional relationship between Circe 
and the King was stressed visually throughout the Balet: Henri III and his mother, Catherine de 
Medici, sat facing their adversary for the duration of the performance (30). This ongoing, 
confrontational relationship edges into crisis as Circe secures a temporary victory, managing to 
immobilise both the Queen’s dancing naiads and Mercury, who had attempted to free them with the 
aid of the moly plant. Thereafter, she is seen “deuant la porte de son chasteau assise en sa maiesté” 
(“seated majestically at the gate of her castle”) (G2v; 63), the figure of Mercury lying prone at her 
feet. This revision of the classical myths, where conversely, Mercury is successful in securing 
Odysseus’s immunity to Circe’s charms, may initially strengthen our impression of Circe’s power. 
Ultimately, however, it serves to simplify and strengthen the polarisation between Circe and sovereign 
rule upon which the Balet’s dramatic and political interest depends: where Circe’s “fugitive favourite” 
                                                          
37 Stephen Kogan, The Hieroglyphic King: Wisdom and Idolatry in the Seventeenth-Century Masque (London: 
Associated University Presses, 1986), 88. 
38 Jonson, Hymenaei, 13. 
39 Rygg, Masqued Mysteries Unmasked, 163. 
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rests at the King’s feet, Mercury lies at Circe’s. Inversely, at the Balet’s close, Circe herself is 
captured and led in triumph around the hall, a prelude of sorts to the performance of the forty 
geometric dance figures of the final ballet, which, we are told, were “disposez de telle facon, qu’à la 
fin du passage toutes turnoyent toujours la face vers le Roy” (“arranged in such a way that at the end 
of each figure all the ladies turned to face the King”) (O3v; 90). In their exact and ordered fashioning, 
these dances present an image of peace, harmony and hierarchy, that signifies the restoration of 
business as usual to a court briefly perturbed by Circean misrule. 
This juxtaposition of order and disorder is seen again in Jonson’s Masque of Queenes, where 
suggestive parallels to the French Balet emerge through the sequence of musical, choreographic and 
narrative counter-moves used to defeat a group of eleven hags and their Dame.40 In the Balet, the 
dancing naiads who are paralysed by Circe and whom Mercury attempts to free are represented by the 
Queen’s Ladies in waiting and presided over, as we have seen, by Queen Louise herself. An analogue 
for the tiered fountain on which these figures are drawn spectacularly into the hall may be found in 
the Masque of Queenes’ discovery of the House of Fame, which seated eleven Queens headed by Bel-
Anna, Queen of the Ocean, an “arch-naiad” played by James I’s consort, Queen Anne of Denmark.41 
After their defeat, the hags are bound, like Circe in the Balet, and dragged through the hall by 
chariots. Yet in Queenes, the mere presence of the House of Fame is sufficient to secure the defeat of 
the hags, just as in Pleasure, Hercules’s command “sink grove” (95) effectively dispels Comus and 
his drunken crew. In the Balet, as we have seen, the victory of the court against Circe, if no less 
absolute, is rather more hard won.  
It would be remiss to discuss these differences without recourse to Jonson’s famous prefatory 
remarks, appended to the printed masque text of Queenes, which introduce the notion of an 
“antimasque,” a “foil, or false masque” (9) that precedes the masque proper and presents “a spectacle 
of strangeness, producing multiplicity of gesture, and not unaptly sorting with the current, and whole 
fall of the device” (13-14). One function of the antimasque, of course, is to further polarise the 
masque form, entrenching its moral allegory to accord with the Jonsonian edict that virtue is ‘more 
                                                          
40 Circe does not appear in Queenes, although she is listed as one of the “witches” of the “ancients,” of whose 
power the Dame boasts (180-81). 
41 Daye, “The Role of Le Balet Comique in Forging the Stuart Masque,” 194. 
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seen, more known, when vice stands by” (Pleasure 295),42 whilst simultaneously confining, or 
attenuating, the conflict generated by such internal oppositions so that “the disorders of the 
antimasque are [able to be ] repressed by the masque itself in a recuperative move of containment.”43 
This might explain why Jonson’s Comus in Pleasure inhabits a discrete part of the entertainment, 
while the Balet’s Circe, who is not aligned with an antimasque,  ranges far more freely between her 
palace and garden at one end of the hall, and the Royal party, stationed at the other.44 A variation of 
this idea of containment, the “carnival” thesis, views the disordered, topsy-turvy world of the 
antimasque as ultimately non-threatening to monarchical authority in the early seventeenth century, 
since “festival freedom was seen as a sign of submission to Royal power.”45 Marcus and others find 
support for this “paradox of state” in James I’s advocation of public mirth in the Book of Sports 
(1618), an act which forbade the suppression by “precise persons” of “any lawful recreation, such as 
dancing, either men or women; archery for men, leaping, vaulting, or any other such harmless 
recreation . . . May-games, Whitsun-ales, and Morris-dances; and the setting up of May-poles and 
other sports therewith used.”46 In courtly entertainments of this period, however, any apparent 
toleration of irreverent festivity is invariably qualified. In addition to Jonson’s segregation of the 
antimasque from the masque itself, at the end of Pleasure, if Hesperus’s (and, implicitly, James I’s) 
intention is to establish peace between “Virtue and her noted opposite, / Pleasure” (157-58), 
personified figures who sit above the musicians at the base of the mountain, it may be observed that 
this is a very “top down” reconciliation and that the pleasure to which virtue is aligned is effectively 
scourged of any association with Comus’s revels. Indeed, there is only an oblique reference to the 
disorder and disruption of the “Belly’s” (78) celebrations, once he has been banished: Dedalus’s 
warning that “. . . what is noble should be sweet, / But not dissolved in wantonness” (266-67). 
                                                          
42 Meagher (Method and Meaning in Jonson’s Masques, 54) suggests the latter point. Sophie Tomlinson argues 
that in Queenes, “the masque thus becomes a vehicle for discriminating between two types of female actor: the 
malefic and the martial; the witch and the heroine” (Tomlinson, Women on Stage in Stuart Drama (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 31. 
43 Hugh Craig, “Jonson, the Antimasque and the ‘Rules of Flattery,’” in The Politics of the Stuart Court 
Masque, ed. David M. Bevington and Peter Holbrook (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 178. 
44 MacClintock suggests this may be a direct consequence of Beaujoyeulx’s novel adaption of the Italian 
intermedio to function “as part of the action, not merely as a diversion between scenes or acts,” establishing 
thereby a new kind of continuity (“Introduction,” 16). 
45 Leah S. Marcus, The Politics of Mirth, 8. 
46 Ibid., 7, 9; The King’s Majesty’s Declaration to his Subjects Concerning Lawful Sports to be Used, 1618, 9 
James 1.  
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A similar notion of temperate, licit pleasure seems to have informed the Balet: Beaujoyeulx’s 
prefatory address to the King praises Henri III for having “attaint les deux points de la perfection de 
toute humaine action, l’vtile & l’agreable” (“achieved the two points of perfection of all human action 
– the practical and the pleasant”), and for having “sceu temperer ceste Martiale inclination, de plaisirs 
honnestes, de passetemps exquis, de recreation esmerueillable en sa varieté” (“known how to temper 
this martial inclination with honest pleasures, delightful pastimes, recreation marvellous in variety, 
inimitable in beauty, incomparable in its delightful novelty”) (a2r; p27). Yet if signs of the Balet’s 
influence may be detected in both Queenes and Pleasure, there is still a significant difference between 
the French performance and the Jonsonian masques. Despite some of the parallels I have noted 
between Jonson’s depiction of Comus in Pleasure and allegorical treatments of Circe, Jonson’s works 
are not, in the final instance, reliant on Circean mythology. Of the English masques treated in this 
chapter which do feature Circe as a character in her own right, moreover, none have a clearly defined 
antimasque-to-masque structure. Milton’s Maske, in fact, self-consciously subverts these conventions 
to dramatic effect. While the sorcerer Comus first encounters the Lady in the suitably inauspicious 
setting of an “ominous wood” (61), her temptation continues in “a stately palace, set out with all 
manner of deliciousness: soft music, tables spread with all dainties” (657, s.d. 1-2). As Lewalski finds, 
“in formal terms, this scene would surprise a masque audience, who would expect the court scene to 
be the main masque after the antimasque in the dark wood with its antic dances of Comus’s rout. 
Instead, Milton presents the court as another antimasque: it is not the locus of virtue and grace but is 
Comus’s own residence . . . The reversal of the usual politics of masquing could not be more 
complete.”47 
Intriguingly, Craig has used the term “Circean” to describe those masques with greater formal 
flexibility, masques where the remit of characters typically associated with the antimasque is 
expanded to produce “an uninhibited and uncouth violence that unleashes wildness close to the seat of 
                                                          
47 Barbara K. Lewalski, “Milton’s Comus and the Politics of Masquing,” in The Politics of the Stuart Court 
Masque, ed. David M. Bevington and Peter Holbrook (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 309. 
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majesty.”48 In a sense, this is unsurprising: it might seem difficult to find a figure more suitable for the 
traditional antimasque role than Circe. The common, allegorical understanding of her character’s 
moral significance is clearly compatible with the typical teleology of the Jacobean and Caroline court 
masque, which, as Demaray has summarised, sees “the triumph of virtue, associated with rational 
restraint and order, over vice, associated with excessive passion and disorder.”49 Yet if Craig is 
correct, a certain interplay between form and content is responsible for this development: as in 
Homer’s tale, in the new “Circean masques,” he suggests, “we characteristically find not strange 
savages but civilized fellow-humans who are for the moment imprisoned, metamorphosed or 
disguised in degraded forms as though by enchantment.”50 This integration and dispersion of 
antimasque elements into the masque itself does little to tame them, effecting instead “a marked 
change in the balance of authority and substance between the masque and antimasque.”51 Given the 
existence of several English masques which feature a plot based on Circean allegory and mythology, 
masques that are Circean in terms of content, as well – we might begin to think – as concept, and 
given, as we have noted, that these masques are not easily divisible into regimented antimasque and 
masque components, it would seem useful to examine whether a closer relationship still might exist 
between the changing nature of the masque form and Circean lore. 
At the end of the Balet, in fact, a great effort to subject Circe to the monarch and transfer her 
powers to his court authority is evident, a fact that bears interestingly on Craig’s argument that in the 
English tradition, “the antimasquers are interlopers in the masque that are nonetheless required by the 
very form of the entertainment. “52 After Circe was captured, we are told, “Minerue estant en la 
presence du Roy luy fit present de la verge d’or & de Circé: laquelle comme vaincue & despouillee de 
sa force, se vint asseoir au bas du lieu où estoyent les Princes” (“Minerva, having entered into the 
presence of the King, presented him with the golden wand and with Circe, who, as if vanquished and 
                                                          
48 Craig, “Jonson, the Antimasque and the ‘Rules of Flattery,’” 182; 177. Craig lists Jonson’s Lovers Made Men 
(1617) and The Gypsies Metamorphosed (1621) as examples of such “Circean” masques which do not conform 
to the earlier structure (ibid., 183). 
49 Demaray, Milton and the Masque Tradition, 91. Yarnall argues that “Circe’s uncouth menagerie had obvious 
potential as antimasquers and it is probably for this reason above all that her myth was adapted to the form” 
(Transformations of Circe, 146). 
50 Craig, “Jonson, the Antimasque and the ‘Rules of Flattery,’” 182. 
51 Ibid., 183. 
52 Ibid., 188. 
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deprived of her power, came to sit below the place where the Princes were” (O3r; 89)). This would 
seem to suggest that Circe has been incorporated into, rather than banished from, the hierarchy of the 
court, a notion that receives further confirmation from her inclusion in the gift-giving ceremony 
Beaujoyeulx documents at the end of the Balet. Similarly, in Tempe Restored, Circe willingly 
transfers her power to King Charles and his consort Henrietta Maria, designating “This Machles 
Payre” her “Heire.”53 As we will see, the cruxes that accompany this pronounced need for 
incorporation or assimilation – cruxes which, I argue, speak to a dissonance already manifest in the 
allegorical apparatus of Beaujoyeulx’s Balet – problematise any alignment of Circe with a traditional 
antimasque role, and lead towards Milton’s extraordinary portrayal of Comus, who is “(unlike other 
antimasque figures) neither conquered, nor transformed, nor contained, nor reconciled.”54  
 
 
Allegorical dissonance in the Balet 
 
One aspect of Circe’s classical characterisation that proves difficult to reconcile with the Balet’s 
monocratic political claims is her semi-divine status. As Warner notes, in the Odyssey, Circe and her 
“avatars” are “intermediate figures in the pantheon, divine, but not Olympians.”55 Most obviously, 
this is reflected by Homer’s description of Circe as δεινὴ θεὸς αὐδήεσσα, “dread goddess of human 
speech” (Od. 10.136), an epithet which, as Watkins suggests, “underscores an uncanny crossing of the 
                                                          
53 Aurelian Townshend, “Tempe Restored,” in Aurelian Townshend’s Poem and Masks, ed. E.K. Chambers 
(London: Clarendon Press, 1912), 95, lines 19-20. All further references appear parenthetically by page and line 
number of this edition, unless otherwise stated. Gossett and Tomlinson have argued that Townshend’s 
departures from the Balet at the ending of Tempe Restored in fact endow his Circe with greater agency. For 
Gossett, this arises through Townshend’s deliberate manipulation of conventional, gendered casting practices: 
the “man-maide Pallas,” instrumental to Circe’s defeat in the Balet, is the only significant character in 
Townshend’s masque to be played by an actor whose sex does not match his role. Gossett notes that “though 
Jones' allegory requires that Circe ‘voluntarily deliver her golden rod to Minerva,’ in Townshend's verses this 
does not happen. Pallas, like Circe, is corrected (Jupiter says, ‘Dear daughter, cease!’), and Cupid and Jupiter 
debate who has brought Circe to resign. Male and masculine Pallas is transcended in the final reconciliation” 
(Suzanne Gossett, “‘Man‐maid, begone!’: Women in Masques,” English Literary Renaissance 18, no. 1 (1988): 
110). See also Sophie Tomlinson, “Theatrical Vibrancy on the Caroline Court Stage: Tempe Restored and The 
Shepherds’ Paradise,” in Women and Culture at the Courts of the Stuart Queens, ed. C. McManus (Houndsmill: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003),186-203, and Tomlinson, Women on Stage, 52-58. 
54 Lewalski, “Milton’s Comus and the Politics of Masquing,” 309. 
55 Marina Warner, “The Enchantments of Circe,” Raritan 17, no. 1 (1997): 13. 
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boundary between human and non-human experience.”56 While many contemporary treatments of 
Circe gloss over this point, it is admitted into the allegorical material derived from Conti’s 
Mythologiae that frames the Balet’s text. In the fourth allegory, as we have seen, Lord Gordon notes 
that “Circe, according to Homer, is a goddess and therefore immortal,” and that “it seems not 
unreasonable to take Circe for that desire in general which rules and dominates all things and is a 
mingling of the divine and sensual” (101), an interpretation which touches upon the notion, associated 
with the Platonic doctrine of a world soul, that divinity is immanent in the natural world.57 The 
allegory goes on to explain that “la personne de ceste deesse est descrite d’vne beauté extraordinaire, 
& ornee de tout ce qui est amiable: sa voix belle & Claire, qui represente ce qui peut esmouuoir le 
desir, soit par la veue, soi par l’ouye, à aimer ou la vertu, ou son contraire. Car le desir aux vns este 
l’instrument de salut: & aux autres l’instrument de perdition & ruine” (“the person of this goddess is 
descried as being extraordinarily lovely, endowed with everything attractive, her voice sweet and 
clear. This represents what may arouse desire, either by sight or hearing – desire to love virtue or its 
contrary; for desire for some people is an instrument of salvation, for others the instrument of 
perdition or ruin”) (T3r; 101-2). This allusion to the redemptive potential of desire draws most 
immediately on Neoplatonic, Pythagorean influences of the kind popularised by Ficino,58 but as my 
thesis will discuss, it may also draw on an essential ambivalence at the heart of Circean mythology: 
the Homeric Circe uses her voice to seduce but also to prophesy and instruct.59 Indeed, as Lord 
Gordon continues, “l’exercice &occupation de ceste Circé est à chanter, & faire des ouurages 
                                                          
56 Watkins, “‘A Goddess Among the Gods,’” 13. 
57 Plato, Timaeus, 34b10-35b1. 
58 As Jayne summarises, for Ficino 
 
The cosmos consists of a hierarchy of being extending from God (unity) to the physical world 
(multiplicity). In this hierarchy every level evolves from the level above it in a descending emanation 
from God and desires to rise to the level above it in an ascending return to God. This desire to return to 
one’s source is called love, and the quality in the source which attracts this desire is called beauty. The 
human soul, as part of the hierarchy of being, is involved in this same process of descent from God and 
return to love; in human beings the desire to procreate inferior beings is called earthly love, and the 
desire to rise to higher levels of being is called heavenly love. Human love is therefore a good thing 
because in both of its phases, descending and ascending, it is part of a natural cosmic process in which 
all creatures share. 
 
(Sears Jayne, “Introduction,” in Commentaries on Plato’s Symposium on Love, by Marsilio Ficino, ed. and 
trans. Sears Jayne (Dallas: Spring Publications, 1985), 7). 
59 See Od. 10.487-541; 12.22-144. 
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immortels, semblables à ceux qui sont les deesses: le chant signifie l’eloquence diuine, & discours de 
la verité” (“the practice and occupation of this Circe is to sing and to create immortal works like those 
made by the goddesses. Her singing signifies divine eloquence and discourses”) (T3r; 102). 
Interestingly, in the Balet itself Circe does not sing, and any allusion to her “divine” nature is 
mitigated by attempts to humanise her character. According to the dryad Opis, the enchantress is 
“filled with pride, sorrow and scorn” (71), and Circe herself is even made to lament,  
 
En vain à tes captifs des charmes tu appliques 
Tu les changes en vain par murmurs magiques 
Puis que tu es muable, & puis que la pitié 
Etrigueur ont de toy chacun une moitié; 
   (C1v) 
 
In vain do you use your spells on your captives. In vain do you change them by magical 
words, since you are changeable and since pity and ruthlessness each possess a half of you. 
(43) 
 
 Any threat Circe poses is seemingly further diluted by the suggestion that her rage upon losing the 
“fugitive gentleman” is fuelled by jealousy and frustrated lust. This characterisation, which recalls 
Ovid’s declaration that at Circe neque enim flammis habet aptius ulla talibus ingenium (“for no one 
has a heart more susceptible to such flames than Circe”),60 renders her as susceptible to desire as the 
men upon whom she inflicts her bestial transformations.61 In the classical texts, Circe’s propensity for 
desire might also be seen to lend her a kind of equality with the predatory male gods. Jupiter, in 
particular, is renowned for inflicting animal forms on his lovers, and in the Balet, of course, Jupiter is 
a figure for the French King. Any subversive significance of this is suppressed, however, by the 
                                                          
60 Ovid, Metamorphoses, trans. Frank Justus Miller, The Loeb Classical Library l43 (1984), 14.25-26. Unless 
otherwise specified, all further references to the Met. are to book and line number of this edition. 
61 See also Ovid, Remedia Amoris, 263-88. On this aspect of Circe’s character in Virgil’s Aeneid, see Viola G. 
Stephens, “Like a Wolf on the Fold: Animal Imagery in Vergil,” Illinois Classical Studies 15, no. 1 (1990): 
108–13. 
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Balet’s encomiastic celebration of Henri III’s divinely sanctioned rule, which might be seen to adhere 
to a “traditional Renaissance distinction between the ‘divided and distinguished’ worlds of 
permanence and mutability, the standard line of division between heaven and earth in the cosmology 
of the time,”62 a distinction which would also inform Jonson’s division of the antimasque from the 
masque proper.63  
In the Balet, Circe tells us that she herself is the only cause of cosmic change, which occurs 
“de rang en rang, de moment en moment” (G1v), an idea supported by the second allegory appended 
to Beaujoyeulx’s text which proclaims that “Circé est la circuition de l’annee par la course reuoluë du 
Soleil” (“Circe is the revolving of the year, following the revolution of the Sun” (T2v; 100)), and by 
the fourth allegory, which finds that “Le nom de sa mere est Perse . . . qui signifie passer d’outre en 
outre: ce qui conuient bien à la mer, laquelle passe & repasse d’vne motion perpetuelle les riues & 
costs de la terre, & par ceste motion se conserue de pourriture & infection” (“The name of her mother 
is Perseis . . . which means ‘passing beyond,’ which is very suitable to the Sea, which ebbs and flows 
in perpetual motion from the banks and coasts of the earth, and by this movement preserves itself 
from dirt and infection” (T2v; 101)). In the Balet proper, Circe’s transformation of the naiads and 
musicians into statues, and her subsequent freezing of Mercury, who tries to intervene by sprinkling 
moly juice over them, is followed by her fatalistic declaration that 
  
. . . du nom de vertus on apelle les moeurs 
Et les façons des vieux, qu’on estime meilleurs. 
Comme si les saisons & les siecles muables  
N’estoyent en changement l’un l’autre semblables 
   (G1r-v)  
 
                                                          
62 Kogan, The Hieroglyphic King, 49. As Browne would put it in his Religio Medici (1642), “Thus is Man that 
great and true Amphibium, whose nature is disposed to live, not onely like other creatures in divers elements, 
but in divided and distinguished worlds” (Sir Thomas Browne, “Religio Medici,” in Selected Writings, ed. 
Geoffrey Keynes (London: Faber & Faber, 1968), 41). 
63  As Orgel observes, Jonson’s antimasque, in principle at least, “is a world of particularity,” while that of the 
masque is “the world of essence, ideal and unchanging” (The Jonsonian Masque, 73). 
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People call “virtues” the way of living of our ancestors, which is supposed to be better, just as 
if the changing seasons and centuries were not, as they change each exactly like the other. 
(62)  
 
This is a response, we learn, to the endeavours of the Queen’s water nymphs to bring the golden age 
back to France and rebuild a temple dedicated to justice. For Yates, therefore, the water nymphs 
represent an alternative belief “in the virtue of ancient times which they wish to restore; for them 
Justice is an absolute value, not an amoral historical process.”64 This idea runs counter to the fatalistic 
notion of perpetual change voiced by Circe in the Balet, and with which the first, second and fourth 
allegories are concerned.65 The nymphs’ position, by contrast, relies on a providential, purposeful and 
teleological view of history which also informs the Balet’s allegorical presentation of the King as 
Jupiter: under the auspices of Henri’s Jovian sovereignty, it is suggested, the golden age of justice will 
be restored, and peace will return (73).  
Unlike the fugitive gentleman, the water nymphs and even Mercury himself, the King and the 
royal party, together with the virtues they represent, would seem to be held exempt from Circean 
mutability. The issue is complicated, however, by the Balet’s simultaneous effort to render Circean 
power unto the King. Thus, the fourth allegory relates the diverse nature of desire, which leads “some 
men to virtue, others to vice,” to “the nymphs, who are partly divine,” and the “brute animals,” who 
represent “vice and sensuality” (101). Importantly, in the Balet Circe commands only the “brute 
animals,” and does not have the nymphs at her disposal – they are servants of the Queen. Yet if 
Yates’s analysis is correct, the nymphs’ dance in the Grand Ballet, which closes the performance, is 
deeply Circean: “On the one hand the figures of the dance, constantly forming, breaking, and re-
forming in a new figure, are the endless succession of birth and death in the transmutation of the 
                                                          
64 Yates, The French Academies of the Sixteenth Century, 244. 
65See Jeanneret on the proliferation of ideas expressed in Circe’s speech in Louis Le Roy’s De la Vicissitude ou 
varieté des choses en l’univers (1575) and elsewhere in French literature of this period. Jeanneret cites this trend 
as evidence, of “a correlation between protean man . . . and a contemporary perception of historic upheaval,” 
and points out that “though the law of unstable equilibrium sustains anxiety, it also legitimates a degree of 
confidence because it ensures renewal and the survival of vital potential. . . . Order is the offspring of disorder: 
the fragile beauty of the world is at this cost” (Michel Jeanneret, Perpetual Motion: Transforming Shapes in the 
Renaissance from Da Vinci to Montaigne (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 166; 69). 
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elements and the passage of the seasons. On the other hand these geometrical figures stand for the 
eternal truths, reached by the spiritual side of man through moral choice and the right direction of 
desire.”66 As my thesis will argue, Circe, for Milton, is a figure who enables both moral choice and 
spiritual renovation, a reading which may draw inspiration from Homer’s assertion that Odysseus’s 
crew, after Circe had released them from their animal state, “became men again, younger than they 
were before, and far handsomer and taller to look upon” (Od. 10.396-98).  
In the Balet, the lines given to Jupiter after he descends at Pallas’s request can be seen to co-
opt this ameliorating, transformative function. In a speech that appears to merge this Homeric event 
with Plato’s notion of the flight of the imprisoned soul in the Phaedo (62b), the Balet’s regal Jupiter, 
“lawgiver to all the world,” claims that  
 
Tout ce qui vit de corps & sentiment 
Suiet tousiours à diuers changement, 
En un estat durable ne demeure: 
La liaison s’en corrompt & desfait 
Et sans perir par apres se refait, 
Et prent de moy une uie meilleure. 
 
Tant de mortels en mostres enchantez, 
Nymphes & Dieux que Circe a surmontez, 
Doiuent reprendre une forme plus belle 
Quand ils auront retrouué la raison, 
Sans craindre plus d’une indigne prison 
Les durs liens, ny qu’on les ensorcelle; 
                                                          
66 Yates, The French Academies of the Sixteenth Century, 249. See also Ravelhofer, Early Stuart Masque, 81: 
“the dance never really stopped: while one group rested, the other provided action. The effect would have been 
that of a kaleidoscope in which certain formations had already settled while others still moved.”  On the possibly 
“apotropaic” function of the geometric shapes the choreographic movements resolved into, bringing order from 
disorder, see Thomas M. Greene, “Labyrinth Dances in the French and English Renaissance,” Renaissance 
Quarterly 54, no. 4 (2001): 1403-66. 
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   (N4r)         
 
“Nothing which has a living body and feelings, subject to many changes, remains in a 
permanent state. The connections grow corrupt and come unbound, and then later,  
without dying, are remade and take on from me a better existence. Many mortal men 
enchanted into monsters, nymphs and gods whom Circe has conquered, will take on a more 
beautiful shape when they recover their reason. They need fear no more a sordid prison, harsh 
bonds, nor being enchanted again.” (86) 
 
While there is a tacit recognition here of the Goddess’s part in man’s spiritual journey, Jupiter himself 
lays claim only to the upward aspects of Circean metamorphosis.67 In the Balet, of course, the 
enchantress’s submission and final act of obeisance to the court in the device-giving ceremony would 
seem to mark her mutability as both subordinate to, and complicit in, the performance’s final 
expression of the divinely conferred triumph and power of the French court. Yet in Beaujoyeulx’s 
printed text, the metaphysical aporia evident in the Balet’s assimilation and adaptation of Circean 
myth are magnified, rather than disguised, by the several allegorical prisms that compete to explain 
the character’s significance.  
Against the latent dissonance that Beaujoyeulx’s elaborate appendix implies, Jonson’s 
satirical reduction of Circean circularity to Comus’s self-serving, appetitive desire in Pleasure relies – 
rather sensibly – on a more straightforward metaphysical dualism. The bowl-bearer’s declaration that 
“I am all for the Belly, the truest clock i’the world to go by” (64-5) is undermined by Hercules’ 
unequivocal assertion of the degenerative, and dehumanising consequences of this ethos: 
 
Go, reel and fall under the load you make, 
Till your swollen bowels burst with what they take. 
                                                          
67 The latter part of Jupiter’s speech is also evocative of the tripartite process of spiritual ascent in Neoplatonic 
philosophy, whereby Nempe summus ille auctor primo singula creat, secundo rapit, tertio perficit (“the supreme 
author first creates all things, second, attracts them to Himself, and third, perfects them.”). See Ficino, De 
amore, 2.1, in Ficino, Commentary on Plato’s Symposium, trans. Jayne, 45. 
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Can this be pleasure, to extinguish man, 
Or so quite change him in his figure? 
    (86-9) 
 
Only downwards metamorphosis is possible here, an idea that we will meet again in the Elder 
Brother’s strictly polarised models of divine and Circean metamorphosis which Milton includes 
(without necessarily endorsing) in his Maske: 
 
So dear to heaven is saintly chastity, 
That when a soul is found sincerely so, 
A thousand liveried Angels lackey her, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Till oft converse with heavenly habitants 
Begin to cast a beam on the outward shape,  
The unpolluted temple of the mind, 
And turns it by degrees to the soul’s essence, 
Till all be made immortal: but when lust 
By unchaste looks, loose gestures, and foul talk, 
But most by lewd and lavish act of sin, 
Lets in defilement to the inward parts, 
The soul grows clotted by contagion, 
Embodies, and imbrutes, till she quite lose 
The divine property of her first being 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
And linked itself by carnal sensuality 
To a degenerate and degraded state. 
   (452-74) 
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Without chastity – a “saintly” virtue which for the Elder Brother, if not Milton, requires the “temple 
of the mind,” to remain cloistered and “unpolluted,” and which Circean temptation, with its appeal to 
“carnal sensuality” would thereby necessarily impeach – only degradation and degeneration is 
possible.68 
Despite the harmonising promise of the title Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue, something similar 
to the Elder Brother’s philosophy conditions the metaphysical structure of Jonson’s masque. In the 
Balet, as we have seen, it is only after having undergone a Circean metamorphosis, according to 
Jupiter, that “many mortal men enchanted into monsters, nymphs and gods . . . will take on a more 
beautiful shape when they recover their reason” (86). In Jonson’s Pleasure, by contrast, an 
unbridgeable gulf between the self-debasing men-turned-bottles who accompany Comus, and those 
who follow the path of virtue and spiritual ascent represented by Atlas, inspires Hercules’ panegyric 
prophecy of the apotheosis of 
 
. . . one . . . whom  
Of the bright race of Hesperus is come, 
Who shall in time, the same that he is be, 
And now is only less light then he. 
    (171-4) 
 
This vision, of course, refers to James I, who presides over the totality of the night’s entertainment. In 
Jonson’s earlier masque, Queenes, dance and music are employed to enforce even sharper moral 
distinctions. The hags or witches make their entrance to “a kind of hollow and infernal music” (19), 
fitting to their nature, and later, “with a strange, and sudden music” (313), perform a “magical dance, 
full of preposterous change, and gesticulation” (314).69 This choreography, Jonson adds, is “most 
                                                          
68 John Milton, “Areopagitica,” in The Works of John Milton, ed. Frank Allen Patterson et al., vol. 4 (New York: 
Columbia U. P., 1932), 311. All further references are to page number of this edition.  
69 In Queenes, Walls has argued, “the musical contrasts . . . became stronger and clearer once the full-blown 
antimasque had evolved.” In between the hags’ entrance and their “magical dance,” he suggests, “the witches’ 
chanted charms are, in effect, unmusical songs. . . . Short lines, strong rhythms, and bald rhymes are the essence 
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applying to their property; who at their meetings, do all things contrary to the custom of men, dancing 
back to back, and hip to hip, their hands joined, and making their circles backward, to the left, with 
strange fantastic motions of their heads, and bodies” (14-17). Dance and music, then, come together to 
produce an antimasque of ungodly perversity, against which the balanced and elegant “grace” of the 
masque proper must have appeared to even greater effect.70 Far from inviting ambivalence, sound and 
movement work in tandem to entrench the oppositions of the masque’s moral allegory. Despite the 
likely influence of Beaujoyeulx’s text on Jonson’s praise of the geometric figures that made up the 
final dance of Queenes, this marks a clear formal departure from the Balet,71 where, as McGowan 
notes, the musicians stationed in the voûte dorée “intervene in every part of the drama, they sing with 
the sirens, the tritons, Glaucus and Thetys; with Mercury, Pan and the virtues; with Minerva and 
Jupiter,” thereby linking particularity to essence and representing the “lines of communication 
between earth and heaven, disorder and order, injustice and justice, vice and virtue.”72  
 
 
The Inner Temple Masque 
 
Circe’s song, as we have observed, is however conspicuously absent from the Balet’s score – a 
silencing that exiles her not only from the Balet’s music, but also, and more problematically, from its 
underlying metaphysics. As I have suggested, the notion of a “mixed” Circe who participates in 
divinity is entertained only in the Balet’s allegorical appendices, where it exposes a degree of tension 
between the work’s moral and political claims and the wider, Neoplatonic interest of its theme. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of this kind of incantation and they are calculated to produce a sinister effect” (Peter Walls, Music in the English 
Courtly Masque 1604-1640 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 78. 
70 Dance offers further opportunities for discrimination in Milton’s Maske, where the revels of Comus and his 
rout are cast into relief by the “jigs” (951) of the “Country Dancers” (956, s.d. 2) or shepherds in the grounds of 
Ludlow Castle, and these in turn by the “trippings . . . / Of lighter toes” (960-61), as the aristocratic dancers take 
the stage at the end of the Maske. 
71 See Meagher, Method and Meaning in Jonson’s Masques, 74. Daye discusses “the disturbed measures of the 
witches’ two dances, as preserved in the surviving musical scores, in which short snatches of changing dance 
metre are mixed with long notes lacking rhythm,” and argues that this “fragmented dance music was a fresh 
innovation in England as no exemplars exist in French ballet music of the early seventeenth century” (“The Role 
of Le Balet Comique in Forging the Stuart Masque,” 196). See also the “barbarous dissonance” of Comus’s rout 
(Maske 449), a phrase recycled by Milton in Paradise Lost as he differentiates the “celestial song” (7.13) of his 
muse Urania from the noise of “Bacchus and his revellers” (7.32). 
72 McGowan, “Introduction,” 32. 
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formal developments of Jonson’s masques, with their separate antimasque and masque components 
and uncompromising moral allegories go some way towards circumventing these difficulties. In those 
masques similarly indebted to the Balet which do not conform to a dualistic structure, however, 
conflicting elements of the French performance may be seen to resurface. Browne’s Inner Temple 
Masque, performed by the “gentlemen” of the Inns of Court in 1615,73 is generally regarded as 
something of an outlier in the masque genre: the masque’s lack of “moral instruction” is discussed by 
Wright,74 and Hill has commented on its unusual structure whereby “the anti-masque is so neatly 
integrated – the animals are thought to be some of Ulysses’s companions and the cause of his grief – 
that it forms a part rather than an interruption of the masque action.”75 This formal fluidity, in 
combination with Browne’s eclectic range of classical source material and the masque’s absence of 
overt moral allegory,76 produces a work of a very different order to Jonson’s Pleasure and Queens. By 
consequence, however, Browne’s Inner Temple Masque is valuably suggestive of the ideological 
work performed by the framing it lacks. As I will argue, in Browne’s masque a relaxation of the 
allegorical constraints, usually attendant upon staged adaptations of the Circe myth, expands the 
figure’s range of signification to encompass aspects of her character that it would seem in the masque 
genre’s best interest to suppress. 
The Inner Temple Masque opens with an exchange on a cliff-face between a Siren, who 
serves Circe, and Triton, a messenger of Tethys who relays his superior’s “command” (line 40) that 
the Goddess should not to delay Ulysses any further on his journey back to Ithaca. The Siren retorts 
that  
                                                          
73 William Browne, “The Masque of the Inner Temple (Ulysses and Circe),” in A Book of Masques in Honour of 
Allardyce Nicoll, ed. T. J. B. Spencer, Stanley Wells, and R.F. Hill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1967), 186. All further references to the Inner Temple Masque are to page or line number of this edition. 
74 Gillian Wright, “Giving Them But Their Own: Circe, Ulysses, and William Browne of Tavistock,” Medieval 
& Renaissance Drama in England 12 (1999): 196. 
75 R. F. Hill, “Introduction,” in A Book of Masques, by William Browne, 184. This observation should recall 
Craig’s notion of the “Circean” masque, in which “we characteristically find not strange savages but civilized 
fellow-humans who are for the moment imprisoned, metamorphosed or disguised in degraded forms as though 
by enchantment” (“Jonson, the Antimasque and the ‘Rules of Flattery,’” 182). 
76 The masque’s epigraph is taken from the Laus Pisonis, which Browne renders as “Ovid. Ad Pisonem” (186). 
Lines from Virgil’s Aeneid, Iamque adeo scopulos Syrenum advecta subibat / Difficiles quondam multorumque 
ossibus albos (lines 14-15; Aeneid 5.864-5), furnish the “description of the first scene” (line 11), while Triton’s 
appearance is said to be “in all parts as Apollonius, lib. 4 Argonautica, shows him” (lines 34-35). The nymphs 
and nereids of the second antimasque, clothed in green and white like their predecessors in the Balet, “are by 
Ovid affirmed to help . . . Circe in their collections” (lines 371-2). Discussion of potential sources for Browne’s 
characterisation of Circe will be found in the main body of this chapter. 
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’tis not Tethys, nor a greater power, 
Cynthia that rules the waves: scarce he, each hour, 
That wields the thunderbolts, can things begun 
By mighty Circe, daughter to the sun, 
Check or control. 
    (54-58) 
 
Triton exits, the Siren sings, and Circe is revealed “upon the rock,” from which she explains that the 
Greek ships have “cast their hook’d anchors on Aeaea’s strand,” and that in “a curious arbour” on her 
island, “Ulysses near his mates, by my strong charms / Lie[s] . . . till my return in sleep’s soft arms” 
(line 94; 104; 118; 123-4). The second scene takes place in the arbour, where “Ulysses was seen lying 
as asleepe under the covert of a fair tree” (lines 154-5), a setting which may owe something to 
Homer’s tale of Odysseus’s encounter with Nausicaa and her maids in Book 6 of the Odyssey. In 
contrast to the Balet’s attempt to play down Circe’s divine heritage, in Browne’s masque, upon 
waking, Ulysses addresses the enchantress as “Thou more than mortal maid” (line 184), an epithet 
which recalls Aeneas’s greeting of his disguised mother Venus, O dea certe, before the tragic events 
of his encounter with Dido unfold in Virgil’s poem.77 This allusion to a more powerful Circe figure is 
daring, given that Browne’s masque also emphasises “Aeaea’s queen[’s]” expert knowledge of the 
transformative powers of the natural world, a knowledge, furthermore, that is dangerously gendered.78 
                                                          
77 Virgil, Aeneid, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough, Loeb Classical Library 63 (1999), 1.329. All further references 
are to this edition. Watkins, in fact, has suggested that this moment in the Aeneid, where Aeneas wonders at the 
strange mix of divine and human attributes of the female figure before him, o—quam te memorem, virgo? 
namque haud tibi vultus mortalis, nec vox hominem sonat; o dea certe! (“but by what name should I call you, 
maiden? for your face is not mortal nor has your voice a human ring; O goddess surely!” (1.327-8)), derives 
from Homer’s account of the meeting between Odysseus and Circe, “the dread goddess of human speech” (Od. 
10.136), whose seemingly hybrid nature invokes both wonder and fear in the Greeks (Watkins, “‘A Goddess 
Among the Gods,’” 15).  
78 Line 333. Stephens notes that in Book 3 of the Aeneid, where Circe is called “Aeaean Circe” (3.386), “the 
adjective alludes not only to her present Italian location but to her Homeric association with Colchis and Medea, 
as Aeetes’ sister (Od. 10. 135). Dido throughout Book 4 evokes Medea, especially in the preparation of her 
funeral pyre (4.465, 474, 484-85)” (Stephens, “Like a Wolf on the Fold: Animal Imagery in Vergil,” 110). 
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The metaphysical and political subservience of the Goddess to a more powerful masculine 
authority that is suggested by Circe’s moniker, “daughter to the Sun” (line 57), is directly challenged 
by her assertion that should Phoebus dare to “pry” (line 119) in her arbour,  
 
I would benight him ere he get his inn, 
Or turn his steeds awry, so draw him on 
To burn all lands but this like Phaeton. 79 
    (120-22) 
 
Yet Browne’s Circe does not only claim to hold sway over the Sun her father. According to the Siren 
who boasts of her mistress’s prowess to Triton at the beginning of the masque, Circe can charm fish 
out of water, walk on water as if it were land, manipulate the clouds and moon to make day as night 
and night as day, reverse the course of rivers and uproot trees, bring dead men back to life, and invert 
the seasons so that “the winter solstice bringe / All Flora’s daintyes” – a veritable litany of powers 
which merges Ovid’s portrayals of Medea and Circe into an image of a singular, all-powerful nature 
goddess.80 Browne’s Circe, furthermore, is also seen to be in full command of the nymphs who gather 
her “simples” (line 368), which in Lord Gordon’s allegory figure “the virtue and knowledge through 
which the minds of men are prepared and disposed for good” (102).81 Thus, in the last lines of 
                                                          
79 Homer tells us that Circe’s parents were Helios, god of the sun, and Perse, an Oceanid nymph (Od. 10.135). 
The well-educated audience of Browne’s masque would be further aware that in Platonic discourse, the sun is a 
metaphor for the illuminating idea of “goodness” that is essential to the generation of knowledge and truth 
(Republic 507b–509). In contemporary literature, furthermore, the sun was a common symbol for sovereign 
power – see for instance Jonson’s Masque of Blackness (1605). 
80 Lines 58-71; 72-73. See Ovid, Met. 7.179-233; 14.368-71. For a discussion of the relationship between Medea 
and Circe in the Renaissance, where “the two are often found paired as a dual archetype of witches or 
enchantresses,” see Tania Demetriou, “‘Essentially Circe’: Spenser, Homer, and the Homeric Tradition,” 
Translation and Literature 15, no. 2 (2006): 168. 
81 While as Watkins notes, the meeting between Aeneas and Venus was read by commentators like Badius as 
“an allegory about the dangers of lust” (“‘A Goddess Among the Gods,’” 17; Jodocus Badius Ascensius, P. 
Virgili Maronis Aneida Commentarium in Virgil, Opera (Venice: Lucantonio Giunta, 1544), 176v.), Landino 
draws a distinction between the Venus coelestis, with whom he identifies Virgil’s deity as one who draws men 
from contemplation of earthly to celestial things, and the Venus naturalis who elicits troublesome sexual desire 
(Cristoforo Landino, Disputationes Camaldulenses, ed. Peter Lohe (Florence: Sansoni, 1980), 120–27). Watkins 
observes that “humanist editors typically invited readers to weigh the merits of these competing interpretations 
by including them in the glosses annotating their editions of Virgil’s poem” (“‘A Goddess Among the Gods,’” 
17). In her discussion of another echo of Virgil’s famous line, Ferdinand’s exclamation “most sure the goddess / 
On whom these airs attend” when he first sees Miranda in The Tempest, Hamilton argues that “in linking 
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Browne’s first scene – lines which may also bring to mind the Neoplatonic vision, perhaps best 
known from Botticelli’s painting, of the attributes of Venus unfolded in the three graces – Circe’s 
sirens declare that “What all the elements do owe to thee / In their obedience, is perform’d in me.”82
 Again, however, the significance of Browne’s departure from the Circean representations 
more typical of this period must be weighed against his depiction of the Goddess’s helplessness in the 
face of her own passion and desire, as Echo’s call to the nymphs in a song commissioned by Circe to 
“please” (line 337) Ulysses, would suggest: 
 
No longer stay, except it be to bring 
A med’cine for love’s sting; 
That would excuse you, and be held more dear 
Than wit or magic, for both they are here. 
(357-60) 
 
Proving herself as susceptible to flattery as she is desire, Circe ultimately passes her wand to Ulysses 
to release the Greeks from their enchantment so that as she is promised, they in turn “May in a dance 
strive how to pleasure thee, / Either with skill or with variety” (lines 391-2).83 The scope for 
complexity and depth that the masque’s eclectic influences lend Circe’s character is thus suppressed, 
or bathetically diminished, by Browne’s emphasis on her voluntary, love-lorn submission to Ulysses. 
At the end of the performance, moreover, the significant feminine power that Circe wields over the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Miranda to Venus . . . Shakespeare enhances Miranda’s double function of being the one who arouses 
Ferdinand’s passion and also leads him to knowledge of divine things”( Donna B. Hamilton, Virgil and The 
Tempest: The Politics of Imitation (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1990), 95). 
82  Lines 127-8. Dempsey suggests that the costumes Venus and the Graces wear in Botticelli’s paintings are 
modelled on those worn in contemporary masques. See Charles Dempsey, “Portraits and Masks in the Art of 
Lorenzo de Medici, Botticelli, and Politians Stanze per La Giostra,” Renaissance Quarterly 52, no. 1 (1999): 1–
42. Ficino calls the graces by the names of Pulchritudo, Amor, and Volupta: Circulus . . . prout in Deo incipit et 
allicit, pulchritude: prout in mundum transiens ipsum rapit, amor; prout in auctorem remeans ipsi suum opus 
coniungit, voluptas. Amor igitur in voluptatem a pulchritudine destinat (“The same circle ... begins in God and 
attracts to Him, it is Beauty; inasmuch as emanating to the world it captivates it, we call it Love; inasmuch as it 
returns to its source and with Him joins His work to Him, it is called Pleasure. Love, therefore, beginning from 
Beauty, ends in Pleasure”). See Ficino, De amore, 2.2, in Marsilio Ficino, Commentary on Plato’s Symposium 
of Love, trans. Jayne, 46.  
83 On the “considerable musical variety” of Browne’s Inner Temple Masque, see Walls, Music in the English 
Courtly Masque, 264-65. 
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natural world is belatedly, yet aggressively counterbalanced by the song which accompanies the first 
dance: 
 
Earth doth think, as otherwhere   
Do some women she doth bear. 
Those wives whose husbands only threaten, 
Are not lov’d like those are beaten: 
Then with your feet to suff’ring move her, 
For whilst you beat earth thus, you love her.84 
(440-45) 
 
There is, however, a certain moral ambiguity that emerges through Browne’s portrayal of the 
relationship between the two main protagonists of the masque, Circe and Ulysses, which this ending 
does not resolve. As we have seen, Circean “time” is associated by Triton at the beginning of the 
masque with the delays faced by Ulysses on his journey back to Ithaca, and consequently, drawing 
perhaps on the “enervating idleness” that Brodwin identifies as one of Circe’s three main temptations 
in the Odyssey, is figured as an impediment to virtue.85 In due course, this would appear to be 
confirmed by Ulysses’s inertia “in sleep’s soft arms” under the influence of Circe’s “charms” (lines 
124; 123), a state of stupefaction that may recall Circe’s paralysis of the dancing nymphs in the Balet. 
Yet Browne offers more than one perspective on the sleeping Greek hero. Circe’s allusion to the 
devastation the Greeks wreaked at Troy, 
 
Now Ithacus,  
Ajax would offer hecatombs to us,   
And Ilium’s ravish’d wives, and childless sires, 
                                                          
84 As Ravelhofer notes, the dancing floor used for masque performances “usually consisted of a timber platform 
slightly raised above the actual floor. . . . dancers could use the floor as acoustic instrument by stamping, as a 
wooden surface resonates” (Early Stuart Masque, 84). 
85 Brodwin, “Milton and the Renaissance Circe,” 21. 
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With incense dim the bright aetherial fires, 
To have thee bound in chains of sleep as here; 
    (157-61) 
 
is a timely reminder that history tends to be written by the victors. There is a degree of irony, 
moreover, in the fact that as Wright notes, in the masque, “when Ulysses himself appears he is 
passive, acquiescent and subordinate, and does not fulfil the promise of his reputation.”86 If these 
characteristics prove consistent with Brodwin’s argument that the Homeric Circe’s real threat resides 
in the effeminate attitude her charms can provoke in men, it is also possible that the “passive” and 
“acquiescent” traits Wright identifies in Browne’s Ulysses are in fact cunning and strategic 
interventions deployed by the Greek to soften and flatter the Goddess.87 Indeed, Ulysses’ hyperbolic 
praise of the first antimasque, followed by his sympathetic response to Circe’s claim that she is a 
victim of envy and slander – “Aeaea’s queene and great Hyperions pride, / Pardon misdoubts; and we 
are satisfied” (lines 333-4) – precipitates the pivotal redress of the masque’s power balance that 
occurs when Circe at the end of the second scene hands over her wand to Ulysses to free his sleeping 
crew. Browne’s Ulysses thus recalls that of the Latin poets, who present the graeculus as deceitful 
and cunning, an extension perhaps of Homer’s description of Odysseus as πολύτροπον or polytropos 
(“of many turns,” Od. 1.1) or πολύμητις (polymetis, “of many ruses,” Od. 2.173). 
 
 
Siren song and poetic pleasures 
 
In the Odyssey, Odysseus himself is warned by Hermes about Circe’s ὀλοφώια δήνεα (“deadly 
guiles,” 10.289), leading Gough to argue that “the similarity between Odysseus’ ruses and Circe’s, his 
duplicity and hers . . . undoes any neat distinction between the enchantress, on the one hand, and the 
                                                          
86 Wright, “Giving Them But Their Own,” 208. 
87 Brodwin, “Milton and the Renaissance Circe,” 21. 
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hero on the other.”88 In Browne’s masque, the Sirenic abilities Circe attributes to Ulysses as she tells 
in her first speech how “the music of Ulysses’ tongue” drew a hundred dolphins to the Greeks’ ships 
(lines 99-101) serve as a reminder of this point. Importantly, as Yates has found, in medieval and 
early modern allegory sirens were commonly used to represent the “temptations of the flesh,” their 
song, which was linked both to intemperate sensual indulgence and flattery, often mentioned in the 
same breath as the dangers of Circe’s pharmakon.89 Thus, Whitney’s Circe emblem, “Homines 
voluptatibus transformatur,” is accompanied by the lines “Oh stoppe your ears, and shutte your eies, 
of Circes cuppe beware,”90 and at the beginning of the first scene of Browne’s masque, the Sirens that 
serve Circe are said to sing a song “as lascivious proper to them.”91 Yates, however, also documents a 
tradition in which the sirens were thought to be the daughters of a Muse, noting “their confusion with 
those sirens who, according to Plato, guided the celestial spheres emitting notes of music which 
formed the heavenly harmony.”92 Thus, Cartari records that for Xenophon, 
 
the Sirens were pleasant and virtuous. For when he reports on the words and deeds of 
Socrates, he writes that the Sirens only sang the true praises of those who deserved to be 
praised, praises that focused on their virtues. Thus in Homer, the Sirens sing that Ulysses 
deserves the very highest praise, because he was such a shining example to all of the Greeks. 
For these were the enchantments and sweet melodies that the Sirens used to lure virtuous men 
into their presence. For once these men hear virtue (which they love so much) being praised, 
they keep trying to get as close as they can to that sound. So in a very free and easy way, they 
head straight for the sweet song of the praiser.93 
 
                                                          
88 Gough, “Daughters of Circe,” 20. 
89 Yates, The French Academies of the Sixteenth Century, 241. 
90 Geoffrey Whitney, A Choice of Emblemes, ed. Henry Green (1586; rpt. New York: Benjamin Blom, 1967), 
82. 
91 Lines 19-20. For further instances of allegorical elisions following Horace’s example in Epistles 1.2.17-2 of 
the dangers posed by Circe and the sirens respectively, see Vredeveld, “‘Deaf as Ulysses to the Siren’s Song’”: 
846–82. 
92 Yates, The French Academies of the Sixteenth Century, 240. See for instance Quaestiones convivales, 14 
774E, in Plutarch, Moralia. Table Talk, vol. 9, Loeb Classical Library 425 (1969), 281. 
93 Cartari, Vincenzo Cartari’s Images of the Gods of the Ancients, 194. See also Xenophon, Memorabilia, 2.6.11 
-12. 
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For Yates, “this is evidently the meaning of the sirens of the Ballet comique, who sing the praises of 
Henry III.”94 Their song, she observes, “is replied to by the music from the voûte dorée which, we are 
expressly told, represented the true harmony of heaven. Thus the song of these sirens is related both to 
the heavenly harmony and to the moral and political harmony which should reign in France under the 
leadership of her pious kings.”95 The creators of the Balet, then, perhaps in an effort to streamline the 
moral and political message of the production, would seem to exorcise the Circean associations of 
siren song from its performance. 
The central indeterminacy this suppresses, however – an indeterminacy which, this thesis 
argues, is intrinsic to the Homeric myth of the Goddess– re-emerges in Townshend’s Tempe Restored, 
where Circe’s beautiful singing voice features prominently, and again in Milton’s Maske, where the 
chaste Lady’s singing reminds the sorcerer of “My mother Circe with the Sirens three” (252).96 The 
presence of Circe’s voice in these later performances takes on additional significance when we 
consider Watkins’ observation that “the question of whether she is a goddess or a woman intersects 
the question of whether her human sounding voice is an illusion to ensnare her listeners or a 
foreshadowing of her later benevolence” as a “protectress” of the Greeks.97 The notion that Circe’s 
charms are illusory has a long history in allegorical interpretations of the myth, and in Christian 
allegory owes much to Augustine’s denouncement of Circe, illa maga famosissima, as a demon who 
is able to change appearances, but not reality.98 In De civitate Dei, therefore, we are told that 
 
Nec sane daemones naturas creant, si aliquid tale faciunt, de qualibus factis ista vertitur 
quaestio; sed specie tenus, quae a vero Deo sunt creata, commutant, ut videantur esse quod 
non sunt. Non itaque solum animum, sed ne corpus quidem ulla ratione crediderim 
                                                          
94 Yates, The French Academies of the Sixteenth Century, 241. 
95 Ibid. Walls has discussed the close link between the theories of musica speculative and what he describes as 
“the music of the king’s peace” in the English masque tradition: see Walls, Music in the English Courtly 
Masque, 8-9. 
96 The significance of this line will be discussed in more depth at a later point in my thesis. 
97 Watkins, “‘A Goddess Among the Gods’: Virgil, Milton and the Woman of Immortal Voice,” 15. 
98 Augustine, City of God, trans. George E. McCracken, vol. 5, Loeb Classical Library 415 (1957), 18.17. All 
further references are to this edition. For a discussion of the influence of Augustinian thought on this point on 
early modern philosophical scepticism, see Jonathan Ellis, “The Figure of Circe and the Power of Knowledge: 
Competing Philosophies in Calderón’s El Mayor Encanto, Amor,” Bulletin of Spanish Studies 87, no. 2 (2010): 
147–62. 
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daemonum arte vel potestate in membra et liniamenta bestialia veraciter posse converti, sed 
phantasticum hominis, quod etiam cogitando sive somniando per rerum innumerabilia genera 
variatur et, cum corpus non sit, corporum tamen similes mira celeritate formas capit, sopitis 
aut oppressis corporeis hominis sensibus ad aliorum sensum nescio quo ineffabili modo 
figura corporea posse perduci; ita ut corpora ipsa hominum alicubi iaceant, viventia quidem, 
sed multo gravius atque vehementius quam somno suis sensibus obseratis.  
 
Certainly demons do not create actual beings, if they do anything of the sort here under 
discussion. It is merely in appearance that they change beings that are created by the true 
God, so that they seem to be what they are not. Therefore I should by no means believe that 
the soul, or even the body, can be really changed by the craft or power of demons into the 
members and features of beasts. I hold instead that a man’s phantom – which also in his 
thoughts and dreams is changed by the countless variety of objects it receives, and though it is 
not a body, still with astonishing swiftness receives shapes that are like material bodies – this 
phantom, I hold, can in some inexplicable way present itself to the senses of others in bodily 
form, when their physical senses are dulled or blocked out. (18.18) 
 
Illusion, however, need not only apply to strictly supernatural or demonic phenomena. As Gough 
notes, an allegorical tradition stretching back to Horace and Plutarch “emphasizes the important role 
the enchantress plays, in Homer and Ovid in particular, as a figure for specifically rhetorical and 
poetic seductions” – she finds, furthermore, “a persistent doubling of poet and temptress” that extends 
through the Renaissance.99 In the Balet, this trope, which may draw ultimately on a Platonic worry 
about the morality of art, informs the fugitive gentleman’s complaint of Circe’s deceptive appearance: 
  
 ce n’estoit vne femme: vne qui l’air respire 
 N’a point tant de beauté, & si n’a point tant d’ire. 
                                                          
99 Gough, “Daughters of Circe,” 72; 149. We will have further recourse to Gough’s work, which explores the 
significance of Odysseus’s escape from the dangers of Circe and the Sirens as an allegory for “right reading,” in 
the next chapter. 
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 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 Mais sous tant de beauté la poison estoit close 
 Du miel, qui de sa bouche en paroles couloit 
 Pour amorcer le Coeur de ceux qu’elle vouloit; 
    (B4r) 
 
no breathing being has so much beauty and so much evil . . . . But beneath such beauty poison 
was hidden, which flowed from her mouth in honeyed words to trap the hearts she desired. 100 
(41) 
 
An association of Circean illusion with rhetorical sophistry might also account for the moly 
plant’s puzzling inefficacy against Circe’s charms in the Balet, a departure from Homeric, Ovidian 
and Virgilian mythology for which it is difficult to find precedent. In the Balet, moly is deployed by 
Mercury, in place of Odysseus, in an attempt to free the musicians and dancers who have been 
rendered “motionless as a statue” (55) by Circe’s golden wand. The root, the messenger God asserts, 
will “cure a mind deprived of its reason, which, when it is tired of virtue, has been charmed by 
pleasure” (60), a claim which draws on both the classical conception of the enervating effects of 
Circe’s spell and the later, allegorical interpretation of moly as logos or right reason, the possession of 
which differentiates men from beasts. The moly root, the Balet’s Mercury explains, has been “distilled 
into a water of forgetfulness” so that it may counter Circe’s ability to make those she has transformed 
forget their former shapes, and thereby “expose the illusions of her art” (61). The endeavour proves 
initially successful, restoring movement to the musicians and dancers who together carry the symbolic 
weight of the King’s virtuous and harmonious rule. Yet Circe is not so easily defeated, and arrests the 
figures a second time with a touch of her wand. The reason for Mercury’s ultimate failure is given by 
Circe herself: 
  
                                                          
100 Ovid’s emphasis on the deceptive nature of Circe’s evil drugs is greater than Homer’s: In the Metamorphoses 
we are told that while concocting her pharmakon, Circe quique sub hac lateant furtim dulcedine, sucos / adicit 
(“in this sweet drink, where they might lie unnoticed, she slyly squeezed some of her baleful juices” (Met 
14.275-6)). 
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Mercure vagabond, muable & insensé, 
De soudain mouuement deça delà poussé, 
Sans chois & sans conseil est foible et sans puissance, 
Si Pallas ne luy donne aduis & asseurance; 
(G2r) 
 
Mercury, volatile, changeable and foolish, urged first one way then another by caprice, 
without decision and without counsel, Mercury alone is weak and without power, unless 
Pallas gives him advice and assurance. (63)  
 
This criticism, we might note, is couched in similar terms to that of Augustine’s description of 
“man’s phantom – which also in his thoughts and dreams is changed by the countless variety of 
objects it receives, and though it is not a body, still with astonishing swiftness receives shapes that are 
like material bodies” (City of God 18.18). Indeed, in the speech the goddess makes to the King upon 
her first appearance in the Balet, Minerva informs us that when Jupiter granted her jurisdiction over 
man’s understanding, Mercury was similarly entrusted with the senses. These are  
 
Freres ailez au dos, plus legers que les vents, 
Incertains comme luy, muables & volages, 
Qui poussent çà & là le desir des courages, 
D’imaginations menant la volonté 
Tantost à la virtue, tantost à volupté; 
   (M3v) 
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winged brothers lighter than air, changeable as it is, and flighty, which shift now here, now 
there; the desire for courage, leading the will by imagination, at one time to virtue, at another 
time to idle pleasure. (79)101  
 
Specifically, we learn from Pallas, what Mercury, who is well endowed with “eloquence” (60) lacks is 
reason. As Yates has argued, if “misuse of desire” has caused the bestial transformation of the men 
that parade before Circe, Mercury’s own helplessness suggests that “even man’s god-like gift of 
intelligence by which he learns his eloquence and his skill in all the arts and sciences – becomes under 
the influence of fatalistic philosophies a more terrible instrument for his enslavement than the animal 
passions,” a point which bears importantly on the ethical problems Spenser and Milton, writing within 
a Reformed theological tradition, will be seen to grapple with in my later chapters.102 In the Balet, 
moly too, then, might be counted among those “false shews and suppositions” symptomatic of the 
“false and corrupt imagination” from which vice proceeds.103  
In the Inner Temple Masque, Browne’s emphasis on Circe’s slavish love to Ulysses might 
seem to endow the Goddess’s direction of desire with a Mercurian flighty arbitrariness. Yet across the 
                                                          
101 My discussion throughout this chapter assumes some knowledge of contemporary faculty psychology, which 
was heavily grounded in Aristotle’s explication of the mental faculties in De Anima. Rossky’s summary is 
useful here:  
 
In a definite hierarchical order of communication, knowledge travels from the so-called “outer” senses 
(the five primary senses), to the “inner” (Common Sense, Imagination and/or Fantasy, Sensible 
Reason, and Memory, which occupy cells in the brain), and thus to the highest rational, incorporeal 
powers (the Intellect or Wit or Understanding, and the Will). More specifically, the general course of 
communication runs from the perception of the outward senses to common sense, or directly to 
imagination, which unites the various reports of the senses into impressions that are in turn submitted 
to the examination of a rational power and then passed to memory which retains the impressions and 
reflects them back to the Imagination and Sensible Reason, should they turn to it to recall past incidents 
Beyond these faculties and functions lies the overseeing and judging power of the highest 
Understanding, which in turn informs the Will.  
(William Rossky, “Imagination in the English Renaissance: Psychology and Poetic,” Studies in the Renaissance 
5 (1958): 50). 
102 Yates, The French Academies of the Sixteenth Century, 244. Le Roy’s metaphysical approach is in an 
important sense different to Circe’s in the Balet – Jeanneret argues that “the universal principle of vicissitudes, 
far from inspiring skepticism or resignation, leads Le Roy to a dynamically optimistic vision: it makes sense to 
ride the wave, guide it in a positive direction, try one’s best to give it a favourable orientation. This willingness 
to accept change and go with the times underlies a theory of progress; since things are flexible we are invited to 
intervene to perfect them and bring to maturity the promises of change” (Perpetual Motion, 169). 
103 Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, ed. Floyd Dell and Paul Jordan-Smith (1621; rpt. New York: 
Tudor Pub., 1938), 221. In the Balet, the inefficacy of moly serves moreover to provide additional panegyric 
opportunity: in Beaujoyeulx’s preface, Pallas, as we have seen is related allegorically to the Queen Mother, 
Catherine de Medici. 
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masque as a whole, aspects of a rather different goddess emerge. Against the Balet’s emphasis on the 
evil forgetfulness that Circe inspires in those who fall victim to her charms, Browne’s Goddess 
exclaims “Circe drinkes not of Lethe” (line 129). This assertion, which appends a flurry of rhetorical 
activity by which the magical qualities of her speech manifest,104 could hardly have been contested by 
the masque’s spectators. In fact, given the broader, cultural memory that her comments on the Trojan 
war suggest she possesses, Browne’s Circe bears some affinity to the powerful, eponymous mage of 
Bruno’s Cantus Circaeus (1582). As Yates notes, “by using magical or talismanic images as memory-
images, the Magus hoped to acquire universal knowledge, and also powers, obtaining through the 
magical organisation of the imagination a magically powerful personality, tuned in, as it were, to the 
powers of the cosmos.”105 In this guise, Circe’s magic “can be used benevolently or malevolently,” 
but her transformations also induce “some kind of moral reform.”106 
 The first allegory of the Balet, as we have seen, tempers the possibility for Circean 
knowledge to be seen as virtuous by stressing that in the mythological narratives, “the four nymphs, 
who served her and gathered the herbs for her potions, are the elements over which she has no power, 
because the corruption, generation and mutation of the elements is perpetual” (99, my emphasis). 
While Circe is associated with the incessant interchange of nature’s elements, the allegory thus denied 
her any active role or agency in this process. In comparison, Browne’s portrayal of a Circe with 
knowledge not only of “Poppy and Mandragoras” but also of “moly” – used here by the goddess to 
wake Ulysses from sleep – might be viewed as a subversive rewriting of the Homeric narrative, that 
boosts our sense of the enchantress’s power and endows her with virtuous potential.107 Together with 
                                                          
104 The second scene opens with the following description: “While Circe was speaking her first speech, and at 
these words, ‘Yon stands a hill, etc.,’ a traverse was drawn at the lower end of the hall, and gave way to the 
discovery of an artificial wood so near imitating nature that I think, had there been a grove like it in the open 
plain birds would have been faster drawn to that than to Zeuxis’ grapes” (lines 132-6). 
105 Frances A. Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1999), 
192. 
106 Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, 202. Yates founds this claim on several unusual features 
of the Circe of Bruno’s Cantus, who “asks where is Astraea, the justice of the Golden Age, threatens evil-doers, 
calls on the gods to restore virtue. As a result of her magic, men are turned into beasts, and this (quite contrary 
to the usual interpretation of the Circe story) is a good thing because wicked men are less harmful in their true 
animal forms.” See Giordano Bruno, “Cantus Circaeus,” in Opere Latine, ed. F. Fiorentino et al., vol. 2(i) 
(Naples, Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: F. Frommann-G. Holzboog, 1879), 186–94. 
107 Browne, Inner Temple Masque, lines 171; 178. 
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her later release of Ulysses’ men, Circe’s possession of the moly plant recalls the claim of the Balet’s 
fourth allegory, which somewhat contradicts the first, that 
 
Circe with one drink converted men into beasts, and with another remedy restored to them to 
their real shape and human form. By this the poets, first inventors of all philosophy, meant to 
convey to us that desire when it is used for luxury and vice, makes us more brutish than the 
beasts themselves, but if it is by divine help imbued with precepts of virtue, it renders to men 
their true form and delivers them from the bestial servitude of vice and lust. (102) 
 
 
Circean stagecraft 
 
In addition to Browne’s restoration of the goddess’s dual nature, and in contrast to the retarding, 
destructive effects of her power in the Balet, in the Inner Temple Masque Circe is constructively 
engaged with the formal ambitions of the work in which she appears. Whereas the Balet’s Circe is 
able only to arrest movement, in Browne’s masque Circe is seen to commission both the dance and 
music of the antimasque, through which she claims to control the audience’s very experience of time 
itself: “music, thy voice, / . . . . Appear; and in a dance ‘gin that delight / Which with the minutes shall 
grow infinite” (lines 213-7). Responding to Ulysses’ dissatisfaction with the “antic measure,” Circe’s 
powers of stagecraft are exemplified further as she directs the course of the performance thereafter to 
better suit his taste: “since what’s past doth not Ulysses please, / Call to a dance the fair Nereides” 
(lines 261; 337-8). Neither is her influence confined to the antimasque part of the production (if 
indeed, given Hill’s remarks on its lack of distinction from the masque proper, it may even be referred 
to as such). Just as she had woken Ulysses with drops of the moly plant, Circe enables the Greek to 
draw his “companions,” the masquers, from their slumber:  
 
Circe is pleased. Ulysses take my wand 
And from their eyes each child of sleep command; 
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Whilst my choice maids with their harmonious voices, 
Whereat each bird and dancing spring rejoices, 
Charming the winds when they contrary meet, 
Shall make their spirits as nimble as their feet. 
(393-8) 
 
The final dances of the masque, which denote the usual return of peace, harmony and ordered rule are 
therefore conducted under her blessing.  
It might be argued that the ending of Browne’s masque, which does, after all, include a verse 
that endorses wife-beating, represents simply another instance of Circean submission and assimilation 
to a patriarchal status-quo. The extent of Circe’s powers in the masque, however, is amplified by their 
forecast longevity: the penultimate verse, sung by the chorus, promises the lawyers and their lady 
partners that 
 
. . . if it lay in Circe’s power,  
Your bliss might so persever, 
That these you choose but for an hour 
You should enjoy for ever. 
(455-8)   
 
While we should not overlook the qualifier “if” in the chorus’s claim, Browne’s continued stress on 
the constructive force of Circe’s desire may give the impression that the masque in its entirety is in 
fact governed by a figure usually deployed as a foil to its ideological concerns. To understand the 
exponential growth of Circe’s theatrical, and indeed metatheatrical powers in Browne’s work – an 
admittedly unusual example of the Circean masque, since it was neither commissioned by, nor 
performed for the King  or Queen– we need, I would suggest, to look beyond the masque genre to 
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contemporary, polemical reactions to the public stage.108 As Gough has found, at the end of the 
sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth century “the trope of the stage as a Siren or Circe pervades 
the English antitheatricalist debate . . . . In such rhetoric against the stage, the enchantress embodies 
not only the sensual pleasures of poetry but also the more dangerous because more rhetorically 
effective appeals that plays make to the eyes and ears of their audiences.”109 Thus, in Gosson’s The 
Schoole of Abuse (1579), the “vanitie,” “wantonnesse,” “follie” and deception of “the visard that 
Poets maske in” are said to be “the Cuppes of Circes, that turne reasonable creatures into brute 
Beastes.”110 This theme would be revisited by Prynne fifty years later in his Histriomastix, a tract 
which denounces all “prophane, and poysonous stage-playes; the common idole, and preuailing euill 
of our dissolute, and degenerous age,” and compares “Play-haunters” to those who, in a suggestively 
Circean manner, “drinke downe poyson in a sugered cup.”111  
As Gough points out, the target of such works tends to be the public theatre, since “for writers 
such as . . . Gosson, and Prynne, it is not only the additional sensual power of spectacle that makes the 
stage an even sweeter and thus even more dangerous Siren than poetry; it is also the illiterate, 
uneducated audience attending the new commercial playhouses that makes the plays performed there 
so capable of witchcraft.”112 The more sophisticated audience of the court masque, safe in the 
knowledge of its own intellectual and moral superiority, is nominally exempt from this danger. Thus, 
in Queenes, Jonson signals a move away from heavy-handed allegory of the kind evident in 
Beaujoyeulx’s paratextual explications of the Balet, as well, indeed, as in his own early masques. In 
                                                          
108 Wright notes that “Browne’s masque has neither the obligation nor the ability to gesture outside the 
performance space towards the king or queen. It identifies no figure of authority outside the fiction of the 
masque itself. The result is a masque which is unusually self-enclosed” (“Giving Them But Their Own,” 199). 
109 Gough, “Daughters of Circe,” 210. 
110 Stephen Gosson, The Schoole of Abuse (London: Thomas Woodcocke, 1579), 2v. 
111 William Prynne, Histriomastix (London: E.A and W.I for Michael Sparke, 1633), 2; 958. In The Reason of 
Church Government (1642), Milton, by contrast, presents a more positive view of the use of such sugaring, 
which he suggests can favour a “well tempered” civil and political discourse “shewing how good, how gainfull, 
how happy it must needs be to live according to honesty and justice.” Such exhortations, he argues, “being 
utter’d with those native colours and graces of speech, as true eloquence the daughter of vertue can best bestow 
upon her mothers praises, would so incite, and in a manner, charme the multitude into the love of that which is 
really good, as to imbrace it ever after, not of custome and awe, which most men do, but of choice and purpose, 
with true and constant delight” (Milton, “The Reason of Church-Government,” in The Works of John Milton, ed. 
Patterson et al., vol. 3 (Columbia, 1932), 181. All further references are to this edition). 
112 Gough, “Daughters of Circe,” 226. 
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Queenes, Jonson defends his decision not to make all of his figures “their own decipherers” by 
claiming that 
 
 To have made . . . each one to have told upon their entrance what they were and whither they 
would, had been a most piteous hearing, and utterly unworthy every quality of a poem: 
wherein a writer should trust somewhat to the capacity of the spectator, especially in these 
spectacles; where men, beside inquiring eyes, are understood to bring quick ears, and not 
those sluggish ones of porters and mechanics, that must be bored through with narrations.113  
(Queenes 82-7) 
 
Schelling argues that this statement is intended to ensure interpretative exclusivity for an elite 
audience, since “hidden significance, and the force of subtle similitude are plain to the cultivated 
gentleman, an intimate in the charmed circle of the court, but a blank to ignorance and outside 
impertinence.”114 We might think here of Harrington’s remarks in the preface to his translation of 
Ariosto’s Orlando Furioso (1591) that “deepe mysteries of learning” ought to be concealed by “the 
vaile of fables” so “that they might not be rashly abused by prophane wits, in who science is 
corrupted, like good wine in a bad vessel.”115  
Harrington’s “vaile of fables” is an Anglicisation of Macrobius’s notion of the narratio 
fabulosa or integumentum, a concept which gained considerable traction in humanist literature from 
the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries.116 For Harrington, a key function of the “vaile of fables” is to 
render different levels of meaning available to different readers, 
 
                                                          
113 We may think here of Quince’s comically laborious prologues to the rude mechanicals’ performance of 
“Pyramus and Thisbe” in Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream (c. 1595-6). 
114 Schelling, Elizabethan Drama, 125. 
115 Sir John Harrington, “A Preface, Or Rather a Briefe Apologie of Poetrie,” in Elizabethan Critical Essays, ed. 
G. Gregory Smith, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1904), 203. 
116 As Hume notes, “the fourteenth book of Boccaccio’s De Genealogia Deorum Gentilium was profoundly 
influential in this context” (Anthea Hume, Edmund Spenser: Protestant Poet (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), 163). The idea of poetry as an integumentum or veil for higher truths is revisited in my 
more extensive discussion of allegory in the next chapter. 
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. . . to be able with one kinde of meate and one dish (as I may so call it) to feed diuers tastes. 
For the weaker capacities will feede themselues with the pleasantnes of the historie and 
sweetnes of the verse, some that haue stronger stomackes will as it were take a further taste of 
the Morall sence, a third sort, more high conceited then they, will digest the Allegorie: so as 
indeed it hath bene thought by men of verie good iudgement.117 
 
It might be observed that Beaujoyeulx’s text, with its generous range of allegorical appendages, fits 
this bill rather more closely than any of Jonson’s masques. Jonson’s appeal to exclusivity, however, 
may also serve a defensive function. As Orgel and others have outlined, the court masque, as a 
political production, “presents the triumph of an aristocratic community; at its center is a belief in the 
hierarchy and a faith in the power of idealization.”118 The masque, perhaps more so than any other 
form of entertainment, relies on its audience to furnish its ultimate meaning: increasingly, during the 
Jacobean and Stuart periods, the Royal party can be seen to act as participants, as well as spectators in 
the productions they commissioned. Yet even where professional actors were used for the 
performance itself, courtiers were called to dance in the “revels” with which the masque typically 
concludes, so that “the spectators . . . became a mirror image of the spectacle.”119  
In the Balet, as we have seen, this early modern collapsing of the fourth wall extends through 
to the device-giving ceremony at the performance’s close, where the allegorical expression and the 
hierarchical, political reality of the court are symbolically merged. Yet if the essentially self-reflective 
nature of the masque form encourages “the breakdown of the barrier between stage and spectator,”120 
the genre – in theory, at least – could work to criticise, as well as glorify its audience.121 Indeed, as 
Gatti reminds us, “the particular characteristics of the masque form, with its codified moves and 
messages, and elaborate, spectacular rituals . . . could be, and sometimes were, stretched at the seams 
                                                          
117 Harrington, “A Preface, Or Rather a Briefe Apologie of Poetrie,” 203. 
118 Stephen Orgel, The Illusion of Power: Political Theater in the English Renaissance (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1975), 40. 
119 Kogan, The Hieroglyphic King, 28. 
120 Orgel, The Jonsonian Masque, 26. 
121 See e.g. Scott, “Wee see sometimes Kings are content in Playes and Maskes to be admonished of divers 
things” (Thomas Scott, Vox Regis (Utrecht: A. van Herwijck, 1624), 34–35). On the relationship between the 
masque as a forum for potential counsel and the humanist concept of laudando praecipere, see Butler, “The 
Politics of the Caroline Masque Form,” 120–21. 
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to include indications and variants strangely at odds with the necessary celebration of monarchical 
power.”122 Jonson has been seen to tread a fine line in this regard,123 and if we suspect his appeal to 
“the capacity of the spectator” to be grounded upon an ultimately self-serving desire for plausible 
deniability, this must be balanced against the satirical drive of many of his antimasques and his 
Horatian claim that masques “ought always to carry a mixture of profit with them no less than 
delight.”124  
I have suggested that a discursive relationship between Circe and the stage informs Browne’s 
presentation of the Goddess as a consummate director and stage-manager. If this claim bears out, it 
remains unclear to what end Browne subverts contemporary anti-theatrical polemic through his 
celebration of Circean authority – as he states in his prefatory letter, “it was done to please ourselves 
in private.”125 In Pleasure, a masque performed not for lawyers, but for the rather more lofty audience 
of the King and his court, Jonson is less daring. While his lesser Circe figure, Comus, is also granted a 
degree of theatrical prowess as the leader of the first antimasque, Jonson’s character is far more 
obviously aligned with vice than Browne’s Circe, and his powers of illusion, limited to the 
antimasque, are subject to greater formal restriction and easily dispelled. In contrast to the Balet 
producers’ toleration of a certain degree of ambiguity within the epistemological (if not political) 
framing of the performance, moreover, Jonson’s portrayal of the “God of cheer” (4) is from the outset 
bathetic and satirical. The reference to Comus’s divine status in the description of the entrances for 
the first scene of the masque is immediately, and ironically qualified by Comus’s followers’ irreverent 
“hymn,”126 a song which celebrates the “belly-god[’s]” (37) invention of a list of devices that serve 
primarily to aid and abet his gluttony: “eating and drinking until thou dost nod, / Thou break’st all thy 
girdles, and break’st forth a god” (30-31). In the carnival world of the antimasque Comus indeed rules 
                                                          
122 Hilary Gatti, “Giordano Bruno and the Stuart Court Masques,” Renaissance Quarterly 48, no. 4 (1995): 812. 
123 David M. Bevington and Peter Holbrook, “Introduction,” in The Politics of the Stuart Court Masque, ed. 
Bevington and Holbrook, 5–13. 
124 Ben Jonson, “Love’s Triumph through Callipolis,” in Ben Jonson, ed. Herford and Simpson, lines 6-7. 
125 Browne, Inner Temple Masque, line 9. 
126 “Hymn” appears as a variant of the manuscript’s “song” in the 1640 folio edition of Pleasure. Butler 
suggests that “it is possible that ‘song’ was substituted by Ralph Crane when he wrote out the manuscript . . . . 
Perhaps Jonson wished to position the praise of Comus as a religious ritual, answered by the ‘hymns’ (246) sung 
to virtue in the main masque” (Pleasure note 7). 
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supreme, yet any divinity the figure lays claim to vanishes together with the grove that hosts him as 
soon as Hercules issues his command. 
It is telling, however, that the kinds of pleasure in which Jonson’s Circean figure participates 
were of particular topical significance to a court which had recently come under fire for the King’s 
excessive expenditure on feasting and revelry: this context, in fact, may well be pertinent to Jonson’s 
careful separation of James I from the riotous party before him on stage, which the King never shares 
with the revellers.127 As several critics have speculated, however, Jonson may not have been careful 
enough. Busino’s eyewitness account captures the King’s apparent displeasure at the ending of 
Pleasure: 
 
Finally they danced the Spanish dance once more with their ladies and because they were 
tired began to lag; and the King, who is by nature choleric, grew impatient and shouted 
loudly, “Why don’t they dance? What did you make me come here for? Devil take all of you, 
dance!” At once the Marquis of Buckingham, his majesty’s favourite minion, sprang forward, 
and danced a number of high and very tiny capers with such grace and lightness that he made 
everyone love him, and also managed to calm the rage of his angry lord.128 
 
Suggestively, in Jonson’s revised version of the masque, For the Honour of Wales (February 1618), 
Comus’s gluttonous crew are replaced by a band of buffoonish Welshmen – a safer target for satire, 
perhaps.129  
During the Caroline period, traditional oppositions between Circean excess and Kingly reason 
are seen to undergo an even greater collapse, exacerbated no doubt by the political and religious 
                                                          
127 For contemporary criticism of the court’s fiscal irresponsibility, see Marcus, The Politics of Mirth, 121. 
Although a clear separation of antimasque from masque proper is characteristic of Jonson’s early works, spatial 
politics can be seen to play out variously across different masques even within these parameters. In Jonson’s 
Queenes, for instance, while the hags are banished from the stage before the appearance of the House of Fame, 
any interlude is brief: the twelve masquers the house conveys are swift to descend into their reclaimed 
performance space. 
128 Orazio Busino quoted in Michael Leapman, Inigo: The Life of Inigo Jones, Architect of the English 
Renaissance (London: Review, 2003), 179–80. Contemporary responses to the performance reveal that it was 
generally ill-received: see Ben Jonson, ed. Hereford, Simpson and Simpson, vol.10, 575-7. 
129 For possible contemporary contexts of the masque, see See A. L. Dodds, Studies in Stuart Wales (Cardiff: 
University of Wales Press, 1952); G. Dyfnallt Owen, Wales in the Reign of James I (London: The Boydell Press 
for the Royal Historical Society, 1988). 
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controversies of Charles I’s years of personal rule. The King’s decision in 1633 to re-publish the Book 
of Sports proved particularly divisive: the Book’s promotion of festivities was linked by contemporary 
critics to the Catholicising agenda of the Royalist Laudian party, to the extent, Marcus has argued, 
that “by the Caroline period, the advocacy of public mirth was linked to the monarchy in most literate 
people’s minds.”130 Scholars have argued that Milton’s 1634 Maske at Ludlow Castle should be read 
as a response to the conflicts engendered by the publication of the Book of Sports, and while this point 
is debatable, the historicist studies of Marcus, Lewalski and others do demonstrate a sustained 
triangulation of Circean myth, monarchy and the court masque genre during the Caroline period. If 
Jonson’s “Belly-god” (Pleasure 37) is arguably reducible to “appetite without intelligence,”131 when 
Comus next appears as Milton’s Circean sorcerer, he is endowed with powers of oratory and cunning 
far beyond anything possessed by Jonson’s “Father of Farts” (49). For Lewalski in fact, Milton’s 
“Comus is the court masquer: he wields ‘dazzling spells’ and marvellous spectacles but they only 
‘cheat the eye with blear illusion,’” and he leads the Lady “to a decadent court with an elaborate 
banquet and a beast-headed entourage – a none-too-subtle allusion to the licentious Cavaliers.”132 
Lewalski interprets Comus’s “rabble” as the “happy oblivion idealised by Catholicizing 
Laudians,” his “decadent court” and “elaborate banquet” as inspired parodies of the increasingly 
castigated indulgences of Charles’ court. As such, she embraces Norbrook and Craig’s notion of the 
“reformed masque,” which “follows the usual courtly unmasking with a more searching revelation in 
which the King and the court are seen as mere idols when compared with transcendent reality.”133 In 
this vein, Comus’s invocation of “the starry choir . . . / In their nightly watchful sphere” (112-3), as he 
summons the antimasque, might be taken as a satirical comment on the way in which the Caroline 
masques exploited the “more remov’d mysteries” (Hymenaei 13) to legitimise their own worldly 
abuses.134 True virtue, the Attendant Spirit explains in his final lines of the performance version of 
                                                          
130 Marcus, The Politics of Mirth, 14. 
131 Orgel, The Jonsonian Masque, 160. 
132 Lewalski, “Milton’s Comus and the Politics of Masquing,” 309. 
133 Craig, “Jonson, the Antimasque and the ‘Rules of Flattery,’” 178. An example of a “reformed” masque, 
according to Craig, is Samuel Daniel’s Tethys Festival (1610), a masque where “King and court are all reminded 
of their final nothingness in the true perspective of Time” (ibid.). 
134 Yarnall, who argues that the splendour of Queen Henrietta’s costuming as Divine Beauty in Tempe Restored 
speaks to an exploitation of “philosophy . . . to rationalize the squandering of the nation’s wealth,” would also 
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Milton’s Maske, “can teach ye how to climb / Higher than the sphery chime” (1019-20). It is 
important to note that, as with Browne’s masque, the situation of Milton’s audience beyond the court 
may have a great deal to do with the degree of license the poet risks.135 But it is apparent that by the 
1630s, even Royally-commissioned entertainments were forced to negotiate new shades of meaning 
attendant upon the Circean imagery they employed. With this in mind, we will return to 
Beaujoyeulx’s edition of the Balet – or more specifically, to its final allegory provided by Lord 
Gordon, which posits Circe as “that desire in general . . . leading some men to virtue, others to vice” 
(101). There may be something of the idea that Circe represents “desire in general” in Jonson’s 
masque, where Hercules’ cup, once “the crowned reward / Of thirsty heroes, after labour hard” 
(Pleasure, 78-79), in the different hands of Comus’s bacchic crew serves profanely to “fill the 
drunken Orgies up” (80). It is not until the reign of Charles I, however, that the idea that Circean 
desire might be both vicious and virtuous appears to have been given serious attention in productions 
staged at court.  
The premise of Townshend’s Tempe Restored of 1632 is derivative of the Balet: like the 
Balet, the masque opens with the complaint of a “fugitive favourite” (84), one of Circe’s captured 
lovers who had been transformed by the enchantress into a lion before his escape. An allegory 
“invented” by Inigo Jones but which in fact incorporates a number of claims translated from Lord 
Gordon’s text, is furthermore appended to the printed edition of Townshend’s masque.136 Importantly, 
however, Queen Henrietta Maria was the preeminent masquer of Tempe Restored and, as “Divine 
Beautie” (92, 1), precipitated Circe’s defeat by descending from the heavens on a golden chariot with 
her Ladies in attendance. This presents a marked contrast to the Balet, where it is the flight of Jupiter, 
sitting atop “a great eagle of burnished gold” (85), that comprises the deus ex machina through which 
Circe is finally vanquished. As the qualifier “divine” in the name of the Queen’s character in Tempe 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
appear to subscribe to this view (Transformations of Circe, 149). Walls’ argument that amidst a climate of 
religious anxiety and fears about the threat of idolatry posed by Arminian  theology, “in the Caroline masques of 
the 1630s it may have seemed that the King appeared as an image of himself to be reverd and worshipped,” 
might equally well apply to Henrietta Maria (The Stage Designs of Inigo Jones, 36).  
135 Milton’s Maske was commissioned to celebrate the installation of John Egerton, Earl of Bridgewater as Lord 
President of Wales, and performed at the Bridgewater family home, Ludlow Castle, situated on the Welsh 
border. 
136 Aurelian Townshend, Tempe Restored (London: Printed by A. M. for Robert Allet and George Baker, 1632), 
19. All references to scene descriptions or the ending allegory of Tempe Restored are to this edition. 
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Restored might suggest, the Neoplatonic schema that forms the basis for the masque’s philosophical 
ideas encompasses a continuum of earthly and celestial desire,137 a spectrum, in which, as we have 
seen, Circe comes to occupy an important position. A number of suggestive parallels between the 
Queen and Circe are evident, in fact, in Jones’s allegorical appendix, making comparisons between 
these two figures seemingly inevitable. As Kogan notes, the allegory’s use of Circe’s “inchaunted 
Palace, glistering with gold, and Precious Ornaments” to exemplify the idea that “desire cannot bee 
moued without apparance of Beauty, either true of false,”138 links the enchantress to the queen, “who 
is a visible expression of spiritual beauty.”139 Taking his cue perhaps from the oppositional 
relationship between Circe and the court in the Balet, Townshend belabours Circe’s pretensions to 
Royalty in the masque itself: the fugitive favourite refers to her “Chayre of State” (85, 18), and his 
escape from her palace elicits the hysterical response “Leade me abroad! Let me my subiects view!” 
(87, 14). The element of parody – even pantomime – evident here serves to differentiate the Queen 
from the enchantress, whose affinity with her appetite-driven victims is stressed through her lament 
for the lover she had previously transformed into a lion, “T’was not for nothing, thou hadst teeth and 
clawes, / For thou hast made a cruell prey of me” (86, 3-4).  
The bathos of this portrayal, however, contends with the effect of Townshend’s most 
important revision to the Balet: his restoration of Circe’s enchanting voice, which together with her 
beauty, “shewes that desire is moved either by sight or hearing, to loue Vertue, or the contrary.”140 To 
mitigate against the suggestion that Circean beauty may itself prompt virtue, Townshend might have 
had recourse to the last part of Lord Gordon’s allegory, which notes that the Balet’s Naiads, 
represented by the Queen and her ladies, embody the notion that “il ne faut point desirer ce qui est 
beau & reluisant exterieurement, mais beaucoup plus la beauté interieure & moins apparente” (“one 
must not desire what is beautiful and shining on the outside, but should desire interior and less 
                                                          
 
138 Townshend, Tempe Restored, 1632, 17. 
139 Kogan, The Hieroglyphic King, 155.  
140 Townshend, Tempe Restored, 1632, 17. In Tempe Restored, Tomlinson observes, it “is ‘the Song of Circe’ 
which, together with its attenandant action, makes audible and visible Circe’s power of enchantment” 
(“Theatrical Vibrancy,” 188). 
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apparent beauty”) (T3v; 103).141 Interestingly, however, he does not. Instead, we are told, “Corporeall 
Beauty, consisting in simetry colour, and certaine unexpressable Graces, shining in the Queenes 
Maiestie, may draw us to the contemplation of the Beauty of the soule, unto which it hath 
Analogy.”142 The implications of this are spelled out by Butler, who observes that the masque’s 
“meaning may have been intellectual, but the language and performance were sensual. As Jones said, 
Divine Beauty appealed to the mind but the body and affections were essential ‘instruments.’ There 
was, then, no fundamental contradiction between Circe’s physical appeals and the Queen’s spiritual 
tutoring. They were differently placed rungs on the ladder to the divine, and in some respects mirrored 
one another.”143 
In fact, as Butler and several other critics have found, a discursive association of Charles’s 
Queen with Circe may well have pre-dated the masque: the Queen’s public devotion to Roman 
Catholicism, together with the eroticised iconography that celebrated her marriage to Charles as a 
fertile bedrock for the state, aggravated anxieties that she unduly influenced her husband’s religious 
and foreign policies.144 In the public imagination, Butler suggests, “Henrietta Maria had affinities with 
. . . [Circe], insofar as she wielded dazzling enchantments to which Charles was no more immune than 
the fugitive favourite was to Circe’s.”145 Given this potential for an association of the Queen with 
Circe, Kogan suggests that where the Balet had portrayed the enchantress as the crown’s inimical foe, 
                                                          
141 As Jeanneret notes, “Marsilio Ficino and his disciples taught that only the mind can contemplate the ideal 
forms in their perfection; the human eye can only perceive vestiges of true beauty because, in the imperfect 
world of bodies and death, we can only indirectly apprehend the intelligible models. . . . But the soul does not 
give in to resignation; it aspires to pierce the veil and discover the clarity of essence behind the opacity of 
things” (Perpetual Motion, 267). 
142 Townshend, Tempe Restored, 1632, 19. In his analysis of Jones’ perspective drawings for Tempe Restored, 
Peacock has observed that the architecture of the masque conforms with this philosophy through its adherence 
to the Renaissance Virtruvian tradition: “each scene is discernibly constructed on the same kind of ideal Platonic 
grid, as if in some underlying sense each were the same scene This kind of relationship between appearances 
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Stage Designs of Inigo Jones, 89) 
143 Martin Butler, The Stuart Court Masque and Political Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 159. Butler cites Townshend, Tempe Restored, 1632, 19. Tomlinson goes further, arguing that “the 
masque’s moral project, the triumph of Divine Beauty and Heroic Virtue . . . is conceivably undermined by 
Circe’s theatrical vibrancy” (“Theatrical Vibrancy,” 189). 
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Henrietta Maria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 72. 
145 Butler, The Stuart Court Masque and Political Culture, 160. The rhetoric and philosophy of the Caroline 
masques could have done little to assuage these fears: in another of Townshend’s masques of 1632, Albion’s 
Triumph, the beauty of Alba (Henrietta) has such a tempering influence on the heroic militancy of Albanactus 
(Charles) that when the pair are joined, the King is said to be “subdu’d by Alba’s eyes” (Aurelian Townshend, 
“Albion’s Triumph,” in Aurelian Townshend’s Poem and Masks, ed. Chambers, 71, line 17). 
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Charles’s “court took the innovative step of softening her viciousness and linking her to goodness.”146 
It is possible, then, that one of the aims of Townshend’s masque was to diffuse the “Circean” threat of 
Henrietta’s foreign and Catholicising influence over her husband by emphasising the virtuous aspects 
of desire which Circe hands on to the couple as her “heir.” Yet as Butler has argued, if “Tempe 
Restored thus legitimated the Caroline marriage as the model of the state,” it also “played out the 
sexual politics of that model with uncomfortable clarity . . . The monarch’s virtuous self-restraint took 
strength from, but also depended on, his susceptibility to desire.”147 This ambiguity may in part may 
explain Circe’s jibe at the “man-maide” (95, 14) Pallas in the masque. This is, of course, a topical 
reference to theatrical transvestism which would have played to great comic effect, but the phrase, 
which further serves to remind the audience of the traditional gender norms and distinctions upon 
which contemporary social and political hierarchies relied, may also betray an anxiety about the threat 
of Circean effeminacy.148  
At the end of Tempe Restored, Pallas and Circe – representatives of wisdom and desire 
respectively – depart together with the chorus into the wood, revisiting the idea posited by Jonson’s 
masque more than a decade earlier that under the Royal gaze, pleasure might finally be reconciled to 
virtue. In the last analysis, however, it would seem that the task Townshend and Jones set themselves 
– to assimilate the Balet’s competing hermeneutic claims into a cerebral yet sensual, aspirational yet 
exclusionary vision of monarchy – had become a game of impossibly high stakes. As I have suggested 
throughout this chapter, the mythographical complexity of Circe’s character ensures that an internal 
conflict, between the allegories that try to constrain her within clear moral bounds and the sum total of 
                                                          
146 Kogan, The Hieroglyphic King, 198. 
147 Butler, The Stuart Court Masque and Political Culture, 160. 
148 Tomlinson notes that “Tempe Restored juxtaposes a male and a female singer, each of whom represents a 
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English Literary Imagination, 1558-1660 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 150–58. 
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her actual meaning, is present to a greater or lesser degree in all of the English masques in which she 
features. This tension may serve as a barometer for the declining fortunes of the genre itself: Circe, 
perhaps, is a vector for contemporary political and social dissatisfactions which would ultimately see 
the end of the English court masque’s “golden period.”149 As I will argue in my third chapter, in his 
Maske Milton openly grapples with these difficulties. In particular, I suggest, he interrogates an aspect 
of Circe that is truly present only in Homer’s Odyssey: Circe’s moral ambivalence. If strands of this 
ambivalence can be detected in some of the preceding masques I have discussed, it generally proves 
ill-suited to the stark, allegorical oppositions demanded by the genre: the Goddess’s duality, as we 
have seen, is rarely entertained without some attempt at suppression.  
Within the conservative parameters of the masque form, however, it is also possible to detect 
the emergence of a more radical understanding of the ethical significance of Circean encounters. 
Something of this informs the curious moment in Browne’s masque where Circe claims she has had 
no part in the transformation of Ulysses’ men: 
 
. . . careless of themselves, they here and there 
Fed on strange fruits, invenoming their bloods, 
And now like monsters range about the woods. 
If those thy mates were, yet is Circe free 
For their misfortunes have not birth from me.150 
    (324-8) 
     
Browne here picks up on another strand of Circean signification that Milton would more fully explore 
in his Maske – man’s responsibility for his own ethical conduct, and the trial and choice that are 
formative of his moral and spiritual disposition. The novelty of this idea within the masque genre will 
                                                          
149 Demaray, Milton and the Masque Tradition: The Early Poems, “Arcades,” & Comus, 3. 
150 In Homer it is Eurylochus, not Odysseus, who suggests the tamed beasts the Greeks encounter on Circe’s 
island were transformed by the Goddess from men (Od. 10.432-33). In Virgil, by contrast, this is presented more 
straightforwardly as fact: quos hominum ex facie dea saeva potentibus herbis / induerat Circe in vultus ac terga 
ferarum (“These were they whom, robbing them of their human form with potent herbs, Circe, cruel goddess, 
had clothed in the features and frames of beasts,” Aeneid 7.19-20). 
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become clearer if we look back to the more orthodox preoccupations of the Balet, where the juice of 
the moly plant which should “cure a mind deprived of its reason” (60), is unsuccessfully wielded by 
Mercury to free the nymphs who have been enchanted by Circe. In the final analysis, the introduction 
of this plot device seems intended rather to safeguard the hierarchical power structures of Henri’s 
court than to suggest the dedication of either the dancers or Mercury himself to a vicious life. In the 
Balet’s opening scene, furthermore, while the “gentilhomme fugitif” admits that he allowed himself to 
be seduced by Circe since “il n’est de plus puissant lien / Que l’apprehension des plaisirs & du bien;” 
“there is no stronger attraction than the anticipation of pleasure and well being” (B4v; 42), his 
transformation into the form of a lion and the subsequent reversal of this enchantment is attributed 
solely to the sorceress’s capricious will. Indeed, Circe herself claims that she can “deprive men of 
their will” (42). In Jonson’s Pleasure, by contrast, the personal responsibility of the belly-god’s 
followers who “transform themselves . . . to bottles, or tuns” (59-60, my emphasis) is stressed, leading 
Orgel to argue that this emphasis on the will is Comus’s strongest debt to Jonson’s masque.151  
As Demaray has noted, this idea is also present at the beginning of Tempe Restored, where by 
choosing “to be govern’d by Reason, and not rul’d by Sense” (85, 9), electing to be human rather than 
a beast, “Circe’s escaped prisoner has achieved an inner freedom that the feeble magic of Circe is 
powerless to destroy.”152 In perhaps the most memorable lines of the masque, the fugitive favourite 
observes that 
  
Tis not her Rod, her Philters, nor her Herbes,  
(Though strong in Magicke) that can bound mens minds; 
And make them Prisoners, where there is no wall. 
It is consent that makes a perfect Slave.153 
                                                          
151 Orgel, The Jonsonian Masque, 169. 
152 Demaray, Milton and the Masque Tradition: The Early Poems, “Arcades,” & Comus, 252. 
153 This emphasis on the nescessity of the assenting, or consenting will is seen again in Davenant’s The Temple 
of Love (1635), which ends with “Sunesis and Thelema (which intimate the understanding and the will) joyning 
together” in marriage, before “the true Temple appears” (William Davenant, The Temple of Love (London: 
Thomas Walkley, 1635), A2v). The wedding of will and reason thus augurs the fulfilment of the prophecy of the 
masque’s “argument,” which stipulates that “by influence” of the “beauty” of “Indamora, Queene of Narsinga,” 
a character danced, of course, by Henrietta Maria, “the Temple of Chast Love should be re-established in this 
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   (85, 19-22) 
 
Yet in neither Townshend’s or Jonson’s masque, where there is no sense of Hercules being presented 
by a real test in Xenophon’s sense, nor indeed in the Balet, is the audience privy to the debate or 
struggle that would make this aspect of the narrative as prominent as it is in Milton’s Maske. For 
Milton, as we will see, the Jonsonian dictum that virtue is “more seene, more knowne, when Vice 
stands by” (Pleasure 259) is insufficient – virtue itself must be interrogated via a more than merely 
passive exposure to vice. Both the Balet and Tempe Restored play down, however unsuccessfully, the 
central ambivalence of Lord Gordon’s allegory, and even Browne’s Circe is ultimately suspect: as 
Wright argues, “in view of the persistent emphasis on her authority over everything on the island and 
even the surrounding sea, her denial of responsibility for what has happened to Ulysses’ men certainly 
seems specious.”154 The doubt that remains, however, speaks to a fraying of the ties between 
allegorical representation and the sovereign’s epistemological prerogative, a shift that would arguably 
signal the death knell for the court masque as it had been known. As Butler observes of the line added 
to the Attendant Spirit’s final song in the 1637 text of the Maske, “(List, mortals, if your ears be true)” 
(996), “Milton’s ‘if’, with its separation between those who have ears to hear and those who merely 
belong to the world, marked a gulf between ritual affirmation and the private obligations of the 
individual that called into question all the usual assumptions underpinning festive forms. It was a gulf 
down which, as events accelerated, the whole festival tradition would eventually disappear.”155
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Island” (Temple of Love A2r). Shell detects vestiges of Catholic interest here: Thelema, who wears “a robe of 
changeable silke” (Temple of Love C4v) represents “the theological implications of alternative both in her dress 
and her name . . . [she] stands as a reproach to predestinarians, as well as an iconographical realization of the 
beauty of changing one’s mind. Her marriage to Sunesis epitomises how the understanding should ally itself to 
human free will – in effect, to a notion of the theology of grace which is interpretable in a Laudian manner, but 
also in a Catholic” (Shell, Catholicism, Controversy and the English Literary Imagination, 149).  
Space will not permit a more extensive discussion of this point here, although I would suggest it merits 
further investigation. It might be observed that like Tempe Restored, The Temple of Love relies on Circean 
motifs to express its distinctions: we learn that the “Temple being long sought for by certaine Magicians 
(enemies to chast Love) intending to use it to their intemperate ends, was by Divine Poesie hidden in mists and 
clouds; so as the Magicians being frustrate of their hopes, sought by enchantments to hinder all others from 
finding it” (Temple of Love A2r). This reference to “Divine Poesie” alludes to the idea of poetry an 
integumentum that veils divine truth. The relationship between allegoresis and Circean mythology will be 
explored further in my next chapter. 
154 Wright, “Giving Them But Their Own,” 209. 
155 Butler, The Stuart Court Masque and Political Culture, 357. 
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“All our drift despise”: Acrasia, Amavia and the Ethics of Allegory in Spenser’s  
The Faerie Queene 
 
I turn now to an English, poetic representation of Circe more contemporaneous to the Balet: Spenser’s 
Circean Acrasia in The Faerie Queene (1590). Acrasia’s Circean roots have been well established by 
modern scholarship on The Faerie Queene.1 Unlike the overdetermined Circe of the Balet, however, 
Spenser’s portrayal of Acrasia in Book 2 of his romance-epic might seem fairly straightforward.2 
Acrasia’s forebears in the Italian Romance tradition include Ariosto’s Alcina, Trissino’s Acratia and 
Tasso’s Armida, sorceresses in gardens who deceive through illusion and “change men’s shapes and 
wills,” until they are conquered, enslaved or converted by a male protagonist.3 Ultimately, these 
figures all prove to be allegorical, hyperbolic extensions of the Homeric Circe, resurrected to 
showcase the virtuosity of the (Christianised) epic hero in the face of great temptation to abandon his 
quest.4 Spenser’s Acrasia, then, who dwells on an island populated by beasts, “Whylome her louers, 
which her lustes did feed,”5 on one level typifies little more than the traditional allegorical 
representation of Circe as a clarissima meretrix who intercepts the unworthy to reveal their baser 
nature, and serves more generally as a poetic shorthand for the dangers of the flesh. Yet while her 
genealogy betrays less manifest contradiction than that of the Balet’s Circe, with her extensive 
allegorical gloss, Acrasia is deployed by Spenser in such a way that competing, and conflicting 
aspects of the poem’s wider ideological commitments are brought to the fore. This portrayal, I argue, 
speaks like the Balet to the difficulty of reconciling Circean mythology with allegory – moral or 
divine – that eventually transcends the bounds of genre. 
                                                          
1 See Merritt Y. Hughes, “Spenser’s Acrasia and the Circe of the Renaissance,” Journal of the History of Ideas 
4, no. 4 (1943): 381–99; John E. Hankins, “Acrasia,” in The Spenser Encyclopedia, ed. Albert Charles Hamilton 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 6. 
2 For a discussion of the genre of Spenser’s poem, see Colin Burrow, Epic Romance: Homer to Milton (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993). 
3 Giamatti, Earthly Paradise, 185. 
4 Ibid., 6. 
5 Edmund Spenser, The Faerie Queene, ed. Hiroshi Yamashita, Toshiyuki Suzuki, and A.C. Hamilton (Harlow: 
Longman, 2007), 2.12.85.3. All further citations of FQ are to book, canto, verse and line number in this edition. 
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More specifically, as we will see, Spenser’s presentation of Acrasia in Book 2 of the Faerie 
Queene, the book of “temperaunce,”6 problematises the relationship between Aristotelian virtue ethics 
and Reformed soteriology that is pivotal to the defence of the work put forward by the poet in his 
letter to Raleigh. In the first part of this chapter, the difficulties raised by Guyon’s “intemperate” 
behaviour in Acrasia’s Bower will be discussed in light of the long-standing, and seemingly 
interminable critical debate about the fairy knight’s conduct. I will pay particular attention to how 
Spenser presents the relationship between incontinence (akrasia), continence and temperance in Book 
2 as a whole, since this forms a major crux of any attempt to reconcile Aristotelian and Christian 
concepts of virtue formation and has an important bearing on the nature of the temptation that 
Spenser’s Acrasia can be seen to present. Ultimately, I suggest that the relationship of Spenser’s 
Circean Acrasia to the philosophical idea of akrasia is vexed.7 Sir Guyon’s destruction of Acrasia’s 
Bower of Bliss in Book 2 of The Faerie Queene can be seen to enact a violent glossing of the 
conflicts inherent in Spenser’s attempted synthesis of Reformed Christian and Aristotelian virtue 
ethics, just as it exposes the difficulties of reconciling the Circean slipperiness of artistic freedom – 
implicit, as we will see in contemporary defences of poetry – with the allegorical overlay invoked to 
legitimize this same liberty. 
The second part of this chapter proposes that the interaction between Guyon, the Palmer and 
Acrasia in the Bower is anticipated by Spenser from the beginning of Book 2 in his portrayal of 
moments of crisis that require discernment and decision making. These scenes, I suggest, inform 
Milton’s famous “misreading” of another episode of Book 2, Guyon’s passage through Mammon’s 
cave. In his Areopagitica, Milton’s rewriting of Spenser, I argue, is a rhetorical strategy that draws 
attention to his predecessor’s heavy reliance on the trope of legalism in this part of the Faerie Queene, 
and perhaps more importantly, to the relationship between the Palmer’s legal, moral and spiritual 
judgments, and the traditional, biblio-classical hermeneutics that inform the Circean content of 
                                                          
6 Spenser, “A Letter of the Authors,” in The Faerie Queene, ed. Hiroshi Yamashita et al., line 43. All further 
references to the letter will appear parenthetically in-text as “Letter to Raleigh,” followed by line numbers.  
7 Recent discussions of this relationship can be found in Christopher Tilmouth, Passion’s Triumph Over 
Reason: A History of the Moral Imagination from Spenser to Rochester (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), 37–74; Joshua Scodel, Excess and the Mean in Early Modern English Literature (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2002), 79–110. 
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Spenser’s text. In the final pages of my discussion, I explore the significance of the tale of Amavia, 
Ruddymane and Mordant that introduces Guyon’s quest, and suggest that the failure of the Nymph of 
the Well to wash the bloodstains from Ruddymane’s hands is a lesson on the limitations of Mosaic 
law that Guyon and the Palmer fail to learn. In his Maske, Milton will revisit this problem and offer a 
solution through the figure of Sabrina, who relieves, where the Nymph of the Well can only 
exacerbate, the law’s petrifying grip on fallen mankind. A better understanding of what is at stake in 
Milton’s divergence from Spenser on this point will encourage, I hope–, a more sophisticated 
understanding of his reception of the work of his “sage and serious” predecessor and of the nature of 
Spenserian influence across his corpus as a whole. 
 
 
Aristotelian akrasia and The Faerie Queene 
  
Book 2 of the Faerie Queene is the book of “temperaunce,” the second of the “twelve private morall 
vertues” that Spenser proposes to show “perfected” in his work (“Letter to Raleigh” 43; 19). 
Following the pattern established in Book 1, where Spenser had related the trials and tribulations of 
the Redcrosse Knight, “Patrone of true Holinesse” (1.1), in the second book of the Faerie Queene we 
can expect Sir Guyon to encounter obstacles and temptations against which his possession of the 
virtue of temperance might be tested and proved. One such obstacle is Acrasia, “a false 
enchaunteresse, / That many errant knightes hath fowle fordonne” (2.1.51.3-4). Acrasia’s name brings 
into focus the interaction between the philosophical notion of akrasia (ἀκρασία) and Circean 
mythography. Since the time of Chrysippus,8 the phenomenon of akrasia, often glossed as weakness 
of the will or incontinence, was commonly illustrated by a classical paradigm: Medea’s declaration in 
Book 7 of Ovid’s Metamorphoses that aliudque cupido, mens aliud suadet: video meliora proboque, 
deteriora sequor (“Affection this, discretion that, perswades. / I see the better, I approve it too: / The 
                                                          
8 Risto Saarinen, Weakness of Will in Renaissance and Reformation Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 13. 
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worse I follow”).9 Mythographically, a strong affinity exists between Medea and Circe, and the two 
are often invoked in tandem by Renaissance writers as figures synonymous with witchcraft and moral 
depravity10 – indeed, scenes from the story of Jason and Medea, are “ywritt” (2.12.44.4), we are told, 
on the gate to the entrance of Acrasia’s Bower.  
Spenser, however, stresses the importance of Aristotle’s virtue ethics to the structure and 
thematic interest of his work in the letter to Raleigh that prefaces his 1590 edition of the Faerie 
Queene.11 Unlike Stoic or Augustinian conceptions, Aristotelian akrasia does not rely upon the idea 
of an assenting will, and might thus have proved particularly attractive to a sixteenth century poet 
writing in a Reformed Christian culture which (as we will see) was particularly sensitive to 
controversy on this point. In Aristotle’s intellectualist account, akrasia comes about through an error 
in the practical syllogism, whereby a major premise or universal, a value that identifies something as 
good, is related to a minor premise about the particulars of a given situation. Thus, the notion that 
“Everything sweet is pleasant,” related to the perception that “this [particular object] is sweet,” leads 
to an indulgence of appetite (1147a31-30).12 In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle invokes 
drunkenness as one of a number of possible states of passion, usually related to an appetitive drive for 
pleasure, which can render perceptual knowledge of particulars incomplete and lead to a state of 
akrasia (NE 1147a10-19). At the beginning of Book 2 of the Faerie Queene, Spenser signals 
Acrasia’s link with the inebriating effects of passion through Amavia’s description of the enchantress: 
“Her blis is all in pleasure and delight, / Wherewith she makes her louers dronken mad” (1.52.1-2). At 
the threshold of Acrasia’s Bower, the figure of Excesse is emblematic of such an assault on the senses 
that could lead towards an akratic state: 
  
In her left hand a Cup of gold she held,  
                                                          
9 Ovid, Metamorphoses, 7.19-21; Ovid’s Metamorphosis Englished, trans. Sandys, 232. 
10 Tania Demetriou, “‘Essentially Circe,’”168. 
11 For a discussion of the availability of Aristotle’s works at this time and the circulation of commentaries and 
Latin translations of the Ethics, see Charles B. Schmitt, Aristotle and the Renaissance (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1983); Gill Kraye, “Moral Philosophy,” in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, 
ed. Charles B. Schmitt and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 303–86. 
12 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, ed. C. J. Rowe and Sarah Broadie, trans. C. J. Rowe (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 1147a31–30. All references will be to this edition, cited parenthetically as NE hereafter. 
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And with her right the riper fruit did reach,  
Whose sappy liquor, that with fulnesse sweld,  
Into her cup she scruzd, with daintie breach  
 Of her fine fingers, without fowle empeach,  
That so faire winepresse made the wine more sweet:  
Thereof she vsd to giue to drinke to each,  
Whom passing by she happened to meet:  
It was her guise, all Straungers goodly so to greet. 
    (2.12.56) 
 
The attention given here to each separate sensory aspect of the experience, as it is revealed through 
lines that build climatically to their end rhyme with an easy musicality, brings the reader tantalizingly 
close to tasting with Guyon the “sappy liquor” of Excesse’s Circean cup. Yet all is not as it seems. 
The word “guise” hints at the deceptiveness of Excesse’s sweetness, a suggestion of the hidden perils 
of her hospitality embedded in Spenser’s strategic alliteration throughout the stanza. “Faire” raises the 
spectre of “fowle” despite the narrator’s denial of this “empeach,” signalling perhaps that a moral 
knowledge overtly denied by the text is nonetheless available to the discerning reader. The scene for 
akratic action, then, is set.13 
As we have seen, in Aristotle’s practical syllogism correct discernment is of central 
importance to the possibility of proper action. Neither is this the first time this theme has emerged in 
the Faerie Queene: Excesse’s cup-bearing predecessors in Book 1 include Duessa, who holds a 
Circean “golden cup” 
 
 . . . replete with magick artes; 
 Death and despeyre did many thereof sup, 
                                                          
13 Hume remarks generally of Spenser’s poetic technique that “a single stanza or pair of stanzas forms a unit 
which opens attractively but gradually exposes sinister occupations and purposes” (Edmund Spenser, 82). 
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 And secret poyson through their inner partes, 
 Th’eternall bale of heauie wounded harts; 
   (8.14.1-5) 
 
yet also the virginal Fidelia, whose own “cup of gold” contains a serpent of manifest “horrour” 
(10.13.2; 5) that is nonetheless Christological.14 Kaske has written at length about the proliferation in 
Spenser’s Faerie Queene of repeated images in bono and in malo, a technique which derives from 
exegetical commentaries on the “bipolarity” of certain images in the Bible that are used in both “an 
honorific and a derogatory sense.”15 Just as a successful interpretation of such images demands 
“right” reading with “an eye for internal differences,”16 Prescott argues that the “doubleness” of 
Spenser’s text makes “a hero’s moral or spiritual dilemma . . . less a matter of choice and will than of 
epistemology and perception.”17 In the episode in question, Guyon discerns correctly and passes the 
test that Excesse presents: “taking it out of her tender hond, / The cup to ground [he] did violently 
cast” (2.12.57.2-3). This is an important moment in Spenser’s narrative relation of the moral progress 
of Guyon’s character, but it also bears metapoetic significance. Via the trope of akrasia, Spenser’s 
tableau of Excesse speaks to contemporary aesthetic, as well as ethical concerns. As my previous 
chapter has indicated, Phantasia, established as a distinct mental capacity in Aristotle’s De Anima, 
was understood in contemporary faculty psychology to mediate between perception and belief,18 and 
had been held suspect since the Classical period for its ability to work in conjunction with passion to 
distort the “true” images of nature delivered by the senses. Augustine, furthermore, held man’s 
                                                          
14 Carol V. Kaske, Spenser and Biblical Poetics (Cornell University Press, 1999), 47. 
15 Kaske observes that “when a word was repeated in such a bipolar way, exegetes said that it was to be 
understood in bono [sensu] et in malo or in meliorem et peiorem partem.” She suggests that “Spenser 
distinguishes images more frequently in bono et in malo than in other ways” (Spenser and Biblical Poetics, 23; 
24). 
16 Ibid., 22. 
17 Anne Lake Prescott, “Complicating the Allegory: Spenser and Religion in Recent Scholarship,” Renaissance 
and Reformation / Renaissance et Réforme 25, no. 4 (2001): 11. Milton’s Maske is also concerned with the 
necessity of perceptual discrimination between vice and virtue – an extended discussion of which may be found 
in Astrid Giugni, “The ‘Holy Dictate of Spare Temperance’: Virtue and Politics in Milton’s A Masque 
Presented at Ludlow Castle,” Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 45, no. 2 (2015): 395 – yet as I 
will argue in my next chapter this theme is inextricable, and ultimately subordinate, to his greater preoccupation 
with “choice and will.”  
18 John Guillory (Poetic Authority: Spenser, Milton, and Literary History (Columbia University Press, 1983), 2) 
notes that in The Advancement of Learning (1605), Bacon refers to the imagination as nuncius (messenger). 
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imagination – phantasticum hominis – to be vulnerable to demonic manipulation: as Goya would have 
it, the sleep of reason produces monsters.  
Yet the imagination was also, traditionally, closely aligned with poetry. A fear that the poet’s 
privileged access to the imaginative realm could give rise to abuses, leading to the production of 
immoral images that would corrupt the uneducated, inexperienced or mentally weak, had persisted at 
least since Plato’s call to expel certain poets – those who imitate or produce mimetic representations 
of all things, regardless of whether they are good or bad – from the polis in his Republic.19 Against 
this, as Rossky notes, in early modern defences of literature, “criticism of the excessive emotional 
power of the imaginative activity is defended by the doctrine of persuasion to good.”20 This idea that 
poetry might wield a corrective influence over the wayward faculty of the imagination is a 
cornerstone of Sidney’s Apologie for Poetrie (1595). In his Apologie, Sidney invokes the Horatian 
rule that poetry ought to be at once utile and dulce to argue that controlled poetic “feigning” harnesses 
the imagination to reason, producing exemplary imitations of life that are both persuasive and morally 
instructive.21 Coupling “the generall notion with particuler example,”22 the poet could thus lay claim 
to Aristotle’s model of the practical syllogism, escaping the censure reserved elsewhere for those who 
“giveth sweete Syrropes to make his poison goe downe the smoother”, writers whose works are like 
“the cuppes of Circes, that turne reasonable creatures into brute beastes.”23 Turning this image on its 
head, Sidney insists that the true poet “doth intende the winning of the mind from wickednesse to 
vertue: even as the childe is often brought to take most wholsom things, by hiding them in such other 
as have a pleasant tast.”24 It is in relation to this aim that we should understand Spenser’s assertion, in 
his letter to Sir Walter Raleigh appended to the 1590 edition of the Faerie Queene, that “the generall 
end” of the work “is to fashion a gentleman or noble person in vertuous and gentle discipline” (7-8), 
                                                          
19 See Plato, Republic 378d-e: Socrates warns that Homer’s tales “must not be accepted in the city, whether they 
are made with a hidden sense or without a hidden sense. A young thing can’t judge what is hidden sense and 
what is not; but what he takes into his opinions at that age has a tendency to become hard to eradicate and 
unchangeable. Perhaps it’s for this reason that we must do everything to ensure that what they hear first, with 
respect to virtue, be the finest told tales for them to hear” (The Republic of Plato, trans. Allan Bloom, 2nd ed 
(New York: Basic Books, 1991)). 
20 William Rossky, “Imagination in the English Renaissance,” 72. 
21 Horace, Ars Poetica, 343. 
22 Sir Philip Sidney, An Apologie for Poetrie (London: Henry Olney, 1595), D3v. 
23 Gosson, The Schoole of Abuse, A2v; A2r. 
24 Sidney, Apologie for Poetrie, E4r. 
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and his suggestion that if his “Methode will seeme displeasaunt, [to those] which had rather have 
good discipline delivered plainly . . . then thus clowdily enwrapped in Allegoricall devises. . . . such, 
me seeme, should be satisfide with the use of these dayes, seeing all things accounted by their showes, 
and nothing esteemed of, that is not delightfull and pleasing to commune sence” (22-25). 
In this same statement, Spenser sets out his intention in the Faerie Queene to portray “the 
image of a braue knight, perfected in the twelue priuate morall vertues, as Aristotle hath deuised” 
(“Letter to Raleigh” 19). As we have noted, Book 2 of the text, featuring Guyon’s travails in the 
Bower of Bliss, is designated by Spenser as the Book of Temperance. From Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics, we learn that a person possessed of the virtue of sophrosyne (σωφροσύνη) or temperance 
enjoys total freedom from struggle with the passions, unlike the merely enkratic or continent 
individual, who experiences appetitive desire but is able to enlist reason and refrain from succumbing. 
Naturally, the temperate man gravitates towards a golden mean between indulgence and deficiency: 
he “has appetite for the things one should, in the way one should and when” (NE 1119b17-18). By 
toppling Excesse, then, Spenser’s Guyon might be understood to fulfil or part-fulfil the criteria for 
temperance, just as his destruction of the “ouerwrought” (2.12.60.6) artifice of Acrasia’s Bower of 
Bliss in canto 12 might be interpreted as a victory for the virtuous, as opposed to the vicious 
imagination.25 Yet as scholars have observed, there is something rather strange about Spenser’s 
association of temperance with the violence of both of these acts. True temperance, it has been 
suggested, connotes an innate proportionality of desire, an idea which seems foreign to Guyon’s total 
and unconditional repudiation of all that greets him in the Bower. Wadowski puts it nicely: in 
Guyon’s interaction with Acrasia’s gatekeeper, “Excesse is answered with excess.”26 Some stanzas 
later, the champion of temperance tears down Acrasia’s “pleasaunt bowres and Pallace brave / . . . 
with rigour pittilesse;” in a “tempest of . . . wrathfulnesse” (12.83.1-2; 4) – a singular failure, in 
Jonsonian terms, to effect any reconciliation between virtue and pleasure, and decidedly un-
Homeric.27  
                                                          
25 For this argument, see C.S. Lewis, The Allegory of Love (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). 
26 Andrew Wadowski, “Spenser, Tasso, and the Ethics of Allegory,” Modern Philology 111, no. 3 (2014): 382. 
27 Odysseus accepts Circe’s invitation to “mount our bed, so that we may mingle in lovemaking / and trust each 
other in friendship” in Homer’s text (Od. 10.334-35). In contrast to Guyon’s “pittilesse” destruction of Acrasia’s 
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To an extent, the seeming incongruity of Spenser’s presentation of Guyon’s behaviour in the 
Bower with the virtue the fairy knight is supposed to exemplify may be explained by changes wrought 
historically to the notion of temperance as it was appropriated by Christianity. Weatherby has studied 
how medieval and early modern translators of the New Testament into Latin – amongst them, 
Erasmus28 – tended to render enkrateia (ἐγκράτεια) as temperantia or temperance, rather than 
continentia or continence where the Greek term did not seem to indicate solely an abstention from 
sexual temptation. Temperance is therefore not viewed as a “fuller” virtue than continence, but 
describes rather any continent action that is not restricted to the realm of sexual conduct: a 
quantitative, rather than qualitative distinction that imbues temperance itself with connotations of 
refusal and negation.29 For Weatherby, this semantic change results ultimately from the Greek church 
fathers’ prioritization of enkrateia over Aristotelian sophrosyne in line with ascetic views on passion 
and sensuality,30 views which Spenser in Book 2 of the Faerie Queene would largely appear to 
uphold. In this part of the poem, continence is indeed presented as a virtue of abstention, exemplified 
by the virginal Belphoebe and by Sir Guyon’s resistance of the “naked Damzelles” (2.12.63.6) in 
Acrasia’s Bower. 
A case might also be made, however, for the importance to this shift in emphasis of the 
facere-perficere distinction invoked by Augustine in the Contra Julianum to explain Paul’s lament in 
Romans 7:15, 22, “that which I do I allow not: for what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do 
I,” a key passage for Christian understanding of akratic or incontinent action.31 While in his earlier 
work Augustine had held the speaker of Romans 7 to be the akratic Paul under the law, by the time of 
his writing of the Contra Julianum he had come to view the passage as relating to Paulus Christianus, 
an enkratic person no longer bound by the law yet still subject to sinful desire.32 Augustine’s 
commentary on this passage relies upon a belief, “more or less presupposed in the medieval 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Bower, moreover, after Circe restores Odysseus’s men and witnesses their reunion with their leader, we are told 
that “the goddess herself took pity” (Od. 10.399).  
28 Harold L. Weatherby, “Spenser’s Legend of Ἐγκράτεια,” Studies in Philology 93, no. 2 (1996): 214. 
29 Weatherby, “Spenser’s Legend of Ἐγκράτεια,” 213–17. 
30 Ibid., 210. 
31 Augustine, “Contra Iulianum Opus Imperfectum,” in Opera Omnia. Patrologia Latina, ed. J. P. Migne, vol. 
45, 47 vols. (Paris: Lutetiae Parisiorum, 1844), 3, 26, 62. 
32 Saarinen, Weakness of Will in Renaissance and Reformation Thought, 25. 
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discussion on Aristotle’s Ethics,”33 that as a punishment for his disobedience in the Fall, man’s will 
was permanently divided along the battle-lines of “rational desire” and “sinful concupiscence.”34 
Given his ever-present concupiscence, man can do good (facere bonum), but he can never do so 
completely (perficere). In the sixteenth century, this would inform Luther’s notion of man as simul 
iustus et peccator: the justified sinner may perform good deeds, but in the presence of perpetual 
concupiscence he is unable to achieve a state of perfect virtue.35 Accordingly, as Tilmouth has 
suggested, for Spenser it may be that “the maintenance of continence . . . is all that man can hope to 
achieve.”36  
Given, however, the attention paid to Aristotle in Spenser’s “Letter,” it seems unlikely that 
the poet was unaware of an alternative ethical model. Medieval commentators such as Aquinas did 
indeed understand Aristotle’s enkrateia or continence to be an “underdeveloped” form of the full 
virtue of sophrosyne or temperance,37 and the Aristotelian hierarchy is preserved in more 
contemporary literature.38 The idea of a developmental relationship existing between continence and 
temperance fits, moreover, with the model of moral and spiritual progress mapped onto the epic genre 
by early modern writers of a more contemporary period. Landino, for instance, directly invokes the 
terms continentia and temperantia in a hierarchical fashion in his allegorical interpretation of 
Aeneas’s sea-voyage as a passage to virtue,39 a reading which is particularly suggestive in light of the 
mini-Odyssey that Spenser writes into the beginning of Book 2, and the metaphoric description of his 
poetic enterprise as a “feeble barke” sailing to “her iourneyes end” that appears at the end of Book 1 
(12.1.8;7).40 I would suggest, then, that Guyon’s ostensibly intemperate behaviour in Acrasia’s Bower 
                                                          
33 Risto Saarinen, Weakness of the Will in Medieval Thought: From Augustine to Buridan (New York: E.J. Brill, 
1994), 85. 
34 Saarinen, Weakness of the Will in Medieval Thought, 27. Augustine did not know EN VII, and thus does not 
comment on Aristotle’s problem, but his writings on Romans 7 were superimposed onto discussions of 
Aristotelian akrasia by later expositors: see Saarinen, Weakness of Will in Renaissance and Reformation 
Thought, 20. 
35 Martin Luther, Martin Luthers Werke, vol. 56, 127 vols. (Weimar: Böhlau, 1883), 343, 18-19. 
36 Tilmouth, Passion’s Triumph Over Reason, 58. 
37 “To sum up, continence is to temperance as the unripe to the fully mature”: Thomas Aquinas, Summa 
Theologica, trans. John Patrick Reid (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), 2-2, q. 155, a. 4. 
38 See for instance Baldassare Castiglione, The Book of the Courtier, ed. W. H. D. Rouse and Drayton 
Henderson, trans. Sir Thomas Hoby (London: J. M. Dent, 1928), 269. 
39 Landino, Disputationes Camaldulenses, 133. 
40 Moss notes that Spenser’s allegorical interpretation of mythology, and “Spenser’s interpretation of Homer in 
particular” was justified by Aristotle, who “regarded the poets as moral and political teachers. In fact he drew 
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does not result from an aversion to or misunderstanding of Aristotle’s paradigm. It is revealing rather 
of the difficulties engendered by Spenser’s imaginative engagement with a Christian ethics that 
retained the classical terms of continence and temperance, yet stripped them of their Aristotelian 
technicality.41  
Since as we have discussed, Guyon’s status as the knight of temperance is strongly tied to his 
abstentious, continent action, Book 2 of the Faerie Queene would seem to advertise the progressive 
potential of this “negative” type of chastity. If this is indeed Spenser’s endeavour, it is not entirely 
successful. Although as I have discussed temperance is largely understood as quantitatively, rather 
than qualitatively different from continence in the Christian tradition, the Aristotelian framework of 
The Faerie Queene inevitably lends it another sense, that of moderation. Consequently, the suggestion 
of a qualitative disjunction between the two states or virtues is latent in the text, raising the question 
of whether human agency can play any real part in spiritual or moral improvement. It is interesting to 
speculate whether Spenser himself might have been alert to the problems incurred by his pairing of a 
chastity nourished by denial with a temperance that nominally, at least, heralds Aristotle’s golden 
mean. For Spenser, like Calvin, chastity could pertain either to virginity or to monogamous marital 
love,42 and Kaske has suggested that Guyon’s defeat by Britomart, who will later be married, 
“demonstrates the difference between negative and positive chastity, showing a slight preference for 
the latter.”43 This problematizes Weatherby’s otherwise compelling argument that Spenser’s ultimate 
stance on the passions in The Faerie Queene is closely modelled on the views of Patristic writers like 
Chrysostom, who “interprets the chief theological virtue, charity, as being identical with practice of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
his conceptions in the Ethics and Politics largely from the Greek poets, especially from Homer.” (William Fenn 
De Moss, The Influence of Aristotle’s Politics and Ethics on Spenser (New York: AMS Press, 1970), 5). See for 
instance NE 1109a 30, where Aristotle uses Circe’s warning to Odysseus to steer clear of both Scylla and 
Charybdis but further from the more dangerous, Charybdis, to illustrate the idea of the golden mean. That 
Aristotle drew his ideas in the Ethics and Politics “largely” from the Greek poets, is, of course debatable. 
41 Something of this, I suspect, is reflected in critical disagreement about whether Acrasia’s character, or  
even her name, is sufficiently compatible with akrasia. Scodel argues that “The Bower of Bliss’s Acrasia 
derives from the Aristotelian term for the half vice of ‘incontinence,’ but acrasia is literally translatable as 
‘distemper’ in the sense of an unbalanced mixture” (Excess and the Mean in Early Modern English Literature, 
85). Berger suggests that Spenser’s Acrasia stands in opposition to both krasis (κρᾶσις), proper blending or 
tempering, and kratos (κράτος), power or power over oneself, and is thus simultaneously akratic and 
intemperate (Harry Berger, Jr., The Allegorical Temper: Vision and Reality in Book II of Spenser’s “Faerie 
Queene,” vol. 137, Yale Studies in English (US: Archon Books, 1967), 66. 
42 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. John Allen (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of 
Publication, 1843), 4.12.28. 
43 Carol V. Kaske, “Chastity,” in The Spenser Encyclopedia, ed. Hamilton, 377. 
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mortifying, and deifying, asceticism. When Saint Paul says that charity ‘is not easily provoked,’ 
Chrysostom understands him to mean that the charitable man is beyond perturbation of passion.”44 
 
 
Milton’s Spenser: the Areopagitica 
 
There is evidence that Spenser’s treatment of temperance in the Faerie Queene preoccupied 
contemporary, as well as more recent readers and scholars. Critics who notice Spenserian influence in 
Milton’s Maske often invoke his laudatory appeal to “our sage and serious poet Spencer” in the 
Areopagitica as proof of the enduring importance of the earlier writer to Milton’s perception of his 
own literary project.45 The relationship between Spenser and Milton suggested by the tract as a whole, 
however, is far from straightforward. In the Areopagitica, Milton argues that a “cloister’d virtue, 
unexercis’d & and unbreath’d” which “knows not the utmost that vice promises to her followers, and 
rejects it, is but a blank virtue, not a pure.” This is the reason, he suggests, that Spenser, “whom I dare 
be known to think a better teacher than Scotus or Aquinas, describing true temperance under the 
person of Guion, brings him in with his palmer through the cave of Mammon, and the bowr of earthly 
blisse, that he might see and know, and yet abstain” (311). There is a curious inaccuracy here. In 
Book 2 of the Faerie Queene, Guyon in fact ventures unaccompanied into Mammon’s cave, a point 
which, as Butler notes, Spenser “belabors” in his narrative.46 Critics have tried to account for Milton’s 
“astonishing mistake” in a number of ways.47 Typically, however, these endeavours share a tendency 
to attempt to prove that Milton’s reading either supports Spenser’s depiction of Guyon as a true knight 
of temperance, or revises the text so that the character’s possession of this virtue, as Milton 
understood it, is made to seem more thoroughly established. To my mind, neither of these 
explanations prove satisfactory.  
                                                          
44 Harold L. Weatherby, Mirrors of Celestial Grace: Patristic Theology in Spenser’s Allegory (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1994), 101. 
45 See for instance Guillory, Poetic Authority, 131. 
46 George F. Butler, “Milton’s ‘Sage and Serious Poet Spencer’: Error and Imitation in The Faerie Queene and 
Areopagitica,” Texas Studies in Literature and Language 49, no. 2 (2007): 103. 
47 See Butler, “Milton’s ‘Sage and Serious Poet Spencer,’“ 102 for this history and reasons for believing 
Milton’s error was deliberate. 
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The crux of the matter lies, I would suggest, in the role that the Palmer plays in the Faerie 
Queene. It is widely held that the Palmer represents the “objectification of Guyon’s ‘rational 
principle’” as he faces the various tests of his virtue in Book 2.48 This grants the Palmer symbolic 
compatibility with both the “intellectualist” account of akrasia that emerges from Aristotle, and with a 
still prevalent medieval anthropology which located fallen man’s depravity in his sensual appetite or 
flesh, and emphasised in Augustinian or Thomistic terms a divided human will over which reason, 
man’s “erected wit,”49 might still reign.50 The latter accounts for the ethical paradigm applied to 
Alma’s palace, the ”dwelling place” of “Temperaunce” at the beginning of canto 11:  
 
What warre so cruel, or what siege so sore,  
As that, which strong affections doe apply  
Against the forte of reason euermore,  
To bring the sowle into captiuity:  
 Their force is fiercer through infirmity  
Of the fraile flesh, relenting to their rage,  
And exercise most bitter tyranny  
Vpon the partes, brought into their bondage: 
No wretchednesse is like to sinfull vellenage.51 
      (2.11.1)  
 
A difficulty emerges, however, if we try to align Guyon’s innate, inborn rationality with the reformed 
theological leanings of Spenser’s text,52 where the “monstruous” minds of Acrasia’s transformed 
“louers” point to the poet’s departure from Homer, and his revision of the common allegorical reading 
of the Circe myth to align with the doctrine that if man’s flesh is utterly corrupt, the contagion of 
                                                          
48 Ernest Sirluck, “Milton Revises ‘The Faerie Queene,’” Modern Philology 48, no. 2 (1950): 92. 
49 Sidney, An Apologie for Poetrie, C2r. 
50 Saarinen, Weakness of Will in Renaissance and Reformation Thought, 20. 
51 As Hamilton (FQ n. 2.11.1.9) notes, Spenser’s “sinfull vellenage” (“vellenage” takes its root from the Latin 
velle) suggests the “bondage of the flesh to sin through the corrupt will.” 
52 See Prescott, “Complicating the Allegory” for a sensitive analysis of the Faerie Queene’s relationship to 
Reformation tropes and ideals, and Hume, Edmund Spenser, on the question of Spenser’s religious affiliations. 
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original sin has also debased that part of him most like to God – his mind. With the Fall, as Calvin 
observes, “the Image of God” in man was “so corrupted, that all that remaineth, is but ugly 
deformity”; “our reason is overwhelmed with deceptions in so many forms, is obnoxious to so many 
errors, stumbles at so many impediments, and is embarrassed in so many difficulties, that it is very far 
from being a certain guide.”53 Reason alone therefore should not be enough to secure virtuous action, 
and indeed, in Book 2 of the Faerie Queene man’s natural proclivity for good – regardless, indeed, of 
whether we consider Guyon himself to be a “natural” man or otherwise54 – often plays second fiddle 
to the supernatural and practical wisdom provided by external spiritual guides. Guillory has argued 
that it is on these grounds that Milton revises Spenser’s account of Guyon’s journey through 
Mammon’s cave. Milton, he suggests, writes the Palmer into the episode because he believes that 
Guyon’s self-reliance threatens to endanger the reader’s notion of Spenser’s virtue, as well as that of 
the fictions he creates: it is Milton, after all, who wrote that “he who would not be frustrate of his 
hope to write well hereafter in laudable things, ought himself to be a true poem; that is, a composition 
and pattern of the best and honourablest things; not presuming to sing high praises of heroic men, or 
famous cities, unless he have in himselfe the experience and the practice of all that which is praise-
worthy.”55 According to Guillory, wishing to “decrease the distance between himself and Spenser,” 
Milton thus bolsters the moral authority of the Faerie Queene in order to boost his own.56 
In the context of the overarching polemic of the Areopagitica itself, however, a different 
picture emerges. Milton’s tract defends the liberty of the press against the extensive censorship 
commissioned by the Parliamentary Licensing Law of 1643.57 To this end, Milton expands the 
                                                          
53 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Thomas Norton (London: Thomas Vautrollier, 1574), 
1.15.4; 2.2.25.  
54 Woodhouse’s theory that Book 1of the Faerie Queene pertains to the “order of grace,” and Book 2 to the 
“order of nature,” so that “what touches the Redcross Knight bears primarily upon revealed religion, or belongs 
to the order of grace, whatever touches Guyon bears upon natural ethics, or belongs to the order of nature,” is 
well known (A. S. P. Woodhouse, “Nature and Grace in the Faerie Queene,” English Literary History 16, no. 3 
(1949): 204). As this chapter progresses, it will become evident that I do not uphold Woodhouse’s claim. While 
Guyon’s exact spiritual status is contested, passages at 2.1.27, 2.1.32 and 2.1.59 clearly indicate his Christianity. 
On the problems with Woodhouse’s argument, see Robert Hoopes, “‘God Guide Thee, Guyon’: Nature and 
Grace Reconciled in The Faerie Queene, Book II,” The Review of English Studies 5, no. 17 (1954): 14–24; 
Hume, Edmund Spenser. 
55 Milton, An Apology for Smectymnuus, 303. 
56 Guillory, Poetic Authority, 132. 
57 The act gave “orders . . . for suppressing the great late abuses and frequent disorders in Printing many false, 
forged, scandalous, seditious, libellous, and unlicensed Papers, Pamphlets, and Books to the great defamation of 
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Horatian argument that art should both instruct and delight to encompass a claim that the virtue of any 
literary pursuit lies in the individual reader’s act of discernment. The ability to read rightly can only 
be developed through a confrontation of both the good and evil of the world as it manifests (for 
instance) in literature, like to “those confused seeds which were impos’d on Psyche as an incessant 
labour to cull out, and sort asunder” (310). It is only through such a process that man, moreover, may 
achieve “true temperance,” a virtue that is threatened therefore by the licenser’s heavy hand.58 The 
possible implications of this for Milton’s reading of Spenser are implicit in Cefalu’s discussion of the 
“ethical quandaries” at stake in Book 2 of The Faerie Queene.59 Against Woodhouse’s taxonomy of 
two orders as operative in Spenser’s epic, the order of nature and the order of grace, Cefalu posits a 
third order of Mosaic law, a frequent resort, he suggests, of Protestant theologians who struggled to 
theorize a model of practical morality compatible with Reformed doctrines of justification and 
sanctification. In the Faerie Queene, this law is embodied by the Palmer, who “affects Guyon in the 
Bower by the brute force of example rather than by a nuanced pedagogy.”60 
This assertion, I would argue, is borne out by the interactions between Guyon and the Palmer 
in Book 2 before they reach the Bower. When we first encounter the Palmer in Spenser’s narrative, he 
supports himself with a “staffe” which “his feeble steps did stire, / Least his long way his aged limbes 
should tire” (2.1.7.4-5). It soon becomes clear, however, that this is no ordinary crutch. The staff 
provides both physical and moral support: the Palmer guides Guyon 
 
. . . ouer dale and hill, 
And with his steedy staffe did point his way: 
His race with reason, and with words his will, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Religion and Government.” See “June 1643: An Ordinance for the Regulating of Printing,” in Acts and 
Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642-1660, ed. C. H. Firth and R. S10. Rait (London: HMSO, 1911), pp. 184-
186. British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/acts-ordinances-interregnum/pp184-186 
[accessed 25 August 2018]. 
58 Kolbrener suggests that there is a broader, political statement in all of this: “the Areopagitica, in its very form 
– the five-part structure of the classical deliberative oration – argues implicitly for the creation of a diffused, 
inclusive, and corporate authority.” Such a view, he argues, is commensurate with Milton’s “emergent 
republicanism” (William Kolbrener, “‘Plainly Partial’: The Liberal Areopagitica,” English Literary History 60, 
no. 1 (1993): 62). 
59 Cefalu, Moral Identity in Early Modern English Literature, 7. 
60 Ibid., 75. 
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From fowle intemperaunce he ofte did stay, 
And suffred not in wrath his hasty steps to stray. 
   (1.34.5-9) 
 
In Canto 12, the staff accrues further significance as its magical, indeed, miraculous power is 
revealed. On the shores of the island that houses Acrasia’s Bower, Guyon and the Palmer are met by 
the 
 
. . . hideous bellowing 
Of many beasts, that roard outrageously, 
As if that hungers poynt, or Venus sting 
Had them enraged with fell surquedry. 
   (12.39.1-4) 
 
The references to “hunger” and “Venus sting” indicate that the beasts represent the “deadly threat” 
(40.1) that untrammelled appetite and concupiscence pose to man’s moral and spiritual life, a 
common allegorical interpretation, as we have seen, of Circe’s metamorphosis of Odysseus’s men. 
Spenser reveals that the Palmer’s staff has the unique ability to subdue these beasts and the passions 
they represent:  
 
 The Palmer ouer them his staffe vpheld, 
 His mighty staffe, that could all charmes defeat: 
 Eftesoones their stubborne corages were queld, 
 And high aduaunced crests downe meekely feld, 
 Instead of fraying, they them selues did feare, 
 And trembled, as them passing they beheld: 
 Such wondrous powre did in that staffe appeare, 
 All monsters to subdew to him, that did it beare. 
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   (12.40.2-9) 
 
The word “charmes” hints at Circean involvement in the condition of these creatures, although the 
reader will have to wait until the end of the canto for confirmation that “These seeming beasts are 
men indeed” (85.1). The Circean trope is extended through the next stanza, however, as Spenser 
provides further interpretative guidance in the form of a potted history of the origins of the Palmer’s 
staff: we learn that  
 
Of that same wood it fram’d was cunningly, 
Of which Caduceus whilome was made, 
Caduceus the rod of Mercury. 
   (41.1-3) 
 
Within the Circean parameters of Spenser’s allegory, this suggestion of the Mercurial attributes of the 
Palmer’s staff aligns its interventionist powers most neatly with those of the moly plant, which as we 
have seen, in the Odyssey is given by Hermes to Odysseus as protection against Circe’s charms, and 
was commonly held to represent logos or right reason. 
In Homer’s myth, however, Circe herself is in possession of a wand or rhabdos (Od. 10.238), 
which she uses to drive the men-turned-pigs into their sty. As my previous chapter has suggested, in 
masques of this period the wand becomes a site of contested power, and tends to be either taken from 
Circe or freely given away by the goddess as she faces defeat.61 Intriguingly, however, the beasts that 
oppose Guyon and the Palmer are not the lions and wolves that the Homeric Circe renders unnaturally 
tame — the monsters or pelora which so trouble Odysseus’s men with their unnatural behaviour as 
they approach Circe’s palace — but wild beasts 
 
                                                          
61 Yarnall notes that Circe’s “transformative magic seems to reside in the drug rather than the rod, which may 
well be an ordinary driver’s stick. Yet because . . . [Circe’s raising of her wand] illustrates more clearly than any 
other female dominance over the male, the rhabdos has come to seem potent, a symbol of phallic powers 
improperly assumed“ (Transformations of Circe, 12). 
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Who all attonce, gaping full greedily, 
And rearing fercely their vpstarting crests, 
Ran towards, to deuoure those vnexpected guests. 
   (12.39.7-9) 
 
In using his staff at this point in the narrative to subdue the beasts without restoring their human 
shapes, the Palmer’s behaviour might appear suspiciously Circean. The reason Spenser takes this risk, 
I would suggest, is that the staff’s miraculous effect here underscores another force that is central to 
Book 2’s allegorical concerns: the force, or rule, of law. 
A suggestion that the Palmer’s rod is an instrument of legal arbitration is given with the 
reference to the buckling of the beasts’ “high aduaunced crests” (40.5) in the presence of his staff. 
Earlier in Book 2, Medina – whose name denotes her close connection to the idea of temperance, or 
the Aristotelian mean – intervenes in a skirmish between Sir Guyon, Sir Huddibras and Sans-loy. 
After the knights have  
 
. . . lett their cruell weapons fall, 
And lowly did abase their lofty crests 
To her faire presence, and discrete behests. 
Then she began a treaty to procure, 
And stablish termes betwixt both their requests, 
That as a law for euer should endure; 
Which to obserue in word of knights they did assure. 
   (2.32.3-9. My emphasis) 
 
If an invocation of law is explicit here, implicit too, in the wider narrative of Medina and her sisters 
Elissa (too little) and Perissa (too much), are the law’s limitations. Between a defective elder sister 
and an excessive younger sister, Spenser posits Medina as an important tempering force: “With equall 
measure she did moderate / The strong extremities of their outrage” (38.3-4). Yet as Stambler notes, 
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the respective position of each sister proves ultimately intractable, so that “one of the lessons (for the 
reader) of Medina’s house is that while Medina can admonish and temporarily deter her half-sisters 
and their lovers from intemperate behaviour, she cannot instill in them a temperate disposition.”62 The 
sisters’ conduct may be moderated, but they remain inwardly unreformed. 
In order to confirm the suspicion that Spenser’s portrayal of the Palmer’s staff embraces this 
same, imperfect trope of legalism, we need to look again to canto 12. Earlier in this canto, during their 
sea passage towards Acrasia’s Bower, Guyon and the Palmer escape one danger, the “Whirlepoole of 
decay,” (12.20.2) to be met almost immediately by another: “an hideous hoast . . . / Of huge Sea 
monsters” (12.22.8-9) which “Came rushing in the fomy waues enrold” (12.25.4), threatening to 
capsize their vessel. While the monsters “appall” Sir Guyon (25.6), the Palmer springs to action — 
first through a motion of discernment which diagnoses “these fearefull shapes disguiz’d” as 
proceeding from Acrasia “to worke vs dreed, / And draw from on this iourney to proceede” (26.3-5), 
and then through a practical application of this knowledge: 
 
. . . lifting vp his vertuous staffe on hye, 
He smote the sea, which calmed was with speed, 
And all that dreadfull Armie fast gan flye 
Into great Tethys bosome, where they hidden lye. 
(26.7-9) 
 
As commentators have observed, this verse is highly allusive to parts of Exodus, where Moses’s 
“virtuous staffe” is wielded to similarly astounding effect. Importantly, as Cefalu reminds us, 
“Reformed theology . . . specifically connected Moses’s rod to divine law.”63 In the scenario above, 
the Palmer is responsible for both judgement and action. Guyon does not engage with the practical 
syllogism at all, ostensibly because he is crippled by fear –the paradox being that, as Cefalu has 
                                                          
62 Peter D. Stambler, “The Development of Guyon’s Christian Temperance,” English Literary Renaissance 7, 
no. 1 (1977): 58. 
63 Cefalu, Moral Identity, 73. 
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discussed, for Reformation exegetes Old Testament Law was often synonymous with the “servile fear 
experienced by the depraved upon confronting an absolutist God.”64  
Following their escape from the sea monsters, Guyon and the Palmer encounter two further 
dangers which should hypothetically afford Guyon two more opportunities to put virtue into action, 
yet in both instances it is the Palmer who evaluates the situation and prescribes the appropriate course 
of conduct. Sailing onwards to Acrasia’s Bower, Guyon and the Palmer “heard a ruefull cry / Of one, 
that wayld and pittifully wept” (27.2-3). As they draw closer, they see an island, and it becomes clear 
that the source of these “resounding plaints” is 
 
A seemely Maiden, sitting by the shore, 
That with great sorrow and sad agony, 
Seemed some great misfortune to deplore, 
And lowd to them for succour called euermore. 
   (27.6-9) 
 
Upon hearing the maiden’s cries, Guyon, like every good knight who spies a damsel in distress, feels 
compelled to go to her aid: he 
 
. . . streight his Palmer bad,  
To stere the bote towards that dolefull Mayd, 
That he might know, and ease her sorrow sad. 
   (28.1-3) 
 
The Palmer refuses to allow this, however, on the (by now familiar) grounds that the “seemely” 
maiden is not what she seems. In the Areopagitica, an ironic echo of Guyon’s hope that he “might 
know, and . . .” sounds in Milton’s claim that the Palmer’s presence in Mammon’s cave ensures that 
Guyon “might see and know, and yet abstain.” Admittedly, Guyon’s desire to visit the maiden’s 
                                                          
64 Ibid., 74. 
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island so that he might “ease her sorrow sad” is not a course for abstinence. Yet the opportunity for 
Guyon to know, appraise the situation in full, and determine appropriate action based on lived 
experience – a principle, as we will see, of the utmost importance to Milton – is also curtailed by the 
Palmer’s “unassailable commands and speech-acts.”65  
Neither does the Palmer’s approach appear to have any real didactic advantages. Leaving the 
maiden behind them, the pair sail towards their next obstacle, the bay of mermaids. Five siren-like 
creatures here begin to ply Guyon with “pleasaunt tunes” that praise him as the  
 
. . . fayre sonne of gentle Faery, 
That art in mighty armes most magnifyde 
Aboue all knights, that euer batteill tryde. 
   (32.2-5) 
 
This is a direct appeal to Guyon’s pride in his martial prowess and knightly conquests, 
accomplishments which the Knight is prone to value excessively, as the preference he had expressed 
to Mammon for “riches” fit for the “high heroicke spright,” “crownes and kingdoms . . . / Faire 
shields, gay steedes, bright armes” (2.7.10.9; 6-8) earlier in Book 2 might suggest. Coupled with the 
quintessentially Circean temptation of respite from heroic labour – “This is the Port of rest from 
troublous toyle, / The worldes sweet In, from paine and wearisome turmoyle” (12.32.8-9) – Guyon 
needs little further persuasion: his senses are “tickeled” or lulled by the “straunge kinde of harmony” 
he finds in the mermaids’ song (33.7; 6).66 This misapprehension is fuelled by Guyon’s mortal 
weakness, his susceptibility to sinful pride and the allure of rest after strenuous effort. Yet one 
wonders if his inability to correctly “heare” the mermaids’ “rare melody” (33.9) in part also derives 
                                                          
65 Ibid., 75. 
66 It seems likely that Spenser is parodying here the Neoplatonic myth of the sirens of the spheres, whose 
singing, as we have seen in the Balet comique, was believed to maintain cosmic harmony. Guyon, who hears in 
the ominous crashing of the waves against the rocks only a “solemne Meane” (33.4) befitting of his status as the 
Knight of Temperance, clearly fails to distinguish these mermaids or sirens in malo from their ethereal cousins 
in bono. Such interpretative difficulty will only increase as Guyon and the Palmer venture into Acrasia’s Bower, 
where “Right hard it was, for wight, which did it heare, / To read, what manner musicke that mote bee” 
(12.70.5-6), and where the danger of confusing the sacred and the profane becomes even greater in the presence 
of “Angelicall soft trembling voyces” which make “To th’instruments diuine respondence meet” (71.3-4). 
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from his inexperience. The danger of death that awaits Guyon, should he attend too long to the 
mermaids’ song is explicitly foretold by the narrator. By contrast, we only have the Palmer’s word 
that the “dolefull mayd” Guyon is prevented from encountering a few stanzas previously would work 
his “ruine” (29.4). Deprived of the opportunity to discern and confront this arguably lesser danger, it 
is little wonder that in the face of the mermaids’ mystical charm offensive, the knight fails to “see and 
know, and yet abstain.” 
There is cause, then, to wonder whether Milton’s retrospective addition of the Palmer to 
Spenser’s Mammon episode might thus work to draw attention to, and implicitly criticize, the 
domineering aspect of this Moses-like figure throughout Book 2, to suggest the Palmer’s continued 
presence in both Guyon’s and the reader’s mind despite the momentary narrative exclusion of his 
character. On one level, Milton’s moralistic misreading – if we accept it as such – of Guyon’s journey 
through the cave of Mammon might be accounted for as a performative justification of his own 
rhetoric in the Areopagitica,67 where overall, the treatment of historic individuals charged with 
imposing and enforcing moral codes in the tract is far from uncritical, and where for Kolbrener, 
Milton’s often simultaneous assertion and subversion of the necessity of such mediatory figures is 
“one of the central paradoxes of the tract.”68 Yet there is evidence to suggest that Milton’s revision of 
the Faerie Queene was not a purely self-reflexive exercise. The coincidence of the Areopagitica’s 
bearing upon Milton’s ongoing feud with his contemporary, the Puritan clergyman Herbert Palmer, 
and Milton’s allusion in the same tract to Spenser’s fictional Palmer, seems to have escaped critical 
attention. It seems likely, however, that Milton’s selective appropriation of this character, from this 
                                                          
67 A further layer of ambiguity emerges when we consider the complexity of the relationship between the 
Areopagitica’s formal attributes and the Miltonic voice’s authoritative claims in the tract. Butler observes that  
 
Beginning with the title page of his pamphlet, Milton deliberately misleads the reader. By proclaiming 
Areopagitica a speech, he gives an early signal that the text that follows may not completely be what it 
seems. And by calling his pamphlet a speech, Milton introduces the character of a fictional speaker, a 
common citizen who, like any other citizen, is capable of making mistakes. And so the “mistakes” that 
occur in Areopagitica are not the failings of Milton; they are, rather, the errors of Milton’s persona, the 
‘Mr. John Milton’ who makes a speech to Parliament. (“Milton’s ‘Sage and Serious Poet Spencer,’” 
107) 
 
This reading, however, fails to take into account the seriousness of the claims Milton makes in the tract, which 
as my thesis will demonstrate, populate his wider corpus. Butler’s argument is for this reason finally 
unconvincing. 
68 Kolbrener, “‘Plainly Partial,’” 67. 
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particular episode of Spenser’s text, was conditioned by something more than chance. Herbert Palmer 
had attacked Milton’s Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce (1643) in a sermon, “The glasse of Gods 
providence towards his faithfull ones,” which appeared in the Stationers Register on 7th November 
1644, deploring the work as a “wicked booke [which] is abroad and uncensured; though deserving to 
be burnt, whose Author hath been so impudent as to set his Name to it.”69 In his address to parliament 
at the beginning of the Tetrachordon (1645), Milton issues a scathing response to Palmer’s complaint, 
demanding to know “why I should be subject, in such a notorious and illegal manner, to the 
intemperancies of this mans preaching choler.”70 Milton takes particular umbrage at Palmer’s 
accusation of the “impudence” of his admission of authorship, given that “the late Discourse of 
Scripture and Reason” – a treatise co-authored by Palmer, which argued that citizens had the right to 
arm themselves to defend their liberties – was itself “publisht without a name, out of base fear, and 
the sly avoidance of what might follow to his detriment, if the party at Court should hap to reach him” 
(67-8). As this imputation of “base fear” begins to suggest, Milton in turn finds Palmer guilty of a 
hypocritical legalism. It is only fitting, therefore, that in the Tetrachordon he threatens to send the 
offending “impudence” back to his accuser “for a phylactery to stitch upon his arrogance” (68). 
 A phylactery, if not literally the letter of the law,71 has strong textural and scriptural 
connotations. Although the word may more broadly signify an amulet or charm, in seventeenth-
century literature it very often refers to verses from the Torah carried by Jewish men in small boxes 
(tefillin) and attached to the body of the bearer by leather straps.72 The commandment to wear tefillin 
is given in Deuteronomy 6:8: “And thou shalt bind them for a sign upon thine hand, and they shall be 
as frontlets between thine eyes.”73 In his study of Milton’s pejorative deployment of phylacteries in 
                                                          
69 Herbert Palmer, The Glasse of Gods Providence towards His Faithfull Ones (London: G.M. for Th. Underhill, 
1644), 57. 
70 Milton, “Tetrachordon,” in Works (Columbia), 67. 
71 In the seventeenth century, as Magarik has found, “the mistaken belief that Jewish phylacteries contained the 
Decalogue was widespread.” See Raphael Magarik, “Milton’s Phylacteries: Textual Idolatry and Beginnings of 
Critical Exegesis,” Milton Studies 57 (2016): 39. 
72 Given the particularly literary nature of Milton’s quarrel with Palmer, and the textual preoccupations of the 
Areopagitica itself, I would suggest that the latter meaning is more applicable here. As Magarik has discussed, 
“beginning in the seventeenth century, Christian Hebraism made the more specific, Jewish tephillin available as 
a meaning for phylacteries, and the Reformation elevation of the biblical text made this meaning attractive” 
(“Milton’s Phylacteries,” 40). 
73 Three other Biblical passages have been interpreted by Rabbis as referring to tefillin: Exodus 6:9 and 6:13 and 
Deuteronomy 11:18. See ibid., p34. 
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the Tetrachordon and other works, Magarik suggests that “since phylacteries are worn as signs . . . the 
metaphorical use of ‘phylactery’ is a sign about signs. It thus seems plausible that when Milton used 
the image of phylacteries, he intended to draw the reader’s attention to the process of interpretation, to 
the work required to travel from signifier to signified.”74 More specifically, Magarik has argued, 
phylacteries in Milton’s texts are often deployed in malo as signs of “textual idolatry,”75 a legalistic 
method of reading whereby the letter of scripture is celebrated above, or confused with, its spirit.76 
Such reading, for Milton, is implicated in the religious abuses committed by figures of suspect 
authority – figures, perhaps, like Herbert Palmer, whose cry to burn Milton’s books would, for the 
latter author, strike at the very heart of Christian liberty. 
Milton’s invocation of a Palmer in the Areopagitica – a tract explicitly concerned with 
refuting censorship, published soon after Palmer’s complaint on 23rd November 1644 – is, then, 
extremely suggestive. Milton’s fury against Herbert Palmer for writing himself out of his own work, 
while censoring others more courageous in shouldering the responsibility and blame of authorship, 
could well account for his annexation of the clergyman’s name to a portrait of textual authority that, 
to the discerning reader, eventually proves less than flattering. The idea that in the Areopagitica, 
Milton forges a connection between Herbert Palmer and Spenser’s fictional Palmer gains additional 
credence when we consider that the Palmer’s wisdom and authority is seriously circumscribed by 
Spenser himself at least once in Book 2 of the Faerie Queen. In canto 1, after Guyon and the Palmer 
are led by Archimago to the Redcrosse knight, the Palmer praises Redcrosse for 
 
 . . . late most hard atchieu’ment by you donne,  
For which enrolled is your glorious name 
In heauenly Regesters aboue the Sunne, 
Where you a Saint with Saints your seat haue wonne. 
                                                          
74 Ibid., 31. 
75 Ibid., 32. 
76 Magarik argues that such “idolatry” was an ironic by-product of the Reformers’ emphasis on the doctrine of 
sola scriptura: “As the spirit calcifies into the letter, the devotional Bible reading that began as an alternative to 
Catholic idolatry becomes its own impediment to true Christianity” (ibid., 43). Milton’s attitude towards biblical 
hermeneutics, sacraments and idolatry will be explored further in my next chapter. 
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(32.2-5) 
 
The Redcrosse Knight responds to this exhortation with a lesson in theology: the Palmer is reminded 
by the knight that any glory he finds in his conduct belongs properly to God’s prevenient grace: 
 
Palmer, him answered the Redcrosse knight 
His be the praise, that this atchieu’ment wrought, 
Who made my hand the organ of his might; 
More then goodwill to me attribute nought: 
For all I did, I did but as I ought.77 
    (33.1-5) 
 
Given what appears to be the Palmer’s limited understanding of the operation of grace, it 
should not be surprising that the machinery of Spenser’s narrative at times casts aspersions on the 
ethical or spiritual soundness of the judgments that the character is seen to make. This manifests 
particularly in the Palmer’s inconsistent treatment of the morally dubious characters he encounters 
with Guyon on their journey towards the Bower. In canto 5, for instance, the Palmer refuses to help 
the beleaguered knight Pyrochles, since 
 
He that his sorow sought through wilfulnesse,  
And his foe fettred would release agayne,  
Deserues to tast his follies fruit, repented payne. 
   (24.7-9) 
  
                                                          
77 This reiterates the narrator’s warning at 1.10.6-9:  
  
Ne let the man ascribe it to his skill,  
That thorough grace hath gained victory.  
If any strength we haue, it is to ill,  
But all the good is Gods, both power and eke will. 
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Pyrochles, lately defeated by Guyon, is at this moment being attacked by Furor, who in turn has been 
“inflam’d” (21.7) by Occasion – a figure held captive by Guyon, but lately released from her chains at 
Pyrochles’ request. This latter wrathful knight, who delights in “bloud and spoile” (4.42.4) and 
actively seeks Occasion for “strife and cruell fight” (42.7), is clearly within the grip of an intractable 
intemperance, characterised by an affinity for discord beyond that which ordinarily attends the 
continent man’s life of struggle.78 As the narrative voice warns at the beginning of canto 5, 
  
Who euer doth to temperaunce apply 
His stedfast life, and all his actions frame, 
Trust me, shal find no greater enimy, 
Then stubborne perturbation, to the same; 
To which right wel the wise doe giue that name, 
For it the goodly peace of staied mindes 
Does ouerthrow, and troublous warre proclame: 
His owne woes authour, who so bound it findes, 
As did Pirrhocles, and it wilfully vnbindes. 
(5.1) 
 
The Palmer’s decision not to intervene would on this occasion, then, appear to be justified. 
As Book 2 progresses, however, the Palmer’s allocation of assistance comes to seem rather 
arbitrary. At the end of canto 12, as Guyon and the Palmer are leaving Acrasia’s Bower, they meet for 
a second time with the “wilde beasts” (39.6) the Palmer had earlier pacified with his staff. The Palmer 
now sees fit to explain their origin: 
 
Sayd he, These seeming beasts are men indeed, 
Whom this Enchauntresse hath transformed thus, 
                                                          
78 As Kane observes, Calvin “acknowledged strife as the inevitable and continuous expression of the battle with 
sin” (Sean Kane, Spenser’s Moral Allegory (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 54). 
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Whylome her louers, which her lustes did feed, 
Now turned into figures hideous, 
According to their mindes like monstruous. 
Sad end (quoth he) of life intemperate. 
   (85.1-6) 
 
Despite the men’s monstrosity and their intemperance, which the Palmer suggests has led to their 
transformation by Acrasia, at Guyon’s request to “Let them returned be vnto their former state” 
(85.9), “Streight way he with his vertuous staffe them strooke, /And streight of beasts they comely 
men became” (86.1-20. In a sense, Spenser is simply following Homer here. In the Odyssey, as we 
have seen, Circe does restore the human forms of Odysseus’s men. In Homer’s text, however, they are 
also said to be made more beautiful at this second metamorphosis (Od.10.396). By contrast, when 
Spenser’s “seeming beasts” are restored by the Palmer’s Mosaic rod, 
 
Yet being men they did vnmanly looke,  
And stared ghastly, some for inward shame,  
And some for wrath, to see their captiue Dame. 
   (86.3-5) 
 
This outcome speaks both to the limitations of the law, which, as we have seen with Medina, 
addresses the outward appearance of sin (the letter), but not man’s inner condition (the spirit),79 and 
the dangerously capricious nature of its application: those of the beasts-turned men who are “wrath, to 
see their captiue Dame” would seem just as incurably vicious as Pyrochles. The failure of the 
Palmer’s staff to work a true reformation of the monstrous minds of Acrasia’s herd, moreover, marks 
the stick out as a kind of phylactery, both in terms of the legalistic, Mosaic nature of its application by 
the Palmer and its mythical association with Pagan magic (it is made of the same wood, we 
                                                          
79 See also Milton’s Areopagitica: “A man may be a heretick in the truth; and if he beleeve things only because 
his Pastor sayes so, or the Assembly so determins, without knowing other reason, though his belief be true, yet 
the very truth he holds, becomes his heresie.” (333). 
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remember, as Mercury’s Caduceus).80 As I have suggested, in Reformation discourse, phylacteries 
were used as a trope for idolatry, threatening a confusion, rather than infusion, of letter with spirit, 
appearance with essence. The importance of the semi-idolatrous rod in Book 2 as an instrument of 
both arbitration and retribution raises serious questions, therefore, about the moral and spiritual 
education Guyon obtains under the Palmer’s tutelage. 
The letter of the Palmer’s law remains with Guyon throughout his travails in Mammon’s 
cave, albeit somewhat transmuted or distorted: the prohibiting command is delivered rather by the 
“feend” (2.7.26.7) who, under the “Stygian lawes” will “rend [Guyon] in peeces with his rauenous 
pawes” (27.9; 8) 
 
If euer couetous hand, or lustfull eye,  
Or lips he layd on thing that likte him best  
Or euer sleepe his eiestrings did vntye  
(27.2-4) 
 
Guyon’s adherence to this injunction clearly protects him from the most immediate moral or spiritual 
danger of temptation, yet it also has a detrimental bearing on the degree of true temperance we might 
award the knight – a temperance which, in the last analysis, may amount to little more than “an 
insulated and unavailing relation to the self and the World’s good.”81 Indeed, in theological terms, 
Book 2 does not evidence any particular moral or spiritual development within the Faerie Knight’s 
own nature beyond that which the work of justification has already achieved.82 This seems to speak to 
the difficulty of locating a coherent account of virtue-formation within the fatalistic parameters of 
                                                          
80 Magarik notes that the connection between phylacteries and pagan objects “goes back as early as John 
Chrysostom, who linked Jewish phylacteries with magical amulets” (“Milton’s Phylacteries,” 38). Interestingly, 
in his commentary on Ovid’s Metamorphoses, Sandys uses the detail of Circe’s rod to present her as a kind of 
anti-Moses: she “could turne men into beasts (as here Vlisses mates into Swine) among her other miracles by 
making them drink of her charmed cup, and wauing her rod ouer them. Wherein the deuill perhaps aped that rod 
of Moses wherewith hee performed such wonders; or deriued from the Aegyptian Sorcerers, as now in vse 
among those of that profession” (Ovid’s Metamorphosis Englished, 479). 
81 Carl Robinson Sonn, “Sir Guyon in the Cave of Mammon,” Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900 1, no. 1 
(1961): 27. 
82 See Cefalu, Moral Identity, 58, on the distinction between justification and sanctification in reformed 
theology. Broadly speaking, as a stage in the ordo salutis “sanctifying righteousness describes the moral 
outworking of justified grace” (ibid., 64). 
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Reformed theology, a difficulty with which Milton, as I will argue in my next chapter, seems to have 
particularly struggled. 
As Cefalu has found, 
 
 Sanctiﬁcation theoretically promotes a renovation of moral character, yet it has trouble 
imagining that ethical agents develop their imparted characters according to any additive or 
developmental regimen of ethical conditioning. To the extent that every moral confrontation 
is a novel challenge, and the moral agent cannot draw on an experiential store of moral 
expertise and wisdom, every action reestablishes the regenerate as a moral apprentice whose 
ethical resources are not his or her own.83 
 
For Milton, in the presence of a moral code enforced through legalistic prohibition, such “ethical 
resources” are even harder to locate within the conscience of the individual Christian man.84 Leading 
up to his (mis)citation of Spenser in the Areopagitica, Milton declares that  
 
I cannot praise a fugitive and cloister’d vertue, unexercis’d & unbreath’d, that never sallies 
out and sees her adversary, but slinks out of the race, where that immortall garland is to be 
run for, not without dust and heat. Assuredly we bring not innocence into the world, we bring 
impurity much rather: that which purifies us is triall, and triall is by what is contrary. That 
vertue therefore which is but a youngling in the contemplation of evill, and knows not the 
utmost that vice promises to her followers, and rejects it, is but a blank vertue, not a pure; her 
whitenesse is but an excrementall whitenesse. (311) 
                                                          
83 Ibid., 71 
84 Sirluck, and, more recently, Fallon and Giugni  find no enthusiasm for Aristotelian habit (ήθος), on which the 
Ethics’ notion of virtue formation vitally depends, in Milton’s work (Sirluck, “Milton Revises ‘The Faerie 
Queen’”; Stephen M. Fallon, “Milton and Literary Virtue,” Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 42, 1 
(2012): 181–200; Giugni, “The ‘Holy Dictate of Spare Temperance’”). Hampton, who draws attention to 
Milton’s use of “the language of causality” in his discussion of the relationship between habit and the virtue in 
De Doctrina Christiana, disagrees (Bryan Adams Hampton, Fleshly Tabernacles: Milton and the Incarnational 
Poetics of Revolutionary England (Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 2012), 173–74). Fallon argues that 
while Milton “intermittently endorses something very like Aristotle’s understanding of the role of habituation in 
virtue, the ethical scene in his poetry repeatedly comes down to strenuous, heroic choice in the moment, not the 
operation of gradually acquired and settled virtue” (“Milton and Literary Virtue,”191).  
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Although Guyon’s meeting with Mammon is signalled by Spenser as a temptation, the character, 
arguably, is never tempted to the extent that we could deem the episode a true “triall” in the Miltonic 
sense. As Berger notes, during his descent into the cave, “Guyon displays one touch of fear when 
Mammon’s goldsmiths look at him . . . Otherwise he seems impervious to the horror of the place; he 
followed Mammon ‘evermore/ Ne darknesse him, ne daunger might dismay’ (7.26). Therefore if the 
hero thinks he is undergoing an ordeal – a bona fide ordeal – he is deceived. His chief activity consists 
in muscle flexing – moral as well as physical.”85 The same might be concluded of Guyon’s 
destruction of both the Circean “bowle” (12.49.3) of Genius, “Pleasures porter” (48.8) to the Bower, 
and Excesse’s Circean cup, when the knight is finally entrusted by the Palmer to do the work of the 
practical syllogism himself. In Homer’s tale, Odysseus is protected from the metamorphic effects of 
the Goddess’s drug by the moly plant gifted to him by Hermes, which has the power to counteract 
Circe’s pharmakon kakon. This does not, however, mean that he refuses to drink: as Yarnall notes, 
Odysseus “is fully receptive to Circe’s power, unhesitatingly draining her cup. Yet he does not fall 
victim to her regressive pull.”86 The Greek’s engagement with Circe in this manner, moreover, leads 
on to the Goddess’s invitation for him to share her perikalles bed,87 an offer which Odysseus, again 
following the advice of Hermes, gladly accepts. It is evident, then, that Odysseus’s success on Circe’s 
island is not dependent on the renunciation of pleasure – such pleasure, in fact, as Yarnall argues, 
becomes the pair’s “grounds of trust.”88  
In the Faerie Queene, Guyon’s abstinence in the Bower, as indeed in the Mammon episode, 
does serve to establish that the knight is not intemperate or vicious. Following the example of 
Pyrochles, Spenser’s introduction of Gryll at the end of canto 12, a Homeric figure who resists the 
Palmer’s attempt to restore his human form, serves to demonstrate what true intemperance looks like. 
Gryll, one of Acrasia’s transformed lovers who “chooseth, with vile difference, / To be a beast, and 
lacke intelligence” (87.4-5), is shown to deliberately, unapologetically and persistently pursue vice: he 
                                                          
85 Berger, The Allegorical Temper, 18. 
86 Yarnall, Transformations of Circe, 21. 
87 The adjective περικαλλής, used elsewhere by Homer as Yarnall (ibid.,14) finds to describe that which is most 
beautiful in nature, may find its Spenserian echo in Acrasia’s luscious bower. 
88 Ibid., 21. 
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is determined to the last to preserve his “hoggish mind” (87.8). Guyon is clearly innocent of 
viciousness of this sort, and with the help of the Palmer, as I have discussed, remains continent 
throughout Book 2. Beyond this, however, as I have also shown, there is little moral or spiritual 
development to which he might aspire. Neither is this state of moral stasis necessarily presented as 
benign. Spenser’s description of Guyon’s conduct in Mammon’s Cave following the Palmer’s 
departure seems to suggest that a kind of atrophy occurs when the character is left to his own hubristic 
devices: 
  
So Guyon hauing lost his trustie guyde,  
Late left behind that Ydle lake, proceedes  
Yet on his way, of none accompanyde;  
And euermore himselfe with comfort feedes,  
Of his owne vertues, and praise-worthie deedes.  
   (7.2.1-5) 
 
This self-congratulatory self-consumption, which I would suggest results from the knight’s 
deprivation of external sources of moral or spiritual sustenance, culminates in the “deadly fit” which 
attacks his “enfeebled spright” (7.66.9; 5) at the end of canto seven. The significance of Guyon’s faint 
here has been subject to endless critical disputation, yet at the very least, as Hume notes, it is 
“irrefutable evidence of his condition as ‘fraile flesh and earthly wight,’ a condition he had forgotten 
when he savoured the thought of ‘his owne vertues,’ and boasted to Mammon about his ‘high 
heroicke spright.’”89 As the first verse of the next canto makes clear, despite Guyon’s putative status 
as the Knight of Temperance – a virtue which in its full Aristotelian sense is foreign, as we have seen, 
to the Reformed Christian understanding of fallen man – only “th’exceeding grace / Of highest God” 
can succour such “creatures bace” (2.8.1.5-6; 2). 
 
 
                                                          
89 Hume, Edmund Spenser, 115. 
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Allegory and akrasia, Law and death 
 
If temperance has no real place in Reformed theology, neither does an Aristotelian, or intellectualist 
notion of akrasia. As Paulus Christianus exemplifies, man’s intractable concupiscence renders even 
the devout man susceptible to sin, yet Luther insists that 
 
We must not think that the Apostle wants to be understood as saying that he does evil which 
he hates, and does not do the good which he wants to do, in a moral or metaphysical sense, as 
if he did nothing good but only evil; for in common parlance this might seem to be the 
meaning of his words. But he is trying to say [Rom. 7:15-16] that he does not do the good as 
often as much and with as much ease as he would like. For he wants to act in a completely 
pure, free, and joyful manner, without being troubled by his rebellious flesh, and this he 
cannot accomplish.90  
 
As Saarinen has outlined, Luther’s adherence to Augustine’s interpretation of Romans 7 is qualified 
by a denial that two opposing appetitive drives are present in man in any profound, metaphysical 
sense. Thus, he speaks of vulnus totius hominis, the wound of the whole man, and introduces the 
notion of compulsion to explain why the apostle may still have sinful thoughts or commit himself to 
wrong action. For Luther, “all voluntary sins stem from consent, which in turn reflects the dynamic 
unity of mind and flesh in the ‘carnal’ person. . . . Contrary to this, the spiritual actions of the 
individual reflect the situation of double inclination. Such actions are either continent actions or 
involuntary sins which occur without consent. Involuntary sins are compelled, rather than akratic. The 
category of incontinent action is thus effectively denied.”91  
Close attention to the trope of legalism embedded in Spenser’s narrative in Book 2 of the 
Faerie Queene, from Guyon’s meeting of Amavia and Ruddymane in canto 1 through to his 
destruction of Acrasia’s Bower at the book’s close, reinforces the sense that a true confrontation 
                                                          
90 Luther, Martin Luthers Werke, 56, 341, 27–33, trans. Saarinen, Weakness of Will in Renaissance and 
Reformation Thought, 117. 
91 Saarinen, Weakness of Will in Renaissance and Reformation Thought, 120. 
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between Guyon and akrasia proper never takes place. In canto 12, Guyon’s encounter with the “Two 
naked Damzelles” wrestling “wantonly” (12.63.6; 8) in a fountain near Acrasia’s Bower would seem 
to suggest a moment teasingly pregnant with akratic possibility. “When Guyon saw,” we learn,  
 
. . . he drew him neare, 
And somewhat gan relent his earnest pace 
His stubborne brest gan secret pleasaunce to embrace. 
   (12.65.10-12) 
 
Wadowski notes that “Guyon stops and spends five stanzas frozen in place, watching and evidently 
enjoying the sight without comment,” and argues that “it is the first time in the entire poem that this 
knight purposefully delays his pursuit of temperance.”92 Yet he is (of course) prevented from turning 
passion to action by the Palmer, who “much rebukt those wandring eyes of his, / And, counseld well, 
him forward thence did draw” (69.2-3). This episode seems particularly revealing given that 
contemporary discourse, drawing form Augustine and Calvin, often figured wrestling as an emblem 
for the Christian struggle.93 In the context of the wider moral framework of Book 2 of the Faerie 
                                                          
92 Wadowski, “Spenser, Tasso, and the Ethics of Allegory,” 378. 
93 See John Calvin, “Commentarius in Epistolam Pauli Ad Romanos; Commentarius in Epistolam Pauli Ad 
Corinthios I.,” in Ioannis Calvini Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia, vol. 49, Corpus Reformatorum (Braunschweig: 
Schwetschke, 1863), 133: 
 
Hic ergo vides qualis sit in piis animis divisio, ex qua oritur illa concertatio spiritus et carnis, quam 
Augustinus alicubi eleganter vocat luctam christianam. Lex Dei ad iustitiae rectitudinem hominem 
vocat: iniquitas, quae est velut lex tyrannica Satanae, ad nequitiam instigat. Ad divinae legis 
obedientiam fert spiritus: caro in contrariam partem retrahit. Homo ita variis voluntatibus distractus 
iam quodammodo duplex est: sed quoniam principatum debet tenere spiritus, illa praecipue sese parte 
censet ac aestimat. Ideo Paulus ait, se captivum a carne sua vinciri: quia, quod titillatur adhuc pravis 
concupiscentiis et commovetur, id coactio est respectu spiritualis desiderii, quod prorsus resistit. 
 
Trans. Saarinen, Weakness of Will in Renaissance and Reformation Thought, 172:  
 
Here [Rom 7:22–3] then you see what sort of division there is in pious souls, from which arises that 
contest between the spirit and the ﬂesh, which Augustine in some place elegantly calls the Christian 
wrestling. The law calls man to the rule of righteousness; iniquity, which is, as it were, the tyrannical 
law of Satan, instigates him to wickedness: the Spirit leads him to render obedience to the divine law; 
the ﬂesh draws him back to what is of an opposite character. Man, thus impelled by contrary desires, is 
now in a manner a twofold being; but as the Spirit ought to possess the sovereignty, he deems and 
judges himself to be especially on that side. Paul says that he was bound a captive by his ﬂesh for this 
reason, because as he was still tempted and incited by evil lusts, he deemed this a coercion with respect 
to the spiritual desire, which was wholly opposed to them. 
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Queene, it is only at the point after Guyon, obeying the Palmer’s command, has turned from any 
active participation in the Damzelles’ sport – forestalling the possibility of akratic action – that the 
Palmer advises his charge they are to encounter “Acrasia, whom we must surprise, / Els she will slip 
away, and all our drift despise” (12.69.8-9). Indeed, a few stanzas on, Guyon and the Palmer 
successfully deploy “A subtile net” to prevent the escape of “The faire Enchauntresse” (12.81.4; 8).  
For Wadowski and others, the use of the net, together with the destruction of Acrasia’s 
Bower, marks the culmination not only of Guyon’s quest but of the poetic meta-narrative that frames 
Book 2: its allegory. As I have discussed, Circe’s pharmakon, the cup sweetened with honey, is 
implicated in Sidney’s Horatian defence of poetic pleasures as a sweetener necessary for “the winning 
of the mind from wickednesse to virtue.”94 Circean mythography, however, also informs a 
“commonplace” allegorical tradition, most clearly expressed in the writings of Plutarch, that offers 
Odysseus’s ability to hear, yet withstand the captivating song of the Homeric sirens – a temptation 
recapitulated, as we have seen, in Spenser’s tale of the bay of mermaids – as an exemplum for the 
kind of “right reading” that can keep the reader from vicious participation in the text.95 In Homer’s 
tale, Odysseus ensures the safety of his crew by ordering his men to block their ears with wax, before 
binding their leader to the mast of the ship. Consequently, the men are deaf to the Sirens’ deadly chant 
and Odysseus, physically restrained by the binding from following his ears to a watery grave, can 
listen without danger as they row onwards. These details are central to Plutarch’s argument against 
the Platonic charge that poetry corrupts the minds of the young and undiscerning through its 
overwhelming appeal to their senses. In his treatise “How the Young Man Should Study Poetry,” a 
tract which Gough suggests was “crucially important to Renaissance epic-Romance and for the poetic 
theory of Tasso and Sidney,”96 Plutarch asks  
 
Shall we then stop the ears of the young, as those of the Ithacans were stopped, with a hard 
and unyielding wax, and force them to put to sea in the Epicurean boat, and avoid poetry and 
steer their course clear of it; or rather shall we set them against some upright standard of 
                                                          
94 Sidney, Apologie for Poetrie, E4r. 
95 Gough, “Daughters of Circe,” 72–90. 
96 Gough, “Daughters of Circe,” 77. 
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reason and there bind them fast, guiding and guarding their judgement, that it may not be 
carried away from the course by pleasure towards what will do them hurt?97 
 
Binding here becomes synonymous with the operation of allegory: with the necessary hermeneutic 
safeguards in place, it is implied, the young need not forgo poetry altogether.  
Spenser’s intention to adhere to a cogent allegorical schema in the Faerie Queene is signalled 
by his description of the poem in his letter to Raleigh as a “continued allegory, or darke conceit” (4), 
and on one level, the events of Book 2 might be interpreted as a Plutarchian defence of allegory writ 
large. As we have seen, over the course of the Book, the Palmer and his prohibitions serve Guyon 
rather like Odysseus’s mast, guiding his judgment and binding the knight to a course of continence 
when his baser impulses threaten to lead him astray. For Wadowski, therefore, the Palmer functions in 
part as “an allegory of allegorical reading.”98 Analogously, Acrasia’s Bower, ostentatious in its 
artifice and “goodly workmanship,” is the ultimate “dangerous text” that he and his charge must 
sanitise and mediate, their destruction of the Bower providing a “narrative account of allegory in 
action.”99 This account, however, is not wholly uncritical: as Wadowski suggests, it is in canto 12 of 
Book 2, when Guyon and the Palmer finally meet Acrasia, that the ethical implications of allegorical 
representation are most acutely raised. “Allegorical reading,” in a general sense, might be surmised as 
a mode of textual interpretation that prioritizes meaning derived from moral abstraction over and 
above the shifting instabilities of language that underpin literary figuration: as Puttenham had put it, 
“we speake one thing and thinke another . . . our wordes and our meanings meete not.”100 In this vein, 
Wadowski argues that in the Palmer and Guyon’s binding of Acrasia, “the net’s status as a made 
object forces us to acknowledge that what the Palmer projects into the world is a bit of artifice; like 
                                                          
97 Plutarch, “How the Young Man Should Study Poetry,” 79. See also Vredeveld, “‘Deaf as Ulysses to the 
Siren’s Song,’” on an interesting counter-tradition whereby certain Renaissance moralists, who rewrite Homer’s 
text to render Odysseus closer to the exemplary Stoic or Christian wiseman, insist that Odysseus, too, had wax 
in his ears. 
98 Wadowski, “Spenser, Tasso, and the Ethics of Allegory,” 380. 
99 Ibid., 366. Following C. S Lewis’s reading of Spenser’s Bower as an emblem for immoral art that deceives in 
order to ensnare (The Allegory of Love, 321–33), Kaske argues that “art is condemned in the Bower of Bliss by 
the gold ivy with green paint over it, the grapes made out of jewels, and the nonfunctional ivory gate with 
verisimilar scenes from the life of Medea. Art would seem to be merely a seductive illusion” (Spenser and 
Biblical Poetics, 86). 
100 George Puttenham, The Arte of English Poesie (London: Richard Field, 1589), 155. 
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the Bower it confronts, his allegorical reading of this space is a fictional ideal struggling to cope with 
ambiguities that challenge its unitary promise.”101  
The net may also be significant, however, in a more specific, exegetical sense. As Gough has 
discussed, following Jerome and Boccaccio’s commentaries on the captive woman of Deuteronomy 
21, writers such as Tasso, to whom Spenser’s portrayal of Acrasia’s Bower is deeply indebted,102 
invoked the notion of the bound woman as “a metaphor for allegoresis, a way to ‘convert’ pagan 
literature and rhetoric for Christian ends rather than censoring or abandoning it.”103 In his own 
allegory of allegory – his allegoresis – Jerome had explicitly conflated the realm of the textual with 
that of the bound female body: “If you love a captive woman, that is, worldly wisdom, and if no 
beauty but hers attracts you, make her bald and cut off her alluring hair, that is to say, the graces of 
style, and pair away her dead nails. Wash her of the nitre of which the prophet speaks, and then take 
your ease with her. . . . Then shall the captive bring to you many children; from a Moabitess she shall 
become an Israelitish woman.”104 The gendered violence this would seem to embed at the heart of the 
allegorical project coheres with Teskey’s theory that “Allegory oscillates between a project of 
reference and a project of capture”; “Allegory operates above, and draws its energy from, a region of 
dissimilitude, of otherness, from which order may be won only by forceful intervention.”105 This 
“otherness” is the body or matter of the text itself. 
In the Faerie Queene, something of this battle between words and meaning, signifiers and 
signified, is conveyed through the Palmer’s use of the word “drift.” When the Palmer worries that 
Acrasia “will slip away, and all our drift despise” (12.69.9), the word drift carries its archaic, active 
meaning of an “intention, purpose, object, aim,” or “scheme, plot, design, device.”106 In its two 
previous appearances in Book 2, however, “drift” conversely signifies incompletion, the frustration of 
purpose, wandering or error, and evil intent. Thus, in canto 1, the villainous Archimago “By forged 
                                                          
101 Wadowski, “Spenser, Tasso, and the Ethics of Allegory,” 380. 
102 David Quint, “Tasso, Torquato,” in The Spenser Encyclopedia, ed. Hamilton, 678–79. 
103 Melinda J. Gough, “Tasso’s Enchantress, Tasso’s Captive Woman,” Renaissance Quarterly 54, no. 2 (2001): 
526. 
104 Jerome, Letter LXVI (“To Pammachius”), in Saint Jerome, trans. W. H. Fremantle, vol. 6 of A Select Library 
of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church (New York: The Christian Literature Co., 1893), 
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105 Gordon Teskey, Allegory and Violence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 8; 55. 
106 OED Online (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), s.v. “drift, n.,” 4; 5, accessed August 26, 2018, 
http://www.oed.com.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/view/Entry/57712?rskey, =O5YiKK&result=1&isAdvanced=false 
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treason, or by open fight /. . . seekes, of all his drifte the aymed end” (1.3.3-4). The negative 
associations of “drift” are even stronger when it is used by Spenser for a second time in canto 12, as 
Guyon and the Palmer, sailing with the “Ferryman” (10.1) Alma has lent them towards Acrasia’s 
bower, encounter a danger clearly modelled on the classical Scylla and Charybdis: the “Gulfe of 
Greedinesse” (3.4) and the “Rocke of vile Reproch” (8.1) Similarly to those who opt for Scylla over 
Charybdis, the Rocke 
  
. . . drawes  
All passengers, that none from it can shift:  
 For whiles they fly that Gulfes deuouring iawes, 
They on this Rock are rent, and sunck in helples wawes.  
   (4.6-9) 
 
The rock is described as “A daungerous and detestable place” (8.2) which attracts 
 
wretches, whose vnhappie cace, 
 After lost credit and consumed thrift, 
 At last them driuen hath to this despairefull drift. 
   (7-9) 
 
In the Homeric narrative, “drift,” especially in its associated sense of delay and “ennervating 
idleness,”107 encompasses Odysseus’s year-long sojourn on Circe’s island. The most famous symbol 
of this temptation in the Faerie Queene, of course, is the monster “Errour,” who is encountered by 
Una and the Redcrosse Knight in the “wandering wood” of Book 1 (1.13.6). As Klein notes, Errour’s 
form, which “Halfe like a serpent horribly displaide, / But th’other halfe did womans shape retaine” 
(14.7-8) is “a conflation of the serpent and the siren,”108 which also, perhaps, bears a resemblance to 
                                                          
107 Brodwin, “Milton and the Renaissance Circe,” 21. 
108 Joan Larsen Klein, “From Errour to Acrasia,” Huntington Library Quarterly 41, no. 3 (1978): 176. 
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Virgil and Ovid’s Scylla, a maiden above the waist and a raging monster below. Further Circean 
associations are present in the description of the Redcrosse Knight’s journey into the wood: “Led with 
delight,” he and Una soon “cannot finde that path, which first was showne, / But wander too and fro 
in waies vnknowne” (1.10.1; 4-5).109 Whether or not we agree with Klein that this is sufficient to 
identify Errour’s wood as the Faerie Queene’s first “pleasure garden” or imitation Eden,110 there are, 
therefore, certain discursive parallels between Acrasia and the monster of Book 1. Acrasia’s Bower 
too is a place that threatens drift: as Guyon and the Palmer approach, they see her new beau “laid a 
slombering, / In secret shade, after long wanton ioyes” (12.72.5-6), his head in the lap of “that wanton 
Lady” (76.8). Meanwhile, “His warlike Armes, the ydle instruments / Of sleeping praise, were hong 
vpon a tree” an emblem that issues a cautionary warning about the perils of pleasure to Guyon, or 
indeed any man who would seek valour in martial pursuit.111 Against this, the Palmer’s worry that 
Acrasia “will slip away, and all our drift despise” (69.9), suggests a rewriting of the errant drift of 
Acrasia’s Bower in service of a teleological quest for virtue. This, of course, is pre-emptive: Acrasia, 
and the alternative drift she represents, have yet to be captured. It is also, however, rather fitting. 
Expectancy is the modus operandi of allegory – a systematic redirection of meaning that anticipates, 
in order to arrest and reassign, the value of the signs it encounters. As contemporary writers stressed, 
linguistic indeterminacy is a characteristic of the fallen world, where error is, to some degree, 
unavoidable.112 Allegory, therefore, is always in pursuit of meaning. We might think here of the sea-
                                                          
109 As Giamatti (The Earthly Paradise and the Renaissance Epic, 187) notes, for Renaissance epic poets 
wandering is also an “emblem for spiritual uncertainty,” a consequence of man’s disobedience and his Fall. See 
for instance the concluding verses of Milton’s Paradise Lost: 
The World was all before them, where to choose 
Thir place of rest, and Providence thir guide: 
 They hand in hand with wandring steps and slow, 
 Through Eden took thir solitarie way. 
(12.646-649) 
110 Klein, “From Errour to Acrasia,” 179. 
111 As C. S. Lewis observes, “In other poets temptation usually summons the will to Titanic action, to the 
inordinate resolutions of a Tamburlaine, a Faustus, a Macbeth, or a Satan. In Spenser it more often whispers 
‘Lie down. Relax. Let go. Indulge the death wish’” (“Neoplatonism in the Poetry of Spenser,” Études Anglaises 
14, no. 2 (1961): 116). 
112 Milton expresses this idea through an imaginative retelling of the myth of Isis and Osiris in the Areopagitica: 
 
Truth indeed came once into the world with her divine Master, and was a perfect shape most glorious 
to look on: but when he ascended, and his Apostles after Him were laid asleep, then strait arose a 
wicked race of deceivers, who as that story goes of the Ægyptian Typhon with his conspirators, how 
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monsters Guyon and the Palmer encounter earlier in the canto, which, the Palmer “well auiz’d” 
Guyon, are illusions delivered by Acrasia “to worke vs dreed, / And draw from on this iourney to 
proceede” (26.1; 4-5) – a statement which coheres with the increasingly combative framing of the 
duo’s quest, yet proves ultimately unverifiable.  
Romance itself, of course, is a “fundamentally expansive and digressive mode” which 
depends on error for narrative sustenance,113 even as the form is organised around its overcoming. 
Spenser, I would argue, is acutely aware of this, yet in Book 1 of the Faerie Queene, the killing of the 
monster Errour is marked by very little pathos – it is, rather, the destruction of Acrasia’s Bower that 
critics tend to lament. The reason, I would suggest, is that unlike the “darksom hole” (1.1.14.3) of 
Errour herself, which the reflected light of Redcrosse’s armour quickly throws into relief, Acrasia’s 
Bower marries error with pleasure such that it is difficult to discern where the one ends and the other 
begins. In narrative and didactic terms, this makes a certain sense: in Book 1, as Klein finds, “Spenser 
first presents lust in its true form – noxious, bestial, and diabolical – so that his reader will know it 
rightly. Next he shows his reader the biform siren clothed like the Whore and able when disguised to 
enervate, seduce, and enchant man, even to bring him to the edge of damnation. Only when Duessa is 
stripped of her borrowed robes is she shown to be nearly as ugly as Errour herself.”114 By the time we 
arrive at Book 2, “when the temptation to lust is clothed in the seductive flesh of Phaedria and the 
lovelier allurements of Acrasia, we have been prepared to recognize that they are tempting us to sin 
and that lust is monstrous and deadly in form and consequence on account of its iconographical 
attributes and the true knowledge – ‘doctrine’ we have learned in earlier episodes.”115 
The threat that the Bower poses to the sophisticated reader is indeed greater than Errour’s 
den: if at the beginning of Book 1, as Hume has discussed, Redcrosse is “the spiritually imperfect 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
they dealt with the good Osiris, took the virgin Truth, hewd her lovely form into a thousand peeces, and 
scatter’d them to the four winds. From that time ever since, the sad friends of Truth, such as durst 
appear, imitating the carefull search that Isis made for the mangl’d body of Osiris, went up and down 
gathering up limb by limb still as they could find them. 
 
In the Fallen world error itself is endless, and truth will not be discovered whole “till her Masters second 
comming; he shall bring together every joynt and member, and shall mould them into an immortall feature of 
lovelines and perfection” (Areopagitica 338). 
113 Catherine Nicholson, “‘Against the Brydale Day’: Envy and the Meanings of Spenserian Marriage,” English 
Literary History 83, no. 1 (2016): 52. 
114 Klein, “From Errour to Acrasia,” 177. 
115 Ibid. 
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believer beguiled by false religion,”116 his victory over the monster and the sin she represents is 
nevertheless relatively easy. Before Redcrosse “raft her hatefull heade without remorse” (24.8) and 
Errour’s children gorge themselves to death on their mother’s body, the Redcrosse Knight “grypt her 
gorge with so great paine, / That soone to loose her wicked bands did her constraine” (19.8-9). Under 
the pressure of this constraint, Errour, we are told, “spewd out of her filthie maw / A floud of poyson 
horrible and blacke” (20.1-2). As Hume finds, Errour’s “floud” associates her vomit with the water 
released by the Dragon of Revelation to prevent the Woman of the Apocalypse from passing, a 
Biblical event which, according to Bale’s gloss, speaks to the temptations to idolatry and superstition 
with which the Devil has afflicted mankind from the time of Eve onwards.117 In the Faerie Queene, 
however, this temptation has peculiarly literary implications. Errour’s vomit, we are informed, “full of 
bookes and papers was” (20.6); “Her fruitfull cursed spawne of serpents small, / Deformed monsters, 
fowle, and blacke as inke” (22.6-7, my emphasis). The episode concludes with a final twist: Errour’s 
spawn, “bellies swolne” with the blood and flesh of their mother “with fulnesse burst” (26.5), so that 
Redcrosse finds “His foes haue slaine themselues, with whom he should contend” (9), an implosion 
which might suggest that error will be short-lived once it has been cut off at its monstrous source.  
For Milton, however, the pursuit of those who would seek to kill error outright through a censorious 
regulation of what might be freely published is in fact detrimental to the recovery of truth: “all 
                                                          
116 Hume, Edmund Spenser, 75. Hume further notes that “Each of the enemies of the Redcross Knight in the first 
half of Book 1 is a false religionist. Two are papists (Archimago and Duessa) while two are adherents of 
Mahomet (Sansfoy and Sansjoy)” (ibid., 80). 
117 As Bale explains, 
 
And the dragon (saith St John) did cast out of his mouth water after the woman. A doctrine of 
hypocrisy, errors and lies, hath always passed from the synagogue of Satan. None other fruits hath gone 
from them, than wavering superstitions, idolatry, and heathen ceremonies: these hath flowed forth like 
a great river; daily have they augmented, and continually increased. Innumerable are the cumbrous and 
unprofitable burdens of their fantasies and dreams, wherewith they noy men’s consciences, drown their 
small faith, and overload their souls. 
This stinking water did the serpent vomit by his ravenous antichrists, which are his insatiable 
mouth, to stop the passage of the woman. He poured it forth in abundance, that he might cause her to 
be caught of the flood. Such is always the mischievous nature of the devil and his angels. Vengeable 
assaults have they, and innumerable crafts to deceive the innocent, not knowing them. Our first mother 
Eve was thus trapped in the beginning, and so had been drowned with Adam her husband, had they not 
had faith in the promised Seed. An innumerable multitude had been, and are yet to this day, swallowed 
up of this flood, and without great difficulty none escapeth it. Exceeding is the compass, study, and 
practice of this false generation. Evermore pour they out their poison; they dispute matters with errors 
and lies, with counsels and customs, having upon their side the darkened powers. 
 
Ibid., 78. Hume cites John Bale, “The Image of Both Churches,” in Select Works of John Bale (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1849), 17–18. 
112 
 
opinions, yea errors, known, read, and collated, are of main service & assistance toward the speedy 
attainment of what is truest” (311). As Butler notes, in the Areopagitica “immediately after 
summarizing the legend of Guyon, Milton asserts that the ‘scanning of error’ is necessary ‘to the 
confirmation of truth.’”118 This statement, I would suggest, supports the argument that Milton’s 
“astonishing mistake” with regard to the Guyon episode may have been intentional.119 In Milton’s 
tract, the pedagogical usefulness of error, which allegory as a form of legalistic censorship seeks to 
suppress, undergirds the speaker’s assertion of “the benefit which may be had of books promiscuously 
read” (312). 
In fact, if in Spenser’s narrative the Redcrosse Knight’s hasty slaughter of Errour would seem 
to be necessary – Una, a figure for the “true” church,120 bids her companion to “Strangle her, els she 
sure will strangle thee” (1.19.4) – it is also shown to be prideful: 
 
Thus ill bestedd, and fearefull more of shame, 
Then of the certaine perill he stood in, 
Halfe furious vnto his foe he came, 
Resolud in minde all suddenly to win, 
Or soone to lose, before he once would lin.  
   (24.1-5) 
 
Kane has argued that in Book 2 of the Faerie Queene, Spenser illustrates “the problem of religious 
idealism or indeed any virtue when it is exercised blindly as an abstraction. The root of the problem is 
the illusion of independence, self-control, and moral self-sufficiency which aggressive ethical codes 
engender.”121 Whether or not we accept this as a significant preoccupation of Spenser’s work, it 
certainly informs Milton’s reworking of Spenserian material in his Maske. In Book 1 of the Faerie 
Queene, Redcrosse’s assertion that “Vertue giues her selfe light, through darkenesse for to wade” 
                                                          
118 Butler, “Milton’s ‘Sage and Serious Poet Spencer,’” 120.  
119 Neither would this be the first instance of intentional error in Milton’s work. For other examples, see John 
Leonard, “‘Thus they Relate, Erring’: Milton’s Inaccurate Allusions,” Milton Studies 38 (2000): 96-121. 
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(12.9) is true enough in the sense that Errour’s “cursed spawne of serpents” the knight “encombred 
sore but could not hurt at all” (22.6; 9). Yet when this allegorical maxim is similarly invoked by the 
Lady’s Brother in Milton’s Maske,  
 
Virtue could see to do what Virtue would 
By her own radiant light, though sun and moon 
Were in the flat sea sunk, 
   (372-4) 
 
it is not borne out by what follows. The Lady will encounter Comus in “Dim darkness, and this leafy 
labyrinth” (Maske 277) regardless of her putative virtue,122 and indeed, as I will suggest in my next 
chapter, her somewhat haughty abstinence plays a part in the state of spiritual and moral paralysis to 
which she succumbs.  
Acrasia, similarly, appears to present Sir Guyon with a challenge which Spenser’s allegory of 
temperance cannot wholly surmount. Further evidence that the relationship between allegory and 
poetry itself is at stake in Spenser’s treatment of Acrasia is unearthed by Gough, who observes that in 
Boccaccio’s Genealogy of the Ancient Gods – a known influence on Tasso – “the poet refers 
explicitly to Jerome’s beautiful captive in conjunction with two additional gendered tropes for 
reading: the figure by which allegory is presented as a veiled woman and the metaphor by which 
Ulysses before the Sirens becomes an exemplary interpreter.”123 The trope of captivity and the trope 
of Ulysses and the sirens, as these relate to Sir Guyon and the Palmer, have already been discussed — 
we have now, therefore, to consider Acrasia’s veil. In the Odyssey, Circe dons her veil or καλύπτρην 
(Od. 10.545), together with a cloak, when after having consented to Odysseus’s request to leave her 
island for Ithaca, she travels secretly to the shore to leave the black ewe and ram which the Greeks 
will sacrifice to summon the dead and Tiresias as her prophecy demands. Yarnall suggests that Circe 
                                                          
122 We may remember Spenser’s description of the path to Errour’s den, “like to lead the labyrinth about” (FQ 
1.1.11.4). On the labyrinth as a symbol for error, see John M. Steadman, “Spenser’s ‘Errour’ and the 
Renaissance Allegorical Tradition,” Neuphilologische Mitteilungen 62, no. 1 (1961): 22–38. 
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is thereby “reassuming the remoteness and sufficiency unto herself that are her prerogatives as a 
goddess,”124 an idea that also informs Chapman’s translation of this passage: 
 
We went wofull on  
To ship and shore, where, was arriu’d as soone  
Circe vnseene; a blacke Ewe, and a Ram,  
Binding for sacrifice; and as she came  
Vanisht againe, vnwitnest by our eyes;  
Which grieu’d not vs, nor checkt our sacrifice;  
For who would see God, loath to let vs see?125 
 
Circe’s veil here might be seen as a type of integumentum, as the term was developed from 
Macrobius’s conception of the narratio fabulosa by Bernard de Silvestris and other medieval 
commentators, a “covering” that protects and shields truth from those that would seek to despoil it: 
 
philosophers . . . make use of fabulous narrative; not without a purpose . . . nor merely to 
entertain, but because they realize that a frank, open exposition of herself is distasteful to 
Nature, who, just as she has withheld an understanding of herself from the uncouth senses of 
men by enveloping herself in variegated garments (vario rerum tegmine operimentoque), has 
also desired to have her secrets (arcana) handled by more prudent individuals through 
fabulous narratives. Accordingly, her sacred rites are veiled in mysterious representations 
(figurarum cuniculis) so that she may not have to show herself even to initiates. Only eminent 
men (summatibus viris) of superior intelligence gain a revelation of her truths.126 
 
                                                          
124 Yarnall, Transformations of Circe, 16. 
125 Homer, Homer’s Odysses, trans. George Chapman (London: Rich. Field for Nathaniell Butter, 1614), 159. 
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If poetry itself, as Boccaccio claims, velamento fabuloso atque decenti veritatem contegere 
(“veils truth in a fair and fitting garment of fiction”),127 unveiling, therefore, becomes a metaphor for 
right reading. This idea informs Spenser’s designation of the Faerie Queene as an “allegorie or darke 
conceite,” his explanatory comments in the Letter to Raleigh provided “for your better light in reading 
thereof” (4-5). In the Faerie Queene, there is at least one example of a true integumentum: the 
“slender veile” that clothes the statue of Venus, discovered by Scudamore in her temple in canto 10 of 
Book 4. The narrator’s interpretation here serves only to deepen the mystery: 
 
The cause why she was couered with a vele, 
Was hard to know, for that her Priests the same 
From peoples knowledge labour’d to concele. 
But sooth it was not sure for womanish shame, 
Nor any blemish, which the worke mote blame; 
But for, they say, she hath both kinds in one, 
Both male and female, both vnder one name: 
She syre and mother is her selfe alone, 
Begets and eke conceiues, ne needeth other none. 
   (41) 
 
As Ruthven suggests, the veil, together with the hermaphrodism and parthenogenetic capabilities of 
the statue, establish her as a Venus Genetrix who “emblematizes, through the resolution of sexual 
difference into sexual unity, that greater resolution of discord into concord which is celebrated in FQ 
IV.”128 Her lower half is bound together by an ouroboros – “a snake, whose head and tail were fast 
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combyned” (40.9) – a figure which usually represents cosmic continuity, the eternal dance of form 
and matter to which eros, in Neoplatonic philosophy, is key.129  
As Panofsky has observed in his discussion of Titian’s Sacred and Profane Love, however, 
through the Elder Pliny “the Renaissance was well acquainted with the fact that Praxiteles [the first 
sculptor of the life-size, naked female form] had made two famous statues of Venus, one draped, the 
other nude, and that the nude one, after having been refused by the inhabitants of Kos, had become the 
glory of the Isle of Knidos.”130 Against the tendency of medieval art to contrast the nude to the clothed 
unfavourably,131 the rise of Neoplatonic philosophy saw nudity increasingly used to represent “the 
ideal and intelligible as opposed to the physical and sensible, the simple and ‘true’ essence as opposed 
to its varied and changeable ‘images,’”132 a distinction which O’Brien suggests incorporates an 
epistemic dichotomy between worldly things “cloaked in deception” and “naked truth.”133 
Concurrently, as Hume has explored, in the writings of the Reformers the “veil” of allegorical 
interpretation, where it had been historically drawn over certain parts of the Bible such as Genesis, 
was subject to an increased distrust.134 Luther describes allegory itself as “like a beautiful harlot who 
fondles men in such a way that it is impossible for her not to be loved, especially by idle men,”135 a 
view which resonates with Tasso’s understanding of why Aristotle does not discuss allegory in his 
Poetics: “ma se la difesa è con qualche difetto del primo senso, e congiunta con difetto nel decoro, e 
con qualche bruttezza o sconvenevolezza ne le cose imitate, non è buona né lodevole difesa” (“But if 
the defence [allegory] involves some fault in the first meaning and is combined with a fault in 
                                                          
129 Ayesha Ramachandran, “Cosmology and Cosmography,” in Edmund Spenser in Context, ed. Andrew 
Escobedo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 328. See Servius’s note on Virgil’s Aeneid 5.85: 
annus secundum Aegyptios indicabatur ante inventas litteras picto dracone caudam suam mordente, quia in se 
recurrit  (“according to the Egyptians, before the invention of the alphabet the year was symbolized by a 
picture, a serpent biting its own tail, because it recurs on itself”) , cited by Danuta Shanzer, A Philosophical and 
Literary Commentary on Martianus Capella’s “De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii” Book 1 (California: 
University of California Press, 1986), 159.  
130 Erwin Panofsky, Studies in Iconology (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 153. Panofsky cites Pliny, Nat. 
Hist., 36.20. 
131 Panofsky argues that “wherever mediaeval art established a deliberate contrast between a nude figure and a 
draped one the lack of clothes designates the inferior principle” (ibid., 156). See ibid., 154, for examples. 
132 Ibid., 159. 
133 Robert Viking O’Brien, “Astarte in the Temple of Venus: An Allegory of Idolatry,” Studies in Philology 96, 
no. 2 (1999): 154. 
134 Hume, Edmund Spenser, 167. 
135 Martin Luther, Luther’s Works: Volume 5 (Lectures on Genesis, Chapter 26-30), ed. J. J. Pelikan, W. A. 
Hansen, G. V. Schick, and P. D. Pahl (St Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1968), 347. 
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decorum, some ugliness or unseemliness in the things imitated, it is neither good nor 
commendable.”)136  
As Gough finds, “Tasso condemns allegory when it is used to defend episodes which involve 
some fault at the literal level, ‘qualche difetto del primo senso.’ Rather than nullifying such lapses of 
decorum, he suggests, allegory becomes contaminated by the faults it attempts to justify.”137 This is a 
natural extension, perhaps, of Sidney’s Platonic argument that the strength of poetry lies in the 
excellence of the “idea, or fore-conceite of the work, and not in the work it selfe” (Apologie C3r). It 
may also, however, touch on the problem of textual idolatry which we began to discuss earlier. In 
Spenser’s text, the Temple of Venus that houses the veiled statue has idolatrous connotations, as the 
narrator’s comparison of the edifice to the Biblical Temple of Diana at Ephesus, denounced by the 
Apostle Paul in Acts 19:26-27, begins to suggest.138 Within her Temple “deckt with crownes, and 
chaynes, and girlands gay, /And thousand pretious gifts worth many a pound” (1.10.37, 6-7), Venus 
herself, we are told, stands “Vpon an altar of some costly masse” (39.2), and “in shape and beautie did 
excell / All other Idoles, which the heathen adore” (40.1-2). Elsewhere in the Faerie Queene, veiling 
in malo is associated with illusion and deceit. Duessa, “a false sorceresse” (2.34.8) of Book 1 who 
describes herself as “the daughter of Deceipt and Shame,” (5.26.9) as Gough observes, “employs 
techniques akin to those of allegory and allegoresis in order to foster illusion and deception” in her 
dealings with Fradubio.139 Conjuring a “foggy mist” (2.38.5) to veil the spectacle from true 
discernment, she pretends to reveal the “foule vgly forme” (8) beneath the “borrowed beauty” of her 
rival Fraelissa, so that Fradubio “Her loathly visage viewing with disdaine, / Eftsoones I thought her 
such, as she me told” (39.2; 5-6). Duessa’s literary associations with both Mary Queen of Scots – for 
the Reformers, a present-day Whore of Babylon – and Circe, with whom the Scottish Queen was 
                                                          
136 Torquato Tasso, The Discourse on the Heroic Poem, trans. Mariella Cavalchini and Irene Samuel (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1973), 153–54; Tasso, Prose, ed. Ettore Mazzali (Milan: Ricciardi, 1959), 674. 
137 Gough, “Daughters of Circe,” 125. 
138 FQ 1.10.30.1-2 see O’Brien, “Astarte in the Temple of Venus,” for a more in-depth discussion of this 
reference, and the idolatrous associations of Spenser’s Temple more widely. 
139 Melinda J. Gough, “‘Her Filthy Feature Open Showne’ in Ariosto, Spenser, and Much Ado about Nothing,” 
Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900 39, no. 1 (1999): 49. 
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often associated by her enemies, have been well established by critics.140 Dressed in “roiall robes, and 
purple pall” (1.8.46.2) and carrying a “golden cup,” “replete with magick artes; / . . . And secret 
poyson” (8.14.1-4), the figure bears out, as Gough argues, Tyndale’s fear of a Popish conspiracy “to 
destroy the whole literal sense” of the Bible and his warning to “beware of allegories; for there is not 
a more handsome or apt thing to beguile withal than an allegory; nor a more subtle and pestilent thing 
in the world to persuade in a false manner than an allegory.”141 Prince Arthur and the Redcrosse 
Knight’s final stripping of Duessa herself in canto 8, therefore, so that “Such as she was, their eies 
might her behold” (46.6) – an event which, as Hume has found, “derives from the prophecy in 
Revelation 17.16 that the Whore of Babylon will become desolate and naked”142 – is an act of 
triumphant iconoclasm against both religious, and semiotic idolatry. 
Neither the example of Venus’s protective integumentum or Duessa’s veil of deceit, however, 
will quite explain the purpose of the veil worn by Acrasia. Acrasia’s veil, like the “christall waues” of 
the pool which only show the wrestling Damzelle’s “snowy limbes” more “plaine” (2.12.64.6-7), for 
better or worse does not conceal anything: her “vele of silke and siluer thin,” we are told, “hid no whit 
her alablaster skin, / But rather shewd more white, if more might bee” (77.4-6). In her study of the 
influences of Italian epic-romance on Spenser’s Bower scene, Gough notes that while the trope of the 
veiled women is deployed conventionally by Trissino in his portrayal of Acratia in Book 5 of L’Italia 
liberata dai Goti, and by Ariosto in his relation of the exposure of Alcina in canto 7 of Orlando 
Furioso, the significance of the veil worn by Tasso’s Circean Armida in the Liberata is less orthodox. 
Both Ariosto and Trissino’s unveilings serve to dispel the illusions created by Circean or Sirenic 
figures, themselves discursively linked, as we have seen, to the dangers of poetry itself: the exposure 
of the enchantresses’ falsity, if we continue the metaphor, is therefore analogous to the act of right 
reading.143 Tasso’s Armida, however, a figure no less representative than her Italian predecessors of 
                                                          
140 See Richard A. Mccabe, “The Masks of Duessa: Spenser, Mary Queen of Scots, and James VI,” English 
Literary Renaissance 17, no. 2 (1987): 224–42; Gareth Roberts, “Circe,” in The Spenser Encyclopedia, ed. 
Hamilton, 165–67. 
141 Gough, “‘Her Filthy Feature Open Showne,’” 47. See William Tyndale, Doctrinal Treatises (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1848), 428. 
142 Hume, Edmund Spenser, 95. 
143 Gough, “Daughters of Circe,” 112–13. 
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erotic and literary excess, remains unmasked.144 Gough ascribes this narrative decision ultimately to 
Tasso’s endorsement of an Aristotelian poetics whereby the imitation of ugly things is seen as a 
breach of epic decorum, in place of which, she suggests, he champions the Neoplatonic notion of the 
“beautiful marvellous” as a mode more suitable for epic poetry.145 Taking his cue perhaps from 
Boccaccio and Jerome’s discussion of the captive pagan woman of Deuteronomy, the “excess” 
Armida threatens is not stripped but rather assimilated into the Christian epic by Tasso via his 
subsequent tale of her conversion.  
Noting that Acrasia’s beauty “is never revealed to be unreal in itself,” Gough argues that 
“Spenser will not fully repudiate Acrasia, unveiling her as a hag; but he also chooses not to attempt to 
assimilate her with a narrative of conversion like the one Tasso employs. In what seems to be an 
attempt to find a ‘mean’ between these extremes, Spenser invents the razing of the Bower with which 
the enchantress is metonymically identified.”146 Within the context of Gough’s analysis of Acrasia’s 
Circean association with poetry and the poetic imagination, this argument is persuasive. Yet we 
should not rush to artificially restrict the play of meaning that Spenser’s text invites, and given the 
particular religious and ethical problems that the Palmer’s mentorship of Guyon throughout Book 2 
exposes, I would suggest that there is an additional theological dimension to Acrasia’s veil that Gough 
does not sufficiently unpick. Veiling, in fact, is also a Pauline trope – in 2 Corinthians, having made 
his famous distinction between the understanding available to man under the Law and that which the 
Gospel permits, “the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life” (2.3.6), Paul notes that the Israelites’ 
“minds were blinded: for until this day remaineth the same vail untaken away in the reading of the old 
testament; which vail is done away in Christ.” As we see with Spenser’s description of Guyon’s 
encounter with Mammon’s daughter Philotime, the knight proves perfectly capable of resisting 
temptation when it comes covered with a “cloke”: he understands that while 
 
. . . face right wondrous faire did seeme to bee, 
That her broad beauties beam great brightnes threw 
                                                          
144 Ibid., 128. 
145 Ibid., 124-31. 
146 Ibid., 158; 205. 
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Through the dim shade, that all men might it see: 
Yet was not that same her owne natiue hew, 
But wrought by art and counterfetted shew, 
Thereby more louers vnto her to call; 
Nath’lesse most heuenly faire in deed and vew 
She by creation was, till she did fall; 
Thenceforth she sought for helps, to cloke her crime withal. 
   (2.7.45) 
 
Guyon is not, however, prepared for the veil to be taken away – to read spiritually, “in fleshy tables of 
the heart.” Consequently, when he sees Acrasia, he is unable to diagnose in her appearance any 
imperfection,147 and the temptation to idolatry this threatens is checked only by his iconoclastic 
destruction of the enchantress’s equally fair Bower.  
As my next chapter will explore more fully, the relationship between allegory and law is 
extremely problematic for Milton, but perhaps also so for Spenser. Following Fowler and 
Weatherby,148 Kaske traces Spenser’s engagement with law in Book 2 back to an earlier episode upon 
which Guyon’s search for Acrasia is founded: the tale of Amavia, her dead husband Mordant 
“fordonne” (2.1.51.4) by Acrasia, and Ruddymane, the couple’s baby son who Guyon and the Palmer 
find playing in the “goreblood thick” (39.7) of his dying mother “beside a bubbling fountain” (40.2) 
As Kaske and others have observed, this outline of Amavia’s narrative, which sees “Mordant’s 
drinking Acrasia’s wine in a garden and magically bequeathing it to his infant son Ruddymane as a 
bloodstain symbolizing original sin (2.1.35-2.11),” presents a “striking re-enactment” of the Biblical 
Fall.149 Kaske’s argument about the legalistic significance of the episode, however, is based on two 
further claims. The first is that the well in which Amavia and Ruddymane lie, which cannot cleanse 
                                                          
147 Magarik notes that “aniconic Jewish law requires that visual art, in order to avoid tempting the viewer to 
idolatry, contain a visible imperfection” (“Milton’s Phylacteries,” 53). 
148 A. D. S. Fowler, “The Image of Mortality: The Faerie Queene, II.i-Ii,” Huntington Library Quarterly 24, no. 
2 (1961): 91–110; Harold L. Weatherby, “Two Images of Mortalitie: Spenser and Original Sin,” Studies in 
Philology 85, no. 3 (1988): 343–45. 
149 Kaske, Spenser and Biblical Poetics, 16. 
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the babe’s “guiltie hands from bloody gore” (2.3.4) – a sharp contrast to the Well of Life of Book 1 
that could “guilt of sinfull crimes cleane wash away” (11.30.2) – and appears even to have hastened 
his father’s death,150 represents Mosaic Law.151 The second is that Amavia, who “wrapt . . . in Palmers 
weed” (1.52.8) had freed Mordant from Acrasia’s clutches and 
 
. . . through wise handling and faire gouernance 
. . . recured him to a better will,  
Purged from drugs of fowle intemperaunce, 
   (54.6-8) 
 
 yet who nonetheless cannot prevent her husband from falling victim to the enchantress one last time, 
enacts “the Pauline paradox that law revives sin.”152 Given the prevalence of legalistic tropes later on 
in Book 2 as Guyon and the Palmer prepare for their own encounter with Acrasia, and the well’s 
wider symbolism (which we will shortly discuss), I would tend to agree with both of these points, 
although the further distinctions Kaske makes, including the argument that Amavia represents 
“natural law,” are perhaps too nice.153 
Undoubtedly, Amavia’s hopes for the son who will survive her are founded in Law: 
                                                          
150 At the well, after Amavia has brought him from Acrasia, Mordant “. . . stoupt to drincke: /The charme fulfild, 
dead suddenly he downe did sincke,” (FQ 2.1.55.8-9). 
151 Kaske does provide a list of dissenting opinions: for other critics, the well has represented “baptism [see 
Fowler, “The Image of Mortality”], natural purity, a too-sudden reformation, the opposite extreme of 
insensibility to the erotic, or the female generative principle” (Spenser and Biblical Poetics, 166). 
152 Ibid., 161. 
153 Kaske also argues that given the narrative of Mordant’s death, “this legacy from a man who ingested 
something proffered by a woman in a garden renders Mordant a type of Adam and Acrasia a type of the 
tempting Eve” (ibid. 160). I would argue however that Acrasia, whose Bower “enclosed rownd about” 
(2.12.43.1) like a hortus conclusus appears more paradisiacal than “Eden selfe, if ought with Eden mote 
compayre” (52.9) plays more the role of the serpent in Spenser’s scenario, Mordant that of Eve. Mordant, we are 
told, initially “knew not . . . his owne ill” (2.1.54.5) and is therefore not properly akratic, a state which, as my 
chapter on Paradise Lost will discuss, was found by commentators to encompass Adam’s, but not Eve’s, 
response to temptation. Whereas in the Faerie Queene’s narrative of Mordant’s Fall, Acrasia “with cup thus 
charmd, him parting she deceiud” (1.55.3), the Biblical Adam is famously not taken in by the serpent’s claims. 
It would fit with the general theme of Book 2 for Mordant to act as an Eve before Acrasia, confirming the 
reader’s suspicion of the effeminising nature of unbridled lust. We should bear in mind however that the 
analogy, in whatever direction we seek to draw it, is not exact. Giamatti makes the point that there is no single 
allegorical code we can apply to crack Spenser’s epic – the Faerie Queene “will not yield to consistent 
historical, or moral, or mythological, or ethical interpretation. Of course, it will yield to all of these approaches 
much of the time, but not to any one of them all of the time“ (The Earthly Paradise and the Renaissance Epic, 
234). 
122 
 
 
But thou, sweete Babe, whom frowning froward fate 
Hath made sad witnesse of thy fathers fall, 
Sith heuen thee deignes to hold in liuing state, 
Long maist thou liue, and better thriue withall, 
Then to thy lucklesse parents did befall: 
Liue thou, and to thy mother dead attest, 
That cleare she dide from blemish criminall;  
Thy litle hands embrewd in bleeding brest 
Loe I for pledges leaue. . . . 
(2.1.37) 
 
As Evans finds here, “Amavia’s language is legal: she interpellates her son as a ‘witnesse’ to his 
father’s murder; she asks that he ‘attest’ to her innocence; and she identifies his bloody hands as 
‘pledges’ to her freedom from ‘criminall’ stain.”154 Yet If Kaske’s thesis is correct, following the 
Pauline paradigm – “For when we were in the flesh, the motions of sins, which were by the law, did 
work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death” (Romans 7.5) – law is implicated in both the sin 
and early mortality of the child’s parents. The reader with any knowledge of Romans has, in fact, 
been doubly forewarned: in Book 1 of the Faerie Queene, we learn that Mosaic law, “writt in stone / 
With bloody letters by the hand of God,” is “The bitter doome of death and balefull mone” (10.53.6-
8). 
As the tragic example of Mordant and Amavia further indicates, in the Faerie Queene Acrasia 
poses a threat that law alone is ill-equipped to handle. Faced with the reality that Ruddymane’s hands 
will never be clean, the Palmer transforms them into phylacteries, bodily inscriptions that serve as a 
reminder both of the law and of man’s inherited concupiscence: 
 
                                                          
154 Kasey Evans, “How Temperance Becomes ‘Blood Guiltie’ in The Faerie Queene,” Studies in English 
Literature, 1500-1900 49, no. 1 (2009): 47. 
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. . . let them still be bloody, as befell, 
That they his mothers innocence may tell, 
As she bequeathd in her last testament; 
That as a sacred Symbole it may dwell 
In her sonnes flesh, to mind reuengement, 
And be for all chaste Dames an endlesse moniment. 
   (2.2.10.4-9) 
    
This call to “reuengement,” together with our knowledge of the quest which Guyon and the Palmer 
are shortly to commence, implicates Acrasia herself in the bloody legacy of man’s first 
disobedience.155 Tellingly, Amavia’s blood returns to haunt Guyon and the narrator as they approach 
the threshold of Acrasia’s Bower in canto 12. Refusing to drink from Excesse’s cup, Guyon instead 
spills its contents, so that, we are told, “the liquor stained all the lond” (57.5). When he encounters 
Acrasia in the Bower itself, the knight’s binding of the enchantress could be seen to similarly 
reinscribe the wrong he seeks to redress. As I have suggested, in Reformed theology, man is either 
incurably vicious, or remains continent in his struggle: struggle itself, therefore, is a hallmark of the 
Christian life, and the words of Romans 7:23, “But I see another law in my members, warring against 
the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members,” might 
be voiced equally well by Paulus Christianus as by the Apostle pre-conversion. If binding is a trope 
for law and sin, however, it also carries discursive associations with magic. In his Homilies on the 
Gospel of John, Augustine had indicted illi ipsi qui seducunt per ligaturas, per praecantationes, per 
machinamenta inimici, misceant praecantationibus suis nomen Christi: quia iam non possunt 
seducere Christianos, ut dent venenum, addunt mellis aliquid, ut per id quod dulce est, lateat quod 
amarum est, et bibatur ad perniciem (“those who lead astray [seducunt] by magical bindings 
[ligaturas], by spells, by the devices of the Enemy, and mix the Name of Christ in with their spells. 
Because they are now not able to lead Christians astray, in order to give them poison they add a little 
                                                          
155 This argument is also made by Stambler (“The Development of Guyon’s Christian Temperance,” 89) and 
Weatherby (“Two Images of Mortalitie: Spenser and Original Sin”). 
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honey, so that which is bitter lies hidden by the sweet, and is drunk destroying them”).156 Minus the 
invocation of the name of Christ, of course, this is in effect what happens to Spenser’s Mordant at the 
hands of Acrasia: “him that witch had thralled to her will, / In chaines of lust and lewde desires 
ybownd” (2.12.54.2-3).  
At the end of Book 2, then, the Palmer and Guyon attempt to redress the inner state of moral 
and spiritual paralysis that Acrasia’s “magical bindings” induce in Mordant by projecting back onto 
the enchantress – and thereby reifying – the metaphorical binding of her victims in sin. In a final act 
of retribution, or narrative redistribution, the “pitifull spectacle” (1.40.1) of Amavia, Mordant and 
Ruddymane is superseded by the “rigour pittilesse” (12.83.2) with which Guyon destroys Acrasia’s 
Bower.157 The immediate threat that Acrasia’s alluring poetic context poses to errant knights and 
readers alike thus dealt with, we are returned swiftly to the canto’s allegory, as the Palmer belatedly 
reveals the human nature of the island’s “seeming beasts” (85.1) and restores them to their former 
bodies. The exception of Gryll, who stubbornly refuses to submit to the lesson of the Palmer’s 
narrative and “Repyned greatly, and did him miscall, / That had from hoggish forme him brought to 
naturall” (86.8-9) only furnishes further matter to be swept into the awaiting, interpretative net which 
Guyon and the Palmer, at the Books close, are shown to jointly wield: 
 
Saide Guyon, See the mind of beastly man, 
That hath so soone forgot the excellence 
Of his creation, when he life began, 
That now he chooseth, with vile difference, 
To be a beast, and lacke intelligence. 
                                                          
156 Augustine, In Joannis Evangelium tractus CXXIV in Migne, Patrologia latina, 35 (1845), column 1440. 
Translated and cited by Gareth Roberts in “The Descendants of Circe: Witches and Renaissance Fictions,” in 
Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe: Studies in Culture and Belief, ed. Jonathan Barry, Marianne Hester, and 
Gareth Roberts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 205. Ironically, as Roberts notes, Augustine’s 
description of the deception integral to the conjurer’s art is couched in the same terms as Sidney’s prescription 
for effective, virtue-promoting poetry, through which readers are “brought to take most wholsom things, by 
hiding them in such other as have a pleasant tast.” Like Augustine’s magician, the poet “dooth not only show the 
way, but giueth so sweete a prospect into the way, as will intice any man to enter into it” (Apologie for Poetrie, 
E4r). 
157 Spenser diverges from Tasso here. As Wadowski observes, “where Tasso’s garden magically vanishes, 
Spenser’s knight of Temperance, Guyon, razes it with considerable effort” (“Spenser, Tasso, and the Ethics of 
Allegory,” 366) 
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To whom the Palmer thus, The donghill kinde 
Delightes in filth and fowle incontinence: 
Let Gyill be Gryll, and haue his hoggish minde, 
But let vs hence depart, whilest wether serues and winde. 
   (87) 
 
 
From Spenser’s chaste Nymph to Milton’s Sabrina 
 
Interestingly, as Skemer finds, in the works of the church fathers ligatura is used interchangeably with 
phylacterium to denote phylacteries.158 For Milton, as my preceding discussion will have suggested, 
binding – whether it is through allegory, or a literal inscription of the law’s injunctions – is an 
insufficient response to the danger that Acrasia poses. In his preface to The Reason of Church 
Government, Milton would seem to acknowledge the necessity of law to support continent action, 
given man’s permanent stain of concupiscence and “the grosse distorted apprehension of decay’d 
mankinde” (183). Yet as Butler notes, for Milton simply stating a law will not guarantee a citizen’s 
compliance. Following Plato, Milton insits on the importance of rhetoric to persuade a subject to 
obedience where force will not:   
 
To such lawes as were of principall moment, there should be us’d as an induction, 
some well temper’d discourse . . . which being utter’d with those native colours and 
graces of speech, as true eloquence the daughter of vertue can best bestow upon her 
mothers praises, would so incite, and in a manner, charme the multitude into the love 
                                                          
158 Don C. Skemer, Binding Words: Textual Amulets in the Middle Ages (Pennsylvania: Penn State Press, 2010), 
11. 
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of that which is really good as to imbrace it ever after, not of custome and awe, which 
most men do, but of choice and purpose, with true and constant delight.159 
 
In a sense, this is simply another formulation of the Horatian platitude. Yet the word “charme” brings 
us back into Circean territory. Milton seems to be suggesting that the Circean, or Mercurial qualities 
of poetic language, as discussed in my introduction, may prove virtuous if – and only if – the listener 
or reader’s “choice” is preserved. In the hands of a tyrant, however, it is “No marvell if the people 
turn beasts, when their Teachers themselves as Isaiah calls them, Are dumbe and greedy dogs that can 
never have enough . . . So little care they of beasts to make them men, that by their sorcerous doctrine 
of formalities they take the way to transforme them out of Christian men into Iudaizing beasts” 
(Apology for Smectymnuus 345). We might think here of Milton’s phylactery-bearing George Palmer, 
and his fictional shadow, the Palmer of the Faerie Queene. 
In keeping with the legalistic associations of the Palmer’s mentorship of Guyon throughout 
Book 2, it seems only fitting that Acrasia is bound by the pair “in chaines of adamant” (82.6) at the 
end of canto 12 – the Mosaic “law of sin and death” (Romans 8:2) first appears, of course, on the 
stone tablets of the Decalogue. Importantly however, in Book 2, stone imagery also coalesces around 
the characters of Amavia and the Nymph of the Well, as Spenser sketches a relationship between law 
and chastity with which Milton, in his Maske, will in turn directly engage. We learn from Spenser’s 
Palmer that the well in which Amavia and Ruddymane lie came to be when a chaste nymph, pursued 
                                                          
159Milton, Reason of Church Government, 181; Todd Wayne Butler, Imagination and Politics in Seventeenth-
Century England (Aldershot: Ashgate Pub, 2008), 109. See also Jesus’s speech in Milton’s Paradise Regained: 
Jesus reports that in his youth, although he yearned  
 
To rescue Israel from the Roman yoke, 
Thence to subdue and quell o’er all the earth 
Brute violence and proud tyrannic power, 
    (1.217-19) 
he 
 
Yet held it more humane, more heavenly, first 
By winning words to conquer willing hearts, 
And make persuasion do the work of fear 
   (221-23) 
 
All further citations to the poem are taken from John Milton, “Paradise Regained,” in Complete Shorter Poems, 
ed. Carey, 424–512. 
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by Dan Faunus, begged Diana to “let her die a mayd” (2.8.5) and was consequently turned into a 
weeping stone: 
 
The goddesse heard, and suddeine where she sate, 
Welling out streames of teares, and quite dismayd 
With stony feare of that rude rustick mate, 
Transformd her to a stone from stedfast virgins state. 
…………………………………………………….. 
Lo now she is that stone, from whose two heads, 
As from two weeping eyes, fresh streames do flow. 
(8.6-9.2) 
 
The nymph’s “stony feare” here – fear, we remember, is another consequence of law – is hardly 
auspicious, and as Weatherby notes, while “virginity is virtuous, and no one who knows Spenser’s 
work can doubt that he thought so . . . this nymph’s virginity is negative (one recalls by contrast the 
wholly positive presentation of virginity in Belphoebe, in the next canto).”160 A strong suggestion that 
Amavia’s death, too, is a kind of petrification, is present in the narrator’s description of her “white 
alabaster brest” (1.39.5) and her eyelids “On which the drery death did sitt, as sad / As lump of lead” 
(45.2-3), as well as in Guyon’s fear that the “stony cold” will have gripped her “frozen hart” (46.5-6) 
before she can tell her tale. Yet there is also a sinister difference between the two figures. Where the 
transformed nymph’s weeping “eyes” or stones produce “fresh streames” (2.9.2), from Amavia’s all 
too mortal “alabaster brest . . . /. . . forth gusht a stream of gorebloud thick” (1.39.5-7). This “griesly 
wownd” (39.6), of course, is self-inflicted. 
In Amavia’s retelling of the course of events that led to her fateful act, Acrasia, upon 
discovering that Mordant’s wife had “recurred” him and was planning his “deliuerance,” 
  
With cup thus charmd, him parting she deceiud; 
                                                          
160 Weatherby, “Two Images of Mortalitie: Spenser and Original Sin,” 341. 
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Sad verse, giue death to him that death does giue, 
And losse of loue, to her that loues to liue, 
So soone as Bacchus with the Nymphe does lincke: 
So parted we and on our iourney driue, 
Till comming to this well, he stoupt to drincke: 
The charme fulfild, dead suddeinly he downe did sincke. 
   (55.3-9) 
 
The opposition between vice and virtue, pleasure and chastity implicit in Acrasia’s reference to 
“Bacchus” and the “Nymphe,” inspires the Palmer’s explanation, in canto 2 of Book 2, of 
Ruddymane’s strangely water-resistant, bloody hands. According to the Palmer, the nymph’s 
 
. . . vertues in her water byde: 
For it is chaste and pure, as purest snow, 
Ne lets her waues with any filth be dyde, 
But euer like her selfe vnstayned hath beene tryde. 
(2.9.6-9) 
 
Acrasia’s binding “charme” (1.55.9), as Amavia herself claims, would appear to be fulfilled from the 
moment that the pleasure-loving Mordant drinks from the nymph’s pure well and the knight is 
deprived of his life, Amavia of her ama. The riddle of the curse,  
 
. . . giue death to him that death does giue, 
And losse of loue, to her that loues to liue, 
So soone as Bacchus with the Nymphe does lincke, 
   (55.4-6) 
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 provides scope for a second loss of life, as well as love, yet it does not demand it: the deprival of love 
from one who loves to live is, strictly speaking, not the same as a deprival of life itself. It would seem 
therefore that it is the working of the Law itself within Amavia that extends Mordant’s sin through to 
her own self-slaughter, bringing the notion that man and wife are “one flesh” (Matthew 19:4-6) – and 
that flesh breeds “mortalitie” (2.1.57.2) – to its most tragic conclusion. 
Acrasia’s prophecy, that death and “loss of loue” will prevail “So soone as Bacchus with the 
Nymphe does lincke,” is, however, also interesting for the connection it suggests between Book 2 of 
Spenser’s epic and Milton’s Maske at Ludlow Castle, where the sorcerer Comus, who is said to be the 
son of Bacchus and the “nymph” Circe (54) – a genealogy that appears to be unique to this author – 
plays the role of the Lady’s tempter. As we will see in my next chapter, falling prey to Comus and his 
“rout” in the “blind mazes” of a “tangled wood” (92. s.d; 180) not unlike that where Spenser’s 
Redcrosse knight had met Errour, the Lady resists the enchanter’s attempts on her chastity to find 
herself, like Spenser’s nymph, “transformd . . . to a stone from stedfast virgins state” (2.8.9). Yet 
unlike Spenser’s nymph or Amavia, the Lady does not die. Her liberty is instead secured through the 
intercession of another nymph, Sabrina, who sprinkles the Lady with “drops” (911) from the fountain 
over which she presides. Milton informs us that Sabrina, like Spenser’s Nymph of the Well, was a 
“virgin pure,” who having “Commended her fair innocence to the flood” to escape a pursuer, 
underwent “a quick immortal change” (825; 830; 840). 
 The parallels between the two figures are not exact. The threat that precipitates Sabrina’s 
“change” is not explicitly sexual, for instance – and indeed, the most likely source for Milton’s nymph 
is the Sabrina that Spenser introduces later on in Book 2 as part of his “Chronicle of Briton Kings” 
(10.arg.1).161 Spenser’s Sabrina, however, merits only 9 lines of verse, whereas the Nymph of the 
Well, alluded to in Acrasia’s “charme” of canto 1, is the focus of several stanzas in canto 2 and has an 
important bearing on the wider narrative of Book 2 of the Faerie Queene, as my preceding discussion 
of Acrasia and Mosaic law would suggest. The discursive correspondence between several key 
aspects of Spenser’s Nymph and Milton’s Sabrina is further suggestive of a symbolic relationship 
                                                          
161 Like Milton’s nymph, Spenser’s Sabrina was the “sad virgin” (10.19.6), daughter of Locrine, who suffers 
death by drowning at the hands of her stepmother, the jealous Queen Guendolene. According to this legend, the 
River Severn in which Sabrina drowns is posthumously named after her 
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between the two figures. Where in the Faerie Queene the water of the fountain of the Nymph of the 
Well, still imbued with the nymph’s “stony feare” (2.2.8.7) appears to be the catalyst required for 
Acrasia’s curse to take effect, Milton’s Sabrina 
 
. . .can unlock 
The clasping charm, and thaw the numbing spell, 
If she be right invoked in warbled song. 
   (852-54) 
 
Again, where Spenser’s nymph is unable or unwilling to wash Amavia’s blood from Ruddymane’s 
hands – blood which, in language more familiar from the Mosaic lex talionis than the Gospel, the 
Palmer decrees to be a “a Sacred Symbole . . . / In her sonnes flesh” (2.10.7-8) – Milton’s Sabrina, we 
are told, 
 
. . . oft at eve 
Visits the herds along the twilight meadows, 
Helping all urchin blasts, and ill luck signs  
That the shrewd meddling elf delights to make. 
(842-45, my emphasis) 
 
Milton thereby reverses the Amavia episode, both in terms of narrative structure (Sabrina’s fountain is 
invoked at the end of the Maske, after the Circean Comus, Milton’s Acrasia figure, has escaped),162 
and of Biblical typology. As I will explore more fully in my next chapter, the later writer’s version of 
the “pure” well symbolises not law, but grace, the essential ingredient that as Evans notes, Guyon’s 
vengeful dealing with Acrasia forgoes.163 Love, with its Christian attendant Charity, rules supreme at 
                                                          
162 This, of course, is exactly what the Palmer had worried would happen with “Acrasia, whom we must 
surprise, / Els she will slip away, and all our drift despise” (12.69.8-9).  
163 Evans, “How Temperance Becomes ‘Blood Guiltie’ in The Faerie Queene,” 50. Evans points to William 
Baldwin’s warning in his 1547 Treatise of Moral Philosophy (1547): “Wrath and revengement taketh from man 
131 
 
the end of Milton’s Maske: the Lady is returned to her life at Ludlow and the Attendant Spirit waxes 
lyrical about the mythical birth of Youth and Joy from Cupid and Psyche, figures often used in the 
Platonic tradition to represent the union of the soul with divinity. As we will see shortly, Milton 
achieves this alternative vision by introducing a third element to Spenser’s Bacchus/nymph duality: 
the Lady’s faith, and the moral and spiritual choice of which she might therefore avail.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the mercy of God, and destroyeth and quencheth the grace that God hath given him” (cited in Eugene D. Hill, 
“Revenge Tragedy,” in A Companion to Renaissance Drama, ed. Arthur F. Kinney (Malden MA: Blackwell, 
2002), 328). 
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“Like his Father but his Mother More”: Milton’s Circean Maske at Ludlow Castle 
 
 
Setting the scene: Circe, Comus and Acrasia 
 
The Spenserian influences at work in Milton’s Maske at Ludlow have been well-documented by 
critics.1 As we have seen, Milton’s Sabrina is thought to acquire her name and aspects of her history 
from the tale of the drowned nymph narrated in Book 2 of The Faerie Queene. Yet if Sabrina enjoys 
an afterlife in Milton’s Maske, so too does Spenser’s Acrasia. Left bound, but not destroyed after 
Guyon’s exploits in the Bower of Bliss, Acrasia acquires a symbolic dynamism in Milton’s Maske 
that strains against the limits of Spenser’s moral allegory. Importantly, Acrasia cannot be mapped 
directly onto any single figure in Milton’s text. Her legacy manifests rather through the dialectical 
complexity of the relationship Milton conceives between the figures of Comus, Comus’s absent 
mother Circe and the Lady, an interchange which establishes akrasia as a driving principle of the 
work’s dramatic, moral and philosophical engagement. This triadic relationship, I argue, activates the 
potentia or possibility inherent within the drama’s central trial of conscience, a potentiality which 
enables the Lady’s eventual consent and accession to grace even as it proves vitally dependent, in 
Milton’s poetics, upon the survival of akratic liberty. 
My assertion of the presence of akrasia in Milton’s masque rests on three main principles: the 
Circean lineage of the “damned magician” (601) Comus, the insufficiently explained paralysis of the 
Lady this character attempts to ensnare, and the masque’s thematic preoccupation with “chastity,” a 
                                                          
1 See for instance Guillory, Poetic Authority; Maggie Kilgour, “Comus’s Wood of Allusion,” University of 
Toronto Quarterly 61 (1992): 316–33. Multiple versions of Milton’s Maske are extant. A Maske Presented at 
Ludlow Castle was printed anonymously in 1637, and appeared again, with some significant changes, in 
Milton’s Poems of 1645 as well as in the poetry collection published in 1673. Two manuscript versions of the 
Maske also survive: one in in the Trinity manuscript (1634) and another in the Bridgewater manuscript (1634), 
often held to be the “performance” text due to its ownership by the Bridgewater family and its redactions of 
potentially sensitive speeches. For a reproduction and comparison of the various texts, see S. E. Sprott, ed., A 
Maske: The Early Versions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973). Throughout this chapter, I cite from 
Carey’s modernised edition of the 1673 text, “A Masque Presented at Ludlow Castle,” in Complete Shorter 
Poems, ed. Carey, 173-223. 
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concept of the highest importance in medieval and early modern discussions of akratic states. Firstly, 
it is important to my argument that Milton does not, as some critics would posit, “make Circe a 
man.”2 Comus remains a distinct figure in the Maske and carries with him a classical and theatrical 
heritage that is important in its own right, as my discussion of Ben Jonson’s Bacchic “belly” god in 
my first chapter will have indicated. Nonetheless, Milton’s novel assignment of Circe and Bacchus as 
Comus’s mother and father, a story “never yet . . . heard” (44) before it is recounted by the Attendant 
Spirit at the beginning of the masque, remains a critically neglected aspect of the text. The fact of this 
genealogy situates the akratic interest of Milton’s masque within a Circean and literary frame of 
reference, even as the early narrative appearance of the Attendant Spirit’s account, which establishes 
the “roving” (60) Comus in an “ominous wood” (61) some distance from his mother’s mythic 
residence, might suggest an effort to hold it apart from the central action of the drama. In fact, the 
invocation, and displacement of the maternal spectre performed here is indicative of the special 
discursive status that Milton grants Circe in his Maske,3 a status which is somewhat unexpected, given 
the poet’s more conventional deployment of the Goddess in his early work.  
In Elegia prima, a verse letter written to Milton’s friend, Charles Diodati, Circe is used as a 
figure for sexual temptation as it presents itself to the poet through the virgineos choros, or young 
women he admits to observing from an umbra loci (“shady spot”) in a dense grove of elms just 
outside the city.4 Similarly perhaps to Spenser’s Palmer’s warning not to pause before the “dolefull 
Mayd” (FQ 2.12.28.2) or the mermaids he and Guyon encounter on the way to Acrasia’s Bower, in 
his Elegy Milton suggests that a path of abstinent avoidance affords the only protection from such 
temptation: 
 
Ast ego . . .  
                                                          
2 Yarnall suggests that this decision in part derives from the influence of Jonson’s Comus figure in Pleasure 
Reconciled to Virtue on Milton’s masque (Transformations of Circe, 149). Furthermore, given the sexual 
overtones of the Lady’s temptation, she argues it would have seemed “ludicrous or, worse still, scandalous” to 
cast Alice Egerton’s Lady against a female enchanter. 
3 There are some interesting similarities here with Shakespeare’s treatment in The Tempest of the witch Sycorax, 
another absent mother of a licentious son. 
4 Milton, “Elegia Prima Ad Carolum Diodatum,” in Poems, ed. and trans. Carey, lines 50-52. Carey dates Elegy 
1 to around April, 1626. 
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Moenia quam subito linquere fausta paro; 
Et vitare procul malefidae infamia Circes 
Atria, divini Molyos usus ope.. 
    (85-88) 
  
(“I intend to quit this fortunate town as quickly as possible . . . and, with the help of divine 
moly, to leave behind the infamous halls of the deceiver, Circe.”) 
 
Again with Spenser, in Elegy sexta – written three years later than Elegia prima,5 and again addressed 
to Diodati – Milton turns to a Circean metaphor to illustrate the ethics of epic poetry, although here it 
is the writer, and not the reader, who must bind himself to the proverbial mast. Against the Bacchic 
indulgence that may provide legitimate inspiration for the elegia levis or “light-footed elegy,”6 Milton 
invokes Circe as one of the dangers that threaten the sacred mission of the epic poet, and which must 
be countered by the temperance of the poet himself: 
 
Sic dapis exiguus, sic rivi potor Homerus 
Dulichium vexit per freta longa virum,  
Et per monstrificam Perseiae Phoebados aulam. 
    (71-73) 
 
 “in this way, sparing of food, and drinking water from the brook, Homer guided Ulysses 
across great oceans and through Circe’s hall, where men were turned to monsters . . . .”7  
 
                                                          
5 Carey, Poems, 116, dates Milton’s Elegia Sexta to December 1629. 
6 Milton, “Elegia Sexta,” in Poems, ed. and trans. Carey, line 49. 
7See also Milton’s later declaration that “he who would not be frustrate of his hope to write well hereafter in 
laudable things, ought him selfe to bee a true Poem, that is, a composition, and patterne of the best and 
honourablest things” in  An Apology for Smectymnuus 303. 
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Finally, in Prolusion 7, “Learning Makes Men Happier Than Does Ignorance,” one of a series of 
orations written by Milton during his university years, Circe’s bestial transformations are invoked to 
warn of the dangers of mental torpor and the abandonment of reason:  
 
And so at last we may ask what are the joys of Ignorance. Are they to enjoy what one has, to 
be molested by no one, to be superior to all cares and annoyance, to live a secure and quiet 
life insofar as possible? Truly, this is the life of any wild beast or bird. . . . Why crave for the 
heavenly power of the mind in addition to these pleasures? Ergo, let Ignorance throw off her 
humanity, let her have Circe’s cup and betake herself on all fours to the beasts.8 
 
Circe stands here for the threat which man’s brutish inclination to vice and passion poses to his 
reason, and thus to the security of the ontological, and spiritual position he occupies in the scala 
naturae, as discussed in my introduction. As the Balet’s moral allegory had put it, Circe is that desire 
which, if overindulged, “urges us to those vices which make us resemble animals, that is to say, 
lechery, drunkenness, cruelty and certain other vices. But the man who is endowed with Reason is 
protected against these poisons.”9  
 If Milton’s use of the Circean trope in these early examples seems fairly typical of the 
allegorical readings promoted by the humanist tradition, in Paradise Lost, as my final chapter will 
argue, this tradition vies with a more complex presentation of elements of the myth in tandem with the 
poet’s interrogation of what it means for man to have been “free to fall,” yet “sufficient to have [with] 
stood” his temptation by the serpent in the garden of Eden.10 This results, I suggest, in the formulation 
of a “Circean” metaphysics, expressed primarily through Milton’s notion of Chaos, which serves to 
protect the writer’s conception of Christian Liberty. Thirty years prior to the publication of Milton’s 
masterpiece, however, the poet can be seen grappling with these same questions through the Circean 
interest of his Maske. As we will see, the liminal relationship of Circe to the events of the drama 
                                                          
8 Milton, “Prolusion 7,” in Milton: Private Correspondence and Academic Exercises, trans. Phyllis B. Tillyard 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), 117. 
9 Beaujoyeulx, Le Balet Comique de La Royne, trans. MacClintock, 100. 
10 Milton, Paradise Lost, 3.99.  
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frustrates the typically allegoric hermeneutic that might otherwise have come into play, instilling at 
the heart of the work a certain symbolic indeterminacy which both conditions, and protects the akratic 
potentiality channelled by Comus. Throughout the masque Circe’s absence will continue to signify, as 
the drama’s narrative works to forge a natural, but also supernatural sympathy between mother and 
son. We learn from the Attendant Spirit that Comus, like his infamous mother, offers visitors to his lair 
an “orient liquor in a crystal glass, / To quench the drought of Phoebus” (65-66). Later, upon hearing 
the “chaste footing” (146) of the Lady, “some virgin sure” (148), Comus will himself declare that  
 
...Now to my charms, 
And to my wily trains; I shall ere long 
Be well stocked with as fair a herd as grazed 
About my mother Circe. 
   (150-153) 
 
This might seem to render Comus a straightforward surrogate for his more famous mother. In fact, a 
carefully guarded difference between the figures of Circe and Comus in Milton’s text prevents their 
relationship from succumbing to this kind of poetic determinism. The Attendant Spirit’s description of 
Comus, born of Bacchus and Circe, as “Much like his father, but his mother more” (57) insists upon 
the character’s mythological hybridity and frustrates the reduction of the maternal tie to a relationship 
of pure resemblance, even as the greater comparative significance of this half of Comus’s filial 
descent is stressed. Indeed, Comus, we are told, “Excels his mother at her mighty art” (63). 
 The question posed by the Attendant Spirit, “Who knows not Circe / The daughter of the Sun” 
(50-51) might seem at this early point in the masque entirely rhetorical, yet the character’s speech in 
fact glosses over a distinction of some importance: which Circe is known? There is no easy answer. 
Milton’s Maske would seem to bear witness to a multitude of Circes, both ancient and modern. The 
Attendant Spirit’s description of Comus’s dwelling as an “ominous wood / . . . in thick shelter of 
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black shades embowered” (61-62) recalls the lucus inacessus of Virgil’s Circe.11 Yet the intoxicating 
beauty of the Goddess’s singing voice as it emerges through Comus’s reminiscence at lines 251-260 
is, in fact, a distinctly Homeric trope: Ovid’s Circe does not sing at all, and far less is made of the 
special quality of the enchantress’s voice in Virgil’s Aeneid.12 If, moreover, Comus’s practice of 
changing his victims’  
 
. . . human countenance,  
The express resemblance of the gods . . . 
Into some brutish form of wolf, or bear,  
Or ounce, or tiger, hog, or bearded goat, 
All other parts remaining as they were 
   (68-73) 
 
is a nod to the costuming of the anti-masquers, the allegorical implications of this change to the men’s 
“human countenance” indicate a departure from classical mythology, where almost the inverse of this 
transformation occurs.13 As Shullenberger notes, “those enchanted by Homer’s Circe experience the 
horror of entrapment in bestial form, for they retain their human consciousness, their memory, their 
longing for home. . . . The essentially and indomitably human in them painfully resists their 
metamorphosis. But Comus’s victims, like those of Spenser’s Acrasia . . . undergo a spiritual 
transformation that signifies itself in their disfigurement and anonymity. They have lost their 
minds.”14 
This recollection of Acrasia, together with the Palmer who guides Guyon through her bower 
in Spenser’s epic, is significant. As we have seen, in the Faerie Queene the “monstruous” minds of 
                                                          
11 Virgil, Aeneid, 7.11 
12 For a discussion of this difference, see Veerle Stofellen, “Vergil’s Circe : Source for a Sorceress,” L’Antiquité 
Classique 63 (1994): 123–24.  
13 There is an element of parody in Milton’s adoption of other aspects of the Homeric narrative. Where 
Odysseus’s crew are said to seem “more beautiful” once Circe has transformed them back to men from their 
bestial state, Comus’s rout, who remain unrestored at the masque’s close, “not once perceive their foul 
disfigurement, / But boast themselves more comely than before” (74-75). This total corruption of perception and 
self-knowledge cements our sense of the men’s moral and spiritual degeneration. 
14 William Shullenberger, Lady in the Labyrinth: Milton’s Comus as Initiation (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson 
University Press, 2008), 156. 
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Acrasia’s transformed “louers” (FQ 2.12.85.3-5) point to Spenser’s revision of the common allegory 
of the Circe myth as the universal mortal struggle between reason and appetite to accommodate the 
“reformed” anthropology of the Faerie Queene. As I have discussed in the previous chapter, if man’s 
flesh is utterly corrupt in a Reformed polemic, the contagion of original sin has also debased that part 
of him most like to God —his mind. Thus, in Paradise Lost, when Adam is reunited with Eve after 
she has tasted the forbidden fruit he describes her as “Defaced, deflowered, and now to death devote!” 
(9.901). In the Maske then, as Shullenberger notes, the change undergone by Comus’s victims, “less 
complete physiologically than that of the poor souls of the Odyssey, is more complete where it 
matters.”15 It is, however, important to note that Milton did not accept the Reformed doctrine of total 
depravity. If man’s divine likeness has been damaged by the Fall, reliquiae et quoddam lumen 
omnium mortalium cordibus permansit (“remnants and a certain gleam have persisted in the hearts of 
all mortals”), which “gleam” in the regenerate vero spiritus sancti opera indies ad perfectionem 
primaevam renovator (“is daily renewed in the direction of its pristine perfection by the working of 
the holy spirit”).16 In De Doctrina Christiana, then, man’s continued degeneration is less the work of 
“original” than of “personal” sin, against which a good education can guard.17 If, moreover, the 
Attendant Spirit, who introduces us to Comus and his rout, works off a Spenserian crib-sheet, this 
does not necessarily signal Milton’s endorsement of the character’s mediating function in the Maske. 
Indeed, the very opposite may be the case. The suggestive corollary between the Attendant Spirit’s 
role as both exegete and guide to those who pass through the Maske’s selva obscura (“. . . when any 
favoured of high Jove, / Chances to pass through this advent’rous glade, / Swift as the sparkle of a 
glancing star, / I shoot from heaven to give him safe convoy,” 78-81) and that of Spenser’s Palmer in 
Book 2 of the Faerie Queene should, given what was earlier argued of the ambivalence of this 
character and other pretenders to moral authority in Milton’s Areopagitica, caution against a 
wholesale acceptance of the Spirit’s assumed omniscience.  
                                                          
15  Shullenberger, Lady in the Labyrinth, 157. 
16 Milton, De Doctrina Christiana, trans. and ed. Laura Lunger Knoppers et al., vol. 8, The Complete Works of 
John Milton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 677. All further references to De Doctrina Christiana are 
to this edition, cited parenthetically as CD hereafter. 
17 Milton notes that Peccatum ciusque proprium est quod quisque per se, praetor commune illud peccatum, 
peccat (“each person’s own sin is that which each commits on his own account, besides that common [original] 
sin”), CD 419. 
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This point begins to establish Milton’s interrogation of allegory as both a hermeneutic tool 
and mode of literary representation; a critique that, as I gestured in my first chapter, will be seen to 
run throughout the Maske. While the textual relationship between Comus and Circe established in the 
masque is eventually irreducible to allegory – Comus’s character does not exist in pure allegorical 
relation to any one “stock” representation of Circe – the dramatic function of the Attendant Spirit’s 
character reads almost as a prototype for Fletcher’s notion of the “daemonic” quality of the mode. 
Fletcher’s exposition of the metaphysical underpinnings and modus operandi of allegory relies 
heavily upon the notion of daemonic agency, a concept which the critic draws ultimately from Plato, 
Euripides, and Aristophanes, where “characters with names like Necessity or Ambition are sometimes 
referred to as daemons, and they appear to hover between personified abstraction and actual deity.”18 
As aerial creatures who reside between the heavens and earth and act as messengers between gods and 
men, daemons offer an analogy for the operation of allegory within hierarchical cosmologies 
supported by linguistic, philosophical and theological systems which “compartmentalise function,” 
unceasingly relating microcosm to macrocosm, imperfect part to perfect whole.19 As one whose 
“errand” (15) sees him pass between “the starry threshold of Joves Court” (1) and “the smoke and stir 
of this dim spot” (5), a movement which bridges the celestial and earthly spheres, the Attendant Spirit, 
I would therefore argue, embodies the allegorical principle in Milton’s Maske: tellingly, in the Trinity 
manuscript, the character is given an alternative appellation: “Daemon.”20 As my discussion hereafter 
will draw out, the poetic syntax operative in the masque, and indeed across Milton’s corpus as a 
whole, premises the Spirit’s totalising claim to knowledge and moral authority upon a legalistic 
elision of command and action that veers dangerously close to the territory of sacramental ritual, 
magic and idolatry. The type of allegorically licensed authority which the Attendant Spirit purports to 
possess in the Maske proves ethically and theologically anathema to Milton even at this relatively 
                                                          
18 Angus Fletcher, Allegory: The Theory of a Symbolic Mode (New York: Cornell University Press, 1964);  
Andrew Escobedo, “Daemon Lovers: Will, Personification, and Character,” Spenser Studies: A Renaissance  
Poetry Annual 22 (2007): 214. 
19 Fletcher, Allegory, 40. See Stephen G. Nichols, “Melusine Between Myth and History: Profile of a Female 
Demon,” in Melusine of Lusignan: Founding Fiction in Late Medieval France, ed. Donald Maddox and Sara 
Sturm-Maddox (Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1996), 137–64, for a useful discussion of medieval 
“demonological narrative.”  
20 Milton, A Maske: The Earlier Versions, ed. Sprott, 42.  
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early stage of his career. It is to this type of allegorical determinism, I argue, that a prophylactic 
akrasia, vital to the poet’s notion of Christian liberty, is in the Maske tentatively opposed. 
 
 
The Lady and the Law 
 
Against the Attendant Spirit, an alternative source of guidance and wisdom is putatively established in 
the masque in the form of the Lady’s brothers. These characters are advanced by Milton as would-be 
defenders of their sister’s virtue, moral advocates upon whose protection she might rely. Yet it is not 
difficult to detect inadequacies in both the Younger and Elder Brother figures. As we will see again 
with Paradise Lost, in the Maske the tensions or ambiguities that qualify Milton’s apparently 
encomiastic portrayal of the brothers often emerge where the script’s mythographical investment is 
most pronounced. One such moment occurs in the redacted version of the myth of Minerva and the 
Medusa used by the Elder Brother to defend the surety of his sister’s chastity at lines 446-51. 
Tellingly, the analogy the Elder Brother draws between this mythic trope and his sister’s present 
situation is not quite fit for purpose. Although Minerva might herself possess “rigid looks of chaste 
austerity” (449), it is essentially a misreading, given the sexual vulnerability that prompts Medusa’s 
transformation in Ovid’s account,21 to attribute such chaste looks to the “snaky-headed Gorgon” (446) 
herself. Gallagher reads the Elder Brother’s use of the Medusa analogy as revealing of Milton’s 
youthful liking for allegorical exegesis, a proclivity the poet had supposedly overcome by the time of 
his writing of Paradise Lost. Reading the implications of the Medusa “allegory” into the masque as a 
whole, he finds a “certain irony in the Brother’s vehemence, since later his quite chaste sister will 
herself be restrained by ‘an enchanted Chair’ and threatened with being transformed to alabaster by 
the power of Comus’ wand.”22  
                                                          
21 See Ovid, Metamorphoses, 4.797-98: hanc pelagi rector templo vitiasse Minervae / dicitur (“’Tis said that in 
Minerva’s temple Neptune, lord of the Ocean, ravished her”). 
22 Philip J. Gallagher, “‘Real or Allegoric’: The Ontology of Sin and Death in ‘Paradise Lost,’” English Literary 
Renaissance 6, no. 2 (1976): 334. The idea that virginity is a virtue sufficient unto itself, so that “She that has 
that, is clad in complete steel” (420), is refuted by Milton in his Apology for Smectymnuus as he uses the 
metaphor of the virginal woman to illustrate the need for proper church governance: “if Christ be the Churches 
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In my view, this does not do justice to the complex nature of Milton’s poetics in the Maske.  
I would argue that something more than irony is intended, or at least effected here, and that this owes 
much to the fact that if the Medusa figure is indeed allegorically active, it is an allegory fraught with 
difficulty. There is general scholarly agreement that the wider dialogue in which the Medusa reference 
appears works to undermine the Brothers’ credibility as both moral and spiritual guides and guards of 
their sister’s chastity. Madsen argues of the Elder Brother’s speech that “the patronizing tone, the 
superabundance of mythological reference, the irrelevance of all this to the Lady’s situation, the 
diction itself, all suggest the imaginative but inexperienced schoolboy,”23 while Fletcher notes that 
when “Like an inspired tutor, the Elder Brother exclaims, ‘Tis chastity, my brother, chastity,’” “The 
repetition keys the tone, and it verges upon farce.”24 Whilst I would agree with this analysis, returning 
attention to the Medusa figure, it might be argued that an emphasis solely on the “ironic” or “farcical” 
impact of the Elder Brother’s speech is short-sighted. These effects are certainly dramatically 
significant, yet the speech also works proleptically as an expression of the nuanced ethical statement 
that emerges through Milton’s juxtaposition of the Lady’s claims to chastity, and the spiritual, as well 
as physical petrification which – like Spenser’s Nymph of the Well and Amavia – she is shown to 
undergo. 
 Earlier, I suggested that Milton’s Attendant Spirit holds a hierarchically equivalent position 
and performs a similar function in the Maske to that of the Palmer in Spenser’s epic. Yet if aspects of 
the Spirit’s character are decidedly legalistic, the portrayal of Comus too carries some affinity with 
this mode. While Comus’s “charming Rod” may only bear a parodic likeness to the Palmer’s 
“vertuous staffe,”25 the trope of petrification that emerges through the Elder Brother’s allusion to 
Medusa, and which occurs again with Comus’s threat to use his wand to keep the Lady’s “nerves . . . 
all chained up in alabaster” (559) proves in the wider context of the Maske suggestively evocative of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
husband expecting her to be presented before him a pure unspotted virgin; in what could he shew his tender love 
to her more, then in prescribing his owne wayes which he best knew would be to the improvement of her health 
and beauty. . . . For of any age or sex, most unfitly may a virgin be left to an uncertaine and arbitrary education” 
(188).  
23 William G. Madsen, “The Idea of Nature in Milton’s Poetry,” in Three Studies in the Renaissance: Sidney, 
Jonson, Milton, by William G. Madsen, Todd W. Furniss, and Richard B. Young (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1958), 210. 
24 Angus Fletcher, The Transcendental Masque; an Essay on Milton’s Comus (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1972), 211. 
25 Milton, A Maske, 92.1, s.d.; Spenser, FQ, 2.12.86.1.  
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the biblical relationship between Law and stone. At no point in the Maske does the Lady drink from 
the “charmed cup” (51) that is the downfall of those of her captor’s previous victims who “taste 
through fond intemperate thirst” (67). The Lady is clearly innocent of this vice. Yet as the wider 
textual implications of the Elder Brother’s Gorgon analogy and Comus’s allusion to alabaster might 
suggest,26 her “chastity” as she understands it proves restrictive and life-denying.27 It should be noted 
that unlike Spenser’s Mordant, who gives in to Acrasia’s temptation and then drinks the water from 
the nymph’s well, fulfilling Acrasia’s prophecy that death and “loss of loue” will ensue “So soone as 
Bacchus with the Nymphe does lincke” (FQ 2.1.55.6), the text of Milton’s Maske, as we have 
received it, fails to tie the Lady’s catatonia directly to any specific external cause: Comus’s threat, “if 
I but wave this wand . . .” (658) is never explicitly realised, whilst elsewhere stage directions 
concerning the use of this instrument tend to be clear.28 Rather than unbridled concupiscence then, the 
penalty for which under Mosaic Law is spiritual or actual death, the Lady’s predicament may signify 
the spiritual arrestation or stagnation of the Christian individual excessively conscientious of the old 
Covenant or Law. This condition, moreover, is identified with a type of allegorical hermeneutics to 
which Milton, as my last chapter began to suggest, was scathingly opposed.  
                                                          
26 Alabaster is a stone with funereal associations, as the contemporary use of this material for effigies and 
Spenser’s description of the dying Amavia’s “white alabaster brest” (FQ 2.1.39.5) further indicates. See also 
Webster’s Duchess of Malfi, where the widowed Duchess, wooing Antonio, seeks to distance herself from “the 
figure cut in alabaster / [which] Kneels at my husband’s tomb” (John Webster, The Duchess of Malfi, ed. Leah 
S. Marcus (London: Arden Shakespeare, 2009), 1.2.364-65). 
27 This idea is revisited by Milton in the Ovidian allusion that appears at lines 660-61, where Comus threatens to 
turn the Lady to “a statue, or as Daphne was / Root-bound, that fled Apollo.” Ovid’s presentation of the tale of 
Apollo’s pursuit of the nymph Daphne, whose metamorphosis into a Laurel tree at the crucial moment of the 
narrative preserves her chastity, is essentially ambivalent. Daphne is transformed into a beautiful ever-green 
tree, perpetuos semper gere frondis honores, (Met. 1. 565), but the change also leaves her barren, rendering 
Apollo’s desire for Daphne sterilem . . . amorem, “a fruitless love” (Met. 1.496). Daphne’s chastity, of course, is 
generally celebrated by early modern allegorists: Golding, for instance, praises the nymph as a “A myrror of 
virginitie,” in the introduction to his translation of Ovid’s Metamorphoses (Arthur Golding, “The Epistle,” in 
The. Xv. Bookes of P. Ouidius Naso, Entytuled Metamorphosis, by Ovid, trans. Arthur Golding (London: 
Willyam Seres, 1567), a2r-b3r). Comus’s pejorative use of the myth in Milton’s Maske does, however, have 
some precedent in post-Reformation literature, where chaste marriage and not sterile virginity is presented as the 
ideal state. In Spenser’s Amoretti, for instance – a sonnet sequence which rejects the sterilis amor of the 
Petrarchan poet’s fixation on an unavailable paramour, celebrating instead both the pursuit and attainment of 
marital love – the poet-lover wittily turns Ovid to his advantage, using the myth of Apollo and Daphne to warn 
the lady he loves of the dangers of spurning him. In the speaker’s retelling, Daphne’s metamorphosis is in fact a 
punishment for her prideful rejection of “Phoebus lovely fire” (Amoretti 28).  
28 See 92.1, “Comus enters with a charming-rod in one hand,” and 812.1-8214, where the absence of any 
mention of the wand in the stage directions is accounted for by the Spirit’s reproach of the Brothers: “O ye 
mistook, ye should have snatched his wand” (814). 
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That true spiritual liberty could not arise under the Mosaic Law is stressed by Milton in De 
Doctrina Christiana: Lex enim quandiu est, cogit, quia servitutis lex est (“For the law, as long as it 
exists, does coerce, for it is a law of slavery; and coercion and slavery are as inseparable from the law 
as freedom, too, is from the gospel.”)29 As we saw in the previous chapter, this motif of “coercion and 
slavery” – translated alternatively as “constraint and bondage”30 – is also prevalent in medieval and 
early modern discussions of allegoresis. Guyon and the Palmer’s binding of Acrasia at the end of 
Book 2 of the Faerie Queene, for instance, is reminiscent of Jerome and Boccaccio’s deployment of 
the captive woman of Deuteronomy 21 as a figure for the way that Pagan literature might be seized, 
stripped of excess signification and realigned to conform with Christian values. In practice, as we 
have also seen, this hermeneutic strategy introduces further religious and ethical difficulties which 
Spenser’s text highlights, but does not resolve. In the Odyssean episodes of the Palmer and Guyon’s 
sea passage to Acrasia’s Bower, the Palmer’s strictures function much like allegory itself, 
systematically binding Guyon to a series of interpretative assumptions that protect him from the 
potentially dangerous pleasures that might otherwise surface in this part of the epic. Yet as I have 
argued, against the titular claim of Book 2, this constraint also prevents the character, and reader, from 
engaging in the acts of discernment and moral confrontation that would seem necessary to the 
development of a truly temperate disposition. Similarly to the way in which the Acrasia narrative is 
framed in Spenser, in Milton’s Maske, a biblical register of stone and law conjoins with the 
metaphoric association of allegory with bondage to suggest a spiritual reason for the Lady’s paralysis. 
Moving beyond Spenser, however, Milton also attempts to engineer a solution to the problem he 
depicts. 
The reasons for the Lady’s eventual liberation in the Maske become clearer, I would argue, 
when we consider the interaction between Milton’s own particular brand of Protestant poetics and the 
Reformed doctrine of sola scriptura. The passage from 2 Corinthians, to which Milton devotes 
considerable attention in De Doctrina Christiana, and to which his statement that “the law, as long as 
it exists, does coerce, for it is a law of slavery; and coercion and slavery are as inseparable from the 
                                                          
29 CD 715. The biblical passage Milton draws from here is 2 Corinthians 3:3. 
30 John Milton and Merritt Yerkes Hughes, Complete Poems and Major Prose (New York: Hackett Publishing, 
1957), 1012. 
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law as freedom, too, is from the gospel” alludes, also contains a line that came to form a cornerstone 
of Reformation discussions of the proper modes of scriptural exegesis: “the letter killeth but the spirit 
giveth life” (2 Cor. 3.6). As MacCallum notes, 
 
In the history of the study of the Bible, two influential interpretations of this statement have 
frequently vied with each other. One interpretation conceives of the life-giving spirit in terms 
of knowledge, the other in terms of grace. The first view results in a theory of Christian 
symbolism; it identifies the work of the spirit with the comprehension of metaphorical or 
figurative expressions, maintaining that spiritual understanding arises from a gradual 
realization of the true meanings of signs. This theory leads finally to allegorical interpretation 
of the Bible. The alternative view of the Pauline injunction results in a theory of Christian 
liberty. This explanation associates the letter with the outward and compulsory law and the 
spirit with grace.31 
 
Only the latter reading of Paul was accepted by the sixteenth-century Reformers,32 and Milton appears 
to have aligned himself with the theologians in this respect. In his Of Reformation Touching Church-
Discipline of England (1641), for instance, we learn how “. . . men came to scan the Scriptures, by the 
Letter, and in the Covenant of our Redemption, magnifi’d the external signs more then the quickning 
power of the Spirit, and yet looking on them through their own guiltinesse with a Servile feare, and 
                                                          
31 H. R. MacCallum, “Milton and Figurative Interpretation of the Bible,” University of Toronto Quarterly 31, 
no. 4 (1962): 397. 
32 MacCallum, “Milton and Figurative Interpretation of the Bible,” 398. See also John Calvin, Commentary on 
the Epistles of Paul to the Corinthians, trans. John Pringle, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: Calvin Translation Society, 
1848), 175:  
 
The exposition contrived by Origen has got into general circulation – that by the letter we ought to 
understand the grammatical and genuine meaning of Scripture, or the literal sense (as they call it), and 
that by the spirit is meant the allegorical meaning, which is commonly reckoned to be the spiritual 
meaning. Accordingly, during several centuries, nothing was more commonly said, or more generally 
received, than this – that Paul here furnishes us with a key for expounding Scripture by allegories, 
while nothing is farther from his intention. For by the term letter he means outward preaching, of such 
a kind as does not reach the heart; and, on the other hand, by spirit he means living doctrine, of such a 
nature as worketh effectually . . . on the minds of men, through the grace of the Spirit. 
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finding as little comfort, or rather terror from them again.”33 This account associates the “symbolic” 
mode of reading with both the oppression of Law and the promotion of textual idolatry – a 
phenomenon towards which, as I discussed in the previous chapter, Milton shows particular disdain. 
Thus, in De Doctrina Christiana, he warns that in reading scripture  
 
ex iis quae scripta sunt, nulla consectaria, nisi necessario plane deducta. Sunt admittena; ne 
pro iis quae scripta sunt, ea quae scripta non sunt, credere cogamur, et pro divina doctrina 
humanas rationes perunque fallaces, nubem pro vero corpore amplectamur: iis enim quae 
scripta sunt in sacris libris, no iis quae disputata sunt in scholis, fides obligatur. 
 
(“no inferences from the things written are to be admitted unless they are plainly necessary 
deductions, lest we be forced to believe the things not written instead of the things written, 
and embrace mostly fallacious human reasonings instead of divine teaching, a cloud instead 
of the true body; for faith is bound by the things written in the sacred books, not by the things 
disputed in the schools.”) (805) 
 
The emphasis meanwhile placed by the Reformers on typological readings of the Bible, even 
as “symbolic” or allegorical readings of scripture were increasingly disfavoured, has been discussed 
extensively by historians and literary scholars.34 We might take the Angel Michael’s revelation to 
Adam in Book 12 of Milton’s Paradise Lost as an example of the exegetical work typology, which 
explicates the old testament in light of the new, could perform:  
 
. . . Law appears imperfect, and but given  
 With purpose to resign them in full time 
                                                          
33 John Milton, “Of Reformation Touching Church-Discipline of England,” in The Works of John Milton, vol. 3 
(Columbia), 3. 
34 See for instance Donald R. Dickson, “The Complexities of Biblical Typology in the Seventeenth Century,” 
Renaissance and Reformation / Renaissance et Réforme 11, no. 3 (1987): 253–72, and Barbara Kiefer Lewalski, 
Protestant Poetics and the Seventeenth-Century Religious Lyric (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 
1979). 
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 Up to a better covenant, disciplined 
 From shadowy types to truth, from flesh to spirit, 
 From imposition of strict laws, to free 
 Acceptance of large grace, from servile fear  
 To filial, works of law to works of faith. 
(300-306)35 
      
Whilst the importance of typology to medieval hermeneutics should not be underrated,36 a significant 
difference in its use by earlier and later theologians does tend to be observed. For Preus, this 
difference may be traced to divergent treatments of the trope of “promise” in medieval and early 
modern exegesis. In the older tradition, “Christians live, in part, under the same lex and doctrina 
(mutatis mutandis) as the Old Testament people. But they live under different promises. For promise 
has an intrinsic historical and temporal meaning: it points to a time of fulfilment . . . The consequence 
seems to be that the Old Testament promises are irrelevant to the Christian virtue of hope, which 
depends entirely on the New Testament.”37 A “hermeneutical divide” thus operates between the 
testaments, so that the Old Testament’s “sole theological relevance is in its New Testament 
antitypes.”38 A shift in this approach, which displaces the “divide,” has been attributed by several 
scholars to Luther and the later Reformers’ rather different understanding of promise. Preus suggests 
that for Luther, the “spirit” that opposed the “letter” of the Law came to encompass promise, so that 
“the ‘divide’ no longer lies between the testaments but begins to appear as a distinction grounded in 
the Old Testament itself – between its law and its promise, between ‘two testaments’ found there, 
between the ‘law of Moses’ and the ‘law of the Lord.’”39 Both the Israelites and Christians live under 
the same promise, yet full knowledge of the “matter” of this promise becomes available only through 
Christ. Thus, “the requirements for Old Testament exegesis are that the interpreter have a good 
                                                          
35 Echoes of Galatians 3:22-6 and Hebrews 86 are present here. 
36 Dickson, “Biblical Typology,” 263. 
37James Samuel Preus, From Shadow to Promise. Old Testament interpretation from Augustine to the young 
Luther (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1969), 17. 
38 Preus, From Shadow to Promise, 16; 156. 
39 Ibid., 200. 
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knowledge of the New Testament, as well as the living Spirit, who gives ‘eruditio’ (spiritual 
understanding).”40  
As Preus notes, this method of reading demands that “the interpreter does not place himself 
with the Old Testament writer in time.”41 The alternative hermeneutic approach might be exemplified 
by the narrative perspective Milton offers his reader at the end of Paradise Lost, where we bear 
witness to the Angel Michael’s apocalyptic revelation to Adam of the entire span of human, and 
Christian history – a revelation which our first parent, who lacks lived experience of the Gospel, fails 
to fully grasp.42 By way of contrast, Milton seems to suggest, the Christian reader freed from the yoke 
of the law and well-versed in typology may find spiritual profit even in Pagan allusion.43 Green makes 
this point in her discussion of the significance of Milton’s relation of Ovid’s Deucalion and Pyrrha to 
the repenting Adam and Eve in Book 11 of Paradise Lost, the first and only mythic comparison the 
poet grants the couple after their fall:  
 
. . . nor important less  
Seemed their petition, than when the ancient pair  
In fables old, less ancient yet than these  
Deucalion and chaste Pyrrha to restore  
The race of mankind drowned, before the shrine  
Of Themis stood devout.  
(11.8-14) 
                                                          
40 Ibid., 164. 
41 Ibid. 
42 For a discussion of the significance of Adam’s various misapprehensions in this part of PL, see Barbara 
Kiefer Lewalski, “Structure and the Symbolism of Vision in Michael’s Prophecy, Paradise Lost, Books 11-12,” 
Philological Quarterly 42, no. 1 (1963): 25–35, and Regina M. Schwartz, “From Shadowy Types to Shadowy 
Types : The Unendings of Paradise Lost,” Milton Studies 24 (1989): 123–39. Where Schwartz argues that 
“Adam’s veil never lifts” (ibid. 126), Lewalski sees Adam’s faith advance in line with Michael’s historical 
revelation, so that “Adam’s experience is directly related to that of his progeny. By their example and at the 
same rate of speed as they, he is led to understand the true meaning of the Covenant of Grace first revealed to 
him in the promise that the seed of the woman would crush the head of the serpent” (“Structure and 
Symbolism,” 29-30).  
43 Bacon had praised “the wisdom of the primitive ages . . . [which] invented the figure to shadow the meaning,” 
(Francis Bacon, “De Sapienta Veterum,” in Works of Francis Bacon, ed. J. Spedding and R. Ellis, vol. 6 
(London: Houghton Mifflin, 1857), 698), an idea echoed by Raleigh, who attested that these “crooked images 
[of the] one true history” contain some “Reliques of Truth” (Sir Walter Raleigh, The History of the World 
(London, 1614), 1.1.6. 
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As Green notes, in Paradise Lost “the first stage of the Father’s promise to ‘soften stony hearts’ 
(3.189) is fulfilled in the inward change that takes place in Adam and Eve, and which is symbolized, 
with characteristic subtlety and indirection on Milton’s part, in Deucalion and Pyrrha’s recreation of 
the human race through the miraculous softening of hard stones.”44 The alert reader will notice a 
further analogy between the myth of Deucalion and Pyrrha and the Old Testament story of Noah, for 
whom, as we learn later in Book 11, God “relents, not to blot out mankind” (11.891), and acts instead 
to “raise another world” (11.877), a decision which, Green finds, “in turn looks directly towards the 
Last Judgement, when fire rather than water will ‘purge all things new’ (xi. 900) and ‘dissolve Satan 
with his perverted world’ before ‘New heavens, new earth, ages of endless date’ are raised ‘From the 
conflagrant mass, purged and refined’ (xii. 546–49).”45 Pagan, Old Testament and New Testament 
narratives thus converge to furnish “a graded typological framework for the historical vision recorded 
in the concluding books of the epic.”46 
As the above discussion might suggest, critical attention to Milton’s prophetic treatment of 
the Mosaic tradition has tended to focus on the late texts of Paradise Lost and Samson Agonistes. Yet 
the influence of this radically revisionary reading practice may also be detected in his earlier work. 
Something very like it may account for the strange version of the story in Exodus 16 of God’s 
provision of manna to the Israelites which appears in the Areopagitica, a misrepresentation which has, 
in comparison to Milton’s erroneous recall of Guyon’s encounter with Mammon in the Faerie Queene 
in the same work, received slight critical attention. The allusion to Exodus is of particular interest 
                                                          
44 Mandy Green, “‘Ad Ferrum Ab Auro’: Degenerative and Regenerative Patterning in the Final Books of 
Paradise Lost,” Modern Language Review 102, no. 3 (2007): 659. See also Ovid, Met. 1.400-402:  
 
Saxa (quis hoc credat, nisi sit pro teste vetustas?) 
ponere duritiem coepere suumque rigorem 
mollirique mora mollitaque ducere formam. 
 
“The stones – who would believe it unless ancient tradition vouched for it? – began at once to lose their 
hardness and stiffness, to grow soft slowly, and softened to take on form.” 
 
Sandys’ allegorical explanation is further instructive here: “God is said in the Gospell to be able of stones to 
raise up children unto Abraham: the sence not unlike, though diviner: meaning the ingrafting of the Gentilies 
into his faith, hardened in sinne through ignorance and custome. So the giving us hearts of flesh instead of those 
of stone, is meant by our conversion” (Ovid’s Metamorphosis Englished, 70). 
45 Green, “Ad Ferrum,” 661. 
46 Ibid., 662. 
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since it is used by Milton to illustrate the virtue of temperance, dialectically bound up, as has been 
discussed, with the trope of continentia or chastity, a thematic preoccupation of the Maske. Explaining 
in the Areopagitica that “God uses not to captivat under a perpetuall childhood of prescription, but 
trusts . . . [man] with the gift of reason to be his own chooser” (310), Milton notes that “when he 
himself tabl’d the Jews from heaven, that Omer which was every mans daily portion of Manna, is 
computed to have bin more then might have well suffic’d the heartiest feeder thrice as many meals” 
(309). Such generosity signifies that where the “great . . . vertue” of temperance is concerned, “God 
committs the managing of so great a trust, without particular Law or prescription, wholly to the 
demeanour of every grown man” (309). What is strange about this is that, as Kolbrener points out, 
Milton’s retelling of the story of Exodus “occludes the intemperance of the Israelites who, against the 
directive of Moses, hoard their daily measure so as to have an abundant supply for the following day. 
Thus Exodus 16: 20: ‘Not withstanding they hearkened not unto Moses; but some of them left of it 
until the morning, and it bred worms, and stank: and Moses was wroth with them.’”47 Kolbrener 
argues that “Milton’s omission tends to emphasize the reasoned temperance of the Israelite multitude 
while obscuring their need for divine guidance that comes through Moses’s ‘wroth,’”48 yet in terms of 
the surrounding text of the passage in Areopagitica, this claim seems unsubstantiated. All that Milton 
stresses is that the munificence of God gives the Israelites the liberty to be temperate: he does not 
preclude the possibility that they will fail to enact this virtue. By writing Moses out of the Biblical 
story, there is a strong sense of typology at play in Milton’s reading. Indeed, such liberty as he 
presupposes in suggesting that God leaves man “to be his own chooser” is properly precluded under 
the Law. While the Israelites themselves are bound by Law, Milton, as a Christian, is not. 
Rhetorically, this typological inflection works to situate him as both reader and writer, within and yet 
without the Old Testament text he cites. 
We can return, now, to the Maske. As Milton would explain in De Doctrina Christiana, the 
notion of Christian liberty is critically dependent upon the “abrogation” of the Mosaic “law of 
servitude” with the coming of the Gospel (CD 715). Law is thus dialectically bound up in the 
                                                          
47 Kolbrener, “‘Plainly Partial,’” 66. 
48 Ibid. 
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operation of liberty and grace, and it is the movement from one state to another that the Lady’s 
situation in the Maske might exemplify. In Milton’s poetic and polemical works, this departure from 
or rupture of the order of Law is sometimes indicated by a considered misreading of the sort his 
retelling of the Exodus manna episode in the Areopagitica enacts. This misreading, as I have 
suggested, opens a discursive space where the possibility exists for man to conduct himself in either a 
temperate or intemperate fashion. This rejection of compulsion indicates an important tenet of 
Augustinian theology – the idea of a human will that is free to consent to sin, but also to accept grace 
– and would seem to prove entirely compatible with Milton’s later Arminian tendencies; as he would 
write in De Doctrina Christiana, those that ad perfectionem in Christo consequendam serio atque 
assidue nituntur . . . perfecti saepe in scripturis, et inculpati, et non peccare dicuntur; quia peccatum 
in iis ut haereat non regnat tamen (“strive earnestly and assiduously to attain perfection in Christ . . . 
[are] often said in scripture to be perfect and blameless, and not to sin; for though sin still cleaves to 
them, it does not reign [in them]”) (609). The strong influence, as I shall argue, that an Augustinian 
emphasis on volitional movement bears even on the earlier theology of Milton’s Maske, runs counter 
to the reception of the voluntarist model by the Reformers, who tended to prefer Augustine’s later 
“Anti-Julian” writings where the intractability of concupiscence – in which both man’s will and 
reason are hopelessly mired – is far more strongly stressed.49  
As I have suggested in the previous chapter, Spenser’s attempt to establish a moral framework 
for The Faerie Queene that might redeem the meaningfulness of the action of its heroes from the 
fatalist leanings of Reformed theology sees him yoke an Aristotelian, “intellectualist” understanding 
of human capability to the Christianised, Platonic notion of the perpetual conflict between spirit and 
flesh that permeates medieval anthropology. As such, Spenser is able to suggest that reason in 
regenerate man may uphold virtuous action. This is only secured, however, by means of an oppressive 
legalism which guides through prohibition. If, as has been argued of the Lutheran spiritual polarity,50 
there is little opportunity in this schema for an experience of true akrasia, there is also very little 
“positive” moral action of which Sir Guyon, like the continent Lutheran individual, might avail 
                                                          
49 Saarinen, Weakness of Will in Renaissance and Reformation Thought, 25. 
50 Ibid., 212. 
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himself. As Teskey observes “For the Spenserian knights, who are, in effect, what they do in the story, 
there is no Cartesian sanctuary where Reason can sit back and choose.”51 Teskey’s relation of this lack 
of choice to the allegorical machinery of The Faerie Queene is insightful, and recalls the morally 
didactic grounds upon which Spenser justifies his art in the prefatory “Letter to Raleigh.” Conversely, 
in Milton’s polemical tracts, the scepticism with which he treats the notion that any earthly authority, 
spiritual or secular, might dictate the proper arbitration of meaning – a wariness which informs both 
the antipathy towards legalism and distrust of allegorical hermeneutics evident in these works – may 
be instructive in understanding the necessity of akrasia to the later writer’s theology and poetics. 
 It is in the sacramental lexis of the Areopagitica, perhaps, that these ideas converge most 
acutely. The absence of Moses, the very embodiment of Law, from the passage concerning manna, 
which Milton in De Doctrina Christiana explains as a type for the Lord’s Supper,52 is highly 
significant given the position he takes on the use of such sacraments in the later tract. In De Doctrina 
Christiana, Milton disputes the “indispensable” nature of sacraments such as the Eucharist, since such 
material entities per se nec salute conferunt nec gratiam, sed utramque tantummodo credentibus vel 
obsignant vel repraesentant (“by themselves confer neither salvation nor grace, but [merely] either 
seal or symbolize each of these benefits for believers only”).53 Such practices are acceptable if one 
recognises that, as in all earthly experience of the divine, the spiritual import of sacramental rites is 
highly mediated, yet a further qualm emerges around the tendency of clerics to attempt to monopolise 
the practice of the same, annexing the object’s mediatory function to their own spiritual authority. 
Thus, Milton goes on to critique those ministers who refuse to “allow the celebration of the Lord’s 
Supper . . . unless they themselves are its ministers,” since novi testament sacerdos unicus est 
Christus . . . non est igitur ullus ordo hominum qui munus hoc sacra dandi ac dispensandi, sibi prae 
aliis vendicare iure possit; cum in Christo aeque omnes sacerdotes (“the unique priest of the covenant 
is Christ. . . there is therefore no order of humankind which can rightly claim for itself before others 
                                                          
51 Gordon Teskey, “From Allegory to Dialectic: Imagining Error in Spenser and Milton,” PMLA 101, no. 1 
(1986): 10. 
52 CD 749. 
53 CD 755. 
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this function of giving and dispensing the sacred things, since in Christ we are all equally priests”).54 
We might think again here of Milton’s jibe at Herbert Palmer, as he threatens to return the 
“impudence” his righteous adversary finds in his honest claim to authorship – Milton’s faithful 
participation, if you will, in the literary banquet of scriptural interpretation – “for a phylactery to stitch 
upon his arrogance.”55 
 
 
The Lady’s predicament 
 
In the Maske, I would argue, Milton, like Spenser seeks to establish a virtue ethics that expands moral 
and spiritual potential beyond the limits set by a deterministic and pessimistic Reformed theology. Yet 
for the reasons set out above, Milton refuses to accept Spenser’s legalistic solution. In the extended 
temptation scene played out between Comus and the Lady, ethical and mythological, religious and 
representational concerns converge. The Lady’s sexual vulnerability, belaboured by her brothers prior 
to this scene, is elaborated rhetorically here in the terms of the debate concerning the proper use of 
beauty that is staged between herself and Comus. That the Lady counters Comus’s celebration of 
“mutual and partaken bliss” (740) with the “holy dictate of spare temperance” (766) and “the sage / 
And serious doctrine of virginity” (785-86) would seem to establish the sorcerer’s offering as a 
Circean cup of concupiscence, yet there is more at stake here than the resistance of sensual pleasure. 
In my first chapter, I began to discuss the anti-Laudian implications of Milton’s representation of 
Comus and his “rabble” in the Maske, yet in fact his critique runs deeper than the contemporary 
political controversy. As critics have noted, the “charmed cup” of “misused wine” that Comus inherits 
from his mother is, like the golden cup that Excesse offers Guyon in Spenser’s bower of bliss, 
strongly redolent of the rhetoric and imagery that accompanied Reformation indictment of the 
Catholic cup of communion, and idolatrous “Popish” practices more widely.56 There is, moreover, a 
                                                          
54 CD 759. 
55 Tetrachordon 68. 
56 Achsah Guibbory, Ceremony and Community from Herbert to Milton: Literature, Religion, and Cultural 
Conflict in Seventeenth-Century England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 158. The whore of 
153 
 
strong link between Reformation iconoclasm, which sought to destroy all such idols, and 
contemporary distrust of allegory as a mode which “can suddenly reverse its governing convention so 
that poetical images are no longer regarded merely as signs but as the true forms of existence beneath 
the text that our senses read out to us.”57 
Milton’s “living apprehension of Scripture,”58 a mode of reading in the “Christian liberty” 
tradition discussed earlier, serves in part as a prophylactic against the idolatrous dangers of allegorical 
exegesis by positing the active, individual Christian mind as an essential third term in any 
representational or hermeneutic process. If, against the confusion of signifier and signified threatened 
by allegory, an emphasis on mediation is evident here, there is a parallel, prominent insistence in 
Reformed literature upon the importance of the right mediator: Christ. As Dickson notes, one 
consequence of the Reformers’ efforts to move away from medieval allegoresis was that “typological 
symbolism . . . became especially important for relating the individual Christian’s life to Christ’s in a 
crucial theological way.”59 Milton’s Lady would seem to understand this. She will not taste from 
Comus’s cup since “none / But such as are good men can give good things, / And that which is not 
good, is not delicious / To a well-governed and wise appetite” (701-704). If her second claim here, 
that “that which is not good, is not delicious / To a well-governed and wise appetite” recalls 
Aristotelian sophrosyne, a virtue which requires the sense perceptions to work together with reason in 
perfect moral harmony, the first part of the Lady’s argument, “none / But such as are good men can 
give good things,” is as Madsen notes “squarely in the Christian tradition . . . ‘In all cases of this 
kind,’ says St. Augustine, ‘it is not the quality of the things we use, but our motive in using them and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Babylon is said to carry a “golden cup in her hand full of abominations and filthiness of her fornication” 
(Revelations 17:4). 
57 Teskey, “From Allegory to Dialectic,” 19. 
58 MacCallum, “Milton and Figurative Interpretation of the Bible,” 399. 
59 Dickson, “The Complexities of Biblical Typology,” 264. The theme of Imitatio Christi is treated by the 
Apostle Paul (see for instance 1 Cor. 11:1 and 4:16-17; Phil. 3:10, 17; and 1 Thess. 1:6), and became a staple of 
medieval theological and devotional literature, as the popularity of Thomas à Kempis’s early fifteenth-century 
work, De Imitatione Christi, might attest. For the early modern reception history of Kempis’s book, which was 
translated by Protestant, as well as Catholic writers, see David Crane, “English Translations of the Imitatio 
Christi in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” Recusant History 13 (1975): 79–100; Elizabeth K. Hudson, 
“English Protestants and the Imitatio Christi, 1580-1620,” The Sixteenth Century Journal 19, no. 4 (1988): 541–
58; and Maximilian von Habsburg, Catholic and Protestant Translations of the Imitatio Christi, 1425 - 1650: 
From Late Medieval Classic to Early Modern Bestseller (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011). 
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our way of striving for them, that causes our actions to be either commendable or reprehensible.’”60  
In questioning Comus’s motive, then, the Lady is acting as a good Christian – an iconoclastic, 
Reformed Christian, what’s more, if we deem her speech to carry sufficient oppositional weight 
against the idolatrous implications of Comus’s offer. Yet at other moments in the Maske, she acts as 
one unduly bound by Law. The Lady’s appeal as she wanders alone in the woods to “thou 
unblemished form of Chastity” (214), the third part of a personified, allegorical triad which also 
comprises “pure-eyed Faith” and “white-handed Hope” (212) recalls the entrance of the triumphant 
virtues in the French Balet and Jonson’s Pleasure, but also Augustine’s encounter with the figure of 
“Continentia” in Book 8 of his Confessions.61 The narrative at this point in the Confessions enlists a 
different interpretation of Romans 7 to that which I have described as the “mature” Augustinian 
reading of the biblical speaker as an enkratic, or continent, Paulus Christianus. For Augustine, at this 
earlier stage in his spiritual and literary career, the speaker who laments that “that which I do I allow 
not: for what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I” (Rom. 7: 15) is the akratic Paul, pre-
conversion, with whom Augustine himself, similarly bound by the law, identifies.62 In the 
Confessions, the vision Augustine then receives of Lady Continentia, the spouse of God, precipitates 
his reading of Romans 13: 13-14 with its instruction to induite dominum Iesum Christum et carnis 
providentiam ne feceritis in concupiscentiis (“clothe yourself in the Lord Jesus Christ and make no 
provision for the flesh concerning its physical desires”), a dictum which was quasi luce securitatis 
infusa cordi meo omnes dubitationis tenebrae diffugerunt (“like a light of sanctuary poured into my 
heart; every shadow of doubt melted away”) (8.12.29). Augustine accepts grace, and remains 
continent thereafter. In Milton’s Maske, however, the Lady is not bound by the Law. Her appeal to a 
personified virtue figure who would not seem out of place in a medieval mystery play, therefore, is 
both anachronistic and rather idolatrous in effect, reliant as it is upon “the identification of the 
                                                          
60 Madsen, “The Idea of Nature in Milton’s Poetry,” 204. Madsen cites Augustine, “Christian Instruction,” in 
Christian Instruction, Admonition and Grace, The Christian Combat, Faith, Hope and Charity, trans. John J. 
Gavigan (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1950), 12.19. In the Maske, the Lady’s 
interrogation of Comus’s motive further anticipates Christ’s response to Satan’s temptation of food following 
his forty day fast in Milton’s Paradise Regained, where Jesus retorts that he will only eat “as I like / the giver” 
(2. 321-22).  
61 Augustine, Confessions, ed. and trans. Carolyn J. B. Hammond, Loeb Classical Library, LCL 26-27 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2014), 8.11.27. All other references and translations are 
to this edition. 
62 Saarinen, Weakness of Will in Renaissance and Reformation Thought, 25. 
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mediator with the object of mediation.”63  
The apparent seriousness of this lapse might be mitigated by appealing again to Preus’s 
argument that a new understanding of “promise” came to bridge the hermeneutical divide between the 
Old and New testaments in Reformed exegesis: Luther thus observes “a parallel, an analogy, of 
situations in the lives of the Old Testament faithful and the Christian. For the Old Testament believer 
to be under the law and asking for Christ is the same as for the Christian to be in sin and asking for 
forgiveness.”64 If the Lady’ s plea to Chastity were fashioned in this way, her safety, sub gratia, might 
seem to be assured, yet it is difficult to locate any direct admission in her speech of even that 
“indwelling” original sin for which the regenerate owe continued repentance.65 Where the Lady is 
silent on this matter, however, the text in which her character is inscribed is not. Although, as I have 
suggested, the Lady is clearly not vicious, the physicality of her predicament cannot be denied. 
Despite her virginity, the Lady finds herself finally incapacitated in a chair “Smeared with gums of 
glutinous heat” (916), an image which, as Le Comte argues, carries distinctly sexual associations,66 
and which might also recall Ovid’s tale of Circe’s jealousy and punishment of her love-rival Scylla 
(Met. 14.1-74), given that, as Green notes, early modern writers tended to see “Scylla herself [as] the 
prime culprit for her transformation, which becomes a punishment for sexual sin.”67 Sandys, for 
instance, explains that Scylla, “once polluted with the sorceries of Circe; that is, having rendred her 
maiden honour to bee deflowred by bewitching pleasure . . . is transformed to an horrid monster . . . 
That the upper part of her body, is feigned to retaine a humane figure, and the lower to be bestiall.” 
This metamorphosis “intimates how man, a divine creature, endued with wisdome and intelligence, in 
whose superiour parts, as in a high tower, that immortall spirit resideth . . . can never so degenerate 
                                                          
63 William Kolbrener, Milton’s Warring Angels: A Study of Critical Engagements (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 151. Milton’s view that even under the gospel we possess “a twofold scripture: the 
external scripture of the written word, and the internal one of the holy spirit . . . etched on believers’ hearts,” that 
which is internal being “supreme and pre-eminent” (CD 811), may also be relevant here. 
64 Preus, From Shadow to Promise, 172. 
65 Critics have for some time speculated about a possible autobiographical connection between the Lady of the 
Maske and Milton himself, nicknamed by his peers at Cambridge the “Lady” of Christ’s. If Fallon’s observation 
that “where anxious self-examination and conviction of sin is a Protestant norm enforced by Lutheran and 
Calvinist theology, Milton writes instead of his blamelessness and heroic virtue” is accepted, the Lady’s own 
lack of repentance in the Maske might further support this hypothesis (Stephen M. Fallon, Milton’s Peculiar 
Grace: Self-Representation and Authority (N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2007), 21). 
66 Edward Le Comte, Milton and Sex (London: Macmillan, 1978), 1–2. 
67 Mandy Green, Milton’s Ovidian Eve (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 171. 
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into a beast, as when he giveth himselfe over to the lowe delights of those baser parts of the body, 
Dogs and Wolves, the blind & salvage fury of concupiscence” (Met, 475).  For the captive Lady in 
Milton’s Maske, this degeneration seems to have already half-begun. Despite her vocal resistance of 
her tempter, the Lady is found by her friends with her “baser parts” in extremis, stuck fast to Comus’s 
“marble venomed seat” (915). 
The particular nature of the Lady’s helplessness might further remind us of Christian 
discussions of akrasia as a state of bondage (ligamen), to which reason is subjected by the passions.68 
This draws upon the Augustinian understanding, discussed in my previous chapter, that in his fallen 
state man’s will suffers from a double inclination towards action guided by right reason on the one 
hand and concupiscence on the other. In fact, we may be forewarned of the danger the Lady’s innate, 
mortal concupiscence poses to her spiritual welfare far earlier in the Maske than the climatic binding 
scene. The brothers’ rather hyperbolic claims for their sister’s “saintly chastity” (452) raise suspicions 
which are only exacerbated by certain inconsistencies within the Lady’s own speech, if we listen with 
a Miltonic ear. It is noteworthy that the character’s account of why her brothers left her in the woods 
is revised in the presence of Comus: alone on stage, the Lady announces that they “Stepped, as they 
said, to the next thicket side, / To bring me berries, or such cooling fruit” (184-85), yet before her 
tempter, she suggests that her siblings’ purpose was “To seek i’ the valley some cool friendly spring” 
(281). Given the Bacchic association of berries earlier in the Maske (Bacchus’s “clustering locks, / 
With Ivy berries wreathed” (54-55), we are told, attracted Circe’s desiring gaze), as well as the 
significance of fruit in the Biblical story of man’s first wandering or going astray, the Lady’s late 
removal of the berries from her account of her abandonment may suggest a tacit awareness, yet public 
denial, of her complicity in the sin of our “general mother” (PL 4.492).69 This denial is portentous. As 
                                                          
68 Aquinas, De Malo, ed. Leonina, vol. 23, Opera Omnia, q3 a9. Cf. Aristotle, EN, 1146a24. 
69 The spectre of the Fall is raised again later in the Maske, as Comus implores the recalcitrant Lady to “be wise, 
and taste” (812) the cup he offers her. In Milton’s Paradise Lost, Satan tempts Eve to disobey God and take the 
fruit from the Tree of Knowledge by claiming that if 
 
Ye eat thereof, your eyes that seem so clear, 
Yet are but dim, shall perfectly be then 
Opened and cleared, and ye shall be as gods, 
Knowing both good and evil as they know. 
    (9.706-710) 
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Milton knew, “if we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us” (1 John 
I.8). Without a confession of sin, repentance is impossible, and Renato resipiscentia fide (“repentance 
is prior to faith”).70 We may begin to see, then, why the lady’s appeal to “Faith...hope...and... 
Chastity” does not procure the expected heavenly succour.71 Instead of “a glistering guardian” (218), 
the “noise” (226) she makes with her song to Echo attracts only the attention of Comus and the 
Attendant Spirit, who initially fails to come to her aid.72  
 
 
Chastity, charity and choice 
 
Perhaps even more revealing than the Lady’s legalistic, semi-idolatrous dependency, her lack of 
repentance and ill-qualified assertion of faith, however, is her substitution here of chastity for charity, 
the scriptural partner of faith and hope (1 Corinthians 13:13) of which “the greatest of these is 
charity” (1 Cor. 13:13). The Maske’s particular emphasis on chastity, of course, is often understood in 
terms of Milton’s preoccupation with this virtue, which seems to have borne especial personal 
significance for the poet.73 Given moreover the recent, and notorious, trial and execution of the Earl of 
Castlehaven (Lord Bridgewater’s brother-in-law) for sexual crimes against his own household, the 
theme of the Maske may have been particularly apt.74 Yet the Lady’s theatrical amendment of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 Eve is persuaded by this argument, as her speech before she eats the fruit makes clear: 
 
Here grows the cure of all, this fruit divine, 
Fair to the eye, inviting to the taste, 
Of virtue to make wise: what hinders then 
To reach, and feed at once both body and mind? 
   (9.776-79) 
70 CD 573.  
71 The less than desirable consequences of the Lady’s song are particularly striking given that elsewhere, Milton 
is fond of stressing virginity’s Orphic powers. See for instance his Epitaphium Damonis, 212-19; Lycidas, 175-
81 and Elegia sexta, 63-4.  
72 The character’s rather cryptic explanation for his lack of intervention at this point, “Longer I durst not stay,” 
might remind the more cynically-minded audience member of the Spirit’s self-confessed reluctance to “soil 
these pure ambrosial weeds, /With the rank vapours of this sin-worn mould” (16-17). 
73 For a discussion of Milton’s ideas about chastity, see Bonnie Lander Johnson, Chastity in Early Stuart 
Literature and Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 138-71. 
74 See Barbara Breasted, “‘Comus’ and the Castlehaven Scandal,” Milton Studies 3 (1971): 201-24, for this 
argument, and John Creaser, “Milton’s ‘Comus’: The Irrelevance of the Castlehaven Scandal,” Milton Quarterly   
21, no. 4 (1987): 24-34, for an opposing view.   
158 
 
scripture, which entails, Ross argues, a “reduction of the highest supernatural grace to a secondary 
practical virtue . . . too startling, too exposed, to have been accidental,”75 has serious theological 
ramifications. Importantly, given the symbolic register and thematic preoccupations of the Maske, in 
the Thomist tradition caritas or charity differentiates the old from the new Law.76 Without charity, the 
movement from law to gospel, or, analogously, from sin to grace, is all but impossible: tellingly, 
Weatherby notes of Spenser’s Nymph of the Well, whose associations with Law were outlined in my 
previous chapter, that  
 
the Palmer’s story of her desperate flight from Faunus and her ultimate liquefaction as a last 
and equally desperate resort is contrary in emphasis at every point to the image of Christ 
enduring in perfect charity the passion which his persecutors impose upon him and freely 
pouring out water from his wounded flesh for the salvation of those very persecutors. The 
waters that transmit her virtue are “chast and pure” but also “cold through feare” (2.2.9). . . . 
Small wonder that unlike the water of baptism, poured out freely in fervent charity, this spring 
will not heal the wound of man’s nature.77 
 
The supernatural provenance of charity is made clear by Milton in CD, where he notes that a 
charitable disposition arises ex sensu divini amoris in corda regenitorum per spiritum effuse (“out of a 
sense of the divine love poured out into the hearts of the regenerate through the spirit”).78 It is for this 
reason perhaps that the Lady’s preference of chastity, a virtue of particular importance to her character 
in the Maske, leads Ross to regard her as “wholly self-regarding,” guilty of exaggerating “her own 
role in the workings of grace.”79  Indeed, Milton's declaration in De Doctrina Christiana that 
charitatis defectis . . . caetera nostra dona atque opera quamvis optima videantur, reddit nobis inutilia 
(“a failure of charity . . . renders useless to us our other gifts and works, however excellent they may 
                                                          
75 Malcolm Ross, Poetry and Dogma, the Transfiguration of Eucharistic Symbols in 17th Century English 
Poetry (N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1954), 196. 
76 Preus, From Shadow to Promise, 48. 
77 Weatherby, “Two Images of Mortalitie,” 341–42. 
78 CD 601. 
79 Ross, Poetry and Dogma, 198. 
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seem”) (1061) ostensibly weighs in favour of this assessment. 
 It ought to be considered, however, that if the voluntarist theology to which I have argued the 
Maske is indebted would seem to grant man considerable control over his own moral destiny, 
Augustine’s anti-Pelagian writings stress the impossibility not only of charity but chastity existing 
apart from an act of divine will. That this is also Milton’s position is, I would argue, implicit in his 
theological works, where he claims that Recte autem de Deo sentire, natura vel ratione sola duce sine 
verbo aut nuntio Dei, potest nemo (“No one can have a right perception of God with nature or reason 
as sole guide, without God’s word or his messenger”).80 In her discussion of the Lady’s address to 
chastity, rather than charity in the Maske, Shohet raises the interesting possibility that “to early 
modern Reformers, in fact, the similarity between the two terms might have been more evident than 
the force of Milton’s distinction. For charity, like chastity, entails a relation to three aspects of the 
world that a Reformist Christian must address: the self, other people, and God.”81 She suggests 
furthermore that “This close relationship between ‘chastity’ and ‘charity’ informs the conventional 
Reformist figuration of all sin as ‘spiritual fornication’: the soul spurning her proper beloved for the 
seductions of Satan. Charity (loving God) demands chastity (refusing all advances of improper 
desires).”82  
If, then, there are grounds to posit an important working relationship between the virtues of 
chastity and charity, we must question further why the chastity to which the Lady lays claim in the 
Maske is not sufficiently charitable to merit her liberation from the old Law. The crux of the matter, I 
would suggest, lies in the way we interpret “improper desires.” In the Maske, the Lady appears to 
attempt to bypass the problematic relationship between continence and temperance that emerges, as 
we have seen, in Spenser’s Faerie Queene, by cutting temperance down to size. Her appeal to the 
“sage / And serious doctrine of virginity” (785-86), an ironic echo, perhaps, of Milton’s tribute to the 
“sage and serious” poet Spenser in the Areopagitica (311), retroactively inscribes the negative 
attributes of this form of chastity into the “holy dictate of spare temperance” (766) that she had cited, 
                                                          
80 CD 27. 
81 Lauren Shohet, “Figuring Chastity: Milton’s Ludlow Masque,” in Menacing Virgins: Representing Virginity 
in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, ed. Kathleen Coyne Kelly and Marina Leslie (Newark: University of 
Delaware Press, 1999), 158. 
82 Ibid., 159. 
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in nearly parallel syntax, only a few lines earlier.83 As with Guyon’s “temperate” destruction of 
Acrasia’s bower there is something incongruous about this effort: where Guyon goes too far in what 
he will allow the virtue to encompass, the Lady does not nearly go far enough. While we ought to be 
careful of trying to unduly schematise or regiment Milton’s thought,84 there is enough of Spenser in 
the Maske to support the idea that Milton might deliberate invoke the faulty syntax of the Fareie 
Queene’s Aristotelian schema, in order to create aporias within his own text that work to subtly 
undermine the Spenserian “negative” chastity to which the Lady also lays claim. If, as I shall suggest, 
it is difficult to dismiss out of hand Comus’s critique of the Lady’s “lean and sallow abstinence” 
(708), the enchanter may also with some justice deride her “pet of temperance” (720). The Lady’s 
understanding of this virtue is as limited as that of the “chastity” it encompasses. Indeed, the Lady’s 
paralysis suggests she is yet to complete this earlier stage of her education, the apprehension of a 
fuller, more “positive” notion of chastity upon which, as I will discuss, true charity depends. Yet 
although the Lady’s relational treatment of continence and temperance lacks the syllogistic cogency 
of an Aristotelian, intellectualist schema, her continence or “chastity,” taken alone, might on this same 
understanding seem sufficient. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Aristotelian akrasia primarily 
involves an error of judgement, from which Milton’s Lady is ostensibly safe. In the Maske she 
invokes the language of regenerate reason in her defence against Comus, linking her mental faculties 
to moral propriety:  
 
Thou canst not touch the freedom of my mind 
 With all thy charms, although this corporal rind 
Thou hast immanacled, while heaven sees good. 
     (662-664)    
                                                          
83 Milton follows the Church Fathers in diluting the qualitative difference between continence (enkrateia) and 
temperance (sophrosyne) as it emerges in Aristotle. In De Doctrina Christiana, temperance is glossed as quae in 
appetendis corporis voluptatibus modum servat . . . . Temperantia est cum sobrietas et castitas tum verecundia 
et honestas (“[the virtue] which preserves measure in pursuing the pleasures of the body. . . . Temperance 
includes not only sobriety and chastity but also respectfulness and decency”) (1075). Chastity itself, according 
to Milton, est temperantia a libidine carnis illicita (“is self-restraint from unlawful carnal desire”) (1079). 
84As one critic rather despairingly notes, “the picture of virtue in Milton’s poetry is extravagantly eclectic and 
nonsystematic . . . It is all but impossible to hold together Milton’s various comments on virtue and the virtues, 
which veer between Aristotelian and Augustinian poles” (Fallon, “Milton and Literary Virtue,” 182). 
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 To a certain extent, the Lady is justified in this claim. It is a safe assumption that the Lady 
and her reason are indeed regenerate, given that she professes Christian faith, and that during the 
masque her “human countenance” (68) remains exempt from the telling transformation of Comus’s 
earlier victims. Yet as my earlier discussion of the Lady’s bound state might suggest, the matter is 
rather more complicated than this. As we have seen, in Reformed theology, the spirit-flesh division 
drawn by Augustine in relation to original sin disintegrates, so that significant, if not devastating 
damage is done even to regenerate man’s right reason. It is noteworthy here that the extended 
argument between the Lady and Comus, which she seems at one point poised to win – “She fables 
not, I feel that I do fear / Her words set off by some superior power” (799-800) – cannot free her from 
her bind. Neither may this be remedied by the rational efforts of other human, or even supernatural 
agents: the Lady’s brothers fail to free her, even with the aid of the Attendant Spirit’s “haemony,” a 
plant which in a typically Miltonic move is described as “. . . more med’cinal...than that Moly, / That 
Hermes once to wise Ulysses gave” (635-36).85 It is here, then, that Milton’s virtue ethics most 
obviously departs from Spenser’s. The security of reason as arbiter would seem far more embattled in 
in the Maske than it is in the Faerie Queene, at least as far as Book 2 is concerned, where in contrast 
to Comus’s skilled rhetoric, Acrasia never speaks.86 
At the end of the Maske, however, Comus vanishes, the Lady is freed, and the siblings are 
brought before their parents in “triumph,” having “through hard assays” prevailed “O’er sensual folly, 
and intemperance” (971-73). Something, then, must have happened, beyond the rational efforts of the 
Lady that have already been rehearsed and the initial endeavours of both the Attendant Spirit and her 
brothers. To understand this, we must look more closely at the theological underpinnings of the 
Miltonic relationship between reason and “choice” that I alluded to earlier in the context of the manna 
passage in the Areopagitica. In the Maske, the reason why the Lady’s vocal efforts prove insufficient 
to free her from her captor, I suspect, is that for Milton, reason is choice – reason without it is not true 
                                                          
85 As I discussed in my introduction, in medieval and early modern discourse, moly is often allegorically 
portentous of reason. 
86 John E. Hankins makes this observation in his entry on “Acrasia,” in The Spenser Encyclopedia, ed. 
Hamilton, 6. 
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reason at all. Spenser’s attempt to reconcile human moral and spiritual potential with a Reformed 
theology that renders mortal reason and will utterly corrupt results, as I have discussed, in a reliance 
on legalism which ultimately voids such choice. Milton, I have suggested is fully aware of this 
problem. The Lady’s assumed virtue, dependent on the power of words and signs, lex rather than 
spiritus, then, might invite no less scepticism than Comus’s “magic dust” (165) and “glozing courtesy, 
/ Baited with reasons not unplausible” (162-63). Indeed, given the close symbolic relationship 
between law, stone and allegorical hermeneutics in the Maske, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Lady 
cannot be extricated from her “marble venomed seat” (915). In adhering so dogmatically to the 
ultimately repressive nature of the chastity she espouses, the Lady, like Spenser’s Nymph of the Well, 
risks allegorical reduction herself. Evidence of Milton’s particular theological stance on both the 
nature and proper acquisition of Christian virtue will allow us to go further with this analysis. As 
Shohet notes, Reformed theologians’ discussion of charity often drew upon Luther’s commentary on 
Galatians: “But here stands Paul in supreme freedom and says in clear and explicit words: ‘That 
which makes a Christian is faith working through love.’”87 In this context, Milton’s comment in De 
Doctrina Christiana that faith is non in intellectu proprie, sed in voluntate esse sitam (“properly . . . 
seated not in the understanding but in the will”),88 is extremely suggestive.  
In the Maske, I would argue, Milton draws upon a brand of voluntarist scholasticism 
renounced by Luther and Calvin in order to convey the Lady to what he considers to be an ethically 
and theologically sound state of continence. For Milton, who announces in De Doctrina Christiana 
that Cum autem statuisset Deus homines restituere, decrevit etiam sine dubio . . . amissam libertatem, 
aliqua saltem ex parte restituere voluntati (“when God had decided to restore mankind, he also 
indubitably decreed . . . to restore lost freedom to the will, in some measure at least”),89 man’s reason 
may be truly regenerate only if his will can also bear the potential for spiritual growth. Importantly, as 
Milton’s retelling of the manna episode in Exodus to accommodate the possibility that the Israelites 
might engage in either temperate or intemperate behaviour might suggest, the akratic heritage and 
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vol. 27, 31 (emphasis added). 
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proclivity that the Lady refuses to own in the Maske is in fact essential to Milton’s own virtue ethics 
and soteriology. If, as Saarinen suggests, “A truly akratic action can only be properly explained when 
a plurality of simultaneous possibilities is presupposed,”90 the reverse must also hold true. This raises 
the proverbial elephant in the bower that Spenser’s Guyon attempts to stamp out with Acrasia: without 
incontinentia, there can be no continentia. In other words, if the Lady has no established 
understanding of what it is to be unchaste, she cannot truly know whether the desires that motivate her 
are “proper” or otherwise. The Lady’s development of a form of chastity that is in itself charitable is 
in fact dependent on her akratic capability. Thus, as Milton argues in the Areopagitica, it is only “he 
that can apprehend and consider vice with all her baits and seeming pleasures, and yet abstain, and yet 
distinguish, and yet prefer that which is truly better, he [who] is the true wayfaring Christian” (311). 
Arguably, in her meeting with the Circean Comus, the Lady is gifted with an opportunity to realize 
this aspect of her human nature. Indeed, the Lady’s appeal to faith, hope and chastity, personified 
figures which she claims to “see . . . visibly” (215), comes immediately after her account of a far more 
nebulous, internal experience whereby  
 
. . . A thousand fantasies 
Begin to throng into my memory 
Of calling shapes, and beckoning shadows dire, 
And airy tongues, that syllable men’s names 
On sands, and shores, and desert wildernesses. 
(204-8) 
 
These lines are deeply ambivalent. It is not clear to what, exactly, the Lady refers, but there is a 
palpable sense of the allure of these “shadows dire”, which “startle” (209) as if to transfix her. The 
Lady’s immediate claim that such thoughts may “. . . not astound / The virtuous mind, that ever walks 
attended / By a strong siding champion Conscience” (209-11), seems designed to counteract and 
neutralize this experience. As we have seen, however, before too long she will indeed be held “In 
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stony fetters fixed, and motionless” (813), the virtue and reason she pretends to manifestly insufficient 
to secure her freedom from Comus’s bonds. 
  Paradoxically, we might consider the Lady’s fatal elision of chastity with charity in the Maske 
amongst those examples of Miltonic misreading that can herald spiritual renovation. If, that is, such a 
“misreading” leads the Lady to confront, interrogate and repent of her own unchaste, or akratic 
potential, she may come to establish “true” continence, the basis of a charitable disposition that, with 
faith, is both the tenor and vehicle of grace. As Milton’s Angel Michael will explain to Adam in 
Paradise Lost,  
 
. . . only add 
Deeds to thy knowledge answerable, add faith, 
Add virtue, patience, temperance, add love, 
By name to come called charity, the soul 
Of all the rest: then wilt thou not be loath 
To leave this Paradise, but shalt possess 
A paradise within thee, happier far. 
    (12.581-87) 
 
A type of volitional awakening or arousal, conceptually indebted to Milton’s fortification of his 
defence of Christian liberty with an Augustinian “consent theory of morality,”91 is instrumental to this 
process. As Fallon notes, although Milton in De Doctrina Christiana supports “the Pauline (and 
Augustinian) position that the merit of good works is God’s alone, he insists there and in Paradise 
Lost (1) that grace sufficient to choose the good is given to all; and (2) that the choice of whether we 
will accept the grace leading to faith and its concomitant good works is ours.”92 This “choice” or 
volitional movement, which follows typologically the progression from the old Law to the new, 
cannot be outsourced. Thus, in the Maske, the brothers are unable to seize Comus’s wand to break the 
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“spells” that bind the Lady, although they fulfil the Spirit’s commandment to “break his glass, /And 
shed the luscious liquor on the ground” (650-51). The brothers thereby successfully re-enact Guyon’s 
confrontation of Excesse in the Faerie Queene, yet in the Maske, the performance of this rite alone is 
insufficient to win their sister’s freedom. As Milton would explain in his Treatise of Civil Power in 
Ecclesiastical Causes, “the state of religion under the gospel is far differing from what it was under 
the law . . . the law was then written on tables of stone, and to be performed according to the letter, 
willingly or unwillingly; the gospel, our new covenant, upon the heart of every believer, to be 
interpreted only by the sense of charity and inward persuasion.”93  
We have nearly arrived at the comprehensive understanding of the Lady’s predicament in the 
Maske upon which I will rely in my discussion of Milton’s dramatic resolution. There is, I believe, 
one remaining element to consider. From the fuller description of charity given by Milton in De 
Doctrina Christiana, we learn that this virtue arises ex sensu divini amoris in corda regenitorum per 
spiritum effusi, qua affecti qui in Christum inseruntur, peccato mortui, Deo redivivi, sua sponte ac 
libere bona opera parturiunt (“from a sense of the divine love shed poured out into the hearts of the 
regenerate by the spirit; influenced by which, those who are being ingrafted into Christ become dead 
to sin and alive again to God, and bring forth good works spontaneously and freely”).94 My discussion 
of the provenance of charity has addressed the role of divine providence in enabling the Christian will 
to work “spontaneously and freely.” Milton’s claim that charitable individuals are “planted in Christ”, 
however, requires further attention. The Lady, as I have noted before, identifies herself with Christ, 
modelling her rebuttal of temptation upon the saviour’s response to his own. As Milton’s observation 
that redimere non est idem ac purificare (“‘to redeem’ is not the same as ‘to purify’”) (CD 527) might 
suggest, however, this does not suffice. Although redempti quidem sunt omnes vel inscientes vel etiam 
adhuc inimici . . . purificatus nemo nisi volens et per fidem (“all are redeemed, even those who are 
ignorant [of God] or who are even yet [God’s] enemies. . . no one has been purified except willingly 
and through faith”) (CD 529). Preus notes that for Luther, “The idea of faith, resting on the mera 
promissio . . . cannot be developed with Christ as its subject, and therefore not tropologically either. 
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For Christ is neither purus homo nor in culpa. And therefore, the abyss of despair and nothingness, the 
threat of ultimate abandonment and desperatio, which for man in sin is a real threat, cannot in Christ 
come to genuine expression. In fact, conformitas has no place here; on the contrary, the real distance 
between Christ and man is disconcertingly exposed. As deus-homo . . . [Christ] is not, at this most 
crucial point, one of us men.”95 Essentially, this means that Christ must “become the object of faith 
rather than its exemplary subject.”96 As such, the Lady may not simply take the exemplary continence 
modelled by Christ for her own: it is only through faith, which involves the adoption of Christ as a 
mediator beyond herself, that she may avail of the continence appropriate to her own spiritual 
condition. The Lady’s insufficient recognition of Christ as external mediator mirrors what I have 
argued to be her under-developed, inner mediatory capacity, properly represented by an active will or 
conscience. The net result, as much critical response to her character in the Maske would seem to 
attest, is narcissism: a regressive psychological and spiritual state, which we will have cause to revisit 
in my discussion of Milton’s Satan in the next chapter on Paradise Lost. 
 
 
The staging of Sabrina 
 
The “stony fetters” (818) with which the Lady verbally girds herself, then, prove in the end both 
physically and spiritually endangering. Against the limited efficacy of “haemony” (637), the success 
of the Attendant Spirit’s invocation of Sabrina, a figure who for many of the Maske’s readers 
represents the operation of grace,97 may recall Milton’s prophetic view that “the mighty weakness of 
the gospel” will “throw down the weak mightiness of man’s reasoning.”98 Sabrina’s literary 
provenance and symbolic efficacy in the Maske is complex and far-reaching: in Kilgour’s 
formulation, “as a human who is also part of nature and a supernatural force, she is a hybrid: human, 
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river, goddess, foreigner, and now part of the English landscape, a real literary mutt who is Virgilian/ 
Ovidian/ Spenserian and now Miltonic,”99 yet there are a number of indications in the Maske that her 
character functions as a type of intercessional, or mediatory figure through whom the Lady might 
channel her faith. As Kilgour notes, “Sabrina herself, whose name, the Severn, puns on ‘sever,’ 
divides the Lady from Comus.”100 Elsewhere, indeed, Milton understands the original logos or Word 
through which God created the World as another such division or cut; so that “by his divorcing 
command the world first rose out of Chaos, nor can be renew’d again out of confusion but by the 
separating of unmeet consorts.”101 Typologically, however, man is loosed from the bonds of the Law 
by Christ, the word makes flesh. Given that as Lewalski notes, “The chaste Sabrina’s tainted origin [in 
the adulterous union of her parents] points to original sin as the source of the Lady’s plight,”102 the 
nymph, who has herself undergone death and resurrection (Nereus’s daughters, we are told, having 
bathed Sabrina in waters containing nectar and asphodel upon her escape from Guendolen, “dropped” 
her “in ambrosial oils till she revived, /And underwent a quick immortal change / Made Goddess of 
the River” (839-41)), might appear a particularly appropriate figure to represent the death of the old 
Lady, and the birth of the new. As I have suggested, for Milton redemption is not synonymous with 
purification, but this latter too may be associated with Sabrina. Sabrina’s sprinkling of the Lady with 
“drops” from a “fountain pure / . . . of precious cure” (911-12) is strongly redolent of the act of 
baptism – more so, indeed, than Mordant’s act of drinking from the Nymph’s Well in the Faerie 
Queene. For Milton, baptism represents sigillum illius gratiae iam exhibitae, remissionis peccatorum, 
sanctificationis (“a seal of grace already shown forth, of the remission of sins, of sanctification”) (CD 
739). We ought not to approach such sacraments, he notes, nisi explorata conscienta eiectisque 
peccatis debemus “without examing our conscience and casting out our sins” (CD 761). In the Maske, 
therefore, Lady’s baptismal encounter with Sabrina might therefore be thought to represent her 
experience of that inner movement or “assent” upon which Milton’s notion of true Christian virtue so 
vitally depends.  
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In De Doctrina Christiana’s discussion of baptism, however, Milton will also assert that 
frustra contendunt qui aspersionem in baptismum pro immersione induxerunt: manus enim qui lavant 
immergere solent, non aspergere “it is in vain that those who have brought sprinkling into baptism to 
replace immersion contend that baptism signified sprinkling . . . for those who wash their hands are 
accustomed to immerse them, not sprinkle them” (CD 743). The “ambrosial oils” moreover, which the 
Attendant Spirit informs us, Sabrina received “into the porch and inlet of each sense” (839), would 
seem evocative of the practice of “extreme unction” practised by the “Papists” that Milton further 
condemns (CD 765). Indeed, given what might be considered to be, at the very least, Milton’s 
ambivalence towards sacramental rites and allegorical poetics, phenomena which exist in uneasy 
rhetorical proximity to the domain of idolatry, the decision to use a figure such as Sabrina to render 
dramatically visible the Lady’s consent to grace is puzzling. There would seem to be enough 
symbolically portentous material in the Maske as a literary work to do without Sabrina. If the Lady, as 
I have suggested, might be understood as a type of self-wounding Medusa, petrified by her own 
chaste legalism, the biblical significance of her escape from Comus’s bonds is clear, recalling the 
tropes of spiritual renewal expressed in Ezekiel 36:26 (“A new heart also will I give you, and a new 
spirit will I put within you: and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and I will give you 
an heart of flesh”) which Milton draws on, together with Ovid’s myth of Pyrrha and Deucalion, in his 
description of Adam and Eve’s repentance in Paradise Lost: 
 
Thus they in lowliest plight repentant stood 
Praying, for from the mercy-seat above 
Prevenient grace descending had removed 
The stony from their hearts, and made new flesh 
Regenerate grow instead . . . 
    (11.1-5) 
 
In fact, Sabrina’s very presence in Milton’s ostensibly “Protestant” masque has met with critical 
suspicion. For Ross, the nymph’s invocation by the Attendant Spirit, and her subsequent sprinkling of 
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the Lady, comprises “a kind of bastard ritual which combines pagan and Christian elements.”103 
Suggesting that “the total effect of the scene is not to lift the doctrine of virginity to the shining 
regions of heavenly grace but to destroy the doctrinal abstraction by actualizing it,” Ross argues that 
“the Christian and pagan ingredients of the symbolism have cancelled each other out. The Christian 
images, dissociated from charity, remain static and merely picturesque.” Unlike Milton’s successful 
typological deployment of Ovid’s myth of Deucalion and Pyrrha in Paradise Lost, perhaps, “the 
pagan material reduces the Christian associations to the merest magic.”104  
That there might be an alternative understanding of this part of the Maske, however, is 
suggested by Ortiz, who reads the scene as testament to Milton’s “acceptance of figuration and 
theatricality, despite their moral ambivalence.” 105 Ortiz’s argument reaches back to the climactic 
scene between Comus and the Lady, where the Lady declares her desire to denounce her captor with 
 
. . . such a flame of sacred vehemence,  
That dumb things would be moved to sympathize, 
And the brute Earth would lend her nerves, and shake, 
Till all thy magic structures reared so high, 
Were shattered into heaps o’er thy false head. 
    (794-98) 
 
The Lady’s strongly worded repudiation of Comus here has a Spenserian echo: the “uncontrolled 
worth” (792) she imagines harnessing recalls Guyon’s “rigour pittilesse,” the “vehemence” of her 
“rapt spirits” (793) the “wrathfulness” which powers the knight’s destruction of Acrasia’s bower in 
The Faerie Queene.106 Within the generic parameters of the Maske, however, the violence of this 
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rhetoric threatens to rebound upon its utterer. As Ortiz notes, 
 
 In threatening to bring down Comus’s “magic structures,” the Lady reiterates a brand of 
antitheatricality typical of Ben Jonson in his attacks on Inigo Jones, whose magic structures 
Jonson begrudged as the most popular element of the Stuart masque. Similar to Jonson’s 
expressions of “unresolved ambivalence” toward the stage, the Lady’s implicit criticism of 
the masque paradoxically belies the fact that she is one of the principal entertainers of the 
evening: the magic structures falling on Comus’s head would presumably fall on hers, too.107 
 
We might conclude, with Ortiz, that “the sincerity of the Lady’s argument depends on a 
deliberate unawareness of its occasional context.”108 If this were to be the case, the character’s speech 
would run directly counter to one of the most significant, and arguably, necessary characteristics of 
the masque form as Milton knew it. As Ortiz notes, the “theatrical self-consciousness” which Orgel 
and others have identified as crucially enabling of the peculiar dramatic and rhetorical effects of early 
modern masque culture (we may think again here of Circe’s sneer at the “man-maide” Pallas in 
Townshend’s Tempe Restored (95, 14)) is wholly absent from the Lady’s speech.109 Whereas “the hero 
of a Stuart masque conventionally triumphs by virtue of ‘know[ing] that he is an actor in a masque 
and is conscious of the presence and significance of the audience,’” the masque, for Milton’s Lady, is 
“a remarkably unreflexive event.” 110 Following this argument, then, the Lady’s defence of her 
chastity is inadequately qualified in generic, as well as broader ethical or theological terms. Yet her 
stance may also carry wider, epistemological implications. As Ortiz notes, the mediated, figurative 
form of knowledge transmitted by the masque (a form which according to some Renaissance 
mythographers, as we saw in my first chapter, is itself embodied by Comus) is of the same order as 
the entirety of the realm of experience which man in his fallen state may access.111 The Lady’s speech 
thus threatens to curtail not only the personal progression of her character but the very possibility of 
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moral discernment at the symbolic or figurative level. Her paralysis indicates the dangers of this: in 
the optimistic moral allegory Sandys draws from the detail of Circe’s reverse-metamorphosis of the 
transformed Greek sailors, “as Circes rod, waued ouer their heads from the right side to the left: 
presents those false and sinister perswasions of pleasure, which so much deformes them: so the 
reuersion thereof, by discipline, and a view of their owne deformity, restores them to their former 
beauties” (480). The Lady’s immobility, then, would seem to suggest some kind of internal hindrance 
caused by a lack of self-knowledge, a natural inability to preserve or further her virtue unaided despite 
her “discipline.” 
 In the wider context of the Maske, however, this same incapacitation promotes dramatic, and 
by extension, moral and spiritual opportunity. For Milton, it would seem that like the Christian 
individual, good art is engaged in a process of continual transformation and regeneration. Indeed, 
charity itself cannot arrive outside of representation. As Shohet notes, “the heart of the Christian 
constitution . . . is ‘love’ (caritas), not as an emotive relation but as the way for faith to become 
manifest in the world, actively ‘working through’ experience.”112 For this reason, the Lady is mistaken 
to sever the “freedom” of her mind from Comus’s attempts to engage with her: there is in fact a 
dialectical relationship between the two. As the earlier discussion of the importance of akrasia to 
Milton’s Christian liberty and ethics would suggest, the process of virtue forming bears a strong 
influence on the nature of the virtue that might be established in an individual. Following Paul’s 
instruction to the Thessalonians to “‘prove all things, hold fast that which is good” (1 Thess. 5:21), the 
“choice” that is at the heart of Milton’s epistemology and virtue ethics is, in the Areopagitica, 
presented as the product of a process of trial and error that requires careful discrimination. In support 
of this, Milton invokes Apuleius’s tale of “those confused seeds which were imposed upon Psyche as 
an incessant labour to cull out, and sort asunder” (310) as a metaphor for the Christian duty to cleave 
the good in the World from the evil that it so closely resembles. Analogously, Milton’s Comus, insofar 
as he provides a surface for hermeneutic and moral reflection, may function in the Maske more or less 
like Spenser’s Acrasia, so that the Lady speaks truer than she knows when, approaching Comus’s 
rabble, she acknowledges that  
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. . .I should be loth 
To meet the rudeness, and swilled insolence 
Of such late wassailers; yet O where else 
Shall I inform my unacquainted feet 
In the blind mazes of this tangled wood? 
    (176-80) 
 
Understood in relation to the questions about knowledge and its dissemination that preoccupy Milton 
in the Areopagitica, the poet might appear to be motivated at this point in the Maske by the same 
moral didacticism invoked by Spenser in his defence of his epic as a work through which man may be 
taught “to separate error from truth.”113 Yet there is, I would argue, an important difference between 
Milton’s and Spenser’s poetics. Where Spenser’s art seeks ultimately to deactivate error through an 
allegorical, binding hermeneutic, Milton’s would set it free. At the end of the Maske, as Lewalski 
notes, “Comus (unlike other antimasque figures) is neither conquered, nor transformed, nor 
contained, nor reconciled.”114 In the Areopagitica, Milton would appear to extend the “principle of 
contrariety” that Danielson finds in the Eden of Paradise Lost,115 to encompass the figurative, literary 
realm: “Since therefore the knowledge and survay of vice is in this world so necessary to the 
constituting of human vertue, and the scanning of error to the confirmation of truth, how can we more 
safely, and with lesse danger scout into the regions of sin and falsity then by reading all manner of 
tractats, and hearing all manner of reason? And this is the benefit which may be had of books 
promiscuously read” (312). Some such endorsement of representative or figurative freedom seems 
equally to inform Milton’s Maske, where as Shullenberger notes, Milton “expands Comus’s role 
beyond the conventional containing structure of the antimasque, assigns a significant set of culturally 
recognizable arguments to him, and endows him with the mesmerizing eloquence to elaborate 
                                                          
113 Teskey, “From Allegory to Dialectic,” 9. 
114 Lewalski, “Milton’s Comus and the Politics of Masquing,” 309. 
115  Dennis Danielson, Milton’s Good God: A Study in Literary Theodicy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992), 172. 
173 
 
them.”116 
 
 
Sabrina and Circe 
 
There is a certain persuasiveness to Ortiz’s argument that in the Maske Milton employs “theatricality 
and Ovidian allusion to demonstrate the radical instability of figurative knowledge, in a way that 
makes complete ‘moral purity in art’ impossible,” yet also “establishes figuration as essential to any 
postlapsarian aesthetic.”117 Even if we accept this, however, Sabrina’s function as a sort of dea ex 
machina figure, wheeled in at the last moment to resolve the drama’s central conflict, may still appear 
symptomatic of the poet’s failure to reconcile the “static, Neoplatonic self-evidence of virtue, power, 
and error,” which Shohet has argued forms “the epistemological basis of Stuart court masque,”118 with 
a more Miltonic, “literary” waywardness. Indeed, Ortiz acknowledges “the precariousness of Milton’s 
project,”119 and we might, in a last analysis, view the poet’s contribution to the masque genre as itself 
an alembic for his developing thought, a trial of his own developing philosophical and literary 
imagination. Yet a further case for the symbolic cohesiveness and eventual success of the Maske, I 
would argue, could be made by shifting focus from Sabrina’s relation to the Lady to another figure, 
whose silence belies her significant presence in this latter part of the masque – Circe. Kilgour notes of 
Sabrina that “as part of her dual nature she seems to bring together different forms of metamorphosis; 
while there are clearly Christological resonances in her ability to walk on water (896-7), she also 
resembles Ovid’s Circe, who skims the surface with dry feet (Met., 14.49-50).”120 Bearing in mind the 
polyvalency of Circean mythography to which, I argued at the beginning of this chapter, the Maske 
bears witness, Sabrina’s anointing of the Lady may also recall Circe’s washing of Odysseus in 
Homer’s Odyssey: 
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I bath’d; and odorous water was  
Disperpled lightly, on my head, and necke;  
That might my late, heart-hurting sorrowes checke  
With the refreshing sweetnesse.121 
 
Given Milton’s observation in his poetic and polemical works of the difficulty and laborious 
effort involved in telling good from the evil that opposes it in this world, Sabrina may here play the 
bono to Circe’s malo. Indeed, I would tend to agree with Kilgour’s contention that “while Stanley 
Fish argues that the masque moves toward the differentiation of figures who are at first hard to tell 
apart (Comus and the Spirit take similar disguises), it seems to me to work in the reverse: from a 
situation of clear antithesis to one of more complex mixing, in which the act of discrimination is both 
more difficult and more urgent.”122 As we have seen, in An Apology for Smectymnuus, Milton invokes 
the Circe myth in direct connection to this trope, juxtaposing the “charming cup” of “vertue” carried 
by “chastity and love” with the “thick intoxicating potion which a certaine Sorceresse the abuser of 
loves name carries about” (305), an image which might recall Comus’s dual inheritance of Bacchic 
and Circean influences . Yet Comus and the Attendant Spirit, Sabrina and Circe, are not the only 
figures in the Maske to bear similarities. The Lady too may possess Circean attributes. The “divine 
enchanting ravishment” (244) of the Lady’s song invokes a maternal memory that moves Comus to a 
rapturous lyricism of his own: 
 
. . . I have oft heard 
My mother Circe with the Sirens three, 
Amidst the flowry-kirtl’d Naiades 
Culling their Potent hearbs, and balefull drugs,  
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Who as they sung, would take the prison’d soul, 
And lap it in Elysium . . .  
    (251-56) 
 
Revard notes of this moment that although both the Lady “and her song are innocent (she is only 
calling for aid), the effect is not. The rapture she causes may be heavenly, but it is not without sexual 
implications, for Comus is aroused and enticed by the Lady’s singing. She inadvertently enthrals 
Comus the enchanter.”123 There is something of this too, of course, in the erotic undertones of 
Milton’s L’Allegro, where in lines which bear a striking resemblance to the above verse, the poet 
appeals to “Mirth” – an Orphic figure born from Venus and Bacchus – to  
 
Lap me in soft Lydian airs,  
Married to immortal verse  
Such as the meeting soul may pierce 
In notes, with many a winding bout 
Of linked sweetness long drawn out, 
With wanton heed, and giddy cunning, 
The melting voice through maze running;  
Untwisting all the chains that tie 
The hidden soul of harmony.124  
 
L’Allegro, for Greene, is symptomatic of “the young Milton’s filtered or displaced sexuality,”125 and 
as such betrays a kind of hysteria: “When L’Allegro asks for soft Lydian airs, we have no immediate 
reason to doubt that he can hear them, until, as the poetry imitates them with progressively ravishing 
sweetness, the very existence of such enchantment becomes open to question. . . . This would be 
                                                          
123 Stella P. Revard, Milton and the Tangles of Neaera’s Hair: The Making of the 1645 “Poems” (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 1997), 145. 
124 John Milton, “L’Allegro,” in Complete Shorter Poems, ed. Carey, lines 136-44. 
125 Thomas M. Greene, “The Meeting Soul in Milton’s Companion Poems,” English Literary Renaissance 14, 
no. 2 (1984): 173. 
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music more potent than Orpheus’, music which would succeed where he failed, music such as has 
never been heard, sounding only in a limbo of the imagination.”126  
In the Maske, it might be argued, this giddy ardour gives place to cynicism: the presence for 
Comus of Circe in the Lady’s song casts aspersions on the possibility that any “holy” (245) innocence 
might inhere in female nature – indeed, given the punishment visited upon womankind after the Fall, 
in a certain sense all women, and especially sensuous, singing women, are Circean sirens.127 The 
Orphic beauty of the Lady’s song might only be defended, then, by a plea of the sort Milton makes in 
Areopagitica, that “all kind of knowledge, whether of good or evil; the knowledge cannot defile, nor 
consequently the books, if the will and conscience be not defiled” (308). In connection with this point, 
it is worth noting that the Attendant Spirit claims to have heard the Lady’s Song somewhat differently 
to Comus. For Comus, as we have seen, the “divine enchanting ravishment” (244) of the Lady’s song 
invokes the power of his mother’s voice to “take the prisoned soul, / And lap it in Elysium” (255-56), 
a spiritual experience of sorts, but one which carries with it associations of indolence and easy 
pleasure, temptations which waylay Odysseus more than once in Homer’s poem. To the Spirit, by 
contrast, the Lady’s “soft and solemn-breathing sound” (554) seems to precipitate a kind of spiritual 
awakening or ascent: her “strains . . . might create a soul / Under the ribs of death” (560-61). Siren 
song may be valuable, on this reading, for the opportunity it affords for discerning, as well as testing, 
the virtue of its hearers. This would seem to accommodate Milton, again with Spenser, squarely 
within the “commonplace” allegorical tradition that co-opts the story of Odysseus into “an important 
defense against the notion that poetry seduces as does the Sirens’ song,” the threat of which was often 
elided with Circe. Accordingly, Odysseus becomes “an emblem of wisdom and temperance,” his 
“cunning and continence” set “against the deceptive pleasures [of] Homer’s temptresses.”128 In the 
Maske, however, it is the Lady’s acts of perception and discrimination that take centre stage, inviting 
far greater scrutiny of her ethical conduct than we are likely to bestow upon either Comus or the 
Attendant Spirit. In view of the symbolic relationship between Circe and the Lady which, I have 
argued, the Maske establishes, in the dualist, allegorical paradigm set out above the Lady would have 
                                                          
126 Ibid., 166. 
127 Revard, Milton and the Tangles of Neaera’s Hair, 145. 
128 Gough, “Daughters of Circe,” 59. 
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to act as an Odysseus to her own internal Circe to guarantee her virtue. Indeed, a masculinisation of 
the Lady’s character would seem to tally with the view of critics such as Lander Johnson that 
“Milton’s morality viewed the affective and the feminine as too proximate to the vice of effeminacy, 
and contrary to truly masculine and rigorous chastity.”129 
Yet as I have argued throughout this chapter, the sensual and sensitive aspect of the Lady’s 
mixed nature cannot, and will not, be so easily repressed. The Circean Comus, moreover, functions as 
rather more than an externalisation of the Lady’s inner concupiscence, a foil to the essential goodness 
of her regenerate nature. These characters play an active role in shaping the virtue that, by the end of 
the masque, the Lady would seem to possess. As my discussion of charity might suggest, for Milton 
as for Reformed believers more widely, the vita contemplativa was considered inferior and potentially 
deleterious to the development of a “positive” Christian ethics and, indeed, poetics, so that he “cannot 
praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue unexercised, and unbreathed, that never sallies out and sees her 
adversary, but slinks out of the race, where that immortal garland is to be run for, not without dust and 
heat” (Areopagitica 311). The rhetorical function of Milton’s Circe is thus rather more complex than 
we might assume from the allusions to her character in his earlier Latin poetry, which bear witness, as 
I have argued, to the figure’s familiar, Ovidian deployment as a “symbol of dangerous, corrosive 
passion.”130 Indeed, a revisionary trend in more recent scholarship has put strain upon Woodhouse’s 
influential allegorical reading of the Maske, with several critics finding that Sabrina, the character 
most instrumental in securing the Lady’s freedom from bondage, is also ultimately irreducible to the 
stable signification that allegory demands. Smith argues that “hardly anything is said by or about 
Sabrina that encourages allegorical identification,”131 while for Shohet “Admitting multiple 
interpretive possibilities, suggesting a whole new way of signifying, Sabrina’s representational 
plenitude constitutes the chaste alternative to the semiotic ‘abstinence’ of fixed or single meanings,”132 
a reading which might recall the essential ambivalence of Circe’s pharmakon.  
                                                          
129 Lander Johnson, Chastity in Early Stuart Literature and Culture, 141. 
130 Charles Segal, “Myth and Philosophy in the Metamorphoses: Ovid’s Augustanism and the Augustan 
Conclusion of Book XV,” The American Journal of Philology 90, no. 3 (1969): 271. 
131 George William Smith Jr., “Milton’s Revisions and the Design of Comus,” English Literary History 46, no. 1 
(April 1, 1979): 68. 
132 Shohet, “Figuring Chastity: Milton’s Ludlow Masque,” 157. 
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 In fact, although in Chapman’s translation of Homer’s Odyssey Circe’s “rauishing” voice 
leads on to her deception of Odysseus’s men,133 the picture of the goddess that emerges from the 
Greek account overall, with which we can assume Milton was familiar,134 is far more ambivalent. For 
Homer, as Segal notes, “the two sides of Circe – lustful sensuality and the refinements of civilization, 
the power both to brutalize and to sing – can still coexist in a complex whole.”135 The Circean 
cadences of the Lady’s song in the Maske may therefore work to enrich rather than deplete the latter’s 
spiritual potential, which the severe “chastity” the character insists upon leaves untapped. As critics 
have noted, a kind of musical dialecticism operates in Milton’s masque to create yet another layer of 
patterned signification. Importantly, Smith observes that while the Lady’s song to ‘Sweet Echo’ 
receives only the response of Comus, a nice irony given the somewhat predictable conventions of 
“echo” songs in contemporary masques,136 “the song to ‘Sabrina fair,’ with which it is paired and for 
which there was no antiphonal convention, brings Sabrina’s answer in song.”137 Similarly, Ortiz’s 
attempt to redeem the Maske from the discursive and ethical impasse observed by other critics relies 
on the salvific power of music, a theme with which readers of Milton’s L’Allegro and Il Penseroso 
will already be familiar. In the Sabrina scene, Ortiz argues, Milton “re-channels the musical and 
Ovidian elements of the antimasque in order to free the Lady, thus authorizing the modes of figuration 
and performativity – which Comus had abused – as necessary and valuable aspects of human 
experience.”138 
If, moreover, in Milton’s Apology for Smectymnuus the “thick intoxicating potion which a 
certaine Sorceresse the abuser of loves name carries about” (305) is a Circean image, Circean too – in 
                                                          
133 Homer, Homer’s Odysses, 151. 
134 Milton may or may not have read Chapman’s translation, but allusions to the Odyssey pepper his prose and 
poetic works: see for instance CD 1081. 
135 Charles Segal, “Circean Temptations: Homer, Vergil, Ovid,” 425. 
136 In both Jonson’s Masque of Queenes and Browne’s Inner Temple Masque, songs to Echo elicit a musical 
rejoinder from the Nymph herself. 
137 Smith, “Milton’s Revisions” 58. Walls finds the song to “Sabrina fair” amongst the more conventional 
elements of Milton’s Maske. The song was performed by Henry Lawes, the masque’s composer and the Egerton 
children’s music master. As Walls notes, “masque musicians were . . . commonly characterized as priests or 
poets. In other words, they were portrayed as men of more than ordinary wisdom and authority. Accordingly, 
their songs elucidate the mysteries of the masque’s device and initiate the apparently magical transformations” 
(Music in the English Courtly Masque, 46). We may think here also of the musician-priests in Jonson’s Pleasure 
Reconciled to Virtue, whose song opens the mountain Atlas (218-23), and of the instrumental role of the 
musicians of the voûte dorée in the action of the French Balet Comique. 
138 Ortiz, “‘The Reforming of Reformation,’” para. 29. 
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the tradition of the pharmakon – is the idea that books of ill repute “are not temptations, nor vanities; 
but useful drugs and materials wherewith to temper and compose effective and strong medicines, 
which man’s life cannot want” (Areopagitica 315, my emphasis). Interestingly, Homer’s Circe is 
herself a tempering force, serving to moderate Odysseus’s hubristic desire.139 When she is asked by 
Odysseus if, having sacrificed six of his men to Scylla, he might avenge them, the Goddess answers 
 
O vnhappy! art thou yet  
Enflam’d with warre? and thirst to drinke thy swet?  
Not to the Gods giue vp, both Armes, and will?  
She, deathlesse is, and that immortall ill  
Graue, harsh, outragious, not to be subdu’d,  
That men must suffer till they be renew’d·  
Nor liues there any virtue that can flie  
The vicious outrage of their crueltie.  
Shouldst thou put Armes on, and approch the Rock,·  
I feare, sixe more must expiate the shocke.140  
 
As Wolfe argues, “Homer’s Circe does not intend for Odysseus to conclude from his experience with 
Scylla that one must, or even can, avoid all contention and adversity; instead, she teaches him to 
moderate, rather than eliminate, his impulse toward strife.”141 The theme of trial and challenge that 
persists through Homer’s narration of Odysseus’s encounter with Circe is, as we have seen, inflected 
with moral and spiritual significance in later allegorical treatments of the myth, with Circe often 
implicated in the failings of the men she leads astray. Yet Circe herself is a goddess, and thus, 
according to Aristotle (NE 1145a25-26), herself exempt from akrasia. Importantly, given the Lady’s 
                                                          
139 Yarnall argues that Circe’s warning to Odysseus “beautifully illustrates the perspective, constant in Homer, 
against which the glory of heroism is seen. . . . [Circe’s] divine knowledge makes military prowess appear as a 
limited thing” (Transformations of Circe, 17).  
140 Homer, Homer’s Odyssey, 183. 
141 Jessica Wolfe, “Spenser, Homer, and the Mythography of Strife,” Renaissance Quarterly 58, no. 4 (2005): 
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inability to defeat Comus through her powers of refusal alone in Milton’s Maske, in the Odyssey, as 
Yarnall reminds us, “Circe’s power becomes benevolent [only] after it is challenged and fully met.”142 
As this chapter draws to a close, it ought to be acknowledged that the significance of Circean 
mythology to the Maske’s final meaning has been remarked previously by at least one critic. Angus 
Fletcher perceptively notes that “in Comus the most important instance of subsurface implication is 
the use of the myth of Circe . . . Milton is withholding much of the direct narrative content of the 
myth of Circe, and it is this withheld context that fills the interior spaces of the myth of Comus, 
Thyrsis, the Lady, her brothers, and Sabrina.”143 Yet although, the tropes of echo, semantic instability 
or pharmakon and Circe’s catalytic, potentialising powers are brought tantalisingly close together in 
the final pages of Fletcher’s monograph, a synthesis of these ideas never quite arrives. Given the lack 
of precedent for the argument the critic makes, perhaps we can hardly blame him – history, after all, 
has not been kind to Circe, and a reading of the kind I have attempted here runs very much against the 
grain. It is difficult to find a parallel for Milton’s unusual treatment of Circean mythography in the 
Maske in either contemporary or modern literature. At the close of his Nosce Teipsum (1599), a poem 
linked by Danielson to Augustine’s teachings on the importance of free will, Sir John Davies asks  
 
 For what is Man without a mouing mind, 
 Which hath a iudging wit, and choosing will? 
 Now, if God’s power should her election bind, 
 Her motions then would cease, and stand all still. 
 
And why did God in man this soule infuse, 
 But that he should his maker know, and loue? 
Now if loue be compeld, and cannot chuse, 
 How can it gratefull, or thank worthie proue? 
 
                                                          
142 Yarnall, Transformations of Circe, 21. 
143 Fletcher, The Transcendental Masque; an Essay on Milton’s Comus, 244–45. 
181 
 
Loue must free hearted bee, and voluntarie, 
 And not enchaunted, or by Fate constraind; 
 Nor like that loue, which did Vlysses carie 
 To Circes ile, with mightie charmes enchaind.144 
 
Circe is here presented as the antithesis of love “free hearted . . . and voluntarie.” Yet this is both un-
Homeric – in the Odyssey, Circe lets Odysseus go – and, I would argue, un-Miltonic. In Chapman’s 
translation of Homer, Circe not only instructs Odysseus how to avoid the threat of the Sirens, she 
advises that 
 
When your friends  
Haue outsaild these: the danger that transcends  
Rests not in any counsaile to preuent;  
Vnlesse your owne mind, finds the tract and bent  
Of that way, that auoids it. I can say  
That in your course, there lies a twofold way;  
The right of which, your owne, taught, present wit  
And grace diuine, must prompt.145  
 
This, surely, is Milton’s moral too.
                                                          
144 Sir John Davies, Nosce Teipsum (London: Richard Field for John Standish, 1599), 37. 
145 Homer, Homer’s Odyssey, 181. 
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Paradise Lost: Milton’s Circean Chaos 
 
John Milton’s Paradise Lost has proved rich hunting ground for scholars of classical reception in the 
Renaissance. In this ostensibly most biblical of poems, classical allusions, references and mythical 
paradigms are interlaced with the Christian story of our first parents’ Fall. As critics have long 
recognised, “Milton’s epic similes involving mythical comparisons are point for point relevant to the 
action of the story. Thus myth serves the double function of description and thematic development.”1 
Given that Paradise Lost features only one explicit allusion to Circean mythography, it would seem 
difficult to trace a continuity between the Maske and Milton’s later poem in this particular respect: 
Fletcher’s important observation that “in Comus the most important instance of subsurface 
implication is the use of the myth of Circe” may seem less relevant to a study of Paradise Lost.2 In 
this chapter, however, I will argue via an analysis of the literary and metaphysical implications of 
Milton’s portrayal of Eve and Chaos at key junctures of his poem that the same Circean potential so 
important to the exploration of Christian liberty in the Maske is granted enhanced providential 
importance in Paradise Lost, Milton’s most ambitious work. 
Before Eve tastes the apple and precipitates both her own and Adam’s Fall in book 9 of the 
poem, the animals that surround her in the garden of Eden are said to be “. . .more duteous at her call, 
/ Than at Circean call the herd disguised” (9.521-22).3 As I will suggest, the effect Milton achieves by 
placing the reference to the Circe story here, at this point in his narrative retelling of the Biblical 
creation story, is far from straightforward. In these two lines, Milton juxtaposes tropes of providential 
design and divinely sanctioned female authority with something that is altogether more sinister. 
Milton’s description of Eve’s command over the beasts of Eden rests on the biblical notion that before 
the Fall, our first parents possessed perfect dominion and mastery over the natural world: 
                                                          
1 Jonathan H. Collett, “Milton’s Use of Classical Mythology in Paradise Lost,” PLMA 85, no. 1 (1970): 88. 
2 Fletcher, The Transcendental Masque, 244. 
3 The hyperbolic comparison is typically Miltonic – we might recall the description of the herb “Haemony” in 
the Maske as “more med’cinal” than moly (635-36). 
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And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have 
dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over 
all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. (Gen. 1:26) 
 
As Peter Harrison has discussed, in Patristic exegesis of Genesis, “The loss of dominion over nature 
was linked to the domination of reason by bestial and carnal affections, and the beasts themselves 
were identified with individual passions.”4 On one level then, Milton’s description of the animals so 
“duteous” to Eve’s call is simply a continuation of an earlier passage in book 4, where a portrait of the 
“Fair couple, linked in happy nuptial league” (4.339) amidst the “frisking . . . / . . . beasts of the earth” 
(4.341-42) invites nostalgia for a time in our prelapsarian history when man’s God-given dominion 
over the beasts of the sea, air and earth was effortlessly maintained, and man and beast lived 
harmoniously, removed from any threat of violence. Milton’s yoking of Circean myth to this divinely 
sanctioned and sanctified relationship does, however, complicate matters. It must not be forgotten that 
treatments of Circe in the Reformed literature of Milton’s near-contemporaries are generally damning: 
as Brodwin argues, by the time of Milton’s writing of Paradise Lost, “Circe had become perhaps the 
most familiar Renaissance symbol of spiritual degradation.”5 Initially, it might seem plausible to cite 
Chapman’s translation of Homer’s account of Circe’s rule over the beasts – a passage of obvious 
relevance to any discussion of Circean presence in Paradise Lost – as an exception to this rule:6 
  
Before her gates; hill-wolues, and Lyons lay;  
Which with her virtuous drugs, so tame she made;  
                                                          
4 Harrison, “Reading the Passions,” 73.  
5 Brodwin, “Milton and the Renaissance Circe,” 22. 
6 For a discussion of Homeric influences in Milton’s PL, see Sarah Van der Laan, “Milton’s Odyssean Ethics: 
Homeric Allusions and Arminian Thought in Paradise Lost,” Milton Studies 49 (2008): 49–76; and Barbara 
Kiefer Lewalski, “The Genres of Paradise Lost,” in The Cambridge Companion to Milton, ed. Dennis 
Danielson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 113–29. 
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That Wolfe, nor Lyon, would one man inuade  
With any violence.7 
 
Chapman’s coupling of “virtuous” with “tame” would seem to suggest that the Goddess’s command 
over her herd serves a protective function. Given however that at the corresponding moment in 
Homer’s Odyssey it is κακὰ φάρμακα, or “evil drugs” that the Goddess is said to employ to subdue 
her herd, this may be best understood as an instance of Chapmanian irony which draws out the 
inherently unnatural basis of the enervated condition in which the transformed men find themselves.8 
Wolfe’s suggestion, that Chapman “recognizes that Homeric epic generates irony out of the 
conflict between disparate perspectives,”9 might also, however, provide a useful vantage point from 
which to investigate the significance of the negative associations of Milton’s reference to Circe at this 
point in his epic. The specific narrative conditions which foster meaning here, I would argue, ought to 
be considered in light of broader critical observations about Milton’s “proleptic” use of myth in 
Paradise Lost.10 The comparison of Eve with Circe is made as Satan, himself “disguised” (9.522) in 
the form of the serpent, spies on Eve as she gardens alone in Eden. The sexually enticing, Circean 
qualities of Eve are prominent in the focalised account we are given of Satan’s prolonged observation 
of “her heavenly form” (457). Musing on “This flowery plat,” her “sweet recess,” he is nearly 
overcome, brought to a point of “stupid” (465) docility fitting for a member of Circe’s herd as 
 
 . . . Her every air11 
 Of gesture or least action overawed 
                                                          
7 Homer, Odysses, 150. 
8 As Burrow notes, Chapman “frequently adds phrases and whole lines to Homer and sometimes simply gets 
him wrong” (Colin Burrow, “Chapmaniac: Chapman’s Homer,” London Review of Books, June 27, 2002; 
https://www.lrb.co.uk/v24/n12/colin-burrow/chapmaniac). The view that such mistranslations are often 
purposeful is put forward by Jessica Wolfe in “Chapman’s Ironic Homer,” College Literature 35, no. 4 (2008): 
151-86. The case for “virtuous drugs” being intended ironically may be strengthened by referring to Ovid’s 
description of the pressos latices radice nocenti which Circe sprinkles into the pool visited by Scylla in 
Metamorphoses 14.56. 
9 Wolfe, “Chapman’s Ironic Homer,” 174. 
10 Collett’s argument that in Paradise Lost, “inherent in the beauty of most of the myths is fragility and often 
ruin,” is particularly pertinent here (Collett, “Milton’s Use of Classical Mythology,” 88).  
11 There may be a subtle indication here that Eve is singing as she works, invoking another Circean quality 
which is made much of, as we have seen, in Milton’s Maske.  
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 His malice, and with rapine sweet bereaved 
 His fierceness of the fierce intent it brought. 
(9.459-62) 
 
Within a matter of lines, however, Satan recovers himself. Driven forward by “Fierce hate” (471) and 
a determination “all pleasure to destroy” (477), he draws closer to begin the temptation that will 
precipitate both Eve and Adam’s fall. 
When a comparison of Eve to Circe is made a second time, the allusion (although implicit) 
derives from Satan’s behaviour, and as we will see, might be suggestive of a more self-conscious 
effort on the fallen angel’s part to use myth to his advantage, expose Eve’s weaknesses and regiment 
her place within the allegorical hierarchy that had long been superimposed on the story. “Fawning,” 
we are told, the Serpent “licked the ground whereon she trod” (9.526), an attitude which recalls the 
manner in which the beasts who wait at the threshold of Circe’s palace greet the first dispatch of men 
from Odysseus’s crew in Homer’s poem: “Within the forest glades they found the house of Circe, 
built of polished stone in a place of wide outlook, and round about it were mountain wolves and lions, 
whom Circe herself had bewitched; for she gave them evil drugs. Yet these beasts did not rush upon 
my men, but pranced about them fawningly, wagging their long tails” (Od. 210-15). This behaviour is 
indicative of the effeminacy induced by Circean enchantment, and by analogy, therefore, with Eve 
herself.  
As the encounter in Paradise Lost between Eve and Satan unfolds, however, it is clearly the 
latter who has the upper hand. In the course of his temptation of Eve, Satan refers to Eve repeatedly as 
“goddess” or “goddess humane” (9.547; 732), the title by which Homer’s Circe is also introduced, 
and thus plays on Eve’s sense of her own “mixed” nature. Eve of course knows she was born of 
Adam, who was himself made in God’s image, and thus enjoys a certain proximity to divinity. Yet the 
human pair are made consciously aware of their difference from God and his angels from the time of 
their creation onwards in the poem, and in Book 5 Milton relates Adam’s curiosity to know 
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Of things above his world, and of their being 
Who dwell in heaven, whose excellence he saw 
Transcend his own so far, whose radiant forms 
Divine effulgence, whose high power so far 
Exceeded human. 
   (455-59) 
 
This leads to the character’s questioning of the angel Raphael, who indicates that the gap Adam 
perceives between himself and the higher beings in heaven may not be so intransient after all. Over 
the lunch they share in Eden, Raphael explains to Adam and Eve that earthly food may be 
metabolised as easily by angels as by men, since both groups, though placed on different rungs of the 
scala naturae, exist in a continuum of the same ontological plane. Within their “several active 
spheres,” (5.477) both angels and men partake of nourishment so that “body [may] up to spirit work” 
(478). Within this paradigm, informed by Milton’s monist metaphysics,12 the “discursive” (488) 
knowledge made available to man through his reason, to which his “corporal nutriments” (496) are 
“sublimed,” differs “but in degree” (490) from the angels’ “intuitive” knowledge (488). Raphael even 
suggests that should the human pair “be found obedient,” and “unalterably firm” in their love for God, 
“whose progeny you are” (501-3), the gap might close, so that  
 
Your bodies may at last turn all to spirit,  
Improved by tract of time, and winged ascend 
Ethereal . . . 
   (497-99) 
                                                          
12 Milton states this concisely in De Doctrina Christiana: Spiritus . . . ut substantia excellentior, substantiam 
utique inferiorem virtualiter, quod aiunt, et eminenter in se contient; ut facultas facultatem spiritualis et 
rationalis corpoream, sentientem nepe et vegetativam (“Spirit, being the more excellent substance, virtually (as 
they say), and eminently contains within itself what is undoubtedly the inferior substance – just as the spiritual 
and rational faculty contains the corporeal one, that is, the sentient and vegetative faculty”) (295). Detailed 
studies of Milton’s monism and materialism include Danielson, Milton’s Good God and Stephen M. Fallon, 
Milton among the Philosophers: Poetry and Materialism in Seventeenth-Century England (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991). 
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 Yet the conditional tense is important here, and in the meantime, he exhorts Adam to  
 
. . . enjoy 
Your fill what happiness this happy state 
Can comprehend, incapable of more. 
   (503-5) 
 
Eve looks on. Within the poem’s hierarchical continuum of human and divine beings, of 
course, she is subordinate not only to God and the angels but to Adam: the pair, we are told, were 
made “He for God only, she for God in him” (4.299).13 In the early books of Paradise Lost, Eve 
proves readily compliant with this notion, addressing Adam as “My author and disposer” and 
confirming that  
 
 . . . what thou bidst 
Unargued I obey; so God ordains, 
God is thy law, thou mine: to know no more 
Is woman’s happiest knowledge and her praise. 
(4.635-38) 
 
This is affirmed again in Book 8, as Eve elects to leave Adam to converse with the angel Raphael 
alone, a decision she makes, the narrator explains, not because she is “not capable” of understanding 
                                                          
13 Eve herself draws out the implications of this notion: 
 
. . .O thou for whom 
And from whom I was formed flesh of thy flesh 
And without whom am to no end, my guide 
And head. 
   (4.440-43) 
See also Gen. 2:23, “Adam said, This is now . . . flesh of my flesh: she shall be called Woman, because she was 
taken out of Man”; 1. Cor. 11:3, “The head of every man is Christ; and the head of the woman is the man” and 
11:9, “Neither was the man created for the woman; but the woman for the man.” 
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“what was high” (8.49-50), but because “Her Husband the relater she preferred / Before the angel” 
(8.52-3). 
Between these two declarations, however, our sense of Eve’s satisfaction with her status in 
Eden – or at least her conviction of the lack of any real alternative – may be shaken somewhat. The 
intervening event of course is Eve’s Satanic dream in Book 5, wherein she is guided towards  
 
. . . the tree 
Of interdicted knowledge: fair it seemed, 
Much fairer to my fancy than by day. 
   (5.52-3) 
 
The implications of the dream will be discussed in more detail later, yet it is important to note here 
that the claims the figure “shaped and winged like one of those from heaven” (55) makes for the 
deifying attributes of the fruit of the tree, “Forbidden here, it seems, as only fit / For gods, yet able to 
make gods of men” (69-70), closely resemble those that will persuade Eve to taste the “fair fruit” (9. 
731) in Book 9. Satan’s use of the epithet “Goddess” in his flattery of Eve in Book 9 recalls the 
promise of the figure who appears in her dream of Book 5,  
 
Taste this, and be henceforth among the gods  
Thyself a goddess, not to earth confined, 
But sometimes in the air, as we, sometimes 
Ascend to heaven, by merit thine, and see  
What life the gods live there, and such live thou. 
   (5.77-81) 
 
Granted, Eve reports a “damp horror” (65) upon witnessing the figure pluck and eat the fruit of the 
tree in her dream, and expresses relief to have woken. Yet there is a moment of elation in her account 
of the ending of the dream, an elation which, together with Eve’s later receptivity to Satan’s offer of a 
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“strange alteration” (9.599), suggests that Satan has successfully “involved” (9.75), or insinuated 
himself into, her desire: 
 
. . . Forthwith up to the clouds 
With him I flew, and underneath beheld 
The earth outstretched immense, a prospect wide 
And various: wondering at my flight and change 
To this high exaltation. 
   (5.86-90) 
 
As I will discuss, another precedent for the hubristic lapse, or “false ambition,”14 that attends 
Eve’s Fall and which seems to make her more susceptible to the Serpent’s temptation, “eat thereof . . . 
/ . . . and . . . be as gods” (9.706-10), might be found in the character’s account of her own creation in 
Book 4 (450-80), where she admits to initially preferring herself, Narcissus-like, to Adam. As the 
ending of her dream might suggest, however, a certain blurring between Satan, the infamous fallen 
angel, and Eve, the first woman, is also apparent here: the flight Eve dreams of has already been 
undertaken by Satan, whose “wonder at the sudden view / Of all this world at once” (3.542-43) as he 
emerges from Chaos prefaces Milton’s panoramic vision of the earth as seen from above. In Book 4 
we see this trope repeated, as Satan gains access to Eden and uses the tree of life as a “prospect” (200) 
from which to “wonder” (205) at Eden’s “delight” (206) whilst “devising death” (197), for mankind. 
Thereafter, a further, and related parallel between Satan and Eve is established through the form of the 
temptation in Book 9, where the serpent’s promise of apotheosis and more general appeal to Eve’s 
pride and ambition recalls the motivations given in Books 1 and 2 for the fallen angel’s own rebellion 
against God, whom “he trusted to have equalled the most high, / If he opposed” (1.40-41).15  
                                                          
14 Sandys, Ovid’s Metamorphosis Englished, 27. 
15 See ibid., 106: “But a fearfull example we haue of the danger of selfe-loue in the fall of the Angells; who 
intermitting the beatificall vision, by reflecting vpon themselues, and admiration of their owne excellency, 
forgot their dependance vpon their creator.” 
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Leading up to the temptation in Book 9 of Paradise Lost, around the time of Milton’s 
comparison of Eve to Circe, we are presented with an increasingly solipsistic economy of desire and 
pleasure, in which the provoking agents, Eve and Satan are confused to the point of merger. If Satan, 
observing Eve, is initially the subject and originator of his desire, 
 
As one who long in populous city pent, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Among the pleasant villages and farms  
Adjoined from each thing met conceives delight, 
 (9.445-49)  
 
subject and object are soon run together through the syntactically ambivalent addendum that  
 
If chance with nymph-like step fair virgin pass, 
What pleasing seemed, for her now pleases more, 
She most and in her look sums all delight. 
Such pleasure took the serpent to behold. 
 (9.452-55) 
The unstable perspective through which we gain access to the interplay between Satan and Eve in this 
part of the book makes it unclear, then, exactly who the Circean agent in the encounter is – and this, 
surely, is the point. In order for Milton to achieve theological coherence, Eve, who like Adam was 
made “Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall” (3.99) must be tempted, yet fall of her own 
volition,16 a point which might recall my discussion of the Lady’s predicament in Milton’s Maske.  
I might seem dangerously close here, given what I argued previously of the positive, indeed 
necessary Circean attributes which Milton builds into his notion of Christian liberty in the Maske, of 
                                                          
16 The significance of this point for the theology and poetics of Paradise Lost has been widely acknowledged, 
although critics continue to dispute its implications. See for instance Danielson, Milton’s Good God; William 
Poole, Milton and the Idea of the Fall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); John C. Ulreich, 
“‘Sufficient to Have Stood’: Adam’s Responsibility in Book 9,” Milton Quarterly 5, no. 2 (1971): 38–42. 
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depicting Satan himself as the most “Circean” character of Paradise Lost, with his initiation of Eve’s 
Fall an ultimately happy event to be celebrated in the tradition of felix culpa.17 Yet the Circean aspects 
of the relationship between Satan and Eve in Paradise Lost cannot, of course, be considered without 
recourse to Milton’s Sin. If, as I have discussed in the previous chapter, there is something of Ovid’s 
Scylla in the Lady’s bondage to her chair “Smeared with gums of glutinous heat” (Maske, 916), in 
Milton’s portrayal of Sin in Paradise Lost the influence of both the Ovidian myth and its allegorical 
treatment in Sandys’ account is yet more prominent.18 Like Scylla, who is presented by Ovid as an 
unfortunate, innocent party to the jealous rage that is born from Circe’s love for her suitor, yet post-
transformation endangers men through a treacherous temptation of her own,19 and like Milton’s Sin, 
initially a victim of Satan’s incestuous lust who becomes, along with their grim progeny Death, a 
“hell-hound” (10.630) to torment mankind,20 Eve, a victim of Satan’s temptation in Book 9 of 
Paradise Lost, will herself become a tempter in turn.21 
The relationship between Milton’s Scylla-inspired Sin and Eve is fortified by the similarities 
between the birth narratives of Eve and Sin in the poem (both Eve and Sin emerge, fully formed, from 
the left side of their male progenitor) and in Milton’s positioning of Sin as gatekeeper of hell, in 
which Tertullian’s famous attack on women is writ large: “You are the devil’s gateway . . . you are 
the first deserter of the divine law; you are she who persuaded him whom the devil was not valiant 
enough to attack. You destroyed so easily God’s image, man. On account of your desert – that is, 
                                                          
17 An classic exposition of the idea of the felix culpa in Paradise Lost is found in A. O. Lovejoy, “Milton and 
the Paradox of the Fortunate Fall,” in Essays in the History of Ideas (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1948), 
277–95. 
18 Philip J. Gallagher argues of Milton’s Sin and Death that while “the structure of the sequence is indebted to 
St. James, whose Epistle (1.15) contains an allegorical vision of lust begetting sin and sin begetting death . . . 
Milton’s proximate source for the iconography of Sin is the allegorical portrait of Errour in Spenser’s Faerie 
Queene (1.1.14-15). Covertly the narrative is mythological: it depends ultimately upon Ovid (Metamorphoses 
14.40-74) for Sin’s appearance and upon Hesiod (Theogony, 2.924-26) for details of her birth” (“‘Real or 
Allegoric,’" 322).  
19 Sandys notes that “once polluted with the sorceries of Circe, that is, hauing rendred her maiden honour to bee 
deflowered by bewitching pleasure, . . . [Scylla] is transformed to an horrid monster. And not so only, but 
endeavours to shipwracke others (such is the envy of infamous women) upon those ruining rocks, and make 
them share in the same calamities)” (Ovid’s Metamorphosis Englished, 475). 
20 Martz suggests that the reference to the “Night-Hag” (2.662-66) in Milton’s description of the “hell hounds” 
(2.654) that torment Sin herself “recalls Circe’s use of Hecateia carmina (14.44) while mixing her poisonous 
herbs” to transform Scylla in Ovid’s Metamorphoses (Louis Lohr Martz, Milton, Poet of Exile (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1986), 215).  
21 Indeed, an echo of Sandy’s account of the “deflowred” Scylla’s fate might sound in Milton’s description of 
Adam’s response to his fallen wife, “From his slack hand the garland wreathed for Eve / Down dropped, and all 
the faded roses shed” (9.892-3), and his subsequent damning appraisal of Eve as “Defaced, deflowered, and now 
to death devote” (9.901). 
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death – even the Son of God had to die.”22 This moralised entwining of the Biblical account of the fall 
with Ovidian mythology relies on the assumption of a dualistic spiritual hierarchy between man and 
woman, but also, and perhaps especially, within humankind itself. As we have seen, for Sandys the 
myth of Scylla “intimates how man, a divine creature, endued with wisdome and intelligence, in 
whose superiour parts, as in a high tower, that immortall spirit resideth . . . can never so degenerate 
into a beast, as when he giveth himselfe over to the lowe delights of those baser parts of the body, 
Dogs and Wolves, the blind & salvage fury of concupiscence” (Met. 475). Indeed, Browning argues 
that “Milton refers to the Ovidian Circe tradition repeatedly throughout Paradise Lost, specifically in 
relation to the characters of Sin, Satan, and Eve,” and that “inherent in this Ovidian tradition is the 
archetypal conflict between reason and appetite within the individual – largely reflected in a medieval 
Catholic anthropology.”23 If this seems inconsistent with the theological perspective I have claimed 
for Milton thus far, Browning, quoting Luther’s discussion of sin as a “poison,” “infused into our 
nature” at birth,24 manages to accommodate a “Reformed revision” of the medieval paradigm within 
her reading of the later parts of Paradise Lost. “After the Fall,” we learn,  
Sin realizes her full potential. She is no longer the Scylla victim of Book II, subject to the 
abuse and rule of her son; neither is there any suggestion of her continued torture by the 
“Cerberean” mouths that surround her. In Book 10, we find the allegorized presence of Circe 
– all of the basic components of the myth are present. Sin is here the infecting agent whose 
function is to make humanity thrall to appetite. She no longer offers her poison as a drug, but 
is herself the poison. Unlike the ancient Circe figures, Sin’s potion is no longer external. 
Circe’s contagion here becomes original sin.25 
  
                                                          
22 Tertullian, “On the Apparel of Women,” in Ante-Nicene Fathers, ed. and trans. A. Cleveland Coxe, vol. 4 
(Buffalo: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1885), 14. 
23 Browning, “Sin, Eve, and Circe,” 135. 
24 Luther, Luther’s Works: Lectures on Genesis, Chapters 1-5, ed. Pelikan, vol. 1, 169. 
25 Browning, “Sin, Eve, and Circe,” 146. 
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This sin, of course, is first internalised by Eve when “in evil hour / Forth reaching to the fruit, she 
plucked, she ate.” Thereafter, in consequence of the Fall, her “poison” will be transmitted 
genealogically to all of mankind as a “propagated curse” (10.729) – a proleptic use of myth indeed. 
Arguably, Milton had linked Circe with the Fall, and thus with Eve, in his earlier work. The 
narrative of his Maske sets up the story of Comus’s birth and parentage as mythically anterior to the 
events that take place during the course of its performance, much as the biblical Fall is anterior to 
human history proper. We learn from the Attendant Spirit that Comus’s father Bacchus “on Circe’s 
island fell” (Maske 50), an interesting choice of verb that is followed by a caesura, ensuring its stress, 
before a rhetorical parenthesis that underlines the analogy between the spiritual consequences of 
man’s Fall following Eve’s temptation and the myth of Circe: “. . . (Who knows not Circe / The 
daughter of the Sun, whose charmed cup / Whoever tasted, lost his upright shape, / And downward 
fell into a grovelling swine)” (50-53). As Yarnall remarks, “the Homeric allegorists’ vision of a 
voluptuous Circe beckoning the rational, temperate Odysseus to drink from her poisoned cup 
possesses obvious similarities to the figure of Eve holding out the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge to a 
still-innocent Adam in Genesis 3.”26 The trope of akrasia, moreover, implicit in humanist allegories 
of the Circe myth, emerges again in conjunction with Milton’s Circean treatment of Eve in Paradise 
Lost.27 If, as I have suggested, a prominent strategy of Satan’s temptation is to appeal to Eve’s desire 
for knowledge, the rhetoric through which this appeal is conveyed is itself provocatively sensual. 
Satan’s (fictional) account of how he acquired language through eating the fruit of the tree of 
knowledge begins with a rich description of the fruit’s sensory allure, whereby the act of eating is 
presented primarily as an indulgence of appetite: “hunger and thirst,” we learn – or are reminded – are 
“Powerful persuaders . . .” (9.586-87). Just as with Spenser’s ekphrastic description of Excesse, the 
reader might well thirst along with Eve, Satan’s other auditor, for the multi-sensory experience of this 
“fruit of fairest colours mixed, / Ruddy and gold” (9.577), that produces “a savoury odour” (9.579) 
more pleasing than “smell of sweetest fennel, or the teats / Of ewe or goat dropping with milk at 
                                                          
26 Yarnall, Transformations of Circe, 93. 
27 Spenser compares the Bower of Bliss to Eden in FQ 2.12.2, further suggesting the topicality of Eve’s Fall for 
explorations of Circean akrasia in Renaissance literature. 
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even” (9.581-82).28 Indeed, Eve’s senses succumb one by one to the “eager appetite” (9.740) “waked” 
by Satan’s “words replete with guile” (9.773), together with “the smell / So savoury of that fruit, 
which with desire, / Inclinable now grown to touch or taste, / Solicited her longing eye.” (9.740-43). 
Satan’s success is manifest in the very language that Eve uses after she tastes the fruit, commencing 
upon a panegyric to that “sovereign, virtuous, precious of all trees / In Paradise, of operation blest / To 
sapience” (9.795-97). As Grossman notes of these lines, “Eve’s unintended pun on ‘sapience’ 
signifies the reduction of knowledge to taste that attends her identification of physical and divine 
power,”29 a phenomenon which would horrify Milton’s Lady, who quickly discerns “vizored 
falsehood, and base forgery” (Maske 697) behind Comus’s attempts to get her to drink his “liquorish 
baits fit to ensnare a brute” (699). Against the Lady’s disdain for “swinish gluttony” (775) and 
preferred observance of the “sober laws, / And holy dictate of spare temperance” (765-66) in the 
Maske, in Paradise Lost Milton signals Eve’s loss of temperance at the moment of her Fall through 
the very manner in which she devours the forbidden fruit: “Greedily she engorged without restraint” 
(9.791). 
In Paradise Lost, in fact, Eve yields to Satan despite her earlier warning by Adam on their 
parting: 
 
. . . God left free the will, for what obeys 
 Reason, is free, and reason he made right, 
 But bid her well beware, and still erect, 
 Lest by some fair appearing good surprised 
 She dictate false, and misinform the will 
 To do what God expressly hath forbid. 
    (9.351-56) 
 
                                                          
28 My argument here is indebted to Stanley Fish’s seminal application of “reader-response” criticism to the 
theology and poetics of Milton’s work. 
29 Marshall Grossman, Authors to Themselves: Milton and the Revelation of History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987), 192. 
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Milton’s inclusion of this advice speaks to a marriage of intellectualist and voluntarist ideas of akrasia 
at this point in the poem, and would seem to implicate Eve, even before her Fall as an akratic agent – 
against both God and Adam’s injunction, she allows her glozing “Tempter” (9.549) to persuade her to 
eat. Day has argued that the propensity of Eve’s reason to be misled by her “lesser faculties” (5.101) 
is first established in Book 4, when gazing at herself in the pool, to which she has been led by 
“unexperienced thought” she “acts initially not from reason but from the stimulation of her senses, 
and . . . is incapable of distinguishing the reality of the sky from the illusion of the water’s reflection 
of the sky.”30 Day is not wrong, exactly, but as my forthcoming discussion will suggest, the point of 
Eve’s watery self-encounter, and its aftermath, lies substantially elsewhere. In Paradise Lost, Milton 
does problematise the notion that a wholly harmonious relationship between human reason and sense 
perception existed even in Eden, but he does so far more overtly through the important passage in 
Book 5 where Eve relates to Adam the dream in which Satan had tried to manipulate “the organs of 
her fancy, and with them forge / Illusions as he list” (4.802-3), to produce “distempered, discontented 
thoughts” (807) and “inordinate desires / Blown up with high conceits engendering pride” (808-9). 
The events of Eve’s dream, of course, foreshadow those of the Fall itself, and as Milton’s narrative in 
Book 9 would attest, Eve’s decision to the taste the fruit offered by the serpent is brought about at 
least in part by the Satanic motivators listed above.  
 It is worth noting that Milton’s thought here runs counter to Augustine’s position in De 
civitate Dei, where we are told that before the Fall man and woman were innocent because they did 
not feel any emotional disturbance or perturbatio (14.10). In order, however, to explain how in the 
absence of perturbatio mankind could lapse from a more intuitive state of having knowledge of evil 
solely through knowledge of the good, to the fallen state of having knowledge of evil through 
experience,31 Augustine had posited the idea of multiple falls, or a protracted fall, caused by a mala 
                                                          
30 Douglas Day, “Adam and Eve in Paradise Lost, 4,” Texas Studies in Literature and Language 3, no. 3 (1961): 
370. 
31 See Adam’s speech in his Fallen state in Paradise Lost: 
 
. . . since our eyes 
Opened we find we know 
Both good and evil, good lost, and evil got, 
Bad fruit of knowledge. 
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voluntas (“evil will”). Therefore, In occulto autem mali esse coeperunt ut in aperiam in oboedientiam 
laberentur (“when the first human beings began to be evil, they did so in secret, and this enabled them 
to fall into open disobedience”) (14.13). Something like this, it is reasonable to assume, might inform 
Milton’s addition of Eve’s dream to the Biblical account of the Fall that is dramatized in Paradise 
Lost. Yet as Poole reminds us, during the initial dream temptation “at no point do her teeth meet the 
fruit.”32 Furthermore, both Adam, Eve’s interlocutor in Book 5, and a majority of commentators 
consider Eve’s first temptation to be involuntary given her condition of sleep.33 Indeed, upon the 
dissolution of this state, Eve’s will reasserts itself: “ . . . oh how glad I waked / To find this but a 
dream!” (5.92-93). Her action, then, cannot truly be described as akratic in the voluntarist sense, and 
indeed, we are reminded that in the Augustinian paradigm, the phenomenon of an intractable akrasia 
attendant upon a disenfranchisement of the will is best understood as a consequence, and not a cause 
of the Fall: 
 
Denique, ut breviter dicatur, in illius peccati poena quid inoboedientiae nisi inoboedientia 
retributa est? Nam quae hominis est alia miseria nisi adversus eum ipsum inoboedientia 
eius ipsius, ut, quoniam noluit quod potuit, quod non potest velit? In paradiso enim etiamsi 
non omnia poterat ante peccatum, quidquid tamen non poterat, non volebat, et ideo poterat 
omnia quae volebat. Nunc vero, sicut in eius stirpe cognoscimus et divina scriptura testatur, 
homo vanitati similis factus est. Quis enim enumerat quam multa quae non potest velit dum 
sibi ipse, id est voluntati eius ipse animus eius eoque inferior caro eius, non obtemperat? 
 
(“To put it briefly then, in the punishment of that sin the requital for disobedience was no 
other than disobedience. For man’s wretchedness consists only in his own disobedience to 
himself, wherefore, since he would not do what he then could, he now has a will to do what 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
   (9.1073) 
32 Poole, Milton and the Idea of the Fall, 175. Poole adds that “the absence of the eating in the dream might 
argue resistance in the face of temptation; or – a new possibility – it might make the point that the actual bite is 
unimportant, desire being the real transgression. But we cannot say which is the more secure interpretation” 
(ibid.). 
33 In Aristotle, of course, sleep – together with madness and drunkenness – is one of the states to which the 
akratic man’s condition of “knowing” is compared. See NE 1147a10-18.  
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he cannot. In paradise, to be sure, man could not do everything whatsoever even before he 
sinned, yet, whatever he could not do, he did not have a will to do, and in that way he could 
do everything that he would. Now, however, as we recognize in his offspring and as holy 
Scripture attests, “Man has become like vanity.” For who can count up all the things that 
man has a will to do but cannot as long as he is disobedient to himself, that is, as long as his 
very mind and even his flesh, which is lower, are disobedient to his will?”)34 
 
Something of this is reflected in Paradise Lost, where Milton would appear to style Eve’s speech 
differently before and after the Fall in conformity with this doctrine. As she contemplates the 
serpent’s claims (9.733-780), both her reason and her appetite are united in her desire for the fruit.35 
There is little to suggest that she does not fully believe Satan’s “persuasive words, impregned / With 
reason, to her seeming, and with truth” (737-38). As Eve rehearses the serpent’s words in her own 
speech, Milton cements the power and seeming inevitability of the Satanic argument’s appeal through 
a marked use of traductio: 
 
For good unknown, sure is not had, or had 
And yet unknown, is as not had at all. 
In plain then, what forbids he but to know, 
Forbids us good, forbids us to be wise?36 
                                                          
34 Augustine, City of God, 14.15. 
35 See Tilmouth, Passion’s Triumph Over Reason, 200, for a more extended discussion of the interplay between 
reason and appetite in Eve’s thought processes before the Fall. 
36 In fact, in Book 7 Raphael had warned the human pair that “knowledge is as food, and needs no less / Her 
temperance over appetite” (126-27). Speaking to Adam in Eve’s absence, the angel is more explicit: 
  
Solicit not thy thoughts with matters hid, 
Leave them to God above, him serve and fear; 
Of other creatures, as him pleases best, 
Wherever placed, let him dispose: joy thou  
In what he gives to thee, this paradise 
And thy fair Eve; heaven is for thee too high 
To know what passes there; be lowly wise: 
Think only what concerns thee and thy being. 
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(756-59) 
 
A certain unity of mind and action is also connoted by the short clauses in the perfect tense 
through which the act of the transgression itself is narrated: “she plucked, she ate” (781). This 
harmony, however, dissolves with the Fall, at which point Eve seems to experience a loss of unity of 
being. In its place, she finds a new self-consciousness that enables her to practise her own kind of 
serpentine “guile” (655): “But to Adam in what sort / Shall I appear?” (817). Indeed, upon their 
reunion, Eve presents herself to Adam with a new performativity:  
 
To him she hasted, in her face excuse 
Came prologue, and apology to prompt, 
Which with bland words at will she thus addressed. 
(9.853-55) 
 
Her physical appearance meanwhile betrays the inner conflict, or dissonance behind her “bland 
words”:  
 
Thus Eve with countenance blithe her story told; 
But in her cheek distemper flushing glowed 
    (886-87) 
 
Eve’s appeal to Adam is nonetheless successful. “Fondly overcome with female charm,” (999), and 
unable to bear the idea of living without his wife when she is punished for her sin by death, Adam 
“scrupled not to eat” (997). The phrase “female charm” is pivotal in assessing Adam’s motivation for 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
    (8.167-73) 
 
Ironically, by failing to restrict her desire for knowledge to that which “concerns thee and thy being,” and by 
directly disobeying God’s commandment not to eat the fruit of the tree of knowledge, Eve effectively bars 
herself and Adam from attaining the kind of “intuitive” knowledge Raphael had referred to at 5.488. 
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choosing to share Eve’s fate. As we have seen, the word “charm” carries Circean connotations in both 
Milton and Spenser’s work, and in Paradise Lost its appearance here, rather than in conjunction with 
Milton’s reference to the Circean herd earlier in Book 9, is significant. As Brodwin notes, “although 
Milton explicitly associates Eve’s momentary influence upon Satan with the temptation of Circe . . . . 
Eve’s major Circean function is none other than to tempt Adam to his fall.”37 
 
 “The charm of beauty’s powerful glance” 
Brodwin’s argument is persuasively damning, and in conceding its cogency, the case for Milton’s 
wholly negative use of the Circean figure in Paradise Lost – a case made by the vast majority of 
scholarship on the subject – might seem to be closed. In this vein, Giamatti argues of Milton’s 
comparison of Eve and the animals in Eden to the “herd” that obeyed the “Circean call,” that “the 
reference to Circe, at this crucial moment, links Eve to the prototype of the evil woman in a garden 
from whom Eve’s immediate predecessors, Alcina, Armida and Acrasia, were all descended.”38 Yet 
Giamatti prefaces her statement by noting that “of all the analogies by which to imply the harmony 
and innocence of the creatures in the garden before the Fall, the comparison of Eve to Circe’s power 
is, to say the very least, the most ambiguous,”39 a remark that is left frustratingly undeveloped. In this 
next section I will argue that disburdening Eve of any exclusive equivalence with the “evil woman in 
a garden” frees up new interpretative possibilities for Milton’s Circean allusions and references. As 
with Milton’s Maske, I want to suggest that the Circean motif in Paradise Lost is more diffuse and 
far-reaching than we might assume. In addition to the initial, and most famous Circean temptation, 
which results in the “archetypal, swinish metamorphosis” so prominent in Virgil and Ovid’s accounts, 
Brodwin discusses two additional subtypes which appear in Homer’s version of the myth: the 
temptation of “effeminating sex,” and that of “enervating idleness.”40 While this schema is somewhat 
crude, it does give us a framework through which we might further scrutinise the degree of likeness 
                                                          
37 Brodwin, “Milton and the Renaissance Circe,” 60. 
38 Giamatti, Earthly Paradise and the Renaissance Epic, 329. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Brodwin, “Milton and the Renaissance Circe,” 21. 
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between Milton’s Eve and the mythological Circes inherited and embellished by the Renaissance 
humanist tradition. Brodwin makes a convincing case for Milton’s exploration of the second two 
temptations in his earlier work, but her argument for the presence of these aspects of Circean 
mythology in Paradise Lost – aspects which are run together under the rather vague umbrella of 
Adam’s neglect of “higher obligations” as a direct result of Eve’s Circean charm – lacks nuance.41 
The charge that Eve induces effeminacy, or uxoriousness in her partner has been discussed 
extensively in the critical literature,42 often in relation to Adam’s decision to share Eve’s fate when 
she offers him the fruit of the tree of knowledge. Post-fall, as I have suggested, Milton does stress this 
aspect of the first couple’s relationship: the Son himself rebukes Adam for the act in which  
 
Thou didst resign thy manhood, and the place 
Wherein God set thee above her made of thee, 
And for thee, whose perfection far excelled  
Hers in all real dignity . . .  
    (10.148-51) 
Critics who view Milton’s Eve as a product of a more misogynistic exegetical or allegorical tradition 
often base an argument for continuity between the Eve known by Adam in a prelapsarian paradise, 
and the Eve who tempts him to his fall, by drawing upon Adam’s confession to Raphael in Book 8 of 
his vulnerability to “the charm of beauty’s powerful glance” (8.533), the word “charm,” of course, 
sounding again at the pivotal moment in Book 9. We are alerted to the troubling consequences of 
Adam’s susceptibility to the “commotion strange” (8.531) that his passion for Eve arouses by the first 
man himself: 
 
                                                          
41 Ibid., 63. 
42 See for instance Brodwin, “Milton and the Renaissance Circe,” 61–64; Day, “Adam and Eve in Paradise Lost, 
4,” 373–81; James W. Stone, “‘Man’s Effeminate s(Lack)ness’: Androgyny and the Divided Unity of Adam and 
Eve,” Milton Quarterly 31, no. 2 (1997): 33–42.  
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All higher knowledge in her presence falls 
Degraded, wisdom in discourse with her 
Looses discount’nanced, and like folly shows; 
Authority and reason on her wait, 
As one intended first, not after made 
Occasionally . . . 
    (8.551-56) 
 
The adjective “discount’nanced” here is foreboding, recalling as it does Satan’s “disfigured” (4.127) 
and “mad demeanour” (129), the physical manifestation of the fallen angel’s “distempers foul” 
(4.118) which leave their mark on his “passion dimmed . . .face” (114), and foreshadowing the 
couple’s state, “discount’nanced and discomposed” (10.110) after the Fall. Instructing Adam on how 
he might better relate to Eve, in Book 8 Raphael advises that 
 
What higher in her society thou findst 
Attractive, human, rational, love still; 
In loving thou dost well, in passion not, 
Wherein true love consists not; love refines 
The thoughts, and heart enlarges, hath his seat 
In reason, and is judicious, is the scale  
By which to heavenly love thou mayst ascend, 
Not sunk in carnal pleasure, for which cause  
Among the beasts no mate for thee was found. 
(586-594) 
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The Neoplatonic opposition of “heavenly love” to bestial, “carnal pleasure” that Milton’s angel makes 
here relies on the assumption that the passions are subordinate to reason, just as animals are 
subordinate to humans, the angels and ultimately God himself within the scale naturae which forms 
the basis for contemporary moral allegories of Circean allure. Within the more fluid Neoplatonic 
schema, as we have seen it deployed in the Balet and Townshend’s Tempe Restored, a man who pays 
too much heed to his appetites and succumbs to lust risks imbruting himself, while he who is capable 
of a more contemplative, “true love” of beauty participates in an earthly image of divinity, and thus 
draws closer to God himself.  
Yet as several critics have discussed, a reading of Eve’s sexual allure before the Fall as 
sinful is itself problematic,43 as indeed is the idea that passion has no place in Milton’s Eden. As 
Blackburn notes, in Paradise Lost “Milton goes to lengths unprecedented in hexaemeral literature to 
make clear his belief that Adam and Eve were created with a full complement of human appetites.”44 
Raphael, then, is condemning a particular type of passion in his speech to Adam – that of excessive, or 
“ungoverned appetite” (11.517), which in the Maske, as we have seen, proves synonymous with the 
state of intemperance, and elsewhere in Milton’s corpus, with sin itself.45 Yet even here we have to be 
careful. It cannot be denied, of course, that Milton’s Eve is associated with excess. The physical 
attributes Milton endows her with speak to an overwhelming beauty and fertility which the narrator’s 
tempering exposition fails to contain: the claim that her “wanton ringlets . . . / . . . implied / 
Subjection” (4.306-8), for instance, is striking mostly for its seeming contradiction. Notions of 
“innocence” imported from the fallen world, Milton perhaps suggests, are anachronistic here. Yet the 
                                                          
43 J. M. Evans notes that Augustine, whom Milton follows in allowing that our first parents had (concupiscence-
free) sexual relations in Eden before the Fall, used the paradigm set up by Paul in Romans 7 to inform his view 
that “the split between . . . [Adam’s] reason or will and his sexual appetite was both the first consequence of the 
Fall and an illustration of the general inability of his rational faculties to retain their authority over his bodily 
ones” (“Paradise Lost” and the Genesis Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 99). On Milton’s depiction 
of Adam and Eve’s sexual activity in the Eden of Paradise Lost, see James Turner, One Flesh: Paradisal 
Marriage and Sexual Relations in the Age of Milton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Tilmouth, 
Passion’s Triumph Over Reason, 191–92. For an account of the Jewish and Christian debates about whether 
Adam and Eve had conjugal relations in Eden see Gary Anderson, “Celibacy or Consummation in the Garden? 
Reflections on Early Jewish and Christian Interpretations of the Garden of Eden,” Harvard Theological Review 
82 (1989): 121–48. 
44 Thomas H. Blackburn, “‘Uncloister’d Virtue’: Adam and Eve in Milton’s Paradise,” Milton Studies 3 (1971): 
130. 
45 Sin is “not in a predicament to be measur’d and modify’d, but is alwaies an excesse . . . and is as boundlesse 
as that vacuity beyond the world” (Tetrachordon 159). 
203 
 
poem does have an internal consistency of sorts, which we may use to guide our interpretation of this 
imagery. As Green and Lewalski have explored, a series of correspondences are set up by Milton in 
book 4 between Eve’s physicality and the irregular, wild beauty of the garden itself, which “not nice 
art / In beds and curious knots, but nature boon / Poured forth profuse” (241-43).46 Like Eve, nature in 
paradise “Wantoned as in her prime” (5.295), and nature, we are expressly told, is blameless.47 We are 
reminded of this not only by Raphael in his admonitory speech to Adam in Book 8 (“Accuse not 
nature she hath done her part,” 8.561), but again in book 11, after the Fall, where there is a resurgence 
of the Circean theme as Milton relates to Adam the suffering of future sinners: 
 
Their maker’s Image, answered Michael, then  
Forsook them, when themselves they vilified 
To serve ungoverned appetite, and took 
His image whom they served, a brutish vice, 
Inductive mainly to the sin of Eve. 
Therefore so abject is their punishment, 
Disfiguring not Gods likeness, but their own, 
Or if his likeness, by themselves defaced 
While they pervert pure nature’s healthful rules 
To loathsome sickness, worthily, since they 
God’s image did not reverence in themselves.48 
                                                          
46 As Lewalski puts it, in Paradise Lost nature “has a surprising tendency to excess and disorder, to 
overprofuseness and languid softness – [see] the ‘mazy error’ of the brooks, the ‘wanton’ fertility of the 
vegetation, the ‘luxuriant’ vines, the ‘pendant shades’” (Barbara Kiefer Lewalski, “Innocence and Experience in 
Milton’s Eden,” in New Essays on “Paradise Lost,” ed. Thomas Kranidas (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1969), 89). See also Green’s discussions of Eve’s relationship with the physical landscape and flora of the 
garden of Eden in Milton’s Ovidian Eve.  
47 So too, of course, is Eve. Poole notes that “Adam and Eve are conspicuously reafﬁrmed as still innocent in 
Book 5. ‘So pray’d they innocent,’ the narrator reminds us; Adam is ‘Accompanied . . . with his own compleat / 
Perfections’; and as for Eve, ‘no thought inﬁrm / Alterd her cheek’ (209, 352–3, 384–5)” (Milton and the Idea of 
the Fall, 175). 
48 This recalls Milton’s Maske: 
 
Soon as the potion works, their human countenance, 
The express resemblance of the gods, is changed 
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(11.515-25) 
 
While Milton’s admission of the intractable legacy of Eve’s transgression conforms with Reformed 
orthodoxy, the qualification in “Inductive mainly to the sin of Eve” (my emphasis), together with the 
pointed repetition of “themselves” in the second, eighth and eleventh lines of the above passage, 
serves to stress the role of individual agency in man’s “brutish vice.” In fact, an elision of Eve with 
passion and passion with Adam’s demise proves inconsistent with what we know of Milton’s 
particular theological perspective. Any clear opposition between the passions and recta ratio, we 
might recall, had already been destabilised in the Areopagitica, where Milton asks of God “Wherefore 
did he create passions within us, pleasures round about us, but that these rightly tempered are the very 
ingredients of virtue?” (319) Far from dismissing the passions as insignificant or ungodly, they are 
presented here as essential to that “freedom to choose,” in particular Adam’s freedom to choose, 
which proves to be a central tenet of Milton’s Christian virtue ethics in both the Areopagitica and 
Paradise Lost.49  
In fact, while I have suggested that recourse to a voluntarist model of akrasia is not essential 
to an understanding of Eve’s lapse in Paradise Lost – Eve appears to fall with a unified will – Adam’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Into some brutish form of wolf, or bear, 
Or ounce, or tiger, hog, or bearded goat, 
    (68-71) 
 
And Augustine: 
 
Hominem vero, cuius naturam quodam modo mediam inter angelos bestiasque condebat ut, si 
Creatori suo tamquam vero domino subditus praeceptum eius pia oboedientia custodiret, in 
consortium transiret angelicum, sine morte media beatam inmortalitatem absque ullo termino 
consecutus, si autem Dominum Deum suum libera voluntate superbe atque inoboedienter usus 
offenderet, morti addictus bestialiter viveret, libidinis servus aeternoque post mortem supplicio 
destinatus.  
 
(“[God] created man’s nature to be midway, so to speak, between the angels and the beasts in such a 
way that, if he should remain in subjection to his creator as his true Lord and with dutiful obedience 
keep his commandment, he was to pass into the company of the angels, obtaining with no intervening 
death a blissful immortality that has no limit; but if he should make proud and disobedient use of his 
free will and go counter to the Lord his God, he was to live like a beast, at the mercy of death, and 
enthralled by lust and doomed to eternal punishment after death.”) (CG 12.22) 
49 Tilmouth notes that in Aristotle, passion is something to be cultivated and tempered rather than simply denied, 
since “desire driven . . . by rational goals is, in Aristotle’s view, morally valuable, and so too are the passions 
which are expressions of that desire.” He cites Castiglione, Thomas Wright and Montaigne amongst those 
Renaissance writers whose works bear signs of Aristotelian influence on this point (Passion’s Triumph over 
Reason, 23) 
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case is different. In the Maske, as we have seen, Milton develops a modified Augustinian notion of the 
will to support his belief that human goodness and the freedom to choose are mutually establishing. 
These ideas are revisited in Paradise Lost, where choice, wedded to reason as it is in the 
Areopagitica,50 is presented as a crucial part of God’s covenant with man both before and after the 
Fall: 
 
I made [man] just and right, 
Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
What pleasure I from such obedience paid, 
When will and reason (reason also is choice) 
Useless and vain, of freedom both despoiled, 
Made passive both, had served necessity, 
Not me. 
(3.98-111, my emphasis) 
 
Although both Adam and Eve are presented by Milton as rational beings, “sufficient to have stood 
though free to fall,” it is not a stretch to say that Adam’s reason is of a higher order than Eve’s, or that 
the robustness of Eve’s reasoning capacity is to a certain extent reliant on that possessed by Adam. 
From the moment we learn that Adam was  
 
 for contemplation . . . and valour formed,  
For softness she and sweet attractive grace, 
                                                          
50 “Reason is but choosing” (Areopagitica 319). 
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He for God only, she for God in him,51 
    (4.297-99) 
 
a hierarchy is established whereby Adam, at least nominally, is treated as Eve’s intellectual superior. 
Adam is positioned by Milton more than once as Eve’s moral and spiritual guide, not least in the 
fateful conversation that takes place between the two before the Fall. After this calamitous event, 
moreover, when Adam complains to the Angel Michael that “. . . the tenor of man’s woe / Holds on 
the same, from woman to begin” (11.632-33), he is met with the reproach that  
 
From Mans effeminate slackness it begins, 
. . . who should better hold his place 
By wisdom, and superior gifts received. 
(634-36) 
 
Before we arrive at the moment of Adam’s Fall, then, the reader has been primed to view 
Adam’s transgression as particularly grave, and for Adam to be implicated in the sin that precedes his 
own. Ulreich has argued that in the pivotal conversation between Adam and Eve in book 9, when Eve 
suggests she ought to leave his side to work in the garden alone and Adam “reluctantly consents: ‘Go; 
for thy stay, not free, absents thee more’ (372),” Adam “knows that his decision is mistaken, for only 
‘What obeys / Reason is free’ (351-2), and Eve’s action is impulsive.”52 This seems rather to do 
Milton’s Eve a disservice: as Green has shown, Eve’s suggestion that she and Adam part ways is “an 
expression of her desire to maximize their impact upon the garden by instituting a division of labour 
that will ensure an increase in productivity and efficiency by removing the distraction of amorous 
‘Looks,’ ‘smiles,’ and ‘Casual discourse’ (9.222-23).”53 Certainly, however, when Eve’s encounter 
                                                          
51 A line which Burrow, with some justice, has described as Milton’s most unlikeable: Colin Burrow, “Shall I 
Go On?,” London Review of Books, March 7, 2013; https://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n05/colin-burrow/shall-i-go-on. 
52 Ulreich, “‘Sufficient to Have Stood,’” 39. 
53 Green, Milton’s Ovidian Eve, 248. 
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with Satan has run its course, it is clear that Adam, unlike Eve before her Fall, knows the falsity of the 
serpent’s claims, and is fully aware of the grave consequences that are likely to follow from his 
partner’s lapse:  
 
. . . Adam, soon as he heard 
The fatal trespass done by Eve, amazed, 
Astonied stood and blank, while horror chill 
Ran through his veins, and all his joints relaxed 
(9.888-91) 
 
The decision to join her in disobeying God is therefore taken “Against his better knowledge, not 
deceived” (9.998-99). The Augustinian tradition, in fact, locates a voluntary akrasia in Adam’s sin 
but not in Eve’s:  
 
Non enim frustra dixit apostolus: Et Adam non est seductus, mulier autem seducta est, nisi 
quia illa quod ei serpens locutus est, tamquam uerum esset, accepit, ille autem ab unico 
noluit consortio dirimi nec in communione peccati; nec ideo minus reus, si sciens 
prudensque peccauit 
 
“For not without significance did the apostle say, ‘And Adam was not deceived, but the 
woman being deceived was in the transgression’; but he speaks thus, because the woman 
accepted as true what the serpent told her, but the man could not bear to be severed from his 
only companion, even though this involved a partnership in sin. He was not on this account 
less culpable, but sinned with his eyes open.” (CG 14.11)  
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It might be noted, furthermore, that Adam’s vulnerability to the “charm” that some critics 
would hold responsible for his Fall is not in fact exclusive to his relationship with Eve.54 At the 
beginning of Book 8, having attended to Raphael’s account of God’s creation, we are told that 
  
The Angel ended, and in Adam’s ear 
So Charming left his voice, that he a while 
Thought him still speaking, still stood fixed to hear. 
(8.1-3) 
 
This reaction to good parallels both Comus’s response to the “divine enchanting ravishment” (244) of 
the Lady’s voice in Milton’s Maske,55 which, like Circe’s song, “in pleasing slumber lulled the sense” 
(259), and later in Paradise Lost, Satan’s reaction to Eve’s “graceful innocence” (9.459), which  
. . .with rapine sweet bereaved 
His fierceness of the fierce intent it brought: 
That space the evil one abstracted stood 
From his own evil, and for the time remained 
Stupidly good . . .  
(461-65) 
 
Perhaps more significantly, while God acknowledges that Eve’s charms are real indeed, he 
admonishes Adam that she was made 
 
. . . lovely to attract 
Thy love, not thy subjection, and her gifts 
                                                          
54 For the former argument, see for instance Le Comte: “It is reason versus passion, and reason loses” (Edward 
Le Comte, Milton and Sex, 97). 
55 Brodwin observes the continuity with Milton’s Maske on this point. See, however, her qualification of the 
seemingly virtuous potential of such stupefaction (“Milton and the Renaissance Circe,” 60). Satan has a very 
similar reaction to a cherub in PL 4.846-47: “. . . abashed the devil stood, / And felt how awful goodness is.” 
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Were such as under government well seemed, 
Unseemly to bear rule, which was thy part 
And person, hadst thou known thyself aright.  
(10.152-156) 
 
Similarly, Raphael responds to Adam’s speech in book 8 on the subject of his helplessness in the face 
of Eve’s allure by sternly reminding him of his own responsibility to discriminate her beautiful 
“outside” (568) from the inner qualities of “just and right” (572) that he possesses, and which he must 
know to be superior. If Adam were to “esteem” (572) himself rightly, and “weigh” (570) his attributes 
against those he finds so seductive in Eve, “The more she will acknowledge thee her head, / And to 
realities yield all her shows” (574-75).56 The ideas expressed here are compatible with an Aristotelian, 
or intellectualist account of akrasia (we think again of the practical syllogism, and the vulnerability of 
perceptual knowledge to the demands of the appetitive drives), but also emphasise that choice, 
especially before the Fall, is not negated by the experience of passion, and that Adam has a moral and 
spiritual obligation to obtain the self-knowledge necessary to govern himself appropriately, before 
heaping blame on Eve.57  
The emphasis placed by both Raphael and God on the importance of self-knowledge, of 
knowing “thyself aright” (10.156), moreover, speaks to some of the complexities of akrasia in 
Milton’s particular brand of reformed theology. In the Maske, as we have seen, choice – even the 
possibility of akratic choice – is a necessary entailment of the freedom that allows man to reject sin 
and accept God’s grace. In contrast to Eve’s diligent narration of her dream, however, Adam refuses 
to acknowledge his own akratic tendencies, and is unable, therefore, to “know . . . [himself] aright.” 
Indeed, one critic finds an inverted echo of Ovid’s Medea’s video meliora proboque, / deteriora 
sequor (Met 7.19-21) in Adam’s defensive claim to Raphael that “yet still free,” he is able to 
                                                          
56 The virtuosity of a “just honouring of our selves” is extolled by Milton in The Reason of Church Government 
260. 
57 Poole points out that Milton had defended himself in An Apology for Smectymnuus from charges of sexual 
incontinence on the grounds of his “self-esteem, either of what I was or what I might be” (Milton and the Idea of 
the Fall, 151; Apology for Smectymnuus, 304). Milton would thus seem to posit a negative relationship between 
incontinence or akrasia and self-esteem. 
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“Approve the best, and follow what I approve,” and suggests that for this reason “we do not share his 
confidence.”58 As it turns out, despite Raphael’s warning not to confuse Eve’s natural attractiveness 
with the desire that is kindled in him – “accuse not nature she hath done her part” (8.561) – Adam will 
do exactly this as he attempts to justify his decision to share Eve’s fate:  
 
So forcible within my heart I feel 
The Bond of Nature draw me to my own,  
My own in thee, for what thou art is mine.59 
(9.955-57)  
 
Knoespel argues that these words “recall [Ovid’s] Narcissus: hic, quid diligitur, vellem diuturnior 
esset; / nunc duo concordes anima moriemur in una (‘I would he that is loved might live longer; but 
as it is we two shall die together in one breath’) (4. 471-73),” and thus ensure the continuation of a 
trope that is most explicitly introduced by Milton in Book 4 of Paradise Lost, with the account of 
Eve’s encounter with her own image in a pool, an image for which she nearly “pined with vain desire” 
(466) shortly after her creation.60 Indeed, Knoespel implicates Adam in the narcissistic drama that 
envelops the couple at this earlier point, noting that Adam’s words to Eve as she flees him, “Return 
fair Eve, / Whom fly’st thou? Whom thou fly’st, of him thou art” (4.481-82), bear a striking 
resemblance to “Narcissus’ plea to his image when it suddenly disappears in the water before him.”61 
On one reading, Adam’s narcissistic identification with Eve is an inevitability. The line “He 
for God only, she for God in him” (4.299), as well as the “voice” (467) which instructs Eve to turn 
from her reflection in the water and to gaze more fruitfully upon Adam instead, since “he / Whose 
                                                          
58 Douglas Bush, “Ironic and Ambiguous Allusion in Paradise Lost,” The Journal of English and Germanic 
Philology 60, no. 4 (1961): 639. 
59 As Tilmouth notes, Adam here “reverts to simply conceding the irresistible pull of passion, ‘So forcible’ now 
that it has become not a ‘link’ but a ‘bond of nature’ (9.955-56)” (Passion’s Triumph, 199). 
60 Kenneth J. Knoespel, “The Limits of Allegory: Textual Expansion of Narcissus in Paradise Lost,” Milton 
Studies 22 (1986): 94. 
61 Ibid., 89. Bush suggests alternatively that the mythological allusion at play here is the speech of Ovid’s 
Apollo as he chases Daphne (in which case, Milton may imitate Spenser’s pro-marital deployment of the myth 
in the Amoretti, as discussed in the previous chapter) but draws a similar conclusion to Knoespel: “Milton’s 
brief but clear echo of Ovid contributes to making his lines the germ, no more, of the extravagant avowal of 
idolatry in 8.521-59, where Adam is on the way toward letting Eve usurp his own proper place and come 
between him and God” (“Ironic and Ambiguous Allusion,” 638).  
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image thou art, him thou shalt enjoy / Inseparably thine” (471-73) draws out the divinely sourced lines 
of correspondence that bind the couple through their creation in imagine dei, a bond that is both 
metaphysical and physical, as Adam’s account in book 8 of Eve’s creation from his “left side” (465) 
confirms. Yet from the moment of our first sighting of the pair in Eden, Milton’s narrator is at pains to 
stress that they are “not equal, as their sex not equal seemed” (4.296), and thus not equivalent. This is 
lost on Adam, whose induction that Eve is “myself / Before me” from his quite accurate observation 
that the first woman is “Bone of my bone, flesh of my flesh” (8.495) evidences a particularly 
dangerous kind of myopia that may account for the Circean “uxoriousness” of which he is often 
accused. In psychoanalytic terms, we could say that Adam channels his impression of Eve through his 
own highly idealised self-image until, after the Fall, she becomes “a projection of his own ego, an 
abstraction ‘to enjoy’ (1032).”62 The “charmed” stupor into which Adam falls in Eve’s presence could 
therefore be understood as narcissistic in origin – Narcissus too, sick with self-desire “Astraughted 
like an ymage made of Marble stone . . . lyes.”63  
In depicting Adam thus, Milton sets up another correspondence, this time with company we 
might rather the first man did not keep. In Book 4, Satan greets the angels Ithuriel and Zephon, sent 
by Gabriel to watch over Adam and Eve in Eden, with the following proud speech: 
 
Know ye not then said Satan, filled with scorn, 
Know ye not me? Ye knew me once no mate 
For you, there sitting where ye durst not soar; 
Not to know me argues yourselves unknown 
   (827-30) 
 
                                                          
62 Ulreich, “‘Sufficient to Have Stood,’” 41. My argument here is indebted to the work of Knoespel, but also to 
Regina M. Schwartz, Remembering and Repeating: Biblical Creation in Paradise Lost (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), who follows James W. Earl, “Eve’s Narcissism,” Milton Quarterly 19, no. 1 (1985): 
13-16, in using a psychoanalytic paradigm to analyse the trope of narcissism in Milton’s poem. 
63 Golding, Metamorphosis, 3.521-4. According to Aquinas, moreover, “Every sinful act proceeds from an 
inordinate desire for some temporal good. Now the fact that anyone desires a temporal good inordinately is due 
to the fact that he loves himself inordinately” (ST I-II, Q.77, Art. 4). In these terms, Adam’s excessive desire for 
Eve originate from his “inordinate” self-desire. 
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As Knoespel finds, “even when forced to recognize his present deformed shape Satan continues to be 
attracted to the idea he conceived of himself in Heaven. Like Narcissus, who continues gazing 
expectantly at his shape in Hades (504-05), Satan continues to love his false image in Hell.”64 The 
issue of Satan’s narcissistic love for his own, as opposed to God’s image, is of course sin and death. 
Sin reminds her father that she was born “Likest to thee in shape and countenance bright,” and that “. . 
. familiar grown, / I pleased” (2.761-62) until Satan  
 
Thyself in me thy perfect image viewing 
Becam’st enamoured, and such joy thou tookst  
With me in secret, that my womb conceived 
A growing burden. 
(764-67) 
 
Schwartz finds a brilliant corollary for this incestuous phenomenon in modern psychoanalytic theory: 
 
Doubling is the spatial form of temporal repetition, and its source, according to both Freud 
and Otto Rank, is narcissism. In Satan’s refusal to confront a genuine Other – for such an 
Other would be an insult to the grandeur of the all-encompassing Self – he reproduces only 
projections of the Self. Like all regressive tendencies, narcissism has as its goal “the attempt 
to return to a state in which subject and object did not yet exist, to a time before that division 
occurred out of which the ego sprang,” to a time when Self and Other were combined in an 
internal love union. Thus, we might expect narcissism ultimately to lead back to the womb. 
But Freud would see this return as a regression to a state even earlier – the state of non-being 
                                                          
64 Knoespel, “The Limits of Allegory: Textual Expansion of Narcissus in Paradise Lost,” 83. The subject of 
Satan’s narcissism has been treated extensively in the scholarship on Paradise Lost, and my discussion of the 
matter here will therefore be brief. 
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prior to birth. This becomes the ultimate return; for disguised attempts to restore the original 
state of non-being. As the classical myth tells it, narcissism leads to death.65 
 
Beyond the love child of Satan and Sin, we might think here of the morbidity inherent in Adam’s 
response to Eve’s Fall in Book 9, as he declares 
 
. . . I with thee have fixed my lot, 
Certain to undergo like doom, if death 
Consort with thee, death is to me as life;  
So forcible within my heart I feel 
The bond of nature draw me to my own, 
My own in thee, for what thou art is mine; 
Our state cannot be severed, we are one, 
One flesh; to lose thee were to lose myself. 
   (9.952-59) 
 
As I have suggested, in Milton’s poem and in the exegetical tradition more widely, Eve is 
also implicated in Satan’s deathly narcissism. In Paradise Lost, this identification is most damningly 
apparent in the temptation scene of book 9, but also in the Circean parallels between Eve and Sin that 
are set up through allusions to the Scylla myth in book 2 of Paradise Lost, and in the recasting of Eve 
as a female Narcissus drawn to her own “smooth watery image” (4.480) in book 4 of the poem. This 
latter scene, however, merits further scrutiny. While we are told that Eve “bent down to look” at her 
reflection (4.460) – a movement of some significance, given the relationship between posture and 
man’s position relative to the “creeping” (Gen. 1.26) beasts in the scale naturae – her ears prove to be 
                                                          
65 Schwartz, Remembering and Repeating, 99. Schwartz cites John T. Irwin, Doubling and Incest/Repetition and 
Revenge: A Speculative Reading of Faulkner (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1975), 43. See also 
Otto Rank, The Double: A Psychoanalytic Study, trans. Harry Tucker, Jr. (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1971); Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. James Strachey, vol. 17 (London: The Hogarth Press, 1919), 217-256. 
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as receptive as her eyes to sense impressions, allowing her to hear the voice of God which leads her 
away and effects, as Knoespel has argued, “a separation of Eve from her physical image.”66 If Eve 
approaches the pool with “unexperienced thought” (4.457), moreover, she leaves it having learned a 
valuable lesson: heeding the “voice” which “warned” (467) her of the self-limited nature of the 
“sympathy and love” (465) her reflection proffers,67 she transitions through something akin to Lacan’s 
mirror stage.68 This results, initially, in disappointment – Adam proves  
 
. . . less fair, 
 Less winning soft, less amiably mild,  
Than that smooth watery image, 
(4.478-80) 
 
but within this reaction is an acknowledgement of difference that Adam, who does not seem to move 
past the state described in psychoanalytic discourse as primary narcissism, never quite attains.69  
Eve, of course, is far from infallible, and is perhaps more easily misled by Satan in book 9 
than she is guided to the right course of action by God in book 4, where – however momentarily – she 
does look back from Adam towards the fairer image she had seen in the pool (480). Despite her 
                                                          
66 Knoespel, “The Limits of Allegory,” 98. An echo of the Puritan commonplace, “Faith comes from hearing” 
(Romans 10:17), may be intended here. Milton’s sense of the central ambivalence, yet necessity of the sense 
impressions to human moral and spiritual experience might be inferred from the poet’s juxtaposition of this 
moment – together with his later, bardic description of the muse bringing poetry “Nightly to my ear” (9.47) – 
with Satan’s positioning “. . . close at the ear of Eve” as he seeks to abuse “The organs of her fancy” (4.800; 
802) in the dream temptation.  
67 Knoespel notes that in the narcissus pool scene in PL “Milton gives special meaning to the narrator’s 
intervention in the Latin story, but critics continue to base discussions on a comparison of Eve and the figure 
before her image. By stressing deception rather than warning, critics transform the fable into a passive rather 
than active narrative. Eve’s weakness, rather than [her heeding of] the divine source of correction, is stressed” 
(ibid., 80). 
68See Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function,” in Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2006), 74-81. Fowler, Paradise Lost, 247, suggests a possible allusion here to 
Porphyry’s commentary on Homer’s cave and water in De Antro Nympharum, which would endow the “liquid 
plain” (4.455) into which Eve gazes with further, Neoplatonic associations (briefly, Eve’s search for her own 
image in the water might be understood as representative of a descent into material creation, her recognition of 
herself – with the aid of the divine voice – as a “second-order” image being a necessary stage in her ascent to 
knowledge of a “higher” form of beauty). 
69Knoespel, “The Limits of Allegory,” 94, argues that “even though Adam has a conceptual awareness that 
differences exist between himself and Eve, it remains passive and unarticulated.” 
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acknowledgement of Adam as her “. . . guide / And head,” (4.442-43), with two simple words, “Lead 
then,” (9.631) she allows Satan to replace her “Pre-eminent . . . / . . . consort” (4.447-48). As Revard 
adroitly puts it, during her temptation she “[abdicates] the rule of reason for the rule of the Serpent.”70 
Post-fall, moreover, while both Adam and Eve are forced to confront an ontological, as well as an 
epistemic difference in their alienation from God,71 the correspondence between Eve and Sin, who “in 
power,” (existing as potential) before the Fall, is “once actual,” or once committed,72 “now in body” 
(10.587) – and namely, in Eve’s body – is firmly cemented. An important counter-argument against 
critical efforts to establish Satan, Sin and Eve as a narcissistic triad is however made by Collett, who 
posits that “by using parallel myths, Milton has implicated Eve, but he wants the difference between 
Satan and Eve to be recognized as clearly as the similarity.”73 Indeed, while Eve’s infection by sin 
brings death, death is secondary to life, and it is “substantial life” (4.485) as the “Mother of human 
race” (475) that Eve is promised by the voice she chooses to heed at the pool, which draws her gaze 
from the “watery gleam” (461) of her own image to the less visually spectacular prospect of Adam. 
The outcome of this scene directly opposes Eve’s experience to that of Sin upon the birth of her son, 
an event greeted by another “echo” that by contrast ossifies any potential for the character’s growth 
beyond allegorical abstraction and subjects her to a kind of perpetual narcissistic agony, devoid of 
choice:  
 
                                                          
70 Stella P. Revard, “Milton’s Dalia and Eve: Filling in the Spaces in the Biblical Text,” in Arenas of Conflict: 
Milton and the Unfettered Mind, ed. Kristin Pruitt McColgan and Charles W. Durham (London: Associated 
University Presses, 1997), 278. 
71 As the couple were forewarned, “God hath pronounced it death to taste” (4.427) the fruit of the tree of 
knowledge. After the Fall, Adam and Eve’s mortality is confirmed: “For dust thou art, and shalt to dust return” 
(10.208). Humankind’s increased distance from divine truth, now available only in mediated forms, is indicated 
by Adam’s speech at 9.1080-84:  
 
. . .How shall I behold the face 
Henceforth of God or angel, erst with joy  
And rapture so oft beheld? Those heavenly shapes  
Will dazzle now this earthly, with their blaze 
Insufferably bright. 
72 Secundum in peccato est post concupiscentiam, ipsa mala action, seu malefactum ipsum quod actuale 
peccatum vulgo nominant (“The second thing in sin after concupiscence is the evil action itself or the evil deed 
itself, which people commonly name actual sin”), CD 425.  
73 Collett, “Milton’s Use of Classical Mythology,” 92. 
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 . . . I fled, and cried out Death; 
 Hell trembled at the hideous name, and sighed 
 From all her Caves, and back resounded Death. 74 
     (2.787-79) 
 
Milton’s founding of the difference between the experiences of Eve and Sin upon their seeming 
commonality is legitimised by the poet’s manipulation of well-established tropes of biblical typology, 
most obviously the Protoevangelium that is revealed in Book 3: Christ is “Made flesh, when time 
shall be, of Virgin seed, / By wondrous birth” (284). Indeed, it has been argued that the voice which 
draws Eve from the waters of the pool, the voice which she later struggles to discern from the 
“meditated guile” (9, “Argument”) of Satan, both in her dream and in the temptation proper, 
foreshadows the popular trope in Marian literature of conceptio per aurem.75 However this may be, 
Eve’s eschatological destiny demands that she parts ways from the “self-enfolded desire” of the 
Satanic triad,76 and it is at this moment in Milton’s work that she most clearly does so.  
The importance of the separation process that Eve undergoes at this early point only fully 
emerges after the Fall. The difference which Eve is forced to acknowledge between herself and Adam 
may, to a certain extent, provoke the rupture which precipitates her transgression: her suggestion that 
they should “divide our labours” (9.14) working separately but together to tame the garden’s 
“luxurious” (9.209) overgrowth insists on difference as essential to God’s work.77 Yet while the 
outcome of Eve’s solo venture is grave indeed, in the aftermath of her transgression the same 
                                                          
74 Martz finds another continuation of the Narcissus theme here: “the repetition is a characteristic device of 
Ovidian rhetoric: thus at the end of the story of Narcissus and Echo we find a similar matching of words at the 
ends of the lines” (Milton, Poet of Exile, 216).  
75 Kent R. Lehnhof, “‘Impregn’d with Reason’: Eve’s Aural Conception in Paradise Lost,” Milton Studies 41 
(2002): 38–75; Knoespel notes that “like the voice of Gabriel that brings fruitful tidings to Mary, the voice of 
God brings fertility to Eve” (“The Limits of Allegory,” 87). 
76 Grossman, Authors to Themselves, 45. Grossman argues that Milton’s unholy trinity of Satan, Death and Sin 
represents “the antithesis of the divine propagation of holy love in the emanation of desire for and through 
others” (ibid.). 
77 Brodwin neglects to mention, in her argument for Eve’s induction of “ennervating idleness” in Adam, that 
before the Fall she is presented by Milton as markedly industrious. The spiritual significance of Eve’s naming of 
the flowers (an extra-Biblical privilege) is discussed by McColley, and establishes a suggestive link to Circe’s 
use of herbs to make her pharmakon (Diane McColley, “Eve and the Arts of Eden,” in Milton and the Idea of 
Woman, ed. Julia M. Walker (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 104). 
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difference that prompts her separation from Adam also enables a vital dialecticism or reciprocity in 
their relationship, and it is through such reciprocity that the couple’s loss is partially repaired.78 Eve’s 
desperate desire to spare Adam from the consequence of their mutual sin leads her to 
 
 . . . importune heaven that all 
The sentence from thy head removed may light 
 On me, sole cause to thee of all this woe, 
    (10.933-35), 
  
Shoaf notes of this moment that 
 
the willingness of Eve . . . to dual for Adam, to take his place (vicariously), even though – no, 
precisely because – she is not Adam, is evidence of the redeeming and the redeemable in her. 
To take the place of another in this context is to sacrifice oneself for another. It is not to usurp 
the privilege of another – that is what Eve wanted to do when Satan seduced her. It is rather to 
give oneself up, to hand oneself over, on behalf of another. This vicariousness, the structure of 
mutuality, is the love necessary for the translation from flesh into Word, and, as such, it is the 
foundation of Christianity, the founding decision of Christ . . . . And this is why, of course, 
Milton presents him, in the speech in which he duals for Eve, in the role of the Priest – “in 
this golden censer, mixed / With incense, I thy priest before thee bring” (11.24-25).79  
 
This last quote presents an interesting transmutation of our theme: one of the many associations that 
Christ’s “golden censer, mixed” may bear, as my discussion of anti-Papal propaganda in previous 
                                                          
78 The role Eve plays in the couple’s repentance, upon which, as I have argued in the previous chapter the 
acceptance of God’s grace depends, has been well documented by critics such as Joan S. Bennett, “Dalia, Eve, 
and the ‘Concept of Woman’ in Milton’s Radical Christian Humanism,” in Arenas of Conflict, ed. Pruitt et al., 
251–60; Grossman; Tilmouth; Lieb; Schwartz; and R. A. Shoaf, Milton, Poet of Duality: A Study of Semiosis in 
the Poetry and the Prose (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993), and can only be summarised here.  
79 Shoaf, Milton, Poet of Duality, 55. 
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chapters has signalled, is the image of Circe’s charming cup. I would argue that it is Eve’s capability 
to engage with another as other which eventually separates the first mother from Satan, and redeems 
her character from the decidedly negative “Circean” attributes she is seen to possess in Book 9.  
 
Chaos 
The final part of this chapter will rely on an understanding that Eve’s charm might well be considered 
Circean, yet Circean in a way that moves beyond the Satanic attributes most prominent in the scenes 
that anticipate the Fall. The power Eve has to effect redemptive as well as sinful action in Adam, and 
indeed all future mankind associates her, like Homer’s Circe, with the pharmakon, and with the 
notion of free will that I have argued is at the heart of Milton’s Circean ideology. Yet Eve provides 
only one of many opportunities for choice in Paradise Lost, for both men and angels. As with the 
Maske, a search for any positive Circean force in Paradise Lost must take into account the poem’s 
wider metaphysical claims, particularly, I will argue, those that underlie Milton’s portrayal of Chaos. 
It must be noted at the outset that the ontological and moral status of Milton’s chaos in Paradise Lost 
has been subject to longstanding and ongoing critical debate.80 Ultimately, this controversy may stem 
from the conflicting ideas about the abyss that can be found in the scriptural and classical sources 
Milton had at hand for his perusal. The accounts of chaos held to be most influential include Plato’s 
discussion of the chōra in his Timaeus (48e4), and the contrasting Biblical presentations of the 
generative abyss of Genesis 1:1-2 and the hellish abyss of the book of Revelation. For our purpose 
here, however, it is enough to note that Milton’s Chaos allows for a multitude of interpretations. Yet 
while there has been an upsurge more recently in readings of Milton’s chaos as good or neutral, many 
critics still have difficulty in reconciling Milton’s statement in De Doctrina Christiana that “original 
matter was not an evil thing, nor . . . worthless: it was good, and it contained the seeds of all 
subsequent good . . . a confused and disordered state at first . . . [that] afterwards God made . . . 
                                                          
80 For a summary of the different interpretative positions that have been taken, see Mary F. Norton, “‘The Rising 
World of Waters Dark and Deep’: Chaos Theory and Paradise Lost,” in Arenas of Conflict, ed. Pruitt et al., 140. 
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ordered and beautiful” (293) with the darker, personified Chaos that they find in Paradise Lost.81 At 
least one recent scholar, moreover, has sought to revive the thesis that Paradise Lost features an 
inherently evil chaos. Scrutinising the claims that Schwartz, the critic in question makes, may aid us 
in understanding why, and how Milton’s text could be said to enable this (mis)reading.  
In the Tetrachordon, Milton had contemplated whether there might be “any way possible to 
limit sin, to put a girdle about that Chaos . . .” (160). For Schwartz, this statement aligns more closely 
with the “poetic” treatment of Chaos in Paradise Lost than with the more orthodox view of first 
matter that is presented by Milton in De Doctrina Christiana.82 As we shall see, in Paradise Lost, an 
associative, as well as more strictly narrative relationship is established between Satan, Sin and 
Chaos, the cumulative effect of which for Schwartz is that “the inference of an evil chaos [is] so 
difficult to escape that it is not worth trying.”83 Schwartz’s position here is grounded upon a 
theologically conservative analysis of the particular qualities associated with Milton’s chaos, 
including limitlessness and excess, together with a damning interpretation of the special relationship 
that Satan seems to enjoy with Chaos at key junctures in the poem. I will return at a later point to the 
first charge, in which Milton’s portrayal of Eve’s “excess” is also implicated. As with the Circean 
qualities that Eve is seen to possess at the moment of her pivotal encounter with Satan, if we are to 
disentangle Chaotic from Satanic excess in Paradise Lost, the affinity that Schwartz and others have 
found between Satan and Chaos in Milton’s work must first be unpicked.  
Like other critics who argue for an “evil” chaos in Paradise Lost, Schwartz, presumably for 
the sake of consistency, elides the metaphysical properties of Milton’s chaos with its spokesman the 
Anarch, an allegorical personage who declares that “havoc and spoil and ruin are my gain” (2.1009). 
Quite correctly, Schwartz notes that “the only encounter Chaos has in the poem is with Satan, whose 
                                                          
81 Danielson suggests that Milton’s assertion in the CD stands in direct opposition to the “meonic tradition, of 
which the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is an outgrowth,” which stipulates that “being is essentially good, 
nonbeing essentially evil, and that “all created things, because it is out of nothing that they are created, 
accordingly retain a necessary element of nihility and are metaphysically evil in more than the merely technical 
sense of ‘less good than the Good’” (Milton’s Good God, 40). For an analysis of Milton’s contrary belief in 
creatio ex deo, see J. H. Adamson, “Milton and the Creation,” The Journal of English and Germanic Philology 
61, no. 4 (1962): 756–78. 
82 Schwartz admits that “Milton the theologian is as emphatic and unambiguous as he could be on the subject of 
a good chaos” (Remembering and Repeating, 8). A related sense of surprise may be registered by Rumrich, who 
remarks of Milton’s chaos that “logically it should not be evil, yet the narrative and aesthetic evidence against it 
looks damning” (John Rumrich, Milton Unbound (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 144). 
83 Schwartz, Remembering and Repeating, 11. 
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journeys through the abyss – at his fall from heaven, en route to tempt man, and upon returning to hell 
to announce his victory – make it familiar territory.”84 Her conclusion that “needless to say, such dark 
missions also colour chaos by association” demands closer scrutiny, however.85 For Schwartz, in fact, 
the relationship between Chaos and Satan in Paradise Lost is one of more than mere “association.” 
Her argument posits a natural sympathy between the inherently belligerent and destructive qualities of 
the Anarch and the fallen angels, and suggests at its furthest point a willed involvement on the part of 
Chaos in Satan’s mission to militarily undermine the ordered sanctity of heaven in Book 2, and to 
destroy the good in God’s creation more widely.86 Undeniably, this interpretation has a certain 
attractiveness: as Fallon observes, it provides a “sense of a fund of evil existing prior to Satan’s sin 
[which] can satisfy our instinctive demand that actions be motivated, a demand frustrated by the 
mystery of radical evil.”87 It is also however, in certain critical ways, a misreading of Milton’s text. 
It is noteworthy that a personified, as opposed to primeval, Chaos is first introduced in the 
poem at a moment of great Satanic significance, the unfurling in Hell of “the imperial ensign” (1.536) 
by Azazel, “a cherub tall” (1.534) who is positioned provocatively at Satan’s right hand side.88 This 
act, through which the “arch-enemy” (1.81) wilfully establishes a dominion that is properly God’s, 
forms a link in the poem’s chain of prideful self-raisings, to which Eve’s tasting of the fruit of the tree 
of knowledge also belongs. More immediately, Satan’s raising of the flag provokes a reaction of 
cosmic magnitude:  
 
. . .the universal host upsent 
A shout that tore hell’s concave, and beyond 
                                                          
84 Ibid., 19. 
85 Ibid. Schwartz’s position, which renders the Anarch and the chaotic entity that God enlists in his work of 
creation virtually synonymous, has not gone unchallenged. While some critics have indeed viewed Chaos as a 
monolithic entity, others have sought to split off the personified Anarch from chaos qua chaos in Milton’s 
poem: see for instance Rumrich, Milton Unbound. The argument I make here falls into the latter camp, but calls 
for greater attention to be paid to the particularities of the Anarch’s allegorical presence in Paradise Lost. 
86 The suggestive parallels between the presentation of Chaos’s belligerent qualities and the fallen angels’ 
military coup are presented by Schwartz, ibid., 26-7. Schwartz ties these similarities to a “wider cosmogonic 
conflict,” drawn ultimately from the apocryphal notion of a “primordial battle” between God and the abyss at 
the moment of creation, which she argues is “tacit in Milton’s epic.” 
87 Fallon, Milton among the Philosophers, 191. 
88 Azazel’s orientation here may be seen to parody that of Christ, who we will encounter later in the poem seated 
to the right of God (3.62). 
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Frighted the reign of Chaos and old Night. 
(1.541-43) 
 
Syntactically, “the Reign of Chaos” is introduced as the indirect, secondary object of a clause which 
gives only slight indication of the direction in which Milton will develop his portrait of the despot 
who holds sway over the deep. From this point forth in the poem, however, the figure gains increasing 
personified life until it would seem that “Chaos’s actions demonstrate that he apprehends and can 
generate and enact order; he is obviously not simply the passive prima materia whose domain is 
‘Encroacht on’ (2.1001) for God’s use in creation.”89 The narrative timing of this initial introduction, 
moreover, may not be incidental. The first allusion to the Anarch Chaos follows close on the heels of 
a foundational act of Satanic self-assertion: like Sin, born from Satan 
 
when at the assembly, and in sight 
Of all the seraphim with thee combined 
In bold conspiracy against heaven’s king, 
(2.749-51)  
 
the Anarch is born into the poetic narrative as Satan’s rebellious insubordination to God’s authority is 
brought to a point of dramatic intensity.  
It is puzzling that Schwartz makes no mention of this, given the keen attention that we have 
seen her pay elsewhere in her work to the narcissistic impulses that govern Satanic relationships in 
Paradise Lost. Indeed, within the psychoanalytic framework that is invoked in the later chapters of 
her book, the Anarch Chaos might be understood, no less than Sin or Death, to be a narcissistic 
projection of some of the more tyrannical, or megalomaniacal tendencies that are born of Satan’s 
monstrous self-desire, yet experienced as other. As Fletcher writes, “for allegorical heroes life has a 
                                                          
89 Norton, “‘The Rising World of Waters Dark and Deep,’” 147. In Hesiod’s Theogony, Chaos is in fact the 
mother of Night (Theogony 123). In the Platonic tradition, moreover, Chaos is usually gendered female. That 
Milton’s Anarch is male may be another indication that he is, as I will argue, an aspect or projection of Satan. 
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segmented character, and as each event occurs a new discrete characteristic of the hero is revealed . . . 
The allegorical hero is not so much a real person as he is a generator of other secondary personalities 
which are partial aspects of himself.”90 Such a “hero” or, in this case, antihero, “will generate a large 
number of other protagonists who react against or with him in a syllogistic manner.”91 In this sense, 
the Anarch is a strawman, a proxy for Satan’s eternally undefeated and undefeatable foe – God 
himself. In his provision of “the shock / Of fighting elements” (2. 1014-15) through which Satan 
makes his journey and mock agon,92 Chaos resists, or “tamely endure[s]” (1028) the Arch-fiend just 
enough to maintain the momentum of the thirst for strife that emanates from his narcissistic wound – a 
wound that originates, perhaps, from the Satanic dread of a “lower deep” (4.76) of exclusion and 
difference, and spurs the character’s compulsion to destroy that good which he cannot “subdue” 
(4.85). Importantly, Chaos’s deific attributes reflect the same limited understanding of what it is to be 
God-like that underpins Satan’s own aspiration, much as Satan’s generation of Sin and Death presents 
a perverse parody of the divine acts of creation. As Shawcross observes, “in the allegoric 
understanding of things supplied by Chaos, we recognize an obverse to God and what he is and what 
he connotes.”93 It is noteworthy that the techniques of parody and inversion which Milton uses most 
extensively to undercut Satan’s claims to rival his maker in the poem also encroach upon the far 
briefer characterisation of the Anarch in Paradise Lost.94 Where ‘Chaos Umpire sits’ (II: 907), God 
bequeaths to humankind “within them as a guide, / My Umpire Conscience” (3.194-5), the Latinate 
delay in the syntax of the former clause of the second quotation expressing its disjunction from and 
distortion of the latter. With remarkable economy, the echo also hints at the relationship between 
tyrannical legalism (to which for Milton, as we have seen, an inner, guiding conscience that embraces 
faith and charity is opposed) and personification, a mode of allegory that through its Satanic 
                                                          
90 Fletcher, Allegory: The Theory of a Symbolic Mode, 35. 
91 Ibid. 
92 In his passage through Chaos, Satan, we are told, was “more endangered, than when Argo passed / Through 
Bosporos betwixt the jostling rocks” (2.1018-19). See Apollonius Rhodius, Argonautica, 2.317, 552-611.  
93 John T. Shawcross, “Allegory, Typology, and Didacticism: Paradise Lost in the Eighteenth Century,” in 
Enlightening Allegory: Theory, Practice and Contexts of Allegory in the Late Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries, ed. Kevin Lee Cope, AMS Studies in the Eighteenth Century, no. 18 (New York: AMS Press, 1993), 
63. 
94 For a discussion of the parodic elements of Satan’s generation of Sin and Death in Paradise Lost, see Victoria 
Khan, "Allegory, the Sublime, and the Rhetoric of Things Indifferent in Paradise Lost," in Creative 
Imagination: New Essays in Renaissance Literature in Honor of Thomas M. Greene (Binghamton, NY: 
Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1992), 185-201. 
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association proves perhaps even more suspect in Paradise Lost than at any previous point in Milton’s 
literary output.95  
As Rumrich notes, while “from an Augustinian, ontological-moral perspective privation has 
also a moral significance indicating something that ought to be a certain way but, to some degree, is 
not – a willful deviation from or perversion of what the maker has ordained,” “because Chaos and 
Night have never been created, there is nothing that they ‘ought’ to be. Moral privation – evil – is 
something that they are incapable of, unless we were to assume that they could resist God’s decision 
to create out of their realm . . . . Nor is there ever a hint that they could decline or resist.” Thus, “the 
factitious attitudes of allegorical characters do not qualify as ethical lapses.”96 Understanding the 
Anarch in this way reroutes the “evil” Schwartz would attribute to Chaos back to its source: Satan 
himself. Like the other shadowy personages of Paradise Lost, Sin and Death, any agency we might 
wish to attribute to the chaotic despot proves in the final analysis “illusory”: as Fallon would have it, 
“like all mirages, the evil Chaos disappears when we get too close to it.”97 The Satanic attributes that 
Milton’s narrative projects onto the wrathful Anarch should not, therefore, unduly influence our 
understanding of the function that chaos qua chaos serves in the poem. Though this argument may 
seem radical, it confirms the intuitions of other recent writers who have grappled with the relationship 
between Satan and chaos in Paradise Lost. Rumrich’s careful analysis, for instance, finds that “except 
when his narrative tracks Satan or his children, Milton never describes chaos in terms of war.”98 In the 
absence of Satan’s directing gaze, in fact, the very nature of Chaos’s narrative presence in Milton’s 
poem can be seen to change. Chaos’s allegorical attendants, 
 
                                                          
95 Hoerner writes of “the complicity of allegory with the wrath of law” (Fred Hoerner, “‘Fire to Use’: A 
Practice-Theory Approach to Paradise Lost,” Representations 51 (1995): 104), while Fallon suggests that by the 
time of his writing of Paradise Lost, allegory had become for Milton “an ideal vehicle for presenting deficient 
ontology” (Milton Among the Philosophers, 192). For a more extended discussion of the significance of 
allegorical presentation in Paradise Lost than space will here allow, see also Gallagher, “‘Real or Allegoric’”; 
Grossman, Authors to Themselves; Michael Murrin, The Allegorical Epic: Essays in Its Rise and Decline 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Arnold Stein, Answerable Style (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1967). 
96 John Rumrich, “Of Chaos and Nightingales,” in Living Texts: Interpreting Milton, ed. Kristin A. Pruitt and 
Charles W. Durham (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 2000), 223. 
97 Fallon, Milton among the Philosophers, 191. 
98 Rumrich, Milton Unbound, 127. 
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Orcus and Ades, and the dreaded name  
Of Demogorgon; Rumour next, and Chance,  
And Tumult, and Confusion, all embroiled,  
And Discord with a thousand various mouths  
    (2.964-67) 
   
either slip from the poem entirely or reappear, apart from Chaos, in other Satanic contexts: it is telling 
that when we next encounter Discord, she has become the adopted “Daughter of Sin” (10.707). 
Strikingly, however, it is not the actively belligerent or vengeful aspects of the Anarch who 
bids Satan “Go, and speed” (2.1008) on his diabolical quest that prove most worrying to Schwartz. 
Her deepest anxiety is reserved for his “indeterminacy,” a point on which she is unequivocal: 
“Indeterminacy – I think again of the unstable visage of the Anarch, Chaos – may well pose a greater 
threat in Milton’s moral universe than the Satanic one of a definite willed disobedience.”99 Schwartz 
suggests that such indeterminacy is Satanic, invoking “Satan’s protean nature – clouded angel, good 
cherub, toad, cormorant, serpent,”100 yet interestingly, perhaps the greatest threat posed by the 
Anarch’s instability is to Satan himself. If, through a process of narcissistic identification Chaos takes 
on the attributes of Satanic desire, the Anarch also reflects the fallen angel’s deepest fears. Upon the 
“throne / Of Chaos” (2.959-60) sits an “Anarch old, / With faltering speech and visage incomposed” 
(988-89), an image of decay and disarray that could hardly fail to disturb one who possesses, despite 
himself, “the bitter memory / Of what he was, what is, and what must be / Worse” (4.24-25). 
Schwartz herself falters, I would suggest, because the element of flux that the Anarch incorporates is, 
in a strict sense, unallegorical, and reaches more deeply into the poetic and philosophical texture of 
Paradise Lost than her argument will admit. If we permit it, however, the visage of the Anarch may 
serve as a portal through which to venture beyond the allegorical trappings of Milton’s poem to the 
more metaphysical chaos that is at its heart, a chaos that, as I will argue, is premised on a Circean 
notion of choice. 
                                                          
99 Schwartz, Remembering and Repeating, 18. 
100 Ibid., 10. 
225 
 
 
 
Milton’s Circean Chaos 
 
Paradoxically, it is the same difference that Satan seeks to evade that chaos, as an entity beyond 
allegory, fosters in Paradise Lost. Chaos, in fact, may be the ultimate “other,” an 
 
Illimitable ocean without bound, 
Without dimension, where length, breadth, and height, 
And time and place are lost. 
   (2.891-93) 
 
Far from threatening Milton’s moral universe, however, such difference or indeterminacy can be seen 
to condition the very possibility of such a universe.101 Schwartz’s argument for the “evil” nature of 
chaos struggles to compete against the conflicting evidence presented by none other than God himself 
in the poem: 
 
Boundless the deep, because I am who fill 
Infinitude, nor vacuous the space. 
Though I uncircumscribed myself retire, 
And put not forth my goodness, which is free 
To act or not, necessity and chance 
Approach not me, and what I will is fate. 
(7.168-73) 
                                                          
101 While my argument here owes much to Danielson, Rumrich and Lieb, who have drawn attention to the 
importance of antithesis and dialecticism in the metaphysical presentation of Paradise Lost, the continuation and 
development of some of the key tenets of Milton’s Circean poetics in the Maske, as explored in the previous 
chapter, should also be evident here. 
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As Danielson who finds “a remarkable case for the consistency of Chaos with divine omnipotence” in 
Paradise Lost notes, “the deep is boundless only because God himself is boundless and free, if he 
chooses, to place certain limits on himself for the sake of putting forth what amounts to a vast ocean 
of potentiality.”102 The withdrawal of Godly direction from the realm of chaos need not, in Milton’s 
poem equate to the evil of privation: chaos originates from God and will, despite his retirement, 
always be a part of God, “because I am who fill / Infinitude” (168-89). This same withdrawal, 
however, creates a space within the poem’s moral and spiritual ontology that allows Milton to redeem, 
as far as he was perhaps ever able, the tragedy of the akratic rebellion of the will in Eden from a 
theology of utter pessimism: 
 
…I made him just and right, 
Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall. 
Such I created all the ethereal powers  
And spirits, both them who stood and them who failed; 
Freely they stood who stood, and fell who fell. 
(3.98-102) 
 
Importantly, such freedom is not only available to man at the moment of his temptation, but 
governs the entire metaphysical framework of Paradise Lost, upon which the success of the poem 
itself might be said to stand or fall. While in theological terms, it is clear that the origin of choice for 
Milton is God’s love, its mythopoetic locus in Paradise Lost proves to be chaos. It is precisely 
because Milton’s chaos is no place that it can be every place: “The womb of nature and perhaps her 
grave” (2.910-11). The regenerative and creative uses to which chaos is put by both God and man in 
Milton’s poem have been discussed at length elsewhere, and need not be rehearsed here, except to 
note with Kaufmann that the moral and metaphysical possibility inherent in chaos is brought to bear 
                                                          
102 Danielson, Milton’s Good God, 48. 
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also upon Milton’s Eden, where the Deep is “that abyssal reservoir which rose up in the Garden as 
mist or fountain, and which signified the intimate union between the closed space of Eden’s enclave 
and the infinite possibilities of the abyss. . . . the threat as well as the promise of flux.”103 Like Eve, 
chaos is premised in Paradise Lost as a vital partner in God’s creative activity – if the abyss had not 
“heard his voice” (7.221), as Eve heard the divine voice by the pool which brought her to Adam, the 
world would not have come to be. Rumrich’s argument that while “Eve’s ‘fruitful Womb’ represents 
chaos on the human level,”104 her “very richness of adornment – her cosmetic excess” also ties her “to 
the irrational wildness of chaos,”105 is particularly interesting, moreover, given Milton’s use of the 
Circean trope in his presentation of our first mother. Like Eve, Chaos “embodies two possibilities: one 
productive and one destructive,” and like Milton’s Circean Eve, the possibilities inherent in chaos, 
once freed from the shackles of the Satanic Anarch, can be seen to serve in the poem at a wider, 
cosmological level as a kind of pharmakon. As Danielson has argued, in Paradise Lost 
 
God in creation actualizes possible goods that exist in Chaos in a state of mere potentiality; 
and man, if he obeys God, will be creative and free after the pattern that God has thus set for 
him. However, in the preactual abyss of Chaos there are evil possibilities as well, and likewise 
man’s freedom to create and enjoy is accompanied by the possibility of destruction and self-
enthrallment. As Aristotle says in his section on actuality and potentiality . . . “Every potency 
is at the same time a potency of the opposite.”106 
 
Given the prominence of this relationship between potentiality and choice in Paradise Lost, 
and the symbolic strength for Milton of the Circean pharmakon, it should therefore seem no accident 
that Satan’s journey through Chaos has reminded several critics of Odysseus’s sea voyage in Homer’s 
epic – indeed, Milton compares the arduousness of the fallen angel’s way to “when Ulysses on the 
                                                          
103 U. Milo Kaufmann, Paradise in the Age of Milton, English Literary Studies 11 (Victoria: University of 
Victoria, 1978), 15. 
104 Rumrich, Milton Unbound, 133. 
105 Ibid., 138. 
106 Danielson, Milton’s Good God, 49.  
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larboard shunned / Charybdis, and by the other whirlpool steered” (2.1019-1020). As we have seen, 
Aristotle uses Odysseus’s passage between Scylla and Charybdis to illustrate his notion of the golden 
mean: Milton’s Satan, despite his heroic posturing, is anything but temperate, and it is therefore 
reasonable to assume that a certain amount of irony is intended here. Yet as Lewalski has observed, in 
Milton’s Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, as in De Doctrina Christiana, readers are referred to 
Homer for a correct understanding of the nature and capacity of human free will.”107 In the same vein, 
Van der Laan makes a strong case that in Paradise Lost, Milton “uses the Odyssey to press an 
Arminian point against Calvinist orthodoxy,” since “by thinking in Odyssean terms, he argues not just 
for the operation, but for the necessity of moral effort in salvation.”108 For Satan, the antithesis of all 
this effort implies, “Which way I fly is hell; myself am Hell” (4.75). Chaos, assuming a guiding role 
not unlike that of Circe to Odysseus as he journeys onward from her island, leaves Satan’s ability to 
choose unimpaired and accordingly delivers him to an Eden from which he can derive no joy: “If that 
way be your walk, you have not far” (2.1007). The qualifier “if,” with its suggestion of a multitude of 
walks and choices, once again links the moral terrain of Paradise Lost to its physical geography. 
 Chaos, we are earlier informed, is 
 
Of neither sea, nor shore, nor air, nor fire, 
But all these in their pregnant causes mixed 
Confusedly . . . 
(2.912-14) 
 
Schwartz is quite correct that the “mixtures and confusions” of Chaos “violate all laws of sanctity,” if 
we follow the Biblical insistence on the necessity and goodness of divisions and distinctions in God’s 
                                                          
107 Lewalski, “The Genres of Paradise Lost,” 119.  
108 Van der Laan, “Milton’s Odyssean Ethics: Homeric Allusions and Arminian Thought in Paradise Lost.” We 
might think here of Adam and Eve’s debate preceding their separation in Book 9. Rehearsing an idea familiar 
from Milton’s Areopagitica, Eve asks “And what is faith, love, virtue unassayed / Alone, without exterior help 
sustained?” (335-36). 
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creation.109 Yet for Milton, as we have seen, mixtures and confusions are intrinsic to the fallen world. 
This is a world that is not itself inherently evil, and whose compound nature, “those confused seeds 
that were impos’d on Psyche as an incessant labor to cull out and sort asunder” (Areopagitica 310), 
serves the important function of both enabling and testing man’s capacity for moral choice and 
spiritual growth. Such choice, attendant on free will, is in Milton’s theology a vital marker of God’s 
continued love for man, and of divine hope for our redemption in Christ. Like both God and chaos, 
moreover, it is “uncircumscribed” (7.171): it is precisely because grace, as Rumrich finds, is 
“undeniably excessive” that there can be in the end no “way possible to limit sin, to put a girdle about 
that Chaos . . .” without disabling the dialecticism upon which Christian eschatology itself relies.110 
For Milton, as for all but the most wistful of Christian dreamers, the state of innocence that Adam and 
Eve enjoyed in Eden before the Fall is forever lost to postlapsarian mankind. Yet Milton also held that 
through knowledge – true knowledge of ourselves, gained from lived experience of the world around 
us, in partnership with faith, moral endeavour, and God’s freely given grace – we might inherit an 
inner spiritual life somewhat richer than that of the continent, Reformed believer: a veritable “paradise 
within” (12.587).
                                                          
109 Schwartz, Remembering and Repeating, 17; 11-13. 
110 Rumrich, Milton Unbound, 140.  
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Conclusion 
 
My thesis looks at poetry and early modern poetics, but in the works of the authors I discuss – men 
who were writing under the wing of a broader European humanist tradition – poetics necessarily 
broaches the fields of moral philosophy, theology, and even epistemology. My thesis argues that the 
departures from traditional allegorical treatments of Circe in certain strands of English and European 
literature of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries could contribute to our understanding of the 
intellectual history of this era. By examining the employment of this myth in relation to the 
theological, and ethical concerns of Spenser and Milton in particular, I have shown that there is still 
much to uncover in terms of the transmission, reception and reworking of ancient ideas in the early 
modern period. It should be noted that if the prominence of the Circean pharmakon in Milton’s work 
owes much to the peculiar logic of his theology, it also hearkens nostalgically to the older idea of a 
nature still replete with divine immanence. Milton’s presentation of chaos in Paradise Lost forges a 
link between moral and spiritual possibility and the natural world that would seem fundamentally 
antithetical to the notion of a mechanistic nature that had been pioneered by Bacon et al., and had seen 
perhaps its most sophisticated philosophical treatment in the work of Milton’s contemporary, 
Hobbes.1 
The longevity of the Circean trope in Renaissance literature, however, testifies both to the 
endurance of this older understanding of man’s place in the world, and to the very real threat that 
those who would “make a kind of dead and wooden world, as it were a carved statue, that hath 
nothing neither vital nor magical at all in it” could seem to pose to a centuries-old, humanistic 
tradition of intellectual and artistic freedom.2 We might think here of Milton’s insistence that Adam 
must necessarily have been permitted by God to transgress, else he would have been a mere 
                                                          
1 According to Adamson, this belief is already present in Milton’s adherence to an ex Deo view of creation: “the 
ex Deo theory, more than the ex nihilo, emphasizes the immanence of God in creation. Thus the corollary of the 
ex Deo theory of creation is a theory of deiform nature, one which is most radically opposed to a mechanistic 
nature” (“Milton and the creation,” 776). 
2 Ralph Cudworth, The True Intellectual System of the Universe, ed. Thomas Birch (New York: Gould & 
Newman, 1837), 209-10. 
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automaton: an “artificiall Adam, such an Adam as he is in the motions” (Areopagitica 319). For 
Milton, “the end . . . of Learning is to repair the ruines of our first Parents” (Of Education 277), and 
such reparation, both in the sense of restoring and repenting for what has been lost, entails 
confronting, rather than running from our baser inclinations. Thus, in the Areopagitica he asks 
“Wherefore did . . . [God] create passions within us, pleasures around us, but that these rightly 
temper’d are the very ingredients of vertu?” (319), and remarks that 
 
I cannot praise a fugitive and cloister’d vertue, unexercis’d & unbreath’d, that never sallies 
out and sees her adversary, but slinks out of the race, where that immortall garland is to be 
run for, not without dust and heat. Assuredly we bring not innocence into the world, we bring 
impurity much rather: that which purifies us is triall, and triall is by what is contrary. That 
vertue therefore which is but a youngling in the contemplation of evill, and knows not the 
utmost that vice promises to her followers, and rejects it, is but a blank vertue, not a pure; her 
whitenesse is but an excrementall whitenesse. (311) 
 
Trial “by what is contrary,” however, is not without its dangers, and although I have given a generally 
favourable impression of Milton’s refashioning of Circean lore in support of his devotion to Christian 
liberty, this is not unqualified. 
 In his Eikonoklastes, Milton’s figure for political tyranny is none other than the “Circean cup 
of servitude,”3 and it is clear that the poet of Paradise Lost, like Spenser before him, knew the 
pharmakon as both a poison and a cure. Across Milton’s corpus, the uncertainties of this world are 
pitted against his unwavering faith in the next, and we may wonder, in the end, how much store he 
really set by man’s transformative potential in this life. In Paradise Regained, after all, Jesus responds 
to Satan’s temptation to repossess the kingdom of “Rome’s great emperor,” and thereby end the 
tyranny of his rule, by asking  
                                                          
3John Milton, Eikonoklastes, in Works, vol. 3, 488. 
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What wise and valiant man would seek to free 
These thus degenerate, by themselves enslaved, 
Or could of inward slaves make outward free?  
Know therefore when my season comes to sit 
On David's throne, it shall be like a tree 
Spreading and overshadowing all the Earth, 
Or as a stone that shall to pieces dash 
All monarchies besides throughout the world,  
And of my kingdom there shall be no end. 
   (4.81; 143-51) 
 
Earthly power is thus renounced by Jesus for the spiritual kingdom over which he is destined to 
preside. Milton’s political and theological perspectives on Christian liberty are brought together with 
Circean allusion once again in his Samson Agonistes, where Dalila’s “fair enchanted cup, and 
warbling charms” are scornfully renounced by Israel’s “deliverer.”4 This is not without cost, however. 
Samson’s successful destruction of the temple realises both the Lady’s threat of vengeance against 
Comus in Milton’s Maske and, as my discussion in chapter 3 has suggested, its likely outcome: 
 
. . . straining all his nerves he bowed, 
 As with the force of winds and waters pent, 
 When Mountains tremble, those two massy pillars 
 With horrible convulsion to and fro 
 He tugged, he shook, till down they came and drew  
 The whole roof after them, with burst of thunder 
 Upon the heads of all who sat beneath, 
Lords, ladies, captains, counsellors, or priests, 
                                                          
4 John Milton, Samson Agonistes, in Complete Shorter Poems, ed. Carey, lines 934; 40. 
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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Samson with these immixed, inevitably 
Pulled down the same destruction on himself. 
    (1646-58) 
 
As Laura Knoppers has argued, although Samson succeeds in destroying the temple and killing the 
Philistines, the Israelites, enthralled by the spectacle of this violence, remain self-enslaved and unable 
to attain the internal, spiritual liberty he had promised.5 Like Sir Guyon’s casting down of Excesse’s 
cup and his destruction of Acrasia’s Bower in The Faerie Queene, the violence of Mosaic law collides 
with the threat of Circean slavery to dramatically powerful, yet morally ambivalent effect. This 
tension is never truly resolved in Milton’s work, and its very lack of resolution is integral to the poet’s 
meaning: it will be the task of future scholarship to determine its legacy. 
                                                          
5 Laura Knoppers, Historicizing Milton: Spectacle, Power, and Poetry in Restoration England (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 1994), 63. 
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